Benefits · Great Britain · Pension Credit take-up 2023–24 · welfare spending 2024–25

Up to £2.5bn of Pension Credit went unclaimed. Who is missing out?

Up to 910,000 eligible pensioner families in Great Britain did not claim Pension Credit in 2023–24, DWP estimates. Up to £2.5bn went unclaimed. These survey estimates cover pension-age benefits; they do not measure take-up across the whole benefits system.

Priority: Reduce hardship and access failures while assessing work incentives, disability costs and fiscal sustainability. What would change it →

Evidence last reviewed 3 October 2026

Overview

The short version

Three key measures

How much Pension Credit went unclaimed?
up to £2.5bnin 2023–24
Up to 910,000 eligible pensioner families did not claim. A survey-based estimate for one year; working-age take-up is not covered.
Great Britain · 2023–24 (financial year ending 2024)
Definition, limits and source: How much Pension Credit went unclaimed?
DWP estimates that up to 910,000 pensioner families were entitled to Pension Credit but did not claim it in 2023–24; 62% of those entitled claimed (65% the year before). One year’s survey-based estimate, not an annual amount. DWP publishes take-up only for pension-age benefits, so the working-age gap is unknown.
Official estimate · DWP, Income-related benefits: estimates of take-up, financial year ending 2024
Take-up, the benefit cap and hardship →
What share of welfare spending goes to pensioners?
54%of spending
£164.9bn of £304.6bn in 2024–25. A share of spending on pension-age benefits, not a share of claimants.
Great Britain · 2024–25 (outturn)
Definition, limits and source: What share of welfare spending goes to pensioners?
£164.9bn of £304.6bn in 2024–25 — a share of spending, not of claimants. Pensioner spending is DWP’s classification of benefits paid to people over State Pension age: the State Pension, Pension Credit, pension-age Housing Benefit, Attendance Allowance and other pension-age benefits. DWP's forecast for 2025–26 is 55%. The State Pension alone was £136.6bn.
Official statistic · DWP, Benefit expenditure and caseload tables 2026 (Spring Forecast 2026), GB welfare summary table
Where the money goes →
How many people on Universal Credit must look for work?
1.6mof 8.4m
People in the “searching for work” group, May 2026. 4.3 million (51%) had no work requirements, often because of ill health or caring, and 3.1 million were in paid work (April 2026).
Great Britain · May 2026
Source: How many people on Universal Credit must look for work?
Administrative data · DWP, Universal Credit quarterly statistics, 29 April 2013 to 14 May 2026, Figures 5, 8 and 9 (people by conditionality regime; employment indicator)
Support in work and out of work →

Who feels this most?

Working-age support is where changes bite hardest, because it is means-tested and depends on circumstances. Universal Credit now supports 8.4 million people, but most are not job-seekers: half have no work requirements — for example because of ill health, caring or a very young child, and 3.1 million are in paid work. Disability support is separate again — PIP covers extra costs and is not a work-status category.

The evidence

Who receives support, whether it is enough, and where it fails

Support cannot help if it never reaches people

Only 62% of those entitled to Pension Credit claimed it in 2023–24. This is a gap in access to an existing entitlement; it does not measure whether the payment is enough to live on.

Do people claim the support they are entitled to?

About 6 in 10 people entitled to Pension Credit claim it

Estimated take-up of income-related benefits among entitled pensioners, by caseload (people) and expenditure (money), Great Britain, 2023–24.

Great Britain · 2023–24 (financial year ending 2024)

Pension Credit — peopleshare of entitled people who claimed62%
Pension Credit — moneyshare of the available amount claimed71%
Housing Benefit (pensioners) — people85%
Housing Benefit (pensioners) — money87%

Take-up by money is higher than by people because those with larger entitlements are more likely to claim. Up to 910,000 pensioner families missed out on Pension Credit, about £2,600 a year each on average. The fall in the money measure from 78% was statistically significant; the fall in the people measure was not. Missing out on Pension Credit can also mean missing help that it unlocks.

Great Britain · 2023–24 (financial year ending 2024) · Official statistics from the Family Resources Survey linked to DWP records; estimates have ranges

Sources, definitions and data

Geography:: Great Britain — Pensioner benefit units entitled to each benefit
Measure:: Per cent take-up
Period:: 2023–24 (financial year ending 2024)
Status:: Official statistics from the Family Resources Survey linked to DWP records; estimates have ranges
Calculation:: As published (central estimates).
Compare with:: 2022–23: Pension Credit 65% (people), 78% (money)
Not included / breaks:: Working-age benefits (Universal Credit) are not covered by DWP’s take-up statistics. Survey-based, so entitlement is modelled from reported income and savings.

Source: DWP, Income-related benefits: estimates of take-up, financial year ending 2024 (released 30 October 2025). Chart BEN-09.

View the data as a table

Measure	2023–24
Pension Credit — people	62%
Pension Credit — money	71%
Housing Benefit (pensioners) — people	85%
Housing Benefit (pensioners) — money	87%
Pension Credit: families entitled but not claiming (up to)	910,000
Pension Credit: unclaimed (up to)	£2.5bn
Housing Benefit (pensioners): unclaimed (up to)	£1.1bn

DWP does not publish an equivalent take-up estimate for Universal Credit. Explore take-up, the benefit cap and hardship →

Who receives what, and why?

“Benefits” are not one programme. The largest share of the money goes to people over State Pension age, mainly through the State Pension itself, which is paid on National Insurance contributions rather than need. The rest supports disability, low pay, housing, caring and children — and, for a minority, people looking for work.

Who does welfare spending go to?

Pensioners receive 54% of welfare spending in Great Britain

Share of expenditure (not of claimants) on welfare in Great Britain, 2024–25 outturn and DWP’s 2025–26 forecast, split into the source’s two mutually exclusive groups: people over State Pension age, and people of working age and children. Cash terms.

Great Britain · 2024–25 (outturn); 2025–26 (forecast)

2024–25 · outturn · total £304.6bn

54%

46%

Pensioners: 54% (£164.9bn)
Working age and children: 46% (£139.7bn)

2025–26 · DWP forecast · total £322.7bn

55%

45%

Pensioners: 55% (£177.7bn)
Working age and children: 45% (£145.0bn)

Pensioners received £164.9bn of the £304.6bn spent on welfare in Great Britain in 2024–25. That majority is not new: the pensioner share has been above half in every year since 1978–79, between 52% and 56% since 2000, and DWP forecasts about 55% by 2030–31. It measures money, not people — many more working-age people receive something, often smaller amounts.

Great Britain · 2024–25 (outturn); 2025–26 (forecast) · Accredited official statistics; 2024–25 is outturn, 2025–26 a forecast for the year just ended

Sources, definitions and data

Geography:: Great Britain — All GB welfare: DWP benefits plus Child Benefit, tax credits and other HMRC welfare
Measure:: Share of expenditure (%), with £ billion
Period:: 2024–25 (outturn); 2025–26 (forecast)
Status:: Accredited official statistics; 2024–25 is outturn, 2025–26 a forecast for the year just ended
Calculation:: Each group’s spending ÷ total GB welfare × 100 (UK Facts calculation from the published £ figures; the two groups sum to the total).
Compare with:: Pensioner share in every year since 1978–79: between 50% (1995–96) and 59% (1978–79)
Not included / breaks:: Northern Ireland runs its own system and is excluded. DWP does not separate spending on children: Child Benefit and the child elements of Universal Credit sit in “working age and children”. Disability benefits are split by age (PIP mostly working age; Attendance Allowance pension age); pension-age Housing Benefit and Pension Credit count as pensioner spending. One person can receive several benefits, so these are shares of money, not of people.

Source: DWP, Benefit expenditure and caseload tables 2026 (Spring Forecast 2026), GB welfare summary table (released April 2026). Chart BEN-01.

View the data as a table

Financial year	Pensioners (£bn)	Working age and children (£bn)	Total (£bn)	Pensioner share	Status
2005–06	75.4	67.0	142.4	52.9%	Outturn
2006–07	77.9	69.4	147.3	52.9%	Outturn
2007–08	83.2	72.9	156.1	53.3%	Outturn
2008–09	90.4	79.9	170.3	53.1%	Outturn
2009–10	96.6	90.2	186.8	51.7%	Outturn
2010–11	100.3	93.3	193.6	51.8%	Outturn
2011–12	104.2	95.6	199.8	52.2%	Outturn
2012–13	109.9	97.4	207.3	53.0%	Outturn
2013–14	110.7	93.3	204.0	54.3%	Outturn
2014–15	114.1	94.2	208.3	54.8%	Outturn
2015–16	116.2	94.6	210.8	55.1%	Outturn
2016–17	117.7	94.0	211.8	55.6%	Outturn
2017–18	119.4	95.2	214.5	55.6%	Outturn
2018–19	121.6	95.7	217.3	56.0%	Outturn
2019–20	123.8	97.4	221.2	56.0%	Outturn
2020–21	125.8	113.5	239.3	52.6%	Outturn
2021–22	128.9	110.5	239.3	53.8%	Outturn
2022–23	133.2	112.0	245.3	54.3%	Outturn
2023–24	150.9	126.4	277.3	54.4%	Outturn
2024–25	164.9	139.7	304.6	54.1%	Outturn
2025–26	177.7	145.0	322.7	55.1%	Forecast
2026–27	186.8	156.0	342.8	54.5%	Forecast
2027–28	191.9	160.9	352.8	54.4%	Forecast
2028–29	197.6	165.7	363.3	54.4%	Forecast
2029–30	207.3	171.6	378.9	54.7%	Forecast
2030–31	217.5	178.0	395.5	55.0%	Forecast

Scroll the table sideways to see every column.

Which benefits does the money go on?

The State Pension is 47% of DWP benefit spending; Universal Credit 23%

Spending on the largest individual DWP benefits, Great Britain, 2024–25, £ billion, cash terms. The bars are separate benefits and, with the remainder, add up to the £289.3bn Table 1a total.

Great Britain · 2024–25 (outturn)

State PensionRetirement£136.6bn
Universal CreditLow income, housing, children, unemployment, ill health£66.7bn
Personal Independence PaymentExtra costs of disability (working age)£25.9bn
Housing BenefitRent (mostly pensioners and remaining legacy cases)£15.5bn
Employment and Support AllowanceIllness or disability that limits work£12.3bn
Attendance AllowanceExtra costs of disability (pension age)£7.8bn
Disability Living AllowanceExtra costs of disability (children; older legacy cases)£7.7bn
Pension CreditLow income in retirement£6.0bn
Carer's AllowanceCaring£4.2bn
All other DWP benefitsJobseeker’s Allowance, Winter Fuel Payments, maternity, bereavement and others£6.6bn

One benefit, the State Pension, accounts for £136.6bn — more than Universal Credit, PIP and Housing Benefit combined. Universal Credit is the second largest and is still growing as people move across from older benefits. Disability-related payments are spread across several lines (PIP, Attendance Allowance, DLA, ESA and the health element of Universal Credit), which is why “disability spending” totals differ depending on what is counted.

Great Britain · 2024–25 (outturn) · Accredited official statistics, outturn

Sources, definitions and data

Geography:: Great Britain — DWP benefits only (excludes HMRC Child Benefit and tax credits)
Measure:: £ billion, cash terms
Period:: 2024–25 (outturn)
Status:: Accredited official statistics, outturn
Calculation:: As published (£ million ÷ 1,000). “All other DWP benefits” = the Table 1a total minus the nine named benefits (£6.6bn).
Compare with:: Total DWP benefit expenditure £289.3bn
Not included / breaks:: This total (£289.3bn) is smaller than the GB welfare total in BEN-01 (£304.6bn) because it leaves out welfare paid by HMRC — Child Benefit and the last tax credits. Universal Credit covers several needs in one payment (living costs, housing, children, ill health), so it cannot be split by need from this table.

Source: DWP, Benefit expenditure and caseload tables 2026 (Spring Forecast 2026), Table 1a, expenditure by benefit (released April 2026). Chart BEN-01b.

View the data as a table

Benefit	Main need it meets	2024–25 (£bn)	Share of total
State Pension	Retirement	136.6	47.2%
Universal Credit	Low income, housing, children, unemployment, ill health	66.7	23.1%
Personal Independence Payment	Extra costs of disability (working age)	25.9	8.9%
Housing Benefit	Rent (mostly pensioners and remaining legacy cases)	15.5	5.3%
Employment and Support Allowance	Illness or disability that limits work	12.3	4.3%
Attendance Allowance	Extra costs of disability (pension age)	7.8	2.7%
Disability Living Allowance	Extra costs of disability (children; older legacy cases)	7.7	2.7%
Pension Credit	Low income in retirement	6.0	2.1%
Carer's Allowance	Caring	4.2	1.5%
All other DWP benefits	Various	6.6	2.3%
Total (Table 1a)		289.3	100%

Scroll the table sideways to see every column.

Why the bill has grown, and why the pensioner share has stayed steady rather than climbing: where the money goes. How the State Pension is uprated is covered on the State Pension page.

Who feels this most?

Does receiving Universal Credit mean someone is out of work?

1.6 million of 8.4 million people on Universal Credit must look for work

People on Universal Credit by DWP conditionality regime (the work-related rules attached to their claim), Great Britain, May 2026. Millions of people.

Great Britain · May 2026

People on Universal Credit, May 2026 · outturn · total 8.4m

51%

19%

30%

No work requirements: 51% (4.3m)
Searching for work: 19% (1.6m)
Four other groups: 30% (2.5m)

Half of everyone on Universal Credit (51%) has no work requirements — for example people assessed as too ill to work, carers and parents of very young children. That group has grown as 1.7 million people moved across from older benefits, many from Employment and Support Allowance. The group required to look for work is 1.6 million. Separately, 3.1 million people on Universal Credit (37.7%) were in paid work in April 2026: receiving support does not tell you whether someone works.

Great Britain · May 2026 · Official statistics (administrative data)

Sources, definitions and data

Geography:: Great Britain — People on Universal Credit (claimants and partners)
Measure:: Millions of people
Period:: May 2026
Status:: Official statistics (administrative data)
Calculation:: “No work requirements” (4.3m) and “searching for work” (1.6m) as published; “four other groups” (working with requirements, working with no requirements, planning for work, preparing for work) = 8.4m − 4.3m − 1.6m, a UK Facts calculation from rounded totals (±0.1m).
Compare with:: “Searching for work” peaked at 2.4 million in March 2021
Not included / breaks:: A benefit rule category is not the ILO unemployment measure, and Universal Credit is not all benefit recipients (State Pension, PIP and others are separate). 35% of people in “searching for work” had some earnings in April 2026, because low earners can be placed there. PIP is not a work-status category at all.

Source: DWP, Universal Credit quarterly statistics, 29 April 2013 to 14 May 2026, Figures 5, 8 and 9 (people by conditionality regime; employment indicator) (released 18 August 2026). Chart BEN-02.

View the data as a table

Group	People (millions)	Share
No work requirements	4.3	51%
Searching for work	1.6	19%
Four other groups (calculated)	2.5	30%
All people on Universal Credit	8.4	100%
In any paid employment (April 2026; overlaps the groups above)	3.1	37.7%

The five numbers most often swapped for one another — and what each counts: support in work and out of work.

Fraud, error and viral claims

DWP estimates 3.2% of benefit spending was overpaid in 2025–26: fraud 2.2%, claimant error 0.6%, official error 0.4%. Separately, 0.4% was underpaid. These are sample estimates, not counts of convictions.

Fraud and error, by benefit, with claim checks →

Shareable visual summary

Visual summary

Image held

The image is not offered for download or sharing until the reasons below are resolved. The chart here is drawn from today’s records.

Most welfare spending goes to pensioners.

Pensioners received 54% of Great Britain’s £304.6bn welfare spending in 2024–25. Separately, 3.1 million Universal Credit claimants were in paid work in April 2026. A share of spending, not of claimants.

Pensioners’ share of Great Britain welfare spending, 2024–25

54%

Share of money, not of people: State Pension, Pension Credit, pension-age Housing Benefit, Attendance Allowance and other pension-age benefits.

Separately: Universal Credit claimants in work, April 2026

37.7%

Why the supplied image is held

Prints 2.7 MILLION; the current record is 3.1m for April 2026 (People on Universal Credit in employment)
Prints 32%; the current record is 37.7% for April 2026 (Share of Universal Credit claimants in employment)
The image shows 2.7 million (32%) in work in December 2025. DWP’s newer release gives 3.1 million (37.7%) in April 2026 on a wider definition that includes self-employment.

Text and data version

Most welfare spending goes to pensioners. Pensioners received 54% of Great Britain’s £304.6bn welfare spending in 2024–25. Separately, 3.1 million Universal Credit claimants were in paid work in April 2026. A share of spending, not of claimants.

Records behind this visual summary
Measure	Value	Period	Geography	Type	Source
Pensioners’ share of Great Britain welfare spendingCalculation: Pensioner welfare spending ÷ total GB welfare spending × 100 (cash, outturn)	54%	2024–25	Great Britain	derived calculation	DWP, Benefit expenditure and caseload tables 2026, GB welfare summary table
People on Universal Credit in employment	3.1m	April 2026	Great Britain	administrative count (provisional)	DWP, Universal Credit statistics
Share of Universal Credit claimants in employment	37.7%	April 2026	Great Britain	administrative count (provisional)	DWP, Universal Credit statistics

All visual summaries, their source records and their publication state are listed on Shareable visuals.

Go deeper

Who receives what, and why?

+61.5%1996-97–2024-25Great Britain · £bn (2026/27 prices)

91.1 → 147.11996-97–2024-25

Working-age and child welfare spending, inflation adjusted. Observations only; forecasts excluded.

Sources and data

Great Britain welfare as defined in DWP's benefit expenditure tables: DWP benefits plus non-DWP welfare (HMRC Child Benefit, tax credits, Tax-Free Childcare and similar). Pensioners and "people of working age and children" are the source's two mutually exclusive groups; DWP does not split Child Benefit or the child elements of Universal Credit out as spending on children. Excludes Northern Ireland. Latest years are forecasts.

Source dataset →

Period	£bn (2026/27 prices)	Status
1996-97	91.1	Outturn
1997-98	89.46	Outturn
1998-99	88.57	Outturn
1999-00	90.26	Outturn
2000-01	94.13	Outturn
2001-02	96.69	Outturn
2002-03	99.28	Outturn
2003-04	111.57	Outturn
2004-05	113.92	Outturn
2005-06	115.07	Outturn
2006-07	115.61	Outturn
2007-08	119.08	Outturn
2008-09	125.83	Outturn
2009-10	140.24	Outturn
2010-11	142.64	Outturn
2011-12	143.11	Outturn
2012-13	143.39	Outturn
2013-14	134.55	Outturn
2014-15	133.94	Outturn
2015-16	133.59	Outturn
2016-17	130.18	Outturn
2017-18	130.05	Outturn
2018-19	127.84	Outturn
2019-20	126.82	Outturn
2020-21	140.41	Outturn
2021-22	136.39	Outturn
2022-23	129.22	Outturn
2023-24	138.47	Outturn
2024-25	147.13	Outturn

Spending by benefit and by need, and what drives the bill.Read the chapter →

Pensioners and uprating: what does the State Pension cost?

+84.1%1996-97–2024-25Great Britain · £bn (2026/27 prices)

94.4 → 173.71996-97–2024-25

Pensioner welfare spending, inflation adjusted; broader than the State Pension.

Sources and data

Source dataset →

Period	£bn (2026/27 prices)	Status
1996-97	94.36	Outturn
1997-98	97.79	Outturn
1998-99	100.47	Outturn
1999-00	105.33	Outturn
2000-01	110.52	Outturn
2001-02	116.27	Outturn
2002-03	117.82	Outturn
2003-04	120.5	Outturn
2004-05	125.42	Outturn
2005-06	129.35	Outturn
2006-07	129.83	Outturn
2007-08	135.99	Outturn
2008-09	142.38	Outturn
2009-10	150.25	Outturn
2010-11	153.43	Outturn
2011-12	156.02	Outturn
2012-13	161.7	Outturn
2013-14	159.58	Outturn
2014-15	162.23	Outturn
2015-16	164.08	Outturn
2016-17	162.96	Outturn
2017-18	163.15	Outturn
2018-19	162.5	Outturn
2019-20	161.23	Outturn
2020-21	155.67	Outturn
2021-22	159.06	Outturn
2022-23	153.64	Outturn
2023-24	165.3	Outturn
2024-25	173.69	Outturn

Covered on the Pensions pages, not repeated here.Read the chapter →

Support in work and out of work3.1 million people on Universal Credit are in paid work; 1.6 million must look for work.Five numbers that are routinely swapped for one another.Read the chapter → Support in work and out of work
Disability and extra costs: what is PIP for?PIP helps with the extra costs of disability and is paid in or out of work. 4.1 million people in England and Wales receive it.Caseload, conditions, appeals and the Timms Review.Read the chapter → Disability and extra costs: what is PIP for?
Adequacy, take-up and hardshipUp to 910,000 pensioner families entitled to Pension Credit did not claim it. Unclaimed support is a measured gap.Who misses out, and what can and cannot be measured.Read the chapter → Adequacy, take-up and hardship

Fraud, error and viral claims

+1.1percentage points2005-06–2025-26Great Britain · % of benefit expenditure

2.1% → 3.2%2005-06–2025-26

Estimated overpayments as a share of expenditure. Includes fraud and error; not all is fraud.

Sources and data

Sample-based estimates (Table 2). Fraud, claimant error and official error are separate categories that sum to the total overpayment rate. Financial year ending (FYE) 2026 = 2025-26. From FYE 2023 (2022-23) estimates previously published as claimant-error underpayments are published separately as "unfulfilled eligibility" and are no longer netted off. FYE 2022 (2021-22) was the first full State Pension review since FYE 2006; earlier State Pension fraud and claimant error used FYE 2006 rates. The benefit mix changes over time (Universal Credit replacing legacy benefits), which moves the all-benefit rate even when individual benefit rates do not change. FYE 2021 and FYE 2022 were affected by pandemic measurement changes and the surge in Universal Credit claims.

Source dataset →

Period	% of benefit expenditure	Status
2005-06	2.1	Outturn
2006-07	2.2	Outturn
2007-08	2	Outturn
2008-09	2.2	Outturn
2009-10	2.2	Outturn
2010-11	2.1	Outturn
2011-12	2.1	Outturn
2012-13	2.1	Outturn
2013-14	2.1	Outturn
2014-15	1.8	Outturn
2015-16	1.9	Outturn
2016-17	2	Outturn
2017-18	2.2	Outturn
2018-19	2.1	Outturn
2019-20	2.4	Outturn
2020-21	3.9	Outturn
2021-22	4	Outturn
2022-23	3.6	Outturn
2023-24	3.6	Outturn
2024-25	3.3	Outturn
2025-26	3.2	Outturn

Three kinds of overpayment, underpayments, and claim checks.Read the chapter →

Evidence → choices → outcomes

What could improve it?

Support in Great Britain that reaches the people entitled to it, at a level tested against the cost of essentials, paid accurately, with suitable help into work for those who can work.

These options link to their national assessment, including funding, delivery constraints and remaining uncertainties.

Assessed option · provisional
Claim what people are owed
Assisted applications for people likely to be entitled to Pension Credit.
8/10 criteria scored
Coverage of the appraisal, not an impact score.
Delivery: Amber
Whole-life costs incomplete
Evidence and delivery constraints
Unclaimed entitlement establishes a gap; effect of this outreach design is untested.
Specify eligible cohort, trusted outreach, application support and comparison group; arrange benefits-processing capacity.
Equality and opportunity list Evidence and assessment
Assessed option · provisional
A child-poverty target and essentials test
7/10 criteria scored
Coverage of the appraisal, not an impact score.
Delivery: Amber
Whole-life costs incomplete
Evidence and delivery constraints
A target does not itself reduce poverty. Modelled effects of a strategy do not establish the effect of the benchmark.
Define poverty/essentials measures, then compare specific benefit, housing-cost and service changes; assign accountability.
Equality and opportunity list Evidence and assessment
Assessed option · provisional
Offer evidence-based employment support alongside healthcare
Fidelity reviews, NHS integration and an impact evaluation inside Connect to Work.
9/10 criteria scored
Coverage of the appraisal, not an impact score.
Delivery: Amber
Whole-life costs incomplete
Evidence and delivery constraints
Trials exist, but effects differ by setting; pooled out-of-work groups showed no employment impact. Do not infer a uniform national growth effect.
Specify cohort and voluntary offer; secure clinical referrals, trained employment specialists, employer links and linked-data evaluation.
Growth and prosperity list Evidence and assessment

This domain in the UK SWOT →UK National Action Plan →

How we assessed these options

What would it take to improve this?

What would move the needle?

The outcome we want: Support in Great Britain that reaches the people entitled to it, at a level tested against the cost of essentials, paid accurately, with suitable help into work for those who can work.

The main constraint: Most spending goes to pensioners and disabled people, and take-up, adequacy and work support each trade off against cost and work incentives; HM Treasury decides what higher legitimate spending is affordable, while DWP’s processing capacity and data-sharing powers limit how fast take-up can rise.

Constraint type: money, workforce, permissions.

The options on the table

What is funded now, and the changes assessed against it — the current baseline and the alternatives, before the position today and the actions.

Claim what people are owedDelivery RAG: Amber
A child-poverty target and essentials testDelivery RAG: Amber
And 2 options assessed with another page as home.

Provisional single-reviewer assessments from the 6 October 2026 review; not approved business cases, and not government policy.

Claim what people are owedDelivery RAG: Amber
Funded now
Pension Credit and DWP take-up campaigns already exist; a targeted, evaluated outreach model is a UK Facts proposal.
The change assessed
Assisted applications for people likely to be entitled to Pension Credit.
Range if completed: 16.0–22.0 out of 30 (equal weights; not yet assessed: expected incremental benefit (Bn), incremental affordability (Co))
A child-poverty target and essentials testDelivery RAG: Amber
Funded now
Not yet stated in the record.
The change assessed
Not yet defined.
Range if completed: 12.0–21.0 out of 30 (equal weights; not yet assessed: increment beyond baseline (Ad), expected incremental benefit (Bn), incremental affordability (Co))

Assessed with another page as home

These options also bear on this topic. The full assessment sits on the home page named under each.

Health-linked work supportDelivery RAG: Amber
Home: Jobs & pay.
Funded now
Connect to Work has taken referrals since April 2025 and aims to support about 300,000 people by 2029/30; IPS also operates in NHS mental health services. The proposal here is to hold it to fidelity and integrate it with care, not to start something new.
The change assessed
Fidelity reviews, NHS integration and an impact evaluation inside Connect to Work.
Range if completed: 17.0–20.0 out of 30 (equal weights; not yet assessed: incremental affordability (Co))
Prevent avoidable loss of rented homesDelivery RAG: Amber
Home: Housing.
Funded now
Funded baseline: the 56-day prevention duty (extended to section 8 notices from 1 May 2026), the Homelessness, Rough Sleeping and Domestic Abuse Grant (£885.0m in 2026–27), the Housing Loss Prevention Advice Service and a £16m Legal Support Grant (October 2026 to March 2029). Testing a defined early-advice offer against comparison areas is a UK Facts proposal, not government policy.
The change assessed
Test early rent-arrears/legal advice and targeted assistance for a defined at-risk cohort before homelessness occurs.
Range if completed: 16.0–22.0 out of 30 (equal weights; not yet assessed: expected incremental benefit (Bn), incremental affordability (Co))

Alternatives already on record: 16 options listed under the points in the position today (6 without an action record), and 4 earlier options under other options compared. They have not been scored in the review.

The position today

What we can build on (1)
What is holding us back (2)Only 62% of people entitled to Pension Credit claimed it; up to 910,000 entitled families did not, leaving up to £2.5bn unclaimed in 2023–24 (one year’s estimate). (2023–24 (FYE 2024) · Great Britain)
What could improve things (1)Raising take-up of existing entitlements, testing whether the basic rate covers essentials and offering suitable employment support address different failures in the same system.
What could make it worse (1)

Which quadrant a point sits in is our analytical judgement, not a statistical category. Each point says whether it is a measured fact, our synthesis or a risk.

What we can build on Strengths

An established payment route: Universal Credit paid 8.4 million people in May 2026, about 3.1 million of them in work — so a change to rates or support can reach people quickly.
Measured factConfidence: High· May 2026 (people); April 2026 (in work)· Great Britain
Source: Department for Work and Pensions, Universal Credit quarterly statistics, 29 April 2013 to 14 May 2026 (Figures 5, 8 and 9 (people by conditionality regime; employment indicator))
Options assessed against this point: Claim what people are owed (Amber delivery RAG)
What government has committed to
Legislation: The Universal Credit Act 2025 sets the standard allowance for 2026–27 to 2029–30 and halves the health element for most new claims. DWP lists "rebalancing Universal Credit" among the reforms it is pursuing (1 October 2026).
Who and when:
Starmer government (to July 2026), 3 September 2025.
Since 20 July 2026:
Kept by the Burnham government. Re-stated by DWP under Pat McFadden in news on 1 Oct 2026. Source: DWP, Call for bold new ideas to support disabled people and those with health conditions into work (Body: £60m Pathways to Work Innovation Fund; list of reforms incl. "Rebalancing Universal Credit to remove the perverse incentives", "Investing £3.5 billion", "Tackling fraud and error ... saving £14.6 billion over this Parliament").
Source:
legislation.gov.uk, Universal Credit Act 2025 (c. 22) (Sections 1 (standard allowance 2026-27 to 2029-30), 2-4 (LCWRA element and protected amount))
Checked 4 October 2026. A commitment is not delivery.
Options (3)
- ShortlistedHelp eligible people claim support they already qualify for
  Uses the existing payment route to reach entitled non-claimants quickly.
  Who: DWP; councils; advice charities · Evidence: Untested proposal · Status: Site-editorial action
  Source: Department for Work and Pensions, Income-related benefits: estimates of take-up, financial year ending 2024 (Sections 1, 2 and 4)
- Set an explicit test for whether benefits cover essentials
  Uses the same payment route to deliver an adequate basic rate.
  Who: DWP; HM Treasury · Evidence: Untested proposal · Status: External proposal
  Source: Joseph Rowntree Foundation, Independent process to ensure Universal Credit covers essential costs (briefing) (Section 1 Introduction: "implement an independent, evidence-based advisory process to recommend minimum rates")
- Offer evidence-based employment support alongside healthcare
  Reaches the 3.1 million UC claimants in work and those who could work.
  Who: DWP; Connect to Work bodies; NHS · Evidence: Synthesis of robust evaluations · Status: Funded programme
  Source: Department for Work and Pensions, Connect to Work delivers for thousands more as programme expands (Body: 25,000 starts to June 2026; 4,100 job starts; full roll-out to every area July 2026; "on course to support 300,000 people by the end of the decade"; over £1bn this Parliament)

What is holding us back Weaknesses

Only 62% of people entitled to Pension Credit claimed it; up to 910,000 entitled families did not, leaving up to £2.5bn unclaimed in 2023–24 (one year’s estimate).
Measured factConfidence: High· 2023–24 (FYE 2024)· Great Britain
Source: Department for Work and Pensions, Income-related benefits: estimates of take-up, financial year ending 2024 (Sections 1 and 2)
Options assessed against this point: Claim what people are owed (Amber delivery RAG)
What government has committed to
Policy: DWP says maximising Pension Credit take-up is "a key priority". It ran a targeted-letter trial (October 2025), is building a joint pensioner Housing Benefit and Pension Credit application (July 2026), and will launch a new autumn take-up campaign in October 2026. There is no take-up target.
Who and when:
Starmer government (to July 2026), 30 October 2025.
Since 20 July 2026:
Kept by the Burnham government. Re-stated in written answer 27178 (Torsten Bell, 11 Sep 2026), including the October 2026 campaign. Source: UK Parliament written questions API, Written question 27178 (tabled 3 Sep 2026, answered 11 Sep 2026 by Torsten Bell) (Answer: "Maximising Pension Credit take-up is a key priority"; "new autumn campaign which will launch in October 2026"; data and targeted approaches).
Source:
Department for Work and Pensions, Fresh drive to boost Pension Credit take-up as new figures reveal large regional gaps (Body: trial letter to 2,000 likely-eligible pensioners with Age UK and Independent Age; take-up 71% North East vs 55% South West)
Checked 4 October 2026. A commitment is not delivery.
Options (3)
- ShortlistedHelp eligible people claim support they already qualify for, through targeted outreach that is evaluated
  Contacts likely-eligible pensioners identified from DWP data, and tests which methods raise claims.
  Who: DWP; Age UK; Independent Age; councils · Evidence: Untested proposal · Status: Pilot
  Source: Department for Work and Pensions, Fresh drive to boost Pension Credit take-up as new figures reveal large regional gaps (Body: trial letter to 2,000 likely-eligible pensioners with Age UK and Independent Age; take-up 71% North East vs 55% South West)
- Join up pensioner Housing Benefit and Pension Credit claims
  One application lowers the effort of claiming both.
  Who: DWP; councils · Evidence: Untested proposal · Status: Announced proposal
  Source: DWP, Bringing together the administration of pensioner Housing Benefit and Pension Credit (Summary: joined-up service to apply for both "to enable more pensioners to receive the benefits they are entitled to")
- Award Pension Credit automatically where DWP data show entitlement
  Removes the claim step for people DWP can already identify.
  Who: DWP; Parliament · Evidence: Untested proposal · Status: External proposal
Payments are wrong in both directions: 3.2% of benefit spending (£9.9bn) was overpaid and 0.4% (£1.2bn) underpaid in 2025–26.
Measured factConfidence: High· 2025–26· Great Britain
Source: Department for Work and Pensions, Fraud and error in the benefit system, financial year ending 2026 estimates (Reference tables 2 and 7)
What government has committed to
Policy: DWP is committed to £14.6bn of gross savings from fraud, error and debt work to 2030–31, including new powers under the Public Authorities (Fraud, Error and Recovery) Act 2025 (expected to save £1.5bn by 2029–30), Targeted Case Reviews and up to 3,000 extra staff. There is no stated target for reducing underpayments.
Who and when:
Starmer government (to July 2026), 3 December 2025.
Since 20 July 2026:
Kept by the Burnham government. Re-stated under Burnham: written answer 23509 (21 Sep 2026) and DWP news (1 Oct 2026). New: Pension Credit Claim Reviews named in the September answer. Source: UK Parliament written questions (DWP answer, Lilian Greenwood), Written question 23509: reducing fraud in the welfare system (answered 21 September 2026) (Answer: £14.6bn gross savings to 2030-31; up to 3,000 staff; Targeted Case Reviews; Pension Credit Claim Reviews; PAFER Act implementation; fraud 2.2%).
Source:
DWP, Fraudsters face tougher action as Government gains new powers to tackle benefit fraud (Body: PAFER Act Royal Assent; £1.5bn by 2029/30; £14.6bn by 2030/31; Targeted Case Review extension)
Checked 4 October 2026. A commitment is not delivery.
Options (3)
- Pay the right amount: bank-data checks and targeted case reviews
  Finds overpayments earlier, before debts build.
  Who: DWP; banks; ICO oversight · Evidence: Modelled scenario · Status: Enacted but not operational
  Source: DWP, Code of Practice on Eligibility Verification Notices (Purpose of the Code (Schedule 3B, Social Security Administration Act 1992))
- Use the same reviews to find and correct underpayments
  Case reviews that check entitlement both ways would cut the 0.4% (£1.2bn) underpaid.
  Who: DWP · Evidence: Untested proposal · Status: External proposal
  Source: DWP, Fraud and error in the benefit system: FYE 2026 estimates (Main stories: 3.2% (£9.9bn) overpaid; 0.4% (£1.2bn) underpaid)
- Help eligible people claim support they already qualify for
  Pension Credit Claim Reviews and take-up work both act on Pension Credit accuracy and entitlement.
  Who: DWP · Evidence: Untested proposal · Status: Site-editorial action
  Source: UK Parliament written questions (DWP answer, Lilian Greenwood), Written question 23509: reducing fraud in the welfare system (answered 21 September 2026) (Answer: £14.6bn gross savings to 2030-31; up to 3,000 staff; Targeted Case Reviews; Pension Credit Claim Reviews; PAFER Act implementation; fraud 2.2%)

What could improve things Opportunities

Raising take-up of existing entitlements, testing whether the basic rate covers essentials and offering suitable employment support address different failures in the same system.
Depends on: The higher legitimate spending that successful take-up brings is budgeted, any rate change is costed and funded explicitly, and employment support stays voluntary and is judged on sustained work.
Our synthesisConfidence: Moderate
Source: Department for Work and Pensions, Income-related benefits: estimates of take-up, financial year ending 2024 (Section 2); Joseph Rowntree Foundation, Independent process to ensure Universal Credit covers essential costs (briefing) (Sections 1–3); Department for Work and Pensions, Health-led Employment Trials: evaluation synthesis report (Synthesis report Table 2.1)
Options assessed against this point: Claim what people are owed (Amber delivery RAG); A child-poverty target and essentials test (Amber delivery RAG); Health-linked work support (Amber delivery RAG)
What government has committed to
Policy: Three strands are government policy: Pension Credit take-up campaigns (autumn campaign October 2026), employment support (Connect to Work, around 300,000 people by the end of the decade, and £3.5bn of support), and the fixed Universal Credit uprating path in the 2025 Act. An adequacy test is not government policy.
Who and when:
Starmer government (to July 2026), 3 September 2025.
Since 20 July 2026:
Kept by the Burnham government. Re-stated: Connect to Work (10 Sep 2026); DWP reforms list (1 Oct 2026); Pension Credit priority (11 Sep 2026). No statement on an adequacy test found. Source: Department for Work and Pensions, Connect to Work delivers for thousands more as programme expands (Body: 25,000 starts to June 2026; 4,100 job starts; full roll-out to every area July 2026; "on course to support 300,000 people by the end of the decade"; over £1bn this Parliament).
Source:
legislation.gov.uk, Universal Credit Act 2025 (c. 22) (Sections 1 (standard allowance 2026-27 to 2029-30), 2-4 (LCWRA element and protected amount))
Checked 4 October 2026. A commitment is not delivery.
Options (3)
- ShortlistedHelp eligible people claim support they already qualify for
  Raises take-up of existing entitlements.
  Who: DWP; councils · Evidence: Untested proposal · Status: Site-editorial action
  Source: UK Parliament written questions API, Written question 27178 (tabled 3 Sep 2026, answered 11 Sep 2026 by Torsten Bell) (Answer: "Maximising Pension Credit take-up is a key priority"; "new autumn campaign which will launch in October 2026"; data and targeted approaches)
- ShortlistedSet an explicit test for whether benefits cover essentials
  Independent advice on minimum rates.
  Who: DWP; HM Treasury · Evidence: Untested proposal · Status: External proposal
  Source: Joseph Rowntree Foundation, Independent process to ensure Universal Credit covers essential costs (briefing) (Section 1 Introduction: "implement an independent, evidence-based advisory process to recommend minimum rates")
- ShortlistedOffer evidence-based employment support alongside healthcare
  Voluntary IPS-style support judged on sustained work.
  Who: DWP; Connect to Work bodies; NHS · Evidence: Synthesis of robust evaluations · Status: Funded programme
  Source: Department for Work and Pensions, Connect to Work delivers for thousands more as programme expands (Body: 25,000 starts to June 2026; 4,100 job starts; full roll-out to every area July 2026; "on course to support 300,000 people by the end of the decade"; over £1bn this Parliament)

What could make it worse Threats

Hardship and error can rise when savings drive design: for most new claims from April 2026 the Universal Credit health element is about half the previous rate, and DWP’s impact assessment calls the behavioural effects the most uncertain part of its estimates.
Risk, not a certaintyConfidence: Moderate
Source: Department for Work and Pensions, Universal Credit Bill: Universal Credit rebalancing — impact assessment (pp.4 and 12 (behavioural impacts); p.9, Table 9)
Options assessed against this point: A child-poverty target and essentials test (Amber delivery RAG); Health-linked work support (Amber delivery RAG)
What government has committed to
Legislation: For most new claims from April 2026, the Universal Credit health element is about half the previous rate (Universal Credit Act 2025). DWP still describes this as "rebalancing Universal Credit to remove the perverse incentives". Separately, the Timms Review of PIP shared emerging recommendations in September 2026, must stay within OBR spending projections, and will make final recommendations "later this autumn".
Who and when:
Starmer government (to July 2026), 3 September 2025.
Since 20 July 2026:
Kept by the Burnham government. Re-stated by DWP (1 Oct 2026). Timms Review continuing under Burnham (co-chair update 9 Sep 2026); Jobs Guarantee to be extended to young people on health benefits from April 2027 (27 Sep 2026). Source: DWP, Call for bold new ideas to support disabled people and those with health conditions into work (Body: £60m Pathways to Work Innovation Fund; list of reforms incl. "Rebalancing Universal Credit to remove the perverse incentives", "Investing £3.5 billion", "Tackling fraud and error ... saving £14.6 billion over this Parliament").
Source:
legislation.gov.uk, Universal Credit Act 2025 (c. 22) (Sections 1 (standard allowance 2026-27 to 2029-30), 2-4 (LCWRA element and protected amount))
Checked 4 October 2026. A commitment is not delivery.
Options (4)
- ShortlistedOffer evidence-based employment support alongside healthcare
  Gives new health claimants a route to work, which is the stated aim of the change.
  Who: DWP; Connect to Work; NHS · Evidence: Synthesis of robust evaluations · Status: Funded programme
  Source: DWP, Thousands of young disabled people to be offered guaranteed jobs (Body: Jobs Guarantee extended to young people on health benefits from April 2027, voluntary)
- ShortlistedSet an explicit test for whether benefits cover essentials
  Provides a floor against which cuts can be judged.
  Who: DWP; HM Treasury · Evidence: Untested proposal · Status: External proposal
  Source: Joseph Rowntree Foundation, Independent process to ensure Universal Credit covers essential costs (briefing) (Section 1 Introduction: "implement an independent, evidence-based advisory process to recommend minimum rates")
- Rebalance Universal Credit and evaluate its effect on new health claimants
  Compares employment and income of post-April 2026 health claimants with earlier cohorts, so hardship is detected.
  Who: DWP; HM Treasury · Evidence: Modelled scenario · Status: Established
  Source: legislation.gov.uk, Universal Credit Act 2025 (c. 22) (Sections 1 (standard allowance 2026-27 to 2029-30), 2-4 (LCWRA element and protected amount))
- Reform how PIP is assessed (Timms Review)
  Recommendations on a fairer assessment within the spending forecast.
  Who: DWP; Parliament · Evidence: Expert or audit recommendation · Status: Announced proposal
  Source: DWP (Timms Review co-chairs), The Timms Review: co-chair update, September 2026 (Letter: emerging recommendations; must stay within OBR PIP projections; "final report later this autumn")

The actions worth examining

Our shortlist for this page. Research quality, policy status, cost and funding are judged separately; none of these is government policy unless its status says so.Our shortlist. None is government policy unless its status says so.

Help eligible people claim support they already qualify for — not yet costed / funding not identified
Set an explicit test for whether benefits cover essentials — not yet costed / funding not identified
Offer evidence-based employment support alongside healthcare — indicative costing / partial funding

Action 1A25Policy status: site-editorial action
Help eligible people claim support they already qualify for
Use lawful data matching and assisted applications to reach people likely to be entitled, then verify and pay their claims.
The thread: issue, evidence, action
1. Issue Weakness: Only 62% of people entitled to Pension Credit claimed it; up to 910,000 entitled families did not, leaving up to £2.5bn unclaimed in 2023–24 (one year’s estimate). Also: opportunity, strength
2. Evidence Pension Credit take-up (caseload)
3. Action A25, this action
Assessment (draft, 6 October review)
- This action: Claim what people are owed
  Delivery RAG: AmberGate: pending
  Range if completed: 16.0–22.0 out of 30 (equal weights; not yet assessed: expected incremental benefit (Bn), incremental affordability (Co))
  National plan: Equality and opportunity list
Who decides:
DWP, councils and advice providers (Great Britain)
Evidence:
Untested proposal. The size of unclaimed entitlement is measured; what outreach would achieve has not been evaluated here.
Expected effect:
Direction plausible; size not established.
Cost and funding
up to £2.5bn a year, 2023–24, cash (nominal) prices; 1 further cost line, some not yet costed
Funding: Not yet costed / funding not identified
Why it is shortlisted here: The take-up gap is measured and large; people are missing support they are already entitled to. Success raises legitimate spending, which must be budgeted.
What it takes
The problem
Hundreds of thousands of pensioner families entitled to Pension Credit do not claim it.
Who is affected, and where
Pensioner families in Great Britain entitled to Pension Credit who do not claim. Territory: Great Britain. Northern Ireland administers its own social security; not assessed.
Policy status
UK Facts proposal. Pension Credit and DWP take-up campaigns already exist; a targeted, evaluated outreach model is a UK Facts proposal.
The evidence
What the research found:
62% of entitled people claimed Pension Credit in 2023–24; up to 910,000 families did not claim, and up to £2.5bn went unclaimed — about £2,600 a year per family.
Evaluated on:
Pensioner families in the Family Resources Survey; Great Britain, 2023–24
Our recommendation (separate from the research):
Test targeted outreach with an evaluation before claiming any take-up effect, and budget for the extra entitlement it would pay.
Strongest counter-evidence:
Survey-based estimates can misclassify households as entitled, so a statistical estimate is not individual eligibility.
Effects on record
- Income of eligible pensioners who start claiming: Direction plausible; size not established. plausible spillover, limited confidence; Great Britain. An unclaimed family misses about £2,600 a year on average, but how many more would claim after outreach has not been evaluated.
Cost and funding
Cost completeness: Partly costed. Funding: Not yet costed / funding not identified.
- Extra Pension Credit paid if more entitled people claim (household transfer; paid by central government): up to £2.5bn a year, 2023–24, cash (nominal) prices. Up to £2.5bn went unclaimed in 2023–24: the ceiling if every entitled family claimed. Successful take-up raises spending; a realistic increase depends on what outreach achieves, which is not established.
- Outreach, data matching and assisted applications (administration; paid by central government, councils): Not yet costed. Administration by DWP, councils and advice services.
Who pays:
Central government: extra Pension Credit payments and administration; councils and advice services for assisted applications.
Financing proposed:
Benefit spending is demand-led; outreach needs an administration budget.
Gap remaining:
Outreach is not costed; extra entitlement could be up to £2.5bn a year if every entitled family claimed.
What delivery needs
Skills:
Advisers trained in Pension Credit.
Operational capacity:
DWP processing.
Infrastructure:
Data-matching systems.
Permissions:
Lawful data-sharing gateways.
Law:
Existing powers; check data-sharing basis.
Public consent:
Older people’s willingness to be contacted.
First step and stages
First step: Identify likely unmet entitlement without treating a statistical estimate as individual eligibility. (owner: DWP with councils)
1. Test outreach in defined areas — DWP and councils (proposed stage, not an official timetable)
2. Verify awards and measure retention — DWP (proposed stage, not an official timetable)
Trade-offs
Who gains and who loses:
Gains for low-income pensioners; higher spending for the Exchequer.
What else the money or effort could do:
Administration and benefit spending compete with other priorities.
Strongest counterargument:
Successful take-up raises spending; a campaign that does not reach the right people wastes money.
Risks:
Privacy, digital exclusion and contacting people who are not entitled.
How we would judge it
Baseline:
Pension Credit take-up (DWP), 62% by caseload in 2023–24.
Leading indicator:
Eligible claimants reached and successful awards.
Outcome:
Take-up by caseload and expenditure; income gains; processing time.
Continue, adapt or stop:
Continue where awards per contact beat a comparison area; stop otherwise.
Earlier option on this page
This card replaces the option “Raise take-up of support people are already entitled to” (operating: Campaigns operate; automatic award is an external proposal, not government policy.). Its evidence: DWP measures the gap (62% caseload take-up, up to £2.5bn unclaimed in 2023–24) but has not published an evaluation showing which outreach methods raise take-up, or by how much. Automatic award has not been tested in the UK for Pension Credit. DWP, Income-related benefits: estimates of take-up, financial year ending 2024
Sources
- Department for Work and Pensions, Income-related benefits: estimates of take-up, financial year ending 2024, Sections 1, 2 and 4 (2025-10-30; relevant passages checked)
- Department for Work and Pensions, Income-related benefits: estimates of take-up, financial year ending 2024, Section 4 (methodology note on housing costs) (2025-10-30; relevant passages checked)
Source published 30 October 2025; evidence reviewed 2026-10-04. Reconsider if: The next take-up release; An evaluation of a Pension Credit campaign.
Also on: Pensions — one shared record, so its cost is counted once.
Action 2A16Policy status: external proposal
Set an explicit test for whether benefits cover essentials
An independent advisory body, on the model of the Low Pay Commission, would publish evidence each year on the cost of essentials for set household types and advise on the standard allowance and deductions; ministers and Parliament would still decide.
The thread: issue, evidence, action
1. Issue Weakness (Inequality): 27.4% of children (4.0 million) were in relative poverty after housing costs, and 13% were in deep material poverty, lacking at least four of thirteen essentials. Also: threat, opportunityHow acting here reaches it: A published test of whether the basic benefit rate covers essentials sets payments against the cost of the items that deep material poverty counts children as lacking.
2. Evidence Children in deep material poverty
3. Action A16, this action
Assessment (draft, 6 October review)
- A new scope of this action (A16v2): A child-poverty target and essentials test
  Delivery RAG: AmberGate: pending
  Range if completed: 12.0–21.0 out of 30 (equal weights; not yet assessed: increment beyond baseline (Ad), expected incremental benefit (Bn), incremental affordability (Co))
  National plan: Equality and opportunity list
Who decides:
DWP and HM Treasury (rates and remit), Parliament (any legislation) (Great Britain)
Evidence:
Untested proposal. A policy proposal drawing on UK and overseas advisory bodies; no evaluation shows that such a body changes hardship, and the essentials estimates are the proposers’ own modelling.
Expected effect:
Direction plausible; size not established.
Cost and funding
Not yet costed
Funding: Not yet costed / funding not identified
Why it is shortlisted here: There is no published test of whether the basic rate covers essentials; one would make the adequacy choice and its cost explicit.
What it takes
The problem
No official benchmark says what the basic rate of Universal Credit is meant to cover; it is set by ministers at the annual uprating review and, for 2026–2030, by a fixed path in legislation, without a published comparison with the cost of essentials.
Who is affected, and where
Households on Universal Credit in Great Britain, and people entitled to it who do not claim. Territory: Great Britain. Universal Credit is legislated for Great Britain; Northern Ireland runs a parallel system and Scotland pays some devolved benefits on top (for example the Scottish Child Payment). Equivalent decisions there are not assessed here.
Policy status
Proposed by researchers or others, not government policy. A Joseph Rowntree Foundation proposal, not government policy. The Universal Credit Act 2025 (Royal Assent 3 September 2025) already sets the standard allowance on a path that ends 4.8% above inflation-only uprating by 2029–30; that is a fixed path chosen by Parliament, not a test of adequacy, and it is the baseline any option must be compared with.
The evidence
What the research found:
JRF reports that the standard allowance from April 2026 (about £98 a week for a single person aged 25 or over, £154 for a couple) is below its destitution thresholds (£105 and £160) and below the JRF/Trussell estimate of essentials (£120 and £205). It proposes an independent advisory process but does not cost the body or any change in rates.
Evaluated on:
Not evaluated. JRF compares 2026–27 Universal Credit rates with its own and Trussell’s estimates of essential costs for a single adult and a couple.; United Kingdom, 2026–27 rates
Transfer to this case:
The Low Pay Commission and New Zealand’s advisory group answer different questions; their record is not evidence that a benefits body would reduce hardship.
Our recommendation (separate from the research):
Specify the essentials basket, household types and decision rule first, then publish a distributional costing of named options against the 2025 Act baseline. UK Facts does not set its own adequacy threshold; the JRF/Trussell figures are their estimates.
Strongest counter-evidence:
An essentials basket is a normative choice, and a published benchmark creates pressure for large recurring spending that must be financed by tax, cuts elsewhere or borrowing; higher basic rates also change work incentives at the margin. JRF itself does not cost the change.
Effects on record
- Material hardship among households on Universal Credit: Direction plausible; size not established. plausible spillover, limited confidence; Great Britain. A benchmark changes nothing unless rates change; how much hardship would fall depends on the option, take-up and housing costs, none of which has been modelled here.
- Recurring benefit spending: A cost or harm; size not established. plausible spillover, limited confidence; Great Britain. Shown as a trade-off, not a benefit. The size depends on the option and has not been costed on the current baseline.
Cost and funding
Cost completeness: Not yet costed. Funding: Not yet costed / funding not identified.
- An independent advisory body on benefit adequacy (secretariat, research, consultation) (administration; paid by central government): Not yet costed. JRF does not cost the body. Comparable bodies (the Low Pay Commission, pay review bodies) are small, but their budgets are not a price for this one.
- Any change in Universal Credit rates or deductions following the benchmark (household transfer; paid by central government): Not yet costed. Must be modelled on the current caseload, take-up and interactions with housing support, against the Universal Credit Act 2025 baseline. No older campaign price tag is reused.
Who pays:
Taxpayers, through higher benefit spending (or cuts elsewhere, or borrowing); DWP for the small administrative cost of an advisory body.
Financing proposed:
None. Any rate change would need a recurring tax, spending or borrowing decision matched to a costing on the current caseload and take-up.
Gap remaining:
Unknown: it depends entirely on the option chosen. The advisory body is a small administrative cost; rate changes could be large and recurring.
What delivery needs
Skills:
Analysts able to price essentials by household type.
Operational capacity:
DWP and HM Treasury modelling of caseloads, take-up and interactions with housing support.
Infrastructure:
None beyond existing payment systems.
Permissions:
None.
Law:
A statutory body or duty would need legislation; a non-statutory panel would not.
Public consent:
Agreement on what counts as an essential; public attitudes to benefit spending.
First step and stages
First step: Specify the essentials basket, household types and the exact options to cost against the 2025 Act baseline. (owner: DWP with HM Treasury)
1. Consult on remit, basket and household types — DWP (proposed stage, not an official timetable)
2. Set up the advisory body and publish a first benchmark — DWP; Parliament if statutory (proposed stage, not an official timetable)
3. Annual report, with a published government response at the uprating review — Advisory body; DWP ministers (proposed stage, not an official timetable)
Depends on: A25: higher rates help only people who claim; Housing support (Local Housing Allowance) interacts with any change
Trade-offs
Who gains and who loses:
Gains for households on Universal Credit, largest for those with the least other income; costs fall on taxpayers or on whatever spending is cut. Rates for pensioners and disability benefits are outside this test unless its remit is widened.
What else the money or effort could do:
Money for higher rates is not available for services, employment support or debt reduction.
Strongest counterargument:
A benchmark turns a political judgement into an apparently technical one and builds in pressure for spending that may not be affordable; uprating already follows a legislated path to 2029–30.
Risks:
Basket choices contested as arbitrary; recommendations ignored, eroding trust; higher rates absorbed by rents where housing support is capped.
How we would judge it
Baseline:
Deep material poverty and food insecurity among people in low-income households (DWP Households Below Average Income).
Leading indicator:
The published gap between each household type’s rate and the benchmark.
Outcome:
Material hardship, food insecurity and income after essential costs; employment and caseload effects alongside.
Continue, adapt or stop:
Review the remit if the benchmark is not used in uprating decisions, or if hardship does not change after rates move towards it.
Sources
- Joseph Rowntree Foundation, Independent process to ensure Universal Credit covers essential costs (briefing), Briefing sections 1–3; section 2 (standard allowance against essentials) (2026-01-30; full text checked)
- legislation.gov.uk, Universal Credit Act 2025 (c. 22), Section 1(2) and 1(4) (standard allowance uplifts to 2029–30) (2025-09-03 (Royal Assent); relevant passages checked)
- Joseph Rowntree Foundation, Independent process to ensure Universal Credit covers essential costs (briefing), Section 3 (models for an independent process) (2026-01-30; full text checked)
Source published 30 January 2026 (JRF); 2025 (Universal Credit Act); evidence reviewed 2026-10-04. Reconsider if: A government response to an independent adequacy proposal; The next uprating review; A costed JRF/Trussell essentials-guarantee update.
Also on: Inequality, Inflation — one shared record, so its cost is counted once.
Action 3A09Policy status: funded programme
Offer evidence-based employment support alongside healthcare
Individual Placement and Support puts an employment specialist alongside health services to find matched work quickly and keep supporting the person once they start.
The thread: issue, evidence, action
1. Issue Weakness (Jobs & pay): 2.78 million people aged 16–64 were economically inactive because of long-term sickness, against 2.08 million at the end of 2019. Also: threat, opportunityHow acting here reaches it: Many people on health-related benefits want to work; voluntary, evidence-based employment support moves some into work, which the long-term sickness inactivity count on the employment page records.
2. Evidence Economically inactive because of long-term sickness, aged 16–64
3. Action A09, this action
Assessment (draft, 6 October review)
- This action: Health-linked work support
  Delivery RAG: AmberGate: pending
  Range if completed: 17.0–20.0 out of 30 (equal weights; not yet assessed: incremental affordability (Co))
  National plan: Growth and prosperity list
Who decides:
DWP and local authority delivery areas (Connect to Work), with NHS commissioners (England and Wales)
Evidence:
Experimental or quasi-experimental evaluation. Randomised trials of an adapted model found modest effects that varied by place; evidence is strongest for severe mental illness, a different group.
Expected effect:
+4 percentage points (22% vs 18%): working 13 or more weeks in the year after joining (out-of-work participants) (West Midlands Combined Authority). No effect for out-of-work participants in Sheffield City Region, and no effect on earnings at 12 months. 2 more results in “What it takes”.
Cost and funding
£1.03bn in total, 2025–26 to 2028–29, cash (nominal) prices; 2 further cost lines, some not yet costed
Funding: Indicative costing / partial funding
Why it is shortlisted here: Many people on health-related benefits want to work; evidence-based, voluntary support is already funded through Connect to Work and should be judged on sustained work.
Builds on the option Employment support for disabled people and people with health conditions compared below.
What it takes
The problem
People with health conditions who want to work often get employment help that is separate from their care and does not stay with them in work.
Who is affected, and where
Adults with health conditions or disabilities who want to work, in England and Wales. Territory: England and Wales. Connect to Work covers England and Wales; Scotland and Northern Ireland run their own employment support.
Policy status
A funded programme already exists. Connect to Work has taken referrals since April 2025 and aims to support about 300,000 people by 2029/30; IPS also operates in NHS mental health services. The proposal here is to hold it to fidelity and integrate it with care, not to start something new.
The evidence
What the research found:
Working 13+ weeks in a year: +4 percentage points for out-of-work participants in the West Midlands; +3 points for people in work in Sheffield City Region (weaker evidence); no effect for out-of-work participants there; no earnings effect at 12 months; small health gains in Sheffield City Region only.
Evaluated on:
9,785 adults with mild to moderate health conditions, in or out of work; Sheffield City Region and West Midlands, 2018–2020
Transfer to this case:
Results for severe mental illness or for one area should not be assumed for all economically inactive people.
Our recommendation (separate from the research):
Keep delivery at fidelity, integrate it with NHS care, and judge it by sustained work and health, not referrals or starts.
Strongest counter-evidence:
One of three trial groups saw no employment effect and the Exchequer return within a year was 1–2p per £1; benefits were mainly in health and wellbeing, and only in one area.
Effects on record
- Working 13 or more weeks in the year after joining (out-of-work participants): +4 percentage points (22% vs 18%) (randomised control group receiving usual support; 12 months after randomisation, 2018–2020; significant at the 99% level; no interval published). evaluated, moderate confidence; West Midlands Combined Authority. No effect for out-of-work participants in Sheffield City Region, and no effect on earnings at 12 months.
- Working 13 or more weeks in the year after joining (people in work but struggling): +3 percentage points (randomised control group; 12 months after randomisation, 2018–2020; significant only at the 90% level; no interval published). evaluated, limited confidence; Sheffield City Region. Weaker evidence than the West Midlands result.
- Self-reported health (EQ-5D-5L) at 12 months: +0.10 standard deviations (randomised control group; 12 months after randomisation; significant at the 90% level (99% when Sheffield groups are pooled); no effect in the West Midlands). evaluated, limited confidence; Sheffield City Region. Small; not found in the West Midlands. Not evidence of reduced NHS demand.
Cost and funding
Cost completeness: Partly costed. Funding: Indicative costing / partial funding.
- Connect to Work grant and programme costs, 2025–26 to 2028–29 (recurring spending; paid by central government): £1.03bn in total, 2025–26 to 2028–29, cash (nominal) prices. Sum of the four years in the revised business case. Excludes £15.5m spent in 2023–24 and 2024–25.
- Connect to Work costs, 2029–30 to 2031–32 (recurring spending; paid by central government): £134.4m in total, 2029–30 to 2031–32, cash (nominal) prices. Sum of the last three years in the revised business case.
- NHS clinical integration, referral and supervision for IPS (recurring spending; paid by NHS): Not yet costed. Not in the DWP business case. An older national IPS price is not a current rollout budget.
- Autumn Budget 2024 and Spending Review 2025 settlements for Connect to Work: £1.09bn, 2025–26 to 2028–29 — committed (allocated to this scope). £114m for 2025–26 plus £978m for 2026–27 to 2028–29. The business case says funding and costs differ because volume forecasts changed.
- Connect to Work funding to be requested at a future Spending Review: £138m, 2029–30 to 2031–32 — not committed (no allocation). “Will be requested in a future Spending Review.”
Who pays:
DWP for Connect to Work grants; the NHS for clinical integration and IPS in mental health services.
Financing proposed:
£138m for 2029–30 onwards is to be requested at a future Spending Review.
Gap remaining:
Connect to Work is funded to 2028–29; the later years are not committed and the NHS-side integration cost is not established.
What delivery needs
Skills:
Trained employment specialists and supervisors.
Operational capacity:
NHS referral routes and fidelity reviews.
Infrastructure:
None beyond services.
Permissions:
Data sharing between health and employment services.
Law:
No new law.
Public consent:
Voluntary for participants.
First step and stages
First step: Select the eligible group, service standard and an existing capacity gap in one area. (owner: DWP delivery areas and NHS commissioners)
1. Recruit and train to fidelity — Connect to Work delivery areas (proposed stage, not an official timetable)
2. Refer and support into work — Providers with NHS teams (proposed stage, not an official timetable)
3. Measure sustained work and health from payroll and survey data — DWP (proposed stage, not an official timetable)
Depends on: NHS capacity to refer and integrate; Employer vacancies
Trade-offs
Who gains and who loses:
Gains for participants who find suitable work; intensive support per person means fewer people reached.
What else the money or effort could do:
The same money could fund less intensive support for more people, or health services directly.
Strongest counterargument:
Trial effects were modest and inconsistent; scaling may dilute fidelity further.
Risks:
Unsuitable jobs, pressure on people who are not ready, and over-claiming benefit savings.
How we would judge it
Baseline:
Economic inactivity due to long-term sickness (ONS Labour Force Survey).
Leading indicator:
Programme starts and the share in paid work within 12 months.
Outcome:
Employment sustained 6–12 months later (HMRC payroll data), job quality and health.
Continue, adapt or stop:
Continue where sustained work beats a matched comparison; adapt or stop where it does not.
Sources
- Department for Work and Pensions, Health-led Employment Trials: evaluation synthesis report, Synthesis report Table 2.1 (2023-04; relevant passages checked)
- Department for Work and Pensions, Connect to Work: Programme Business Case 2 summary, Section 3.1, Table 9 (2026-07-30; full text checked)
- Centre for Mental Health, Investment priorities for mental health 2025 (2025-05-07; full text checked)
- Department for Work and Pensions, Health-led Employment Trials: evaluation synthesis report, Table 2.1 (Sheffield City Region out-of-work group) (2023-04; relevant passages checked)
Source published April 2023 (trials); July 2026 (business case); evidence reviewed 2026-10-04. Reconsider if: Connect to Work impact evaluation results; The next Spending Review; New trials in different populations.
Also on: NHS, Economy, Jobs and pay — one shared record, so its cost is counted once.

How the options are assessed

One shared record per option — the same one the national plan reads. Delivery RAG, gate and list membership are separate judgements.

Claim what people are owed — Amber delivery RAG; gate pending
A child-poverty target and essentials test — Amber delivery RAG; gate pending

Provisional single-reviewer assessments from the 6 October 2026 review; not approved business cases, and not government policy.

A25Delivery RAG: AmberGate: pending
Claim what people are owed
Existing action A25, assessed at the same scope.
Provisional single-reviewer assessment; not an approved business case.
Who and where
Pensioner families in Great Britain entitled to Pension Credit who do not claim. (from the action record) Jurisdiction: Great Britain.
Result so far
Range if completed: 16.0–22.0 out of 30 (equal weights; not yet assessed: expected incremental benefit (Bn), incremental affordability (Co))
Funded now (baseline)
Pension Credit and DWP take-up campaigns already exist; a targeted, evaluated outreach model is a UK Facts proposal. (from the action record)
The change assessed (marginal)
Assisted applications for people likely to be entitled to Pension Credit. (from the superseded 4 October selection table)
- Domain home: Benefits
- In the national plan: Equality and opportunity list
What the evidence supports—and the next decision
Estimated non-take-up identifies an access problem, but cannot predict how many additional awards a new campaign will secure.
Codex — AI-assisted analytical follow-up · 8 October 2026. Proposed appraisal design; the attributed scores below are unchanged. No funding or delivery agreement is implied.
Define the change
Test assisted Pension Credit applications for an identified likely-entitled group against existing outreach.
Test whether it works
Additional correct awards, processing time, household income and sustained receipt; distinguish applications from entitlement and awards.
Establish the cost
Outreach, advice and processing plus additional benefit expenditure. Report fiscal transfers separately from social resource costs.
Protect against harm
Use consent and secure data matching; minimise distress, false eligibility messages and digital exclusion.
Read with the outcome evidence and sources in the full assessment. Monitoring proposals are not existing baseline measurements. A numerical benefit or cost score needs evidence for the defined increment, not just the scale of the problem.
Full assessment of Claim what people are owed: ten criteria, scenarios, delivery, costs and monitoring
The ten criteria (0–3)
Each criterion is scored 0 to 3 by the reviewer. “Not yet assessed” means unknown: it is never counted as zero.
Scale and severity (Sc)2 of 3 — Serious harm to a defined group or widespread moderate harm
Reviewer’s reason: Provisional problem-importance judgement from linked site pages; not the scale of achievable benefit.
Increment beyond baseline (Ad)2 of 3 — Specific material change to existing delivery
Reviewer’s reason: Specify eligible cohort, trusted outreach, application support and comparison group; arrange benefits-processing capacity. A missing rating requires a defined marginal change.
Confidence in the proposed action (Ev)0 of 3 — No effect evaluation
Reviewer’s reason: Unclaimed entitlement establishes a gap; effect of this outreach design is untested.
Expected incremental benefit (Bn)Not yet assessed
Reviewer’s reason: Unknown unless a reasonably defined target-population benefit can be judged; no bonus merely for spanning domains.
Residual harms (Hm)2 of 3 — Manageable harm with specified safeguards
Reviewer’s reason: Privacy, mistaken advice and processing delays; fiscal cost is not equivalent to social loss.
Incremental affordability (Co)Not yet assessed
Reviewer’s reason: Outreach and administration plus additional entitlement paid; show fiscal transfers separately from social resource costs.
Delivery capacity (Ca)2 of 3 — Stretched but plausibly obtainable
Reviewer’s reason: Specify eligible cohort, trusted outreach, application support and comparison group; arrange benefits-processing capacity.
Distribution (Fa)3 of 3 — Benefits concentrated on disadvantaged people with assessed burdens
Reviewer’s reason: Provisional distribution judgement for the stated target; verify who pays, who gains and excluded groups.
Meaningful first outcome (Ti)3 of 3 — Within one year
Reviewer’s reason: First meaningful outcome, not announcement: Successful sustained take-up, disposable income, errors and claimant experience.
Readiness (Rd)2 of 3 — Named commissioning/allocation/coordination step
Reviewer’s reason: DWP, councils and advice providers; Assisted-application trial
Four weightings
Normalised as 10 × weighted sum ÷ sum of weights, on a 0–30 scale. Where a criterion is not yet assessed, the range is the lowest and highest result if it were later scored 0 or 3 — not a score, a confidence interval or a rank.
Equal weights: Range if completed: 16.0–22.0 out of 30. Not yet assessed: expected incremental benefit (Bn), incremental affordability (Co). Funding gate: not passed.
Evidence doubled: Range if completed: 14.5–20.0 out of 30. Not yet assessed: expected incremental benefit (Bn), incremental affordability (Co). Funding gate: not passed.
Scale doubled: Range if completed: 16.4–21.8 out of 30. Not yet assessed: expected incremental benefit (Bn), incremental affordability (Co). Funding gate: not passed.
Cost ignored (the funding gate still applies): Range if completed: 17.8–21.1 out of 30. Not yet assessed: expected incremental benefit (Bn), incremental affordability (Co). Funding gate: not passed.
Funding gate: Not passed — the cost is not yet assessed or no allocation is committed for this scope. Ignoring cost in a weighting never removes the gate.
Delivery RAG and gate
Delivery RAG shown: AmberReview’s claim: Amber. Best the recorded evidence allows: Amber.
Review’s reason: Outreach and administration plus additional entitlement paid; show fiscal transfers separately from social resource costs.
Why it is not Green yet
Scope (population, place and increment) not verified against the delivery baseline.
No verified owner with the powers in place.
Delivery capacity not verified.
Lifetime incremental costs not complete.
No credible funding (a committed allocation for the scope).
Safeguards not specified.
Monitoring lacks a metric, a data source or a baseline.
Green needs verified scope, a verified owner with the powers, verified capacity, complete lifetime costs with credible funding, specified safeguards and monitoring with a metric, source and baseline. Amber means appraisal gaps remain; Red means a material delivery obstacle. Red does not mean unimportant.
Gate: Pending — appraisal incomplete (review label: “Pending: incomplete appraisal”).
Why: Scores incomplete; Funding gate not passed (cost unknown or no credible funding).
The gate is separate from national list membership: being listed does not make an option eligible, and an eligible option need not be listed.
Cost and funding
Lifetime costing: Partial — some lines costed, no whole-life total. Review: “Full incremental costing not established in reviewed material”.
Extra Pension Credit paid if more entitled people claim (partial; C-A25-ENTITLEMENT)
Outreach, data matching and assisted applications (not costed; C-A25-OUTREACH)
Still to cost: Outreach and administration plus additional entitlement paid; show fiscal transfers separately from social resource costs.
Funding status: not identified.
Owner, powers and capacity
Proposed owner: DWP, councils and advice providers (proposed, unverified).
Powers: needs a decision or allocation. Capacity: unverified.
Powers and capacity read from the review’s Rd and Ca anchors; no proposed owner has agreed to act (the review: “Proposed owners have not agreed to act”).
England:
DWP, councils and advice providers (action record)
Scotland:
DWP, councils and advice providers (action record)
Wales:
DWP, councils and advice providers (action record)
Northern Ireland:
not assessed
Northern Ireland administers its own social security; not assessed.
Dependencies, safeguards and risks
Depends on: None recorded.
Safeguards
None specified yet.
Risks and residual harms: Privacy, mistaken advice and processing delays; fiscal cost is not equivalent to social loss.
Monitoring and measured results
Metric: Successful sustained take-up, disposable income, errors and claimant experience.
Data source: Not yet named. Baseline: Not yet established.
Measures already on the domain page
Pension Credit take-up (caseload): latest 62% (2023–24 (FYE 2024)); baseline 65% (2022–23 (FYE 2023)) (Great Britain).
A page measure is not necessarily the review’s metric; linking the two is an editorial decision still to be made.
Evidence for the outcome
Outcome: Successful sustained take-up, disposable income, errors and claimant experience.
Unclaimed entitlement establishes a gap; effect of this outreach design is untested.
Effect records for this action
Income of eligible pensioners who start claiming: size not established (plausible spillover, limited confidence; Great Britain)
SWOT points it addresses
Only 62% of people entitled to Pension Credit claimed it; up to 910,000 entitled families did not, leaving up to £2.5bn unclaimed in 2023–24 (one year’s estimate).
Raising take-up of existing entitlements, testing whether the basic rate covers essentials and offering suitable employment support address different failures in the same system.
An established payment route: Universal Credit paid 8.4 million people in May 2026, about 3.1 million of them in work — so a change to rates or support can reach people quickly.
Review record
Assessment version: working-review-2026-10-06 (A25@working-review-2026-10-06).
Reviewer: Author of the review blueprint (single reviewer, not named in uk-facts-complete-plan.json). Reviewed: 6 October 2026.
Scored in the working review of 6 October 2026 on the shared ten-criterion scale (one reviewer); not independently calibrated.
First 90 days (review): Produce a signed scope and current-delivery baseline; Specify eligible cohort, trusted outreach, application support and comparison group; arrange benefits-processing capacity. Obtain incremental costs and an accountable decision before expansion.
Decision route: Assisted-application trial
An earlier assessment exists on the 4 October 2026 selection table (nine H/M/L bands; superseded 7 October 2026). Its bands are kept, not converted into these scores.
An editorial screening framework by one reviewer, not a formal appraisal or business case. Proposed owners have not agreed to act.
A16v2Delivery RAG: AmberGate: pending
A child-poverty target and essentials test
A new scope of action A16 (A16v2); A16 itself is unchanged and nothing is inherited from it.
Provisional single-reviewer assessment; not an approved business case.
Who and where
Population not yet defined. Jurisdiction: not defined.
Result so far
Range if completed: 12.0–21.0 out of 30 (equal weights; not yet assessed: increment beyond baseline (Ad), expected incremental benefit (Bn), incremental affordability (Co))
Funded now (baseline)
Funded baseline not yet stated
The change assessed (marginal)
Marginal change not yet defined
- Domain home: Benefits
- In the national plan: Equality and opportunity list
What the evidence supports—and the next decision
A poverty target and an essentials test are measurement choices; benefits depend on the policies adopted in response.
Codex — AI-assisted analytical follow-up · 8 October 2026. Proposed appraisal design; the attributed scores below are unchanged. No funding or delivery agreement is implied.
Define the change
Separate the monitoring framework from costed tax, benefit, housing and service options beyond the current Child Poverty Strategy.
Test whether it works
Relative and absolute low income after housing costs, material deprivation and subgroup outcomes; document definition changes and income-model uncertainty.
Establish the cost
Cost administration separately from recurring household support; model interactions and take-up rather than summing headline policy estimates.
Protect against harm
Protect families just outside thresholds and report who loses as well as who gains.
- DWP: Child Poverty Strategy baseline report →
Read with the outcome evidence and sources in the full assessment. Monitoring proposals are not existing baseline measurements. A numerical benefit or cost score needs evidence for the defined increment, not just the scale of the problem.
Full assessment of A child-poverty target and essentials test: ten criteria, scenarios, delivery, costs and monitoring
The ten criteria (0–3)
Each criterion is scored 0 to 3 by the reviewer. “Not yet assessed” means unknown: it is never counted as zero.
Scale and severity (Sc)3 of 3 — Severe harm across a broad population
Reviewer’s reason: Provisional problem-importance judgement from linked site pages; not the scale of achievable benefit.
Increment beyond baseline (Ad)Not yet assessed
Reviewer’s reason: Define poverty/essentials measures, then compare specific benefit, housing-cost and service changes; assign accountability. A missing rating requires a defined marginal change.
Confidence in the proposed action (Ev)0 of 3 — No effect evaluation
Reviewer’s reason: A target does not itself reduce poverty. Modelled effects of a strategy do not establish the effect of the benchmark.
Expected incremental benefit (Bn)Not yet assessed
Reviewer’s reason: Unknown unless a reasonably defined target-population benefit can be judged; no bonus merely for spanning domains.
Residual harms (Hm)2 of 3 — Manageable harm with specified safeguards
Reviewer’s reason: Unfunded targets; narrow metrics; inadequate treatment of disability and housing costs.
Incremental affordability (Co)Not yet assessed
Reviewer’s reason: Separate low-cost monitoring from recurring policy measures; model household distribution and behavioural effects.
Delivery capacity (Ca)2 of 3 — Stretched but plausibly obtainable
Reviewer’s reason: Define poverty/essentials measures, then compare specific benefit, housing-cost and service changes; assign accountability.
Distribution (Fa)3 of 3 — Benefits concentrated on disadvantaged people with assessed burdens
Reviewer’s reason: Provisional distribution judgement for the stated target; verify who pays, who gains and excluded groups.
Meaningful first outcome (Ti)1 of 3 — More than three but less than ten years
Reviewer’s reason: First meaningful outcome, not announcement: Poverty depth, material deprivation and child outcomes after housing costs.
Readiness (Rd)1 of 3 — Legislation/external agreement or major enabling work
Reviewer’s reason: Treasury, DWP and relevant service departments/devolved governments; Replace benchmark-only action with costed options
Four weightings
Normalised as 10 × weighted sum ÷ sum of weights, on a 0–30 scale. Where a criterion is not yet assessed, the range is the lowest and highest result if it were later scored 0 or 3 — not a score, a confidence interval or a rank.
Equal weights: Range if completed: 12.0–21.0 out of 30. Not yet assessed: increment beyond baseline (Ad), expected incremental benefit (Bn), incremental affordability (Co). Funding gate: not passed.
Evidence doubled: Range if completed: 10.9–19.1 out of 30. Not yet assessed: increment beyond baseline (Ad), expected incremental benefit (Bn), incremental affordability (Co). Funding gate: not passed.
Scale doubled: Range if completed: 13.6–21.8 out of 30. Not yet assessed: increment beyond baseline (Ad), expected incremental benefit (Bn), incremental affordability (Co). Funding gate: not passed.
Cost ignored (the funding gate still applies): Range if completed: 13.3–20.0 out of 30. Not yet assessed: increment beyond baseline (Ad), expected incremental benefit (Bn), incremental affordability (Co). Funding gate: not passed.
Funding gate: Not passed — the cost is not yet assessed or no allocation is committed for this scope. Ignoring cost in a weighting never removes the gate.
Delivery RAG and gate
Delivery RAG shown: AmberReview’s claim: Amber. Best the recorded evidence allows: Amber.
Review’s reason: Separate low-cost monitoring from recurring policy measures; model household distribution and behavioural effects.
Why it is not Green yet
Scope (population, place and increment) not verified against the delivery baseline.
No verified owner with the powers in place.
Delivery capacity not verified.
Lifetime incremental costs not complete.
No credible funding (a committed allocation for the scope).
Safeguards not specified.
Monitoring lacks a metric, a data source or a baseline.
Green needs verified scope, a verified owner with the powers, verified capacity, complete lifetime costs with credible funding, specified safeguards and monitoring with a metric, source and baseline. Amber means appraisal gaps remain; Red means a material delivery obstacle. Red does not mean unimportant.
Gate: Pending — appraisal incomplete (review label: “Pending: incomplete appraisal”).
Why: Scores incomplete; Funding gate not passed (cost unknown or no credible funding).
The gate is separate from national list membership: being listed does not make an option eligible, and an eligible option need not be listed.
Cost and funding
Lifetime costing: Not established. Review: “Full incremental costing not established in reviewed material”.
Still to cost: Separate low-cost monitoring from recurring policy measures; model household distribution and behavioural effects.
Funding status: not established in review.
Owner, powers and capacity
Proposed owner: Treasury, DWP and relevant service departments/devolved governments (proposed, unverified).
Powers: needs legislation or external agreement. Capacity: unverified.
Powers and capacity read from the review’s Rd and Ca anchors; no proposed owner has agreed to act (the review: “Proposed owners have not agreed to act”).
England:
not assessed
Scotland:
not assessed
Wales:
not assessed
Northern Ireland:
not assessed
Not defined in the review.
Dependencies, safeguards and risks
Depends on: None recorded.
Safeguards
None specified yet.
Risks and residual harms: Unfunded targets; narrow metrics; inadequate treatment of disability and housing costs.
Monitoring and measured results
Metric: Poverty depth, material deprivation and child outcomes after housing costs.
Data source: Not yet named. Baseline: Not yet established.
Measures already on the domain page
Children in deep material poverty: latest 13% (FYE 2025); baseline 14% (FYE 2024) (United Kingdom).
A page measure is not necessarily the review’s metric; linking the two is an editorial decision still to be made.
Evidence for the outcome
Outcome: Poverty depth, material deprivation and child outcomes after housing costs.
A target does not itself reduce poverty. Modelled effects of a strategy do not establish the effect of the benchmark.
SWOT points it addresses
Raising take-up of existing entitlements, testing whether the basic rate covers essentials and offering suitable employment support address different failures in the same system.
Hardship and error can rise when savings drive design: for most new claims from April 2026 the Universal Credit health element is about half the previous rate, and DWP’s impact assessment calls the behavioural effects the most uncertain part of its estimates.
27.4% of children (4.0 million) were in relative poverty after housing costs, and 13% were in deep material poverty, lacking at least four of thirteen essentials. (Inequality)
Review record
Assessment version: working-review-2026-10-06 (A16v2@working-review-2026-10-06).
Reviewer: Author of the review blueprint (single reviewer, not named in uk-facts-complete-plan.json). Reviewed: 6 October 2026.
Scored in the working review of 6 October 2026 on the shared ten-criterion scale (one reviewer); not independently calibrated.
First 90 days (review): Produce a signed scope and current-delivery baseline; Define poverty/essentials measures, then compare specific benefit, housing-cost and service changes; assign accountability. Obtain incremental costs and an accountable decision before expansion.
Decision route: Replace benchmark-only action with costed options
An editorial screening framework by one reviewer, not a formal appraisal or business case. Proposed owners have not agreed to act.

Decision brief

Write to pensioners on Housing Benefit who are missing Pension Credit, help them claim, and count the claims that succeed

The leading option set out as a decision someone could take: who decides, who benefits, the best evidence, cost and funding, and the main trade-off. The full research record is one click away.

Decision briefPublic-policy proposalReviewed 2026-10-04

Write to pensioners on Housing Benefit who are missing Pension Credit, help them claim, and count the claims that succeed

The thread: issue, evidence, action

Issue Weakness: Only 62% of people entitled to Pension Credit claimed it; up to 910,000 entitled families did not, leaving up to £2.5bn unclaimed in 2023–24 (one year’s estimate). Also: opportunity, strength
Evidence Pension Credit take-up (caseload)
Action Help eligible people claim support they already qualify for

Decision required: DWP writes to every pensioner household that its Housing Benefit records suggest is entitled to Pension Credit but not claiming, offers a named route to help complete the claim, and contacts households in a random order so the extra successful claims and income can be measured.
Who and where: Pensioner households in Great Britain receiving Housing Benefit but not Pension Credit whose Housing Benefit records suggest entitlement. Applies in: Great Britain.
Accountable body: Department for Work and Pensions (Pension Credit policy and the Pension, Disability and Carers Service)
Intervention: Send invitation-to-claim letters and a reminder to pensioners whose Housing Benefit records suggest Pension Credit entitlement, with a named person who can help complete the claim.
Best evidence, and where it applies: In DWP’s 2023 trial, 27.5% of households written to under its refined criteria made a successful claim within about four months, against 4.6% of similar households not written to; the comparison was not randomised. A US randomised trial found help with the application roughly tripled enrolment compared with no contact.Studied in: About 144,500 pensioner households on Housing Benefit but not Pension Credit; 2,409 written to (708 under refined criteria); refined comparison group 45,400 (Letters July 2023, reminder September 2023; claims followed for almost four months).How closely the comparison transfers to this decision: Pennsylvania, United States — partial; London, England (17 boroughs) — high.
Extra cost of this change: Capital: none identified in the brief.Recurring: Extra Pension Credit paid when more entitled people claim — up to £2.5bn a year, 2023–24, cash (nominal) prices; Average award per successful claim in the trial — £50.57 per household per week; Outreach, data matching and assisted applications — Not yet costed; Help to complete claims (phone and home visits) — not yet established.One-off or mixed: Evaluation using the randomised contact order — not yet established.
Funding: Not funded: no funding route identified yet.Committed to this change: none.Possible source, not an award: none identified.Unfunded: The administration cost is not established and is unfunded; the extra benefit spending depends on how many claims succeed.
Savings and wider benefits: Not yet specified: no cashable saving or avoided cost has been costed for this change. Expected outcomes are listed one by one in the research appendix and are never added together or counted as money available.
First 90-day step: DWP confirms the legal basis, refreshes the refined Housing Benefit screening, and publishes the evaluation plan with the randomised contact order before the first letters go out.The proposed first milestone; a 90-day date is not yet specified. Owner: DWP. Proposed by UK Facts, not an official deadline.
Twelve-month milestone: Not yet specified.Time to a first useful result: About four months after the first letters, the period over which the 2023 trial counted claims; awards and income need around a year.
Outcome, and when to scale or stop: Measure: Calls and claims started within eight weeks of the letter, and the share of claims abandoned before a decision.Scale if: Successful claims and income gained are clearly higher among households written to than in the comparison group, at an administration cost per extra successful claim DWP judges acceptable.Stop if: Letters produce no more successful claims than the comparison group, or refusals and complaints show the screening is wrong.
Main trade-off: Every successful claim adds to benefit spending, and letters still miss entitled pensioners who claim no benefit at all.
Source and review date: Pension Credit ‘Invitation to Claim’ Trial (DWP research report RR 96) (7 October 2024); Take-up and Targeting: Experimental Evidence from SNAP (NBER Working Paper 24652) (May 2018 (Quarterly Journal of Economics, 2019)). Reviewed 2026-10-04.

An editorial proposal by UK Facts for discussion, not government policy. Records: A25 · effects E-A25-INCOME · costs C-A25-ENTITLEMENT, C-A25-OUTREACH

Research appendix: study design, effect sizes and limits, alternatives, full costing, international comparisons and how we would know

1.The change, in plain words

Write to pensioners on Housing Benefit who are missing Pension Credit, help them claim, and count the claims that succeed

2.The decision requested

Decision: Commit to writing, with a reminder, to all pensioner households on Housing Benefit identified by DWP’s refined Pension Credit criteria; fund a help-to-claim route by phone or home visit for those who respond; contact households in a randomised order over several months; and publish successful claims, awards and income gained.
Accountable institution: Department for Work and Pensions (Pension Credit policy and the Pension, Disability and Carers Service)
Geography: Great Britain
Powers: Existing social security administration powers and DWP’s administration budget. DWP used Housing Benefit data for this purpose in its 2023 trial, so no new legislation is expected; the legal basis and data protection impact assessment must be confirmed before scaling.
Delivery partners: Councils (Housing Benefit and Council Tax Reduction administration; Crisis and Resilience Fund advice services); Independent advice providers such as Citizens Advice and Age UK local organisations, under contract; DWP Pension Credit processing teams

3.Who it is for, and what changes beyond today

Target population: Pensioner households in Great Britain receiving Housing Benefit but not Pension Credit whose Housing Benefit records suggest entitlement.
Eligibility: Over State Pension age, on Housing Benefit, not on Pension Credit, and passing DWP’s refined screening on income and capital. A letter is an invitation to claim, not a decision: entitlement is still assessed on the claim.
Scale: Set by DWP’s own records: its refined criteria identified just under 121,000 Housing Benefit claimants who may be entitled (2023). Housing Benefit claimants are only part of the gap; DWP notes that around one in six entitled non-claimants claim Housing Benefit.
Baseline: Pension Credit take-up was 62% by caseload in 2023–24; up to 910,000 entitled families did not claim and up to £2.5bn went unclaimed, about £2,600 a year per family (DWP, financial year ending 2024). In DWP’s 2023 trial, 27.5% of households written to (refined criteria) made a successful claim within almost four months, against 4.6% in the comparison group.
Source: Department for Work and Pensions, Income-related benefits: estimates of take-up, financial year ending 2024 (Sections 1 and 2); Department for Work and Pensions, Pension Credit ‘Invitation to Claim’ Trial (DWP research report RR 96) (Executive summary; section 4)
Change beyond existing law or funding: DWP has run a national awareness campaign since April 2022 and trialled letters in 10 areas in 2023. Help to Claim covers Universal Credit, not Pension Credit. The added change is a complete, published letter round to the identified group with a reminder, a funded route for help with the claim, a randomised contact order that creates a comparison group, and published results. Whether DWP has already written to the wider group since the trial was not found in a source we could verify; if it has, the increment is the help-to-claim route, a second round for non-responders and the published evaluation.

4.How it would work

Do: Send invitation-to-claim letters and a reminder to pensioners whose Housing Benefit records suggest Pension Credit entitlement, with a named person who can help complete the claim Changing: more entitled pensioners making a claim, and fewer abandoned or incomplete claims

More successful Pension Credit claims among the households written to
Hypothesis to test
DWP’s 2023 trial found 27.5% against 4.6% (refined criteria) over almost four months, but its treatment areas were not randomly chosen. No validated effect record exists, so this is untested for a national round.
Higher income for pensioners who start claiming
Hypothesis to testEffect record E-A25-INCOME
The mean award in the trial’s refined group was just under £51 a week (2023). Income gained should be measured from awards, not projected from the national average unclaimed amount.
Access to help that Pension Credit unlocks, such as help with council tax, energy bills and health costs
Hypothesis to test
Pension Credit is a gateway to other support; whether these are then claimed is not measured in the trial and should be tracked separately.
Wasted claims and worry among households that are not entitled
Hypothesis to test
A risk, not a benefit: under the original criteria only 37.4% of claims after the letter succeeded; under refined criteria 75.3% did.

Outcomes are kept separate and never added into one impact figure.

5.Best evidence

Pension Credit ‘Invitation to Claim’ Trial (DWP research report RR 96)
Author or institution:
Department for Work and Pensions (Clara Yates, Gary Gifford, Catriona Parpworth, Joe Shuter); research report RR 96
Published:
7 October 2024
Evaluation period:
Letters July 2023, reminder September 2023; claims followed for almost four months
Design:
Planned test with a non-random comparison group: households in 10 local authority areas written to; identified households elsewhere in Great Britain not written to; administrative claims data and 19 interviews
Sample or population:
About 144,500 pensioner households on Housing Benefit but not Pension Credit; 2,409 written to (708 under refined criteria); refined comparison group 45,400
Effect and uncertainty:
Successful claims 27.5% of those written to against 4.6% in the comparison group (refined criteria); 11.1% against 2.3% under the original criteria. Mean award just under £51 a week. No confidence intervals reported.
Limits:
The 10 areas were not a random sample, so DWP says it cannot conclude the same result would follow for all households; follow-up under four months; criteria refined part-way through.
Where: Executive summary; sections 1.3.2, 2.3, 2.4 and 4. Affiliation is provenance, not proof of quality.
Take-up and Targeting: Experimental Evidence from SNAP (NBER Working Paper 24652)
Author or institution:
Amy Finkelstein (MIT) and Matthew J. Notowidigdo, with Benefits Data Trust and the Pennsylvania Department of Human Services; NBER Working Paper 24652
Published:
May 2018 (Quarterly Journal of Economics, 2019)
Evaluation period:
2016, nine months’ follow-up
Design:
Three-arm randomised controlled trial (letter only; letter plus application help; no contact)
Sample or population:
About 30,000 people aged 60 and over in Pennsylvania, likely eligible for food assistance but not enrolled
Effect and uncertainty:
Enrolment after nine months 6% (no contact), 11% (letter only), 18% (letter plus help); differences significant (p < 0.001).
Limits:
A different benefit and administration in the United States; the extra enrollees were less needy than average enrollees; costs are rough 2016 dollar estimates.
Where: Abstract; Introduction pp.1–3. Affiliation is provenance, not proof of quality.
How London used data to make pensioners £8 million a year better off
Author or institution:
Policy in Practice (the delivery provider), funded by the Mayor of London
Published:
15 September 2023
Evaluation period:
February to August 2023
Design:
Data-matched letters with signposting to advice partners; provider monitoring with no comparison group
Sample or population:
8,239 pensioner households in 17 London boroughs
Effect and uncertainty:
More than 2,000 successful claims worth just under £8.4m in the first year (gross, not net of claims that would have happened anyway).
Limits:
No counterfactual; reported by the company that ran it; costs not published.
Where: Opening paragraph; “Being smart with data through meaningful collaboration”. Affiliation is provenance, not proof of quality.

6.Alternatives, counter-evidence and who loses

Closest feasible alternative: Join up Pension Credit and pension-age Housing Benefit claims so that one claim is assessed for both, instead of relying on letters. That would reach future claimants without outreach but needs systems and possibly rule changes, and has not been evaluated.
Strongest counter-evidence: Generic awareness work has not measurably raised take-up: DWP has run a campaign since April 2022, yet take-up was 62% in 2023–24 against 65% the year before (not a statistically significant change). In the US trial, outreach drew in less-needy eligible people more than the neediest. Claims rose sharply in late 2024, but alongside the Winter Fuel Payment being tied to Pension Credit, so that rise is not evidence for letters alone.
Source: Department for Work and Pensions, Income-related benefits: estimates of take-up, financial year ending 2024 (Section on Pension Credit take-up (campaign from April 2022)); National Bureau of Economic Research, Take-up and Targeting: Experimental Evidence from SNAP (NBER Working Paper 24652) (Abstract; p.3 (targeting)); Department for Work and Pensions, Tens of thousands more pensioners now in receipt of Pension Credit (Press release text)
Distributional effects: Gains go to low-income pensioners, especially renters on Housing Benefit; in the trial, letters had the largest relative effect for people entitled to small weekly amounts. Entitled pensioners who are owner-occupiers or claim nothing are not reached by this data match. Cost falls on the Exchequer.
Main downside: Success raises benefit spending with no offsetting saving guaranteed, and DWP processing capacity can become the bottleneck: it deployed 500 extra staff during the 2024 surge.

The options compared, including current policy
Option	Who is reached	Evidence	Likely outcome and timing	Cost and funding	Main trade-off
The proposalLetters plus help to claim for pensioners on Housing Benefit, in a randomised order (this brief)	Pensioners on Housing Benefit who seem entitled to Pension Credit but do not claim	DWP trial: 27.5% successful claims against 4.6% (non-random comparison); US randomised trial supports help with claims	Extra claims within about four months; income gains over the following year	Administration not costed and not allocated; extra benefit spending demand-led	Higher benefit spending; misses entitled people who claim nothing
Current policyCurrent policy: awareness campaign, the 2023 letter trial, and council data shares	Pensioners who see adverts or are contacted by their council; Help to Claim covers Universal Credit only	Take-up did not rise measurably after the 2022 campaign began	Gradual, uneven change	Existing DWP campaign and council budgets	No national comparison, so what works is not learned
AlternativeCouncil-led data-matched campaigns using the Crisis and Resilience Fund (see the Hampshire decision brief)	Residents known to councils, including pensioners not on Housing Benefit but on Council Tax Reduction	London: more than 2,000 successful claims from 8,239 letters, no comparison group	Depends on each council’s choice and capacity	Within councils’ ring-fenced allocations, displacing crisis payments	Patchy coverage and uneven evaluation
AlternativeJoin up Pension Credit and pension-age Housing Benefit claims	Future pensioner claimants of either benefit	Not evaluated	Years: needs new systems	Not costed here	Does not reach today’s non-claimants without outreach
AlternativeSet a test of whether benefits cover essentials	All recipients if rates change	A measurement and decision rule, not an outreach intervention	A published test, then a rate decision	Any rate rise costed separately	Helps people already claiming, not those missing out
AlternativeEmployment support alongside healthcare (see the national decision brief)	Working-age people with health conditions who want to work	See the national decision brief on /employment	Sustained work over one to two years	Connect to Work allocations	Different group; does not address pensioner take-up

The options compared, including current policy

The proposal
Letters plus help to claim for pensioners on Housing Benefit, in a randomised order (this brief)
Who is reached
Pensioners on Housing Benefit who seem entitled to Pension Credit but do not claim
Evidence
DWP trial: 27.5% successful claims against 4.6% (non-random comparison); US randomised trial supports help with claims
Likely outcome and timing
Extra claims within about four months; income gains over the following year
Cost and funding
Administration not costed and not allocated; extra benefit spending demand-led
Main trade-off
Higher benefit spending; misses entitled people who claim nothing
Current policy
Current policy: awareness campaign, the 2023 letter trial, and council data shares
Who is reached
Pensioners who see adverts or are contacted by their council; Help to Claim covers Universal Credit only
Evidence
Take-up did not rise measurably after the 2022 campaign began
Likely outcome and timing
Gradual, uneven change
Cost and funding
Existing DWP campaign and council budgets
Main trade-off
No national comparison, so what works is not learned
Alternative
Council-led data-matched campaigns using the Crisis and Resilience Fund (see the Hampshire decision brief)
Who is reached
Residents known to councils, including pensioners not on Housing Benefit but on Council Tax Reduction
Evidence
London: more than 2,000 successful claims from 8,239 letters, no comparison group
Likely outcome and timing
Depends on each council’s choice and capacity
Cost and funding
Within councils’ ring-fenced allocations, displacing crisis payments
Main trade-off
Patchy coverage and uneven evaluation
Alternative
Join up Pension Credit and pension-age Housing Benefit claims
Who is reached
Future pensioner claimants of either benefit
Evidence
Not evaluated
Likely outcome and timing
Years: needs new systems
Cost and funding
Not costed here
Main trade-off
Does not reach today’s non-claimants without outreach
Alternative
Set a test of whether benefits cover essentials
Who is reached
All recipients if rates change
Evidence
A measurement and decision rule, not an outreach intervention
Likely outcome and timing
A published test, then a rate decision
Cost and funding
Any rate rise costed separately
Main trade-off
Helps people already claiming, not those missing out
Alternative
Employment support alongside healthcare (see the national decision brief)
Who is reached
Working-age people with health conditions who want to work
Evidence
See the national decision brief on /employment
Likely outcome and timing
Sustained work over one to two years
Cost and funding
Connect to Work allocations
Main trade-off
Different group; does not address pensioner take-up

7.What other countries or the devolved nations show

Country lesson · Pennsylvania, United States, Sample drawn late 2015; letters sent in the first half of 2016; enrolment followed for nine months

Writing to older people likely to be eligible for food assistance in Pennsylvania

Evidence: Experimental or quasi-experimental evaluationPartial match: some conditions differ

What was changed: State and Medicaid records were linked to find people aged 60 and over who were not enrolled in the Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP) but were likely to be eligible. One group received a letter from the state human services department and a reminder postcard; a second group received the same letter with a number for a non-profit that gave phone help to complete the application and gather documents; a third group received nothing.
Study design and population: Randomised controlled trial of about 30,000 people in three equal groups, registered in the AEA RCT Registry; outcomes from state administrative records. Older people already enrolled in Medicaid but not in SNAP, identified from linked administrative data as likely eligible.
Measured outcome there: After nine months, 6% of the control group had enrolled, against 11% of those sent the letter only and 18% of those also offered help to apply; the differences were statistically significant (p < 0.001). About 30% of each letter group called in, and about 75% of applications succeeded in all three groups. The authors’ rough cost per additional enrollee was about $20 for the letter and about $60 with application help.
Cost status: Historic and approximate: the authors’ own rough calculation in US dollars for 2016; no UK cost can be read from it.
What failed or remains uncertain: Most people who were written to still did not enrol. The extra enrollees received lower benefits and were less sick than people who enrolled without the letter, so the outreach reached less-needy eligible people better than the neediest. Dropping the reminder postcard cut the letter’s effect by about a fifth. A working paper finding; the authors’ welfare conclusions rest on a model.
Why the UK differs: SNAP is a food benefit with a different application process, run by a state; Pension Credit is a cash benefit run by DWP, with a backdating rule and passported help. The data match here used Medicaid enrolment; the UK equivalent is Housing Benefit and Council Tax Reduction records, which miss entitled pensioners who claim neither.
First change required here: Randomise the order in which identified households are written to, and test letter only against letter plus a named person who helps complete the claim, so the UK learns the cost per extra successful claim and who is reached.

Not a UK forecast: the effect above was measured in that place and population. Source: National Bureau of Economic Research, Take-up and Targeting: Experimental Evidence from SNAP (NBER Working Paper 24652) (Abstract; Introduction pp.1–3). Reviewed 2026-10-04.

Country lesson · London, England (17 boroughs), February to August 2023 (first phase)

Targeted Pension Credit letters across 17 London boroughs

Evidence: Observational analysisClose match to the UK decision

What was changed: Funded by the Mayor of London, Policy in Practice analysed the boroughs’ own records (with its Low Income Family Tracker software) to identify 8,239 pensioner households likely to be entitled to Pension Credit, wrote to them, and pointed them to partners such as Age UK to help them claim.
Study design and population: Campaign monitoring by the delivery provider: claims and awards tracked in council data after the letters; no comparison group. Pensioner households known to the boroughs (for example through Housing Benefit or Council Tax Reduction) whose records suggested Pension Credit entitlement.
Measured outcome there: More than 2,000 successful claims, worth just under £8.4 million in their first year (average £3,879 per household); about £700,000 of Attendance Allowance was also claimed by 186 people. DWP’s own trial report describes the campaign’s claim success rate as around 28%.
Cost status: Not published in the source read: the cost of the data work, letters and advice is not stated.
What failed or remains uncertain: With no comparison group, some of these households would have claimed anyway, so the figures are gross results, not the campaign’s effect. The provider ran and reported the campaign. Most households written to did not make a successful claim. Results for the later phase were not checked.
Why the UK differs: An English case, so the benefit rules match. London boroughs are unitary councils that hold both benefit records and the local welfare budget; in Hampshire the county holds the crisis fund while the 11 districts hold Housing Benefit and Council Tax Reduction records, so a data-sharing agreement is needed first.
First change required here: Use the same cohort definition across every participating council and stagger the order of contact, so a comparison group exists from the start.

Not a UK forecast: the effect above was measured in that place and population. Source: Policy in Practice, How London used data to make pensioners £8 million a year better off (Blog post, sections “Being smart with data through meaningful collaboration” and opening paragraph); Department for Work and Pensions, Pension Credit ‘Invitation to Claim’ Trial (DWP research report RR 96) (Section 2.3 (comparison with the Mayor of London initiative, footnote 8)). Reviewed 2026-10-04.

8.What delivery needs first

law — A confirmed legal basis and data protection impact assessment for using Housing Benefit records to invite Pension Credit claims at national scale. (Genuine veto: nothing proceeds without it; owner: DWP data protection officer and legal advisers)
staff — Pension Credit processing staff to decide the extra claims quickly, so backdated awards are not delayed. (Scarce resource shared with other priorities; owner: DWP Pension, Disability and Carers Service)
staff — Trained advisers who can help older people complete claims by phone or at home, including people with limited digital access. (Scarce resource shared with other priorities; owner: DWP with councils and contracted advice providers)
data — Up-to-date Housing Benefit income and capital data, screened with the refined criteria, and a way to link claims back to letters for the evaluation. (Requirement; owner: DWP analysts with council Housing Benefit teams)
public consent — Clear letters that explain why the person was contacted and that a letter is not a decision, so people are not alarmed or misled. (Requirement; owner: DWP communications, tested with older people’s organisations)

9.What it would cost

How the cost is built up: Letters and reminders + screening + assisted claims × households helped + extra processing + evaluation = administration cost; separately, successful claims × measured average award = extra benefit spending. The two are reported side by side, never netted against each other.

Cost build-up: one row per component, with scope, unit, quantity, unit cost, type, price year, period, status and source.
Component	Unit and quantity	Unit cost or amount	Type, price year, period	Status
Extra Pension Credit paid when more entitled people claimPensioner families entitled to Pension Credit who start claiming	per year; quantity to be set from need and capacity	up to £2.5bn a year, 2023–24, cash (nominal) prices (ledger C-A25-ENTITLEMENT)	recurring; price year not stated; Each year the award continues	Historic costRead from the ledger: the national unclaimed total is a ceiling, not a forecast of what a letter round would add. Source: Department for Work and Pensions, Income-related benefits: estimates of take-up, financial year ending 2024 (Section 2)
Average award per successful claim in the trialHouseholds in the trial’s refined group who made a successful claim	per household per week; quantity to be set from need and capacity	£50.57	recurring; 2023–24 prices; Weekly, while entitled	Historic costMultiply by measured successful claims, not by the number of letters sent. Source: Department for Work and Pensions, Pension Credit ‘Invitation to Claim’ Trial (DWP research report RR 96) (Section 2.4 table (refined treatment group))
Outreach, data matching and assisted applicationsLetters, reminders, screening and help to claim	per year; quantity to be set from need and capacity	Not yet costed (ledger C-A25-OUTREACH)	recurring; price year not stated; While the programme runs	Not yet establishedRead from the ledger, which has no amount.
Help to complete claims (phone and home visits)Households who respond and want help	per assisted claim; quantity to be set from need and capacity	Not yet established	recurring; price year not stated; While the programme runs	Not yet established
Evaluation using the randomised contact orderLinking letters to claims, awards and passported help	per evaluation; quantity to be set from need and capacity	Not yet established	one-off revenue; price year not stated; First 12 to 18 months	Not yet established

Extra Pension Credit paid when more entitled people claim
Pensioner families entitled to Pension Credit who start claiming
up to £2.5bn a year, 2023–24, cash (nominal) prices (ledger C-A25-ENTITLEMENT)
recurring; price year not stated; Each year the award continues; Historic cost
Read from the ledger: the national unclaimed total is a ceiling, not a forecast of what a letter round would add.
Source: Department for Work and Pensions, Income-related benefits: estimates of take-up, financial year ending 2024 (Section 2)
Average award per successful claim in the trial
Households in the trial’s refined group who made a successful claim
£50.57 per household per week
recurring; 2023–24 prices; Weekly, while entitled; Historic cost
Multiply by measured successful claims, not by the number of letters sent.
Source: Department for Work and Pensions, Pension Credit ‘Invitation to Claim’ Trial (DWP research report RR 96) (Section 2.4 table (refined treatment group))
Outreach, data matching and assisted applications
Letters, reminders, screening and help to claim
Not yet costed (ledger C-A25-OUTREACH)
recurring; price year not stated; While the programme runs; Not yet established
Read from the ledger, which has no amount.
Help to complete claims (phone and home visits)
Households who respond and want help
Not yet established per assisted claim
recurring; price year not stated; While the programme runs; Not yet established
Evaluation using the randomised contact order
Linking letters to claims, awards and passported help
Not yet established per evaluation
one-off revenue; price year not stated; First 12 to 18 months; Not yet established

10.Who pays, and what is missing

Programme envelope (a possible route, not an award): None identified
Allocation committed to this change: None
Remaining gap: The administration cost is not established and is unfunded; the extra benefit spending depends on how many claims succeed.
Proposed financing: DWP’s administration budget for letters, processing and evaluation; extra Pension Credit is demand-led benefit spending. Councils may choose to fund help with claims from the resilience part of their Crisis and Resilience Fund allocations. Nothing is allocated to this proposal.
Responsible payer: central government, councils
Budget displaced: Other DWP administration and processing work; for councils, other uses of the Crisis and Resilience Fund such as crisis payments.

11.First milestone and time to a useful result

DWP confirms the legal basis, refreshes the refined Housing Benefit screening, and publishes the evaluation plan with the randomised contact order before the first letters go out. (Owner: DWP. Proposed by UK Facts, not an official deadline.)

Time to first useful result: About four months after the first letters, the period over which the 2023 trial counted claims; awards and income need around a year.

What could delay it: Processing capacity keeps pace with extra claims Housing Benefit data are current enough to screen accurately Advice partners can be contracted in time No competing policy change (such as a new passported payment) distorts the comparison

12.How we would know

Baseline: Pension Credit status of every identified household at the start; take-up of 62% (2023–24) as the national context.
Comparison: Households randomly assigned to be written to later act as the comparison for those written to first; within the early group, letter only against letter plus a named helper.
Leading indicator: Calls and claims started within eight weeks of the letter, and the share of claims abandoned before a decision.
Follow-up: At four and 12 months: successful claims, average award, refusals and reasons, passported help claimed, and who was reached by age, household type and area.
Continue if: Successful claims and income gained are clearly higher among households written to than in the comparison group, at an administration cost per extra successful claim DWP judges acceptable.
Adapt if: Many claims are refused or abandoned: tighten the screening, change the letter or add help before writing to more households.
Stop if: Letters produce no more successful claims than the comparison group, or refusals and complaints show the screening is wrong.
Thresholds: Not yet set: Numerical levels need the cost per letter and per assisted claim, the refreshed cohort size and a power calculation; none is published.

What is not yet known, and how to find out

What do letters, screening and help with claims cost per extra successful claim? (cost)Next step: Price the letter round and the assisted-claim service, then divide by extra successful claims measured against the randomised comparison.Scope: One national letter round to the identified Housing Benefit group, with help to claim, for 12 months · Data or quotes needed: DWP unit costs for letters and processing; quotes from advice providers per assisted claim; evaluation tender · Who can estimate it: DWP finance and analysts, with advice providers
Does a national letter round repeat the trial’s result, and does help with claims add to it? (effect)Next step: Randomise the contact order and the offer of help in the first round.Defensible route: bounded pilot
Has DWP already written to the wider Housing Benefit group since the trial, and with what result? (data)Next step: Ask DWP to publish any roll-out dates, numbers written to and claim outcomes.
How can entitled pensioners who claim no benefit at all be identified? (data)Next step: Test other lawful data sources, such as council tax records, in council-led campaigns and compare hit rates.
Can processing keep pace without delaying other claims? (delivery)Next step: Phase letters to match processing capacity and publish clearance times.

Sources last checked 4 October 2026 · Owner: Evidence editor (James Harris) · Next check: DWP income-related benefits: estimates of take-up, financial year ending 2025 (22 October 2026) or the first trigger: A change to Pension Credit or Housing Benefit rules.

More decision briefs on other pages

For low-income families with a child under five, decide what Universal Credit should cover — and compare it with a home and with early-years help — the brief for “Set an explicit test for whether benefits cover essentials”, on Inequality
Run Connect to Work to the tested model, side by side with NHS care, and test whether it works — the brief for “Offer evidence-based employment support alongside healthcare”, on Jobs & pay

What it would take

The order things have to happen in, who pays, and the effects and appraisals on record.

The order things have to happen in

First, the prerequisite
Identify likely unmet Pension Credit entitlement without treating a survey estimate as individual eligibility
Owner: DWP with councils
No date: the timing depends on the steps before it.
Then, the decision
Specify the essentials basket and options to cost; budget for extra entitlement from take-up
Owner: DWP with HM Treasury
No date: the timing depends on the steps before it.
Then, delivery
Test outreach in defined areas; keep employment support voluntary and at fidelity
Owner: DWP, councils, advice services and Connect to Work providers
No date: the timing depends on the steps before it.
Finally, the measured outcome
Higher take-up, smaller payment errors both ways, more people in sustained work
Owner: DWP statistics
No date: the timing depends on the steps before it.

Who pays, and what is still missing

Cost, committed funding and the remaining gap for the same scope and years. A programme envelope is not an award to a project; a proposal is not committed money. No total is shown because these costs are on different bases or periods and cannot be added.

Cost and funding ledger

Extra Pension Credit paid if more entitled people claim
A25 · household transfer · partial
Amount
up to £2.5bn a year, 2023–24, cash (nominal) prices
Who pays
central government
Committed
None identified
Proposed, not committed
—
Gap
Not established
Outreach, data matching and assisted applications
A25 · administration · not costed
Amount
Not yet costed
Who pays
central government, councils
Committed
None identified
Proposed, not committed
—
Gap
Not established
An independent advisory body on benefit adequacy (secretariat, research, consultation)
A16 · administration · not costed
Amount
Not yet costed
Who pays
central government
Committed
None identified
Proposed, not committed
—
Gap
Not established
Any change in Universal Credit rates or deductions following the benchmark
A16 · household transfer · not costed
Amount
Not yet costed
Who pays
central government
Committed
None identified
Proposed, not committed
—
Gap
Not established
Connect to Work grant and programme costs, 2025–26 to 2028–29
A09 · recurring spending · complete for scope
Amount
£1.03bn in total, 2025–26 to 2028–29, cash (nominal) prices
Who pays
central government
Committed
£1.09bn
Proposed, not committed
—
Gap
None for this scope
Connect to Work costs, 2029–30 to 2031–32
A09 · recurring spending · complete for scope
Amount
£134.4m in total, 2029–30 to 2031–32, cash (nominal) prices
Who pays
central government
Committed
None identified
Proposed, not committed
£138m (Connect to Work funding to be requested at a future Spending Review)
Gap
£134.4m
NHS clinical integration, referral and supervision for IPS
A09 · recurring spending · not costed
Amount
Not yet costed
Who pays
NHS
Committed
None identified
Proposed, not committed
—
Gap
Not established

Cost and funding ledger
Cost line (action)	Amount	Who pays	Committed	Proposed, not committed	Gap
Extra Pension Credit paid if more entitled people claim A25 · household transfer · partial	up to £2.5bn a year, 2023–24, cash (nominal) prices	central government	None identified	—	Not established
Outreach, data matching and assisted applications A25 · administration · not costed	Not yet costed	central government, councils	None identified	—	Not established
An independent advisory body on benefit adequacy (secretariat, research, consultation) A16 · administration · not costed	Not yet costed	central government	None identified	—	Not established
Any change in Universal Credit rates or deductions following the benchmark A16 · household transfer · not costed	Not yet costed	central government	None identified	—	Not established
Connect to Work grant and programme costs, 2025–26 to 2028–29 A09 · recurring spending · complete for scope	£1.03bn in total, 2025–26 to 2028–29, cash (nominal) prices	central government	£1.09bn	—	None for this scope
Connect to Work costs, 2029–30 to 2031–32 A09 · recurring spending · complete for scope	£134.4m in total, 2029–30 to 2031–32, cash (nominal) prices	central government	None identified	£138m (Connect to Work funding to be requested at a future Spending Review)	£134.4m
NHS clinical integration, referral and supervision for IPS A09 · recurring spending · not costed	Not yet costed	NHS	None identified	—	Not established

“Not yet costed” means no defensible cost has been found — not that the action is free. Lifetime benefits, benefit-cost ratios and forecast savings are never shown here as money available to spend.

Effects on record, with evidence ratings (6 records)

What the evidence says each action changes

Effects on record — these measure different outcomes, so they are not drawn on one scale
Action	Outcome and area	Effect	Compared with	Evidence
Offer evidence-based employment support alongside healthcare	Working 13 or more weeks in the year after joining (out-of-work participants) Work and pay	+4 percentage points (22% vs 18%)significant at the 99% level; no interval published	randomised control group receiving usual support; 12 months after randomisation, 2018–2020	evaluated; moderate confidence; West Midlands Combined AuthorityNo effect for out-of-work participants in Sheffield City Region, and no effect on earnings at 12 months.
Offer evidence-based employment support alongside healthcare	Working 13 or more weeks in the year after joining (people in work but struggling) Work and pay	+3 percentage pointssignificant only at the 90% level; no interval published	randomised control group; 12 months after randomisation, 2018–2020	evaluated; limited confidence; Sheffield City RegionWeaker evidence than the West Midlands result.
Offer evidence-based employment support alongside healthcare	Self-reported health (EQ-5D-5L) at 12 months Health and care	+0.10 standard deviationssignificant at the 90% level (99% when Sheffield groups are pooled); no effect in the West Midlands	randomised control group; 12 months after randomisation	evaluated; limited confidence; Sheffield City RegionSmall; not found in the West Midlands. Not evidence of reduced NHS demand.
Help eligible people claim support they already qualify for	Income of eligible pensioners who start claiming Pensions and retirement	Direction plausible; size not established	—	plausible spillover; limited confidence; Great BritainAn unclaimed family misses about £2,600 a year on average, but how many more would claim after outreach has not been evaluated.
Set an explicit test for whether benefits cover essentials	Material hardship among households on Universal Credit Poverty and inequality	Direction plausible; size not established	—	plausible spillover; limited confidence; Great BritainA benchmark changes nothing unless rates change; how much hardship would fall depends on the option, take-up and housing costs, none of which has been modelled here.
Set an explicit test for whether benefits cover essentials	Recurring benefit spending Public finances and tax · harm	Size not established	—	plausible spillover; limited confidence; Great BritainShown as a trade-off, not a benefit. The size depends on the option and has not been costed on the current baseline.

How we would know

Pension Credit take-up (caseload); Benefit spending overpaid (fraud and error); Benefit spending underpaid (error).

The outcome measures to watch. A baseline is where we start, not a target; where there is no official target we say so.

Pension Credit take-up (caseload)
% of entitled people · Great Britain
Baseline
65%
2022–23 (FYE 2023)
Latest
62%
2023–24 (FYE 2024)
Target: none — no official take-up target. The fall from 65% was not statistically significant.
Source: Department for Work and Pensions, Income-related benefits: estimates of take-up, financial year ending 2024 (Section 1). Next release: annual; the FYE 2025 estimates are next (check the release calendar).
Benefit spending overpaid (fraud and error)
% of expenditure · Great Britain
Baseline
2.1%
2018–19
Latest
3.2%
2025–26
Target: none — no published target rate.
Source: Department for Work and Pensions, Fraud and error in the benefit system, financial year ending 2026 estimates (Reference table 2). Next release: annual (usually May) (check the release calendar).
Benefit spending underpaid (error)
% of expenditure · Great Britain
Baseline
Not published
Latest
0.4%
2025–26
Target: none — no published target rate.
Source: Department for Work and Pensions, Fraud and error in the benefit system, financial year ending 2026 estimates (Reference table 7). Next release: annual (usually May) (check the release calendar).

Measured results

What each option would be judged on, and the latest value of the measures already on this page. A measure moving is not proof that an option caused it.

Claim what people are owed
Judged on: Successful sustained take-up, disposable income, errors and claimant experience.
Data source: not yet named; baseline: not yet established.
- Pension Credit take-up (caseload)Latest: 62% (2023–24 (FYE 2024)). Baseline: 65% (2022–23 (FYE 2023)). Great Britain.
National plan: Equality and opportunity list
A child-poverty target and essentials test
Judged on: Poverty depth, material deprivation and child outcomes after housing costs.
Data source: not yet named; baseline: not yet established.
- Children in deep material povertyLatest: 13% (FYE 2025). Baseline: 14% (FYE 2024). United Kingdom.
National plan: Equality and opportunity list

Where the ideas come from

Research, counter-evidence and methods (10 sources; 2 claims held back)

Universal Credit quarterly statistics, 29 April 2013 to 14 May 2026 — Department for Work and Pensions, 18 August 2026.Official statistics; Great Britain. Relevant passages checked, 2026-10-04.
Income-related benefits: estimates of take-up, financial year ending 2024 — Department for Work and Pensions, 2025-10-30.Official statistics; Great Britain. Relevant passages checked, 2026-10-04.
Fraud and error in the benefit system, financial year ending 2026 estimates — Department for Work and Pensions, 14 May 2026.Official statistics; Great Britain. Relevant passages checked, 2026-10-04.
Independent process to ensure Universal Credit covers essential costs (briefing) — Joseph Rowntree Foundation (Iain Porter, Isobel Richardson), 2026-01-30.Policy briefing with UK and international precedents; United Kingdom. Full text checked, 2026-10-04. Limits: Does not cost an advisory body or any rate change; essentials estimates are the proposers’ modelling. Makes no claim about savings targets and error.
Health-led Employment Trials: evaluation synthesis report — Department for Work and Pensions, 2023-04.Randomised controlled trials of an adapted IPS service with economic and process evaluations; 9,785 people randomised in Sheffield City Region and the West Midlands, May 2018 to October 2019; people with mild to moderate physical or mental health conditions, in or out of work; Two English combined authorities. Relevant passages checked, 2026-10-04. Limits: Adapted IPS for mild to moderate conditions; results differ sharply by site and group. Not evidence about severe mental illness or all economically inactive people.
Universal Credit Bill: Universal Credit rebalancing — impact assessment — Department for Work and Pensions, 2025-07-07.Impact assessment; Great Britain. Relevant passages checked (read from an Internet Archive copy (Parliament’s site blocked automated requests); the gov.uk copy is marked withdrawn and points here), 2026-10-04. Limits: Estimates are modelled; DWP describes the behavioural effects as the most uncertain part.
Universal Credit Act 2025 (c. 22) — legislation.gov.uk, 2025-09-03 (Royal Assent).Legislation; Great Britain. Relevant passages checked, 2026-10-04.
Connect to Work: Programme Business Case 2 summary — Department for Work and Pensions, 2026-07-30.Programme business case; England and Wales. Full text checked, 2026-10-04.
Investment priorities for mental health 2025 — Centre for Mental Health, 2025-05-07.Evidence review and policy proposals. Full text checked, 2026-10-04. Limits: Supports examining Individual Placement and Support for appropriate populations. Check original trials, service fidelity and the vintage of any national costing before reuse.
The Pensions Review: final recommendations — Institute for Fiscal Studies / abrdn Financial Fairness Trust (Jonathan Cribb, Carl Emmerson, Paul Johnson, Heidi Karjalainen, Laurence O’Brien), 2025-07-02.Policy review with microsimulation of automatic-enrolment reforms; Private-sector employees aged 16–74 (ASHE 2021, earnings uprated to 2025 prices); United Kingdom (automatic enrolment: Great Britain; Northern Ireland has parallel legislation). Relevant passages checked (read from an Internet Archive copy), 2026-10-04. Limits: Not a 12% package (12% appears only as a comparison). Modelled costs, not an approved settlement; transition and administration not included.

Counter-evidence and criticism

Help eligible people claim support they already qualify for: Survey-based estimates can misclassify households as entitled, so a statistical estimate is not individual eligibility. (Department for Work and Pensions)
Set an explicit test for whether benefits cover essentials: An essentials basket is a normative choice, and a published benchmark creates pressure for large recurring spending that must be financed by tax, cuts elsewhere or borrowing; higher basic rates also change work incentives at the margin. JRF itself does not cost the change. (Joseph Rowntree Foundation)
Offer evidence-based employment support alongside healthcare: One of three trial groups saw no employment effect and the Exchequer return within a year was 1–2p per £1; benefits were mainly in health and wellbeing, and only in one area. (Department for Work and Pensions)

Claims held back

Error, exclusion and hardship rise when savings targets dominate service design (brief threat, cited to S37) — The JRF briefing makes the case for an adequacy process; it does not present evidence on savings targets and error. Needed: An audit or evaluation linking savings measures to error and hardship; the threat is re-sourced to DWP’s own impact assessment.
Any adequacy threshold for benefits — UK Facts sets no threshold of its own; the JRF/Trussell essentials estimates are shown as their modelling. Needed: An independent, published benchmark with a stated basket and household types.

“Full text checked” means we read the report itself; “relevant passages” means the sections behind each figure; “summary or abstract only” means we could not read the full study, so no number from it is published here without another source.

Other options compared — not on the shortlist (4)

Other options compared

Options from earlier work on this page that are not on the shortlist. They remain valid choices; their evidence is shown as before.

structuralStatus: legislated
Rebalance Universal Credit: a higher standard allowance, a lower health element for new claims
Aims to:
A higher basic rate for all Universal Credit households and, the government intends, a weaker incentive to be assessed as unable to work.
How:
The standard allowance rises above inflation each year to 2029–30; the health (LCWRA) element for most new claims from April 2026 is about half the previous rate, with protection for the most severe conditions and people at the end of life.
Who decides:
DWP and HM Treasury.
Main constraint:
Behavioural effects are uncertain; people with health conditions who claim after April 2026 receive less for the same assessed need.
Evidence:
Not evaluated — a mechanism to test, not an evidenced fix
See the trade-offs and evidence
What the evidence shows
The effects are modelled, not observed. DWP’s impact assessment expects 750,000 people on the lower health rate by 2029–30 and says the behavioural effects are “the most uncertain aspects”. No evaluation of the change has been published yet.
Policy status
Universal Credit Act 2025. From April 2026 the standard allowance for a single person aged 25+ is £424.90 a month; the new-claim health element is £217.26 a month (was £423.27).
Resources
Benefit spending; Work Capability Assessment capacity; employment support for people with health conditions.
Consent and decisions needed
Enacted by Parliament in 2025; further change would need new legislation.
Time
Rates changed April 2026; full caseload effect by 2029–30.
Cost and yield
DWP impact assessment (July 2025, cash): the standard allowance increase costs about £1.85bn in 2029–30; the health-element change saves about £2.1bn net in 2029–30 after protections.
Trade-offs and who pays
Gains for all Universal Credit households are partly paid for by new claimants with health conditions.
How we would know it worked
Leading indicator: Number of new claims on the lower health rate, and Work Capability Assessment referrals. Outcome: Employment and household income of people with health conditions on Universal Credit, compared with earlier cohorts. It would not be working if: Employment among new health claimants does not rise while their incomes fall.
Sources
DWP, The Universal Credit Bill: Universal Credit rebalancing — impact assessment (July 2025)
DWP, Benefit and pension rates 2026 to 2027
capacityStatus: funded
Employment support for disabled people and people with health conditions
Aims to:
More people who want to work and who have health conditions in sustained jobs.
How:
Voluntary, tailored support — employment specialists, more work-coach time and links with health services — offered to people on health-related benefits.
Who decides:
DWP; local authorities (Connect to Work); NHS; employers.
Main constraint:
Recruiting specialists; NHS capacity; employers offering adjusted jobs. Money does not create jobs or health care on its own.
Evidence:
Moderate evidence — evaluated, with limits on scope or transfer
See the trade-offs and evidence
What the evidence shows
DWP cites evaluations of earlier programmes: Work Choice participants were 11–14 percentage points more likely to be in work eight years later; extra work-coach time for people in the UC health group raised employment by 3 points after a year. Effects are real but modest. Detailed evidence on Individual Placement and Support is on the Jobs and pay page.
Policy status
£2.2bn of new employment support from 2026–27 to 2029–30 (per the July 2025 impact assessment).
Resources
Work coaches and employment specialists; NHS referral routes.
Consent and decisions needed
Funded; voluntary for participants.
Time
Job outcomes within 12 months of starting; caseload effects over several years.
Cost and yield
£2.2bn over 2026–27 to 2029–30 (cash). DWP estimates fiscal savings of about £180m a year for every 10,000 extra people in full-time work (modelled).
Trade-offs and who pays
Intensive support reaches fewer people; the money could raise benefit rates instead.
How we would know it worked
Leading indicator: Starts and job entries within a year. Outcome: Employment sustained at 12 months against a comparison group. It would not be working if: No difference in sustained employment from similar people not offered support.
Sources
DWP, The Universal Credit Bill: Universal Credit rebalancing — impact assessment (July 2025)
preventionStatus: legislated
Pay the right amount: bank-data checks and targeted case reviews
Aims to:
Lower overpayments (and earlier detection, so claimants build up smaller debts).
How:
Banks flag accounts receiving specified benefits that break eligibility rules (for example savings above £16,000 on Universal Credit); DWP reviews them before deciding anything.
Who decides:
DWP; banks and building societies; Information Commissioner (oversight).
Main constraint:
Data protection and proportionality; false positives; banks’ IT; capital and abroad errors are hard to detect from other data.
Evidence:
Limited evidence — plausible mechanism, little direct evaluation
See the trade-offs and evidence
What the evidence shows
DWP estimates the eligibility verification measure will find 50,000–100,000 overpayments a year and save about £500m a year when fully rolled out; the OBR validated savings of up to £940m over five years. These are estimates, not evaluated results; the measure is being rolled out on a test-and-learn basis.
Policy status
Public Authorities (Fraud, Error and Recovery) Act 2025 (Royal Assent December 2025); gradual rollout.
Resources
DWP investigators and data analysts (up to 3,000 more staff across fraud, error and debt work); bank systems.
Consent and decisions needed
Legislated; privacy concerns raised in Parliament and by the Information Commissioner shape the codes of practice.
Time
Gradual; DWP expects £1.5bn savings from the Act by 2029–30.
Cost and yield
Savings estimate about £500m a year at full rollout (DWP), up to £940m over five years (OBR-validated); implementation costs not separately published here.
Trade-offs and who pays
Wrongly flagged claimants face checks and stress; data access raises privacy concerns. Recovering more overpayments can deepen hardship if deductions are high.
How we would know it worked
Leading indicator: Accounts flagged and the share confirmed as overpaid. Outcome: The fraud and claimant-error overpayment rates in DWP’s annual estimates (2.2% and 0.6% in 2025–26). It would not be working if: Overpayment rates for capital and savings errors do not fall in the benefits covered.
Sources
DWP, Eligibility verification powers in the Public Authorities (Fraud, Error and Recovery) Bill: factsheet
DWP, Fraudsters face tougher action as government gains new powers (Royal Assent, 3 December 2025)
DWP, Fraud and error in the benefit system, financial year ending 2026 estimates
structuralStatus: announced
Reform how PIP is assessed (Timms Review)
Aims to:
A PIP assessment that reflects the extra costs of disability fairly and is trusted, within the spending forecast.
How:
A review co-chaired by Sir Stephen Timms (Minister for Social Security and Disability), Sharon Brennan and Dr Clenton Farquharson, with a 12-member steering group, recommends changes to the assessment.
Who decides:
DWP (Minister for Social Security and Disability); Parliament for any legislation.
Main constraint:
The spending forecast; assessment quality (67% of PIP appeals decided at a tribunal hearing in January–March 2026 went the claimant’s way); legal challenge.
Evidence:
Not evaluated — a mechanism to test, not an evidenced fix
See the trade-offs and evidence
What the evidence shows
No recommendations yet: the interim report (July 2026) sets out evidence and says final recommendations will come in the autumn. Its terms of reference require recommendations to sit within forecast PIP spending (over £41bn by 2030–31, DWP spring 2026 forecast, 2026–27 prices).
Policy status
Review under way; final report due autumn 2026.
Resources
Assessment capacity; DWP decision-makers; tribunal capacity if appeals rise.
Consent and decisions needed
Parliament directed that the review be co-produced with disabled people; any change to eligibility needs regulations or primary legislation.
Time
Recommendations autumn 2026; any new assessment would take years to apply to existing claims.
Cost and yield
No official costing until recommendations are published.
Trade-offs and who pays
Tighter criteria reduce spending but remove support from some disabled people; looser criteria raise cost.
How we would know it worked
Leading indicator: Share of initial decisions changed on reconsideration or appeal. Outcome: Material deprivation and extra-cost hardship among disabled people. It would not be working if: Appeal overturn rates and disabled people’s hardship do not improve after reform.
Sources
Timms Review of Personal Independence Payment: interim report

The options side by side
Option	Resources	Time	Evidence	Outcome to watch
Rebalance Universal Credit: a higher standard allowance, a lower health element for new claims	Benefit spending; Work Capability Assessment capacity; employment support for people with health conditions.	Rates changed April 2026; full caseload effect by 2029–30.	not evaluated	Employment and household income of people with health conditions on Universal Credit, compared with earlier cohorts.
Employment support for disabled people and people with health conditions	Work coaches and employment specialists; NHS referral routes.	Job outcomes within 12 months of starting; caseload effects over several years.	moderate	Employment sustained at 12 months against a comparison group.
Pay the right amount: bank-data checks and targeted case reviews	DWP investigators and data analysts (up to 3,000 more staff across fraud, error and debt work); bank systems.	Gradual; DWP expects £1.5bn savings from the Act by 2029–30.	limited	The fraud and claimant-error overpayment rates in DWP’s annual estimates (2.2% and 0.6% in 2025–26).
Reform how PIP is assessed (Timms Review)	Assessment capacity; DWP decision-makers; tribunal capacity if appeals rise.	Recommendations autumn 2026; any new assessment would take years to apply to existing claims.	not evaluated	Material deprivation and extra-cost hardship among disabled people.

Plan reviewed 2026-10-04. How we judge evidence.

How this connects

How is the State Pension uprated, and what does it cost?
The State Pension is the largest single benefit; how it is uprated drives most of the pensioner share above.
Why are more people out of work through ill health?
The rise in health-related Universal Credit and PIP claims sits alongside the rise in people out of work through long-term sickness.
The two are associated; benefit data alone do not show which causes which.
What do benefits do to poverty?
Child and pensioner poverty after housing costs, and the two-child limit option, are compared on the Inequality page.
How far does housing support go for renters?
Housing costs are paid through Universal Credit and Housing Benefit; rents decide how far that support stretches.

Sources and methods (5)

DWP, Benefit expenditure and caseload tables 2026 (Spring Forecast 2026), GB welfare summary table; Table 1a (released April 2026) — GB welfare by pensioners / working age and children (BEN-01) and spending by benefit (BEN-01b), outturn and forecast
DWP, Universal Credit quarterly statistics, 29 April 2013 to 14 May 2026, Figures 5, 8 and 9 (people by conditionality regime; employment indicator) (released 18 August 2026) — Universal Credit caseload by conditionality regime and employment (BEN-02)
DWP, Fraud and error in the benefit system, financial year ending 2026 estimates, Reference tables 2 and 7 (released 14 May 2026) — overpayment and underpayment rates by type and benefit
DWP, Income-related benefits: estimates of take-up, financial year ending 2024 (released 30 October 2025) — Pension Credit and pension-age Housing Benefit take-up
DWP, Personal Independence Payment statistics to July 2026 (released 15 September 2026) — PIP caseload, age split and award levels

Method notes

Benefit spending covers Great Britain: Northern Ireland runs its own social security system. Spending by Social Security Scotland on devolved benefits (such as Adult Disability Payment) is not in the DWP figures.
The financial year that has just ended is still a DWP forecast in the Spring Forecast tables; the page leads with the latest outturn year and labels the forecast separately.
Shares of spending are shares of money, not of people: one person can receive several benefits, so recipient counts are never added together here.
Universal Credit counts are administrative and published quarterly; the employment indicator is a month behind the caseload.

The short version

Three key measures

Who receives support, whether it is enough, and where it fails

Support cannot help if it never reaches people

About 6 in 10 people entitled to Pension Credit claim it

Who receives what, and why?

Pensioners receive 54% of welfare spending in Great Britain

The State Pension is 47% of DWP benefit spending; Universal Credit 23%

Who feels this most?

1.6 million of 8.4 million people on Universal Credit must look for work

Fraud, error and viral claims

Visual summary

Pensioners’ share of Great Britain welfare spending, 2024–25

Separately: Universal Credit claimants in work, April 2026

Go deeper

What could improve it?

Claim what people are owed

A child-poverty target and essentials test

Offer evidence-based employment support alongside healthcare

What would move the needle?

The options on the table

Assessed with another page as home

The position today

What we can build on Strengths

What is holding us back Weaknesses

What could improve things Opportunities

What could make it worse Threats

The actions worth examining

Help eligible people claim support they already qualify for

The problem

Who is affected, and where

Policy status

The evidence

Effects on record

Cost and funding

What delivery needs

First step and stages

Trade-offs

How we would judge it

Earlier option on this page

Sources

Set an explicit test for whether benefits cover essentials

The problem

Who is affected, and where

Policy status

The evidence

Effects on record

Cost and funding

What delivery needs

First step and stages

Trade-offs

How we would judge it

Sources

Offer evidence-based employment support alongside healthcare

The problem

Who is affected, and where

Policy status

The evidence

Effects on record

Cost and funding

What delivery needs

First step and stages

Trade-offs

How we would judge it

Sources

How the options are assessed

Claim what people are owed

The ten criteria (0–3)

Four weightings

Delivery RAG and gate

Cost and funding

Owner, powers and capacity

Dependencies, safeguards and risks

Monitoring and measured results

Evidence for the outcome

Review record

A child-poverty target and essentials test

The ten criteria (0–3)

Four weightings

Delivery RAG and gate