Monarchy · United Kingdom · 2025–26

The Sovereign Grant was £132m in 2025–26. The full public cost is not published.

The audited Sovereign Grant was £132.1m in 2025–26 and is set at £137.9m for 2026–27, the final year of Buckingham Palace reservicing funding. Royal security costs are not published, and several other public costs are disclosed only in part, so the grant cannot establish the total.

Editorial purpose (not a recommendation): Show which public costs of the monarchy are audited, which are disclosed only in part and which are not published, without taking a side on the constitutional question.

Evidence last reviewed 3 October 2026

Overview

The short version

Three audited figures

£132.1m

Sovereign Grant (audited)

UK2025/26Outturn

Not the same as: The total public cost of the monarchy. Security, ceremonial and departmental costs sit outside it.

Royal Household financial reports 2025–26

£67.5m

Spent on occupied royal palaces

UK2025/26Outturn

Not the same as: Money paid to the Royal Family. This is building preservation and protection — over half the Grant.

Royal Household financial reports 2025–26

2,273

Official engagements by working royals

UK and overseas2025/26Administrative count

Not the same as: A measure of value. It counts activity, not what that activity achieved.

Royal Household financial reports 2025–26

What it means

Anyone quoting a single annual cost for the monarchy — in either direction — is filling in gaps the accounts leave open.

The evidence

The evidence, path by path

What is audited: the Sovereign Grant

The Grant rises to £137.9m in 2026/27, the final scheduled tranche for the Buckingham Palace reservicing programme. It pays for official duties, staff, travel and the occupied palaces.

Known, partial, and not disclosed

Published and audited

  • Sovereign Grant, 2025/26£132.1m
  • Of which occupied royal palaces£67.5m
  • Sovereign Grant, 2026/27£137.9m
  • Crown Estate profit to Treasury, 2025/26£487m

Known but partial

  • Royal Household Pension Scheme, 2024/25£5m
  • Lord-lieutenants, Cabinet Office, 2023/24£1.5m
  • 2023 Coronation, DCMS£50.3m
  • Coronation policing, Home Office£21.7m
  • Queen Elizabeth II state funeral, 2022£161.7m

Not disclosed

  • Royal security and policing — withheld because a breakdown could compromise protection arrangements
  • Departmental support for honours, ceremonial occasions and state visits
  • Military support for ceremonial duties
  • Local authority costs for royal visits
  • The value of soft power, diplomacy and trade introductions

There is deliberately no total here. One-off event costs — coronations, funerals — must not be added to a recurring annual figure, and security, a recurring cost of unknown size, is not published at all. A single 'true cost of the monarchy' cannot be calculated from what is disclosed. Campaign-group estimates fill those gaps with assumptions; they belong in a debate, not in a ledger of audited figures.

What remains unknown

These costs are real but not published as figures, so they appear here as named gaps rather than as zero or as an estimate:

  • Royal security and policing, withheld because a breakdown could compromise protection.
  • Departmental support for honours, ceremonial occasions and state visits.
  • Military support for ceremonial duties, and local authority costs of royal visits.
  • Any measured value of soft power, diplomacy or trade introductions.

The Crown Estate is not a cheque from the King

This is the most common error in the monarchy’s favour. The Crown Estate returned £487m of profit to the Treasury in 2025/26. It is often presented as the King handing over £487m and receiving £132m back.

The Crown Estate is a statutory public corporation. Its assets are attached to the Crown as an institution, not owned by the King personally, and he neither manages nor controls it. The Sovereign Grant is calculated as a percentage of its profit from two years earlier — a funding formula, not a dividend.

  1. 1The Crown Estate operates independently, under its own board.
  2. 2Its profit goes to the Treasury.
  3. 3The Sovereign Grant is set as a percentage of that profit, lagged by two years.
  4. 4The Grant funds official duties and the occupied palaces.

So do not:compare £132.1m with £487m as though they were the same financial year; call Crown Estate profit “money the King gives the government”; assume the Crown Estate would cease to exist under a republic; or describe the Grant as a dividend the monarch legally owns.

Tax: liability and voluntary payment are different things

The King and the Prince of Wales are not legally liable for income tax, capital gains tax or inheritance tax where the relevant statutes do not bind the Crown. A non-statutory memorandum provides for voluntary payments, and the King does pay income tax on private income. Transfers from one sovereign to the next are exempt from inheritance tax.

Two claims that are not equivalent.“They pay tax” is true. “They are taxed exactly like everyone else” is not. Other members of the Royal Family are generally liable under normal rules.

Does tourism pay for the monarchy?

What is known, plainly: 2.7 million people visited the Royal Collection Trust in 2025/26, generating £61.0m in access income; Windsor Castle drew 1.25 million visits and the Buckingham Palace Summer Opening 555,024. Royal branding is used throughout UK tourism marketing. That is real, measured activity — nobody disputes it.

“The Royal Family brings in more through tourism than the monarchy costs”

Unverifiable

What is known: Royal Collection Trust welcomed 2.7 million visitors in 2025/26, with access income of £61.0m. Windsor Castle recorded over 1.25 million visits in 2025 and the Buckingham Palace Summer Opening 555,024. Royal associations are used in tourism marketing.

What is not known: How many visits to Britain would not happen without a working monarchy; how much of that spending would simply go to other attractions; whether demand would change if the palaces, ceremonies and collections remained open under a different constitutional arrangement. The full public cost is also undisclosed, so neither side of the comparison is complete.

What would change this verdict: A credible counterfactual estimate of tourism caused by retaining a working monarchy, plus a full public cost including security. Neither exists.

One number would settle this. It doesn’t exist.

The old £500 million figure attributed a quarter of culture-and-heritage visitor spending to the monarchy, because roughly a quarter of the relevant attractions had royal connections — an association, not a measurement of cause; VisitBritain itself said it showed nothing about a republic. The reverse claim — that the monarchy costs more than it brings in — fails for the identical reason, not a different one. Neither side has produced the one number that would actually settle it: what tourism demand would look like without a working monarchy.

That is the finding, not an evasion of one: the tourism argument is undemonstrated on both sides, and no published research closes that gap. Until one does, treat any total on either side as invented.

Constitutional role: what power actually remains

The Crown retains substantial formal powers. Almost all are exercised by ministers, or by the King on advice he is constitutionally bound to accept — and responsibility then rests with ministers accountable to Parliament.

  • Appointing the Prime Minister

    In law

    The King formally appoints the Prime Minister.

    In practice

    Convention requires whoever can command the confidence of the Commons. Real discretion arises only in an unclear result.

  • Appointing and dismissing ministers

    In law

    Formally done by the King.

    In practice

    On the Prime Minister’s advice.

  • Royal Assent

    In law

    Required before a bill becomes an Act.

    In practice

    Parliament describes it as a formality. It was last refused in 1708.

  • Dissolving Parliament

    In law

    A prerogative revived by the Dissolution and Calling of Parliament Act 2022.

    In practice

    Exercised on the Prime Minister’s request. Parliament dissolves automatically after five years if not sooner.

  • Foreign affairs, treaties, armed forces

    In law

    Many powers remain Crown prerogatives.

    In practice

    Exercised by ministers, who are accountable to Parliament for them.

  • King’s or Prince’s Consent

    In law

    Required during passage of bills affecting Crown or Duchy interests.

    In practice

    Allows Parliament to debate the bill. Distinct from Royal Assent, and not refused in modern times.

  • Reserve powers

    In law

    Residual personal powers may exist in an exceptional constitutional crisis.

    In practice

    Narrow, convention-bound and rarely tested. Theoretical extremes are not ordinary governing power.

Claim checks

“The monarchy cost £132.1 million in 2025/26”

Missing context

What is known: That is the Sovereign Grant. It is an audited figure and it is correct as far as it goes.

What is not known: Security, departmental, devolved and local costs sit outside the Grant and are not all published. The total is higher, by an amount nobody outside government can state.

“The King gave the Treasury £487 million from his estate”

Misleading

What is known: The Crown Estate returned £487m to the Treasury in 2025/26. It is a statutory corporation whose assets are attached to the Crown as an institution.

What is not known: Nothing here is uncertain — the claim simply misdescribes ownership. The King neither owns the Crown Estate privately nor manages it, and the Grant is a lagged formula, not a refund.

“The King has no power”

Misleading

What is known: Real formal and residual powers remain, including appointing the Prime Minister and granting Royal Assent. In ordinary circumstances they are exercised on binding advice, by ministers accountable to Parliament.

What is not known: How reserve powers would operate in a genuine constitutional crisis. They are narrow and rarely tested, which is precisely why confident claims in either direction are unsafe.

Shareable visual summary

Visual summary

Image current

Every figure printed in the image matches today’s record, and its primary sources have been checked.

The Sovereign Grant was £132m in 2025–26. The full public cost is not published.

The audited Sovereign Grant was £132.1m in 2025–26 and is set at £137.9m for 2026–27, the final year of Buckingham Palace reservicing funding. Royal security costs are not published, and several other public costs are disclosed only in part, so the grant cannot establish the total. £67.5m of the 2025–26 grant went on the occupied royal palaces; that is inside the grant, not on top.

  • £132.1mSovereign Grant, 2025–26
  • £67.5mof which: occupied palaces
Source: Sovereign Grant and Sovereign Grant Reserve Annual Report 2025–26.
Download image (PNG, 1024 by 1536 pixels)

The Sovereign Grant was £132m in 2025–26. The full public cost is not published.

Monarchy infographic: the 2025–26 Sovereign Grant was £132.1m, of which £67.5m went on the occupied royal palaces; it is not the whole cost.
Text and data version

The Sovereign Grant was £132m in 2025–26. The full public cost is not published. The audited Sovereign Grant was £132.1m in 2025–26 and is set at £137.9m for 2026–27, the final year of Buckingham Palace reservicing funding. Royal security costs are not published, and several other public costs are disclosed only in part, so the grant cannot establish the total. £67.5m of the 2025–26 grant went on the occupied royal palaces; that is inside the grant, not on top.

Records behind this visual summary
MeasureValuePeriodGeographyTypeSource
Sovereign Grant£132.1m2025–26United Kingdomadministrative countRoyal Household, Sovereign Grant and Sovereign Grant Reserve Annual Report and Accounts 2025–26
Sovereign Grant allocated to the occupied royal palaces (Reservicing and property maintenance)£67.5m2025–26United Kingdomadministrative countRoyal Household, Sovereign Grant and Sovereign Grant Reserve Annual Report and Accounts 2025–26

Image description: Monarchy infographic: the 2025–26 Sovereign Grant was £132.1m, of which £67.5m went on the occupied royal palaces; it is not the whole cost.

All visual summaries, their source records and their publication state are listed on Shareable visuals.

Go deeper

Evidence → choices → outcomes

What the evidence can tell us

A complete, auditable account of what the monarchy costs the public, so funding and constitutional choices can be debated on evidence.

This domain in the UK SWOT →UK National Action Plan →

How we assessed these options

What would it take to improve this?

What would move the needle?

The outcome we want: A complete, auditable account of what the monarchy costs the public, so funding and constitutional choices can be debated on evidence.

The main constraint: Security costs are withheld on protection grounds and other costs sit in departmental, police and council accounts, so no full total exists; changing what is reported or how the Grant is set needs decisions by HM Treasury, the Royal Trustees and Parliament, and the constitutional question itself is a value choice.

Constraint type: evidence, public consent, legislation.

The position today

  • What we can build on (2)
  • What is holding us back (2)Royal security costs are not published: Treasury guidance says no breakdown is available because disclosure could compromise protection. (Guidance of August 2023, still in force June 2026 · United Kingdom)
  • What could improve things (1)The Sovereign Grant Bill, introduced on 1 September 2026 and passed by the Commons on 14 September, resets the Grant lower after the Buckingham Palace reservicing; its passage and the next review period are a natural point to set an explicit remit and publish a reconciled cost statement.
  • What could make it worse (2)

Which quadrant a point sits in is our analytical judgement, not a statistical category. Each point says whether it is a measured fact, our synthesis or a risk.

What we can build on Strengths

What is holding us back Weaknesses

  • Royal security costs are not published: Treasury guidance says no breakdown is available because disclosure could compromise protection.

    Measured factConfidence: High· Guidance of August 2023, still in force June 2026· United Kingdom

    Source: House of Commons Library, Finances of the Monarchy (CBP-9807) (Section 8.1, printed pp.75–76)

    What government has committed to

    No commitment found. No commitment to publish royal security costs: HM Treasury guidance says no breakdown is available because disclosure could compromise protection, and nothing on disclosure was found in the Sovereign Grant Bill debates or the 2026 review.

    Searched: gov.uk search; Hansard and written statements since 20 July 2026; Sovereign Grant Bill debates of 1 and 14 September 2026; 4 Oct 2026

    Checked 4 October 2026. A commitment is not delivery.

    Options (2)
    • ShortlistedPublish a fuller, auditable monarchy cost statement

      Reports security as a single audited total where a breakdown would be unsafe.

      Who: HM Treasury; Home Office; Royal Household · Evidence: Untested proposal · Status: External proposal

      Source: House of Commons Library, Finances of the Monarchy (CBP-9807) (Section 8.1)

    • Audit security costs with closed reporting to Parliament

      An NAO audit reported to a committee in private tests the cost without publishing operational detail.

      Who: National Audit Office; Parliament · Evidence: Untested proposal · Status: External proposal

  • Other costs sit in separate accounts: £5.1m for Royal Household pensions from the Consolidated Fund and £1.5m for Lord-Lieutenants from the Cabinet Office, plus event policing and council costs that are not reported together.

    Measured factConfidence: High· 2023–24· United Kingdom

    Source: House of Commons Library, Finances of the Monarchy (CBP-9807) (Section 8.1, printed p.75)

    What government has committed to

    No commitment found. No commitment to publish a consolidated statement of monarchy costs. The Exchequer Secretary’s letter on the Sovereign Grant Bill promises a framework that is “proportionate, transparent and subject to appropriate parliamentary oversight”, not a cost statement.

    Searched: gov.uk search; Sovereign Grant Bill debates and deposited letter (11 Sep 2026); 4 Oct 2026

    Checked 4 October 2026. A commitment is not delivery.

    Options (2)

What could improve things Opportunities

What could make it worse Threats

The actions worth examining

These actions concern transparency, accountability and informed choice — not a spending programme, and not a view on which party or system is right.

  1. Publish a fuller, auditable monarchy cost statement — not yet costed / funding not identified
  2. Test the royal grant against an explicit public purpose — not yet costed / funding not identified
  • Action 1A27Policy status: external proposal

    Publish a fuller, auditable monarchy cost statement

    Reconcile all public spending linked to the monarchy into one annual taxonomy — known, overlapping and undisclosed — publishing security only as an aggregate if a breakdown is unsafe.

    Who decides:
    HM Treasury, with the Home Office and police (security), the Royal Household and Parliament (UK)
    Evidence:
    Untested proposal. A transparency proposal; no evaluation applies. The facts on what is and is not disclosed are well documented.
    Expected effect:
    Direction plausible; size not established.
    Cost and funding

    Not yet costed

    Funding: Not yet costed / funding not identified

    Why it is shortlisted here: The page’s central gap: the full public cost cannot be established from what is published.

    What it takes
    The problem

    The audited Sovereign Grant is only part of the public cost: security and costs met by departments, police and councils are not reported together, so the full cost cannot be established.

    Who is affected, and where

    Taxpayers and Parliament across the UK. Territory: UK. Some costs fall to devolved bodies (for example Historic Environment Scotland for Holyroodhouse); a statement would need their figures.

    Policy status

    Proposed by researchers or others, not government policy. No consolidated statement exists. Treasury guidance states no breakdown of security costs is available because disclosure could compromise protection. The statement is a UK Facts proposal building on the Commons Library’s assembly of public figures.

    The evidence
    What the research found:
    The Sovereign Grant was £132.1m in 2025–26 and £137.9m in 2026–27. The Commons Library lists other public costs (pensions, Lord-Lieutenants, event policing) and notes general security costs are not discussed publicly, with outside estimates ranging from several million to a hundred million pounds a year.
    Evaluated on:
    Public costs associated with the monarchy; United Kingdom, 2025–26 and 2026–27
    Our recommendation (separate from the research):
    Publish a reconciled taxonomy of known, overlapping and undisclosed costs each year, naming what is withheld and why.
    Strongest counter-evidence:
    Security disclosure could put people at risk; some costs (such as state events) serve wider public purposes and would exist under other arrangements; a statement proves neither value nor misconduct.
    Cost and funding

    Cost completeness: Not yet costed. Funding: Not yet costed / funding not identified.

    • Reporting and audit work for a reconciled cost statement (administration; paid by central government): Not yet costed. Staff time in HM Treasury, the Home Office, police and councils; possibly NAO time. No saving is established.
    Who pays:
    HM Treasury and the bodies that hold the figures (staff time); possibly NAO audit time.
    Financing proposed:
    Existing departmental budgets. Staff time has an opportunity cost; it is not free.
    Gap remaining:
    Unknown: reporting and audit effort has not been costed.
    What delivery needs
    Skills:
    Public-sector accountants.
    Operational capacity:
    Data from departments, police and councils.
    Infrastructure:
    None.
    Permissions:
    Royal Household cooperation.
    Law:
    No new law for a voluntary statement.
    Public consent:
    Agreement on what security information can be aggregated safely.
    First step and stages

    First step: Publish a reconciled taxonomy of known, overlapping and undisclosed cost categories. (owner: HM Treasury)

    1. Agree categories and data owners — HM Treasury (proposed stage, not an official timetable)
    2. Publish alongside the Sovereign Grant accounts — HM Treasury; Royal Household (proposed stage, not an official timetable)
    3. Audit scope reviewed — Parliament; NAO (proposed stage, not an official timetable)

    Depends on: Home Office judgement on safe aggregate security reporting

    Trade-offs
    Who gains and who loses:
    Benefits are better public information; costs are administrative.
    What else the money or effort could do:
    Treasury and audit time not spent on other scrutiny.
    Strongest counterargument:
    The Grant is already audited and small relative to public spending; further reporting adds cost with little decision value.
    Risks:
    Security exposure; spurious precision from adding incompatible categories.
    How we would judge it
    Baseline:
    Sovereign Grant £132.1m (2025–26); security costs not published.
    Leading indicator:
    Publication of a reconciled statement.
    Outcome:
    Fewer undisclosed categories each year; audit findings.
    Continue, adapt or stop:
    Review if the statement omits the same categories that are unknown now.
    Earlier option on this page

    This card replaces the option “An annual statement of all public costs” (proposed). Its evidence: No such statement exists; the House of Commons Library briefing assembles what is public and notes what is not. House of Commons Library, Finances of the Monarchy

    Sources

    Source published June 2026 (Commons Library); 2025 (Royal Trustees); evidence reviewed 2026-10-04. Reconsider if: The Sovereign Grant Bill is published; A tribunal or government decision on security disclosure.

  • Action 2A28Policy status: announced proposal

    Test the royal grant against an explicit public purpose

    Compare the current formula with a needs-based settlement against a stated remit, with maintenance, staffing and transition costs, and let Parliament decide on that evidence.

    Who decides:
    The Royal Trustees (Prime Minister, Chancellor, Keeper of the Privy Purse) and Parliament (UK)
    Evidence:
    Expert or audit recommendation. An institutional policy choice: official reports describe the formula; no evaluation compares it with a needs-based settlement.
    Expected effect:
    Direction plausible; size not established.
    Cost and funding

    Not yet costed

    Funding: Not yet costed / funding not identified

    Why it is shortlisted here: The formula is under review and new legislation is planned, so the remit question is live.

    What it takes
    The problem

    The Sovereign Grant follows Crown Estate profits with a lag, so it can rise sharply for reasons unrelated to need — as offshore wind income showed.

    Who is affected, and where

    Taxpayers and Parliament across the UK. Territory: UK. The Sovereign Grant Act 2011 is UK legislation; Crown Estate Scotland is separate.

    Policy status

    Announced by government, not yet in place. The Royal Trustees’ five-yearly review reported on 26 June 2026: the Grant resets to £99.9m from 2027–28 with a reference percentage of 20.5%. The Sovereign Grant Bill to enact this was introduced on 1 September 2026, passed all its Commons stages on 14 September and is in the Lords; it is not yet law. A needs-based comparison against an explicit remit is a UK Facts proposal.

    The evidence
    What the research found:
    The 2025–26 Grant of £132.1m was 12% of 2023–24 Crown Estate income (£1,100.7m); the 2023 review cut the percentage from 25% to 12%. The government intends to reduce the Grant from 2027–28 once £100.3m of remaining reservicing funding has been provided.
    Evaluated on:
    The Sovereign Grant, 2012–13 to 2026–27; United Kingdom
    Our recommendation (separate from the research):
    Map the legal formula and the announced Bill first; then publish a needs-based comparison with a stated remit and transition costs.
    Strongest counter-evidence:
    A formula gives stability and keeps decisions at arm’s length from ministers; constitutional preferences are value choices; claimed tourism benefits and costs are both highly uncertain.
    Cost and funding

    Cost completeness: Not yet costed. Funding: Not yet costed / funding not identified.

    • Review and transition costs of an alternative Grant settlement (administration; paid by central government): Not yet costed. Maintenance and staffing implications of each option are not published. No tourism dividend or automatic saving is assumed.
    Who pays:
    Taxpayers through the Grant; the review itself uses Treasury and Royal Household staff time.
    Financing proposed:
    Not a financing source. A lower Grant saves money only if spending actually falls without moving to another public body.
    Gap remaining:
    Unknown: maintenance and transition implications of alternatives are not published.
    What delivery needs
    Skills:
    Estate and finance expertise.
    Operational capacity:
    Independent review capacity.
    Infrastructure:
    Estate condition data.
    Permissions:
    Royal Household cooperation.
    Law:
    Amending the Sovereign Grant Act 2011.
    Public consent:
    Parliamentary support; public opinion is divided.
    First step and stages

    First step: Publish the current formula, the announced reset and the estate’s maintenance needs side by side. (owner: HM Treasury (Royal Trustees))

    1. Complete the 2026 review (begun in 2026) with published reasoning — Royal Trustees
    2. Parliament considers the Sovereign Grant Bill — Parliament (proposed stage, not an official timetable)
    3. Publish a transition and audit the outcome — HM Treasury; NAO (proposed stage, not an official timetable)

    Depends on: A27: a fuller cost statement; The Sovereign Grant Bill

    Trade-offs
    Who gains and who loses:
    Small effects on public finances either way; mainly a question of accountability and constitutional preference.
    What else the money or effort could do:
    Parliamentary time for legislation.
    Strongest counterargument:
    Linking the Grant to need invites annual political bargaining over the head of state’s funding.
    Risks:
    Deferred estate maintenance if the Grant falls too far; cost shifting to departments.
    How we would judge it
    Baseline:
    Sovereign Grant £132.1m in 2025–26; £137.9m in 2026–27.
    Leading indicator:
    Published review reasoning and Bill provisions.
    Outcome:
    Audited public cost, estate condition and performance against the stated remit.
    Continue, adapt or stop:
    Revisit if the Grant moves with property income regardless of need after the reset.
    Earlier option on this page

    This card replaces the option “Review the Sovereign Grant formula” (operating: Periodic reviews under the Sovereign Grant Act 2011. The 2026 review reported on 26 June 2026 (Grant reset to £99.9m from 2027–28; reference percentage 20.5%), and the Sovereign Grant Bill giving effect to it was introduced on 1 September 2026.). Its evidence: The Grant is set as a percentage of Crown Estate profit two years earlier and reviewed periodically by the Royal Trustees; no evaluation compares this with a needs-based approach. HM Treasury, Report of the Royal Trustees on the Sovereign Grant 2025–26

    Sources

    Source published 2025 (Royal Trustees); June 2026 (Commons Library); evidence reviewed 2026-10-04. Reconsider if: Publication of the Sovereign Grant Bill; The 2026 Royal Trustees review report.

Decision brief

  • Publish one statement of what the monarchy costs the public, then compare grant rules on it

The leading option set out as a decision someone could take: who decides, who benefits, the best evidence, cost and funding, and the main trade-off. The full research record is one click away.

Decision briefStatutory/accountability reformReviewed 2026-10-04

Publish one statement of what the monarchy costs the public, then compare grant rules on it

Decision required
HM Treasury publishes, beside the annual Sovereign Grant report, a reconciled statement of every public cost linked to the monarchy — audited, known but held elsewhere, and undisclosed — and the Royal Trustees publish the grant-rule options for the forthcoming Sovereign Grant Bill on that same cost basis.
Who and where
UK taxpayers and Parliament. Applies in: UK.
Accountable body
HM Treasury (Royal Trustees: the Prime Minister, the Chancellor and the Keeper of the Privy Purse); Parliament through the Bill
Intervention
Reconcile every public cost into one dated statement and cost each grant rule on the same expected-cost basis.
Best evidence, and where it applies
The Commons Library shows the audited Sovereign Grant is only part of the public cost and that security costs are not published; the Netherlands already presents related spending across ministries in one budget annex.Studied in: Public spending linked to the monarchy (Public figures to 2026–27).How closely the comparison transfers to this decision: Netherlands — high.
Extra cost of this change
Capital: none identified in the brief.Recurring: Reporting and audit work for the reconciled statement — Not yet costed.One-off or mixed: Costing alternative grant rules — Not yet costed.
Funding
Mainly a legal or regulatory change: administration costs still need a budget.Committed to this change: none.Possible source, not an award: none identified.Unfunded: Reporting and audit effort not costed.
Savings and wider benefits
Not yet specified: no cashable saving or avoided cost has been costed for this change. Expected outcomes are listed one by one in the research appendix and are never added together or counted as money available.
First 90-day step
HM Treasury publishes the cost taxonomy (audited / known elsewhere / undisclosed) and the grant-rule comparison before the Sovereign Grant Bill’s committee stageThe proposed first milestone; a 90-day date is not yet specified. Owner: HM Treasury. Proposed by UK Facts, not an official deadline.
Twelve-month milestone
Not yet specified.Time to a first useful result: Before Parliament votes on the Bill; the first full statement with the next Sovereign Grant report.
Outcome, and when to scale or stop
Measure: Publication of the taxonomy and the options comparison.Scale if: Each year’s statement covers more categories on a consistent basis and the NAO can audit it.Stop if: Not a stop decision: if the statement keeps omitting the same categories, Parliament should ask why.
Main trade-off
A fuller statement costs staff time and can never be complete while security stays undisclosed; without it, debate swings between the Grant alone and unverifiable outside estimates.

An editorial proposal by UK Facts for discussion, not government policy. Records: A27, A28 · costs C-A27-STATEMENT, C-A28-REVIEW

Research appendix: study design, effect sizes and limits, alternatives, full costing, international comparisons and how we would know

1.The change, in plain words

Publish one statement of what the monarchy costs the public, then compare grant rules on it

2.The decision requested

Decision
Commit, during the passage of the Sovereign Grant Bill, to (1) an annual reconciled public-cost statement in three columns — audited, known but held by other bodies, undisclosed — and (2) a published comparison of the 20.5% formula with at least two alternatives (a fixed needs-based settlement and an indexed amount) costed on the Trustees’ own expected-cost figures.
Accountable institution
HM Treasury (Royal Trustees: the Prime Minister, the Chancellor and the Keeper of the Privy Purse); Parliament through the Bill
Geography
UK
Powers
The statement needs no legislation; the Treasury can publish it under existing authority. Changing the Grant rule needs the Sovereign Grant Bill the government has committed to introduce.
Delivery partners
Royal Household (Keeper of the Privy Purse); Home Office and police (security aggregate); Departments and councils that meet related costs; National Audit Office; House of Commons Public Accounts Committee

3.Who it is for, and what changes beyond today

Target population
UK taxpayers and Parliament.
Eligibility
All public spending linked to the monarchy: the Sovereign Grant; costs met by departments (for example state visits and royal travel not covered by the Grant); police and council costs of events; pensions and Lord-Lieutenants; security (aggregate only, if safe).
Scale
One annual statement and one options comparison before the Bill’s committee stage.
Baseline
Sovereign Grant £132.1m in 2025–26 and £137.9m in 2026–27. The 2026 review changed the reference percentage from 12% to 20.5% of Crown Estate revenue account profit, and the government will legislate for a Grant of £99.9m from 2027–28, flat to 2031–32. Security costs are not published; outside estimates range from several million to a hundred million pounds a year.

Source: HM Treasury (Royal Trustees), Sovereign Grant Act 2011: Report of the Royal Trustees on the Sovereign Grant Review 2026 (Paragraphs 1.12 and 6.5); House of Commons Library, Finances of the Monarchy (CBP-9807) (Summary; section 8.1)

Change beyond existing law or funding
Today the Grant is audited and reported annually and the Trustees set the formula from expected costs, but other public costs are reported (if at all) by each body separately and no alternative grant rule is published. The change adds the reconciled statement and the published options comparison; it does not change the amount.

4.How it would work

Do: Reconcile every public cost into one dated statement and cost each grant rule on the same expected-cost basis Changing: so that Parliament votes on the Bill knowing the full known cost, the undisclosed categories and what each rule would pay

  • Fewer undisclosed cost categories each year

    Hypothesis to test

    An accountability output; security is expected to remain undisclosed or aggregate only.

  • Grant settlements that track the Household’s stated needs rather than Crown Estate windfalls

    Hypothesis to test

    The 2023–2026 offshore-wind income showed the formula can move for reasons unrelated to need; no evaluation compares rules.

Outcomes are kept separate and never added into one impact figure.

5.Best evidence

  • Finances of the Monarchy (CBP-9807)

    Author or institution:
    House of Commons Library (David Torrance, Lorna Booth)
    Published:
    5 June 2026
    Evaluation period:
    Public figures to 2026–27
    Design:
    Parliamentary research briefing assembling official figures
    Sample or population:
    Public spending linked to the monarchy
    Effect and uncertainty:
    Lists costs beyond the Grant (pensions, Lord-Lieutenants, event policing); general security costs are not published and outside estimates range from several million to a hundred million pounds a year.
    Limits:
    Assembles figures; does not reconcile them into one total, and cannot cost security.

    Where: Summary; section 8.1. Affiliation is provenance, not proof of quality.

  • Sovereign Grant Act 2011: Report of the Royal Trustees on the Sovereign Grant Review 2026

    Author or institution:
    Royal Trustees (HM Treasury)
    Published:
    June 2026
    Evaluation period:
    Review of 2023–24 to 2025–26; expected costs 2026–27 to 2031–32
    Design:
    Statutory five-yearly review
    Sample or population:
    The Sovereign Grant and the occupied royal palaces
    Effect and uncertainty:
    Reference percentage set at 20.5% so that the Grant (£99.9m from 2027–28) meets expected costs; continuing at 12% would leave funding “significantly lower than the Household’s needs”.
    Limits:
    Considers one rule (the formula) at different percentages; alternatives are not published.

    Where: Chapter 4; paragraphs 6.3–6.6. Affiliation is provenance, not proof of quality.

6.Alternatives, counter-evidence and who loses

Closest feasible alternative
Pass the Bill as proposed and rely on the existing Sovereign Grant report and the Commons Library’s periodic assembly of other costs.
Strongest counter-evidence
Security disclosure could put people at risk; some costs (state events, visits) serve wider public purposes and would exist under any head of state; a statement proves neither value for money nor misconduct.

Source: House of Commons Library, Finances of the Monarchy (CBP-9807) (Summary)

Distributional effects
Small effects on public finances either way; the main effect is on what Parliament and the public can know.
Main downside
Adding incompatible categories can create spurious precision; the statement must show categories separately and never imply a single complete total while security is undisclosed.

The options compared, including current policy

  • The proposal

    Reconciled cost statement + published grant-rule comparison before the Bill

    Who is reached
    Taxpayers and Parliament
    Evidence
    Commons Library assembly of costs; Dutch budget annex
    Likely outcome and timing
    Before the Bill’s committee stage; annually after
    Cost and funding
    Staff time, not costed
    Main trade-off
    Never complete while security is undisclosed
  • Current policy

    Current policy: Grant reset to £99.9m at 20.5% by the Bill; other costs reported separately

    Who is reached
    Taxpayers and Parliament
    Evidence
    Royal Trustees 2026 review
    Likely outcome and timing
    Lower Grant from 2027–28; next review 2031
    Cost and funding
    Grant set by formula
    Main trade-off
    Full cost and alternative rules not visible
  • Alternative

    Fixed needs-based settlement voted by Parliament every five years

    Who is reached
    Taxpayers and Parliament
    Evidence
    Untested in the UK since 2011
    Likely outcome and timing
    From the next review
    Cost and funding
    Would need the Trustees’ cost plan
    Main trade-off
    More political involvement in royal funding

7.What other countries or the devolved nations show

Country lesson · Netherlands, Consolidated from the 2010 budget; current example the 2026 budget

Putting the cost of the monarchy in one budget chapter in the Netherlands

Evidence: Expert or audit recommendationClose match to the UK decision

What was changed
The King’s budget chapter brings together the constitutional allowances, the Royal Household’s functional costs and costs recharged from other ministries, and an annex lists related spending that stays on other ministries’ budgets (palaces, state visits, security), so the full set can be read in one place.
Study design and population
Budget presentation reform following a government steering-group review; no evaluation of its effects. Dutch Parliament and the public
Measured outcome there
Administrative result, not an evaluated effect: in 2026 the chapter totals €60.8m in three articles (allowances €12.571m; functional costs €39.806m; recharged costs €8.415m), with other ministries’ related spending listed in an annex. Security is deliberately not attributed.
Cost status
The cost of producing the statement is not published; it uses existing budget processes.
What failed or remains uncertain
Security — likely the largest uncosted item — is still not attributed, so the statement is not a full cost. Whether consolidation changed public trust or spending was not evaluated.
Why the UK differs
The UK Sovereign Grant is set by formula from Crown Estate profits and audited separately; the Royal Household also has private income (the Duchy of Lancaster). Departmental and police costs are spread across UK, devolved and local budgets. Euro totals are not comparable with UK figures.
First change required here
HM Treasury publishes an annual annex beside the Sovereign Grant report listing every public cost linked to the monarchy, by budget holder, with security stated as “not attributed” if a figure is unsafe.

Not a UK forecast: the effect above was measured in that place and population. Source: Government of the Netherlands (Ministry of General Affairs), via rijksfinancien.nl, Memorie van toelichting, begroting I De Koning 2026 (explanatory memorandum to the 2026 budget chapter “The King”) (Tables 3, 5, 8 and the extra-accounting annex); Government of the Netherlands, via rijksfinancien.nl, Memorie van toelichting, begroting I De Koningin 2010 (explanatory memorandum to the 2010 budget chapter) (Budget structure). Reviewed 2026-10-04.

8.What delivery needs first

  • data — Each department, police force and council that meets a related cost must report it on a common basis. (Requirement; owner: HM Treasury)
  • law — A change to the Grant rule needs the Sovereign Grant Bill; the statement does not. (Genuine veto: nothing proceeds without it; owner: Parliament)
  • dependency — The Home Office and police decide whether any security aggregate is safe to publish. (Genuine veto: nothing proceeds without it; owner: Home Office)

9.What it would cost

How the cost is built up: Treasury, departmental, police and council staff time to report + NAO audit time + Treasury time to cost alternative rules. No saving is assumed.

  • Reporting and audit work for the reconciled statement

    All public spending linked to the monarchy

    Not yet costed (ledger C-A27-STATEMENT)

    recurring; price year not stated; Annual; Not yet established

  • Costing alternative grant rules

    The Sovereign Grant and the occupied royal palaces

    Not yet costed (ledger C-A28-REVIEW)

    one-off revenue; price year not stated; Before the Bill’s committee stage; Not yet established

10.Who pays, and what is missing

Programme envelope (a possible route, not an award)
None identified
Allocation committed to this change
None
Remaining gap
Reporting and audit effort not costed.
Proposed financing
Existing departmental administration budgets.
Responsible payer
central government
Budget displaced
Staff time in HM Treasury and the reporting bodies.

11.First milestone and time to a useful result

HM Treasury publishes the cost taxonomy (audited / known elsewhere / undisclosed) and the grant-rule comparison before the Sovereign Grant Bill’s committee stage (Owner: HM Treasury. Proposed by UK Facts, not an official deadline.)

Time to first useful result: Before Parliament votes on the Bill; the first full statement with the next Sovereign Grant report.

What could delay it: The Bill timetable moves Bodies holding related costs report on different bases Security advice rules out even an aggregate

12.How we would know

Baseline
Sovereign Grant £137.9m (2026–27) audited; other costs reported separately or not at all; security undisclosed.
Comparison
The categories left unknown in the first statement.
Leading indicator
Publication of the taxonomy and the options comparison.
Follow-up
Each annual Sovereign Grant report; the next review in 2031.
Continue if
Each year’s statement covers more categories on a consistent basis and the NAO can audit it.
Adapt if
Bodies cannot report on a common basis — then publish their figures separately with the reason.
Stop if
Not a stop decision: if the statement keeps omitting the same categories, Parliament should ask why.
Thresholds
Not yet set: An accountability publication; no numerical threshold is justified.

What is not yet known, and how to find out

  • What the statement and audit would cost each year (cost)Next step: HM Treasury to scope the data request to departments, police and councils and ask the NAO for audit days.Scope: All linked public costs, annually · Data or quotes needed: Staff time estimates from each reporting body · Who can estimate it: HM Treasury with the NAO
  • What alternative grant rules would pay over 2027–32 (cost)Next step: Cost each rule on the Trustees’ Chapter 4 expected-cost figures.Scope: Sovereign Grant 2027–28 to 2031–32 · Data or quotes needed: Expected costs and Crown Estate profit projections · Who can estimate it: HM Treasury (Royal Trustees)
  • Whether any security aggregate can be published safely (legal)Next step: Home Office to advise; if not, the statement records the category as “not attributed”, as the Netherlands does.

Sources last checked 4 October 2026 · Owner: Evidence editor (James Harris) · Next check: the first trigger: Sovereign Grant annual report and accounts.

What it would take

The order things have to happen in, who pays, and the effects and appraisals on record.

The order things have to happen in

  1. First, the prerequisite

    Five-yearly review of the Grant percentage

    Owner: Royal Trustees

    Commenced 2026 — source

  2. Then, the decision

    Sovereign Grant Bill: reset after the reservicing and a mechanism for future reductions

    Owner: HM Treasury; Parliament

    Session 2026–27 (government intention) — source

  3. Then, delivery

    Publish a reconciled statement of known, overlapping and undisclosed costs

    Owner: HM Treasury, with the Home Office and Royal Household

    No date: the timing depends on the steps before it.

  4. Finally, the measured outcome

    Fewer undisclosed categories; audited cost against the stated remit

    Owner: Parliament; NAO

    No date: the timing depends on the steps before it.

Who pays, and what is still missing

Cost, committed funding and the remaining gap for the same scope and years. A programme envelope is not an award to a project; a proposal is not committed money. None of these costs has been established yet, so no total is shown.

Cost and funding ledger

  • Reporting and audit work for a reconciled cost statement

    A27 · administration · not costed

    Amount
    Not yet costed
    Who pays
    central government
    Committed
    None identified
    Proposed, not committed
    —
    Gap
    Not established
  • Review and transition costs of an alternative Grant settlement

    A28 · administration · not costed

    Amount
    Not yet costed
    Who pays
    central government
    Committed
    None identified
    Proposed, not committed
    —
    Gap
    Not established

“Not yet costed” means no defensible cost has been found — not that the action is free. Lifetime benefits, benefit-cost ratios and forecast savings are never shown here as money available to spend.

What the evidence says each action changes

No effect has been established for these actions yet: direction plausible; size not established.

How we would know

Sovereign Grant; Royal security cost published.

The outcome measures to watch. A baseline is where we start, not a target; where there is no official target we say so.

Where the ideas come from

Research, counter-evidence and methods (5 sources; 2 claims held back)
  • Sovereign Grant Act 2011: Report of the Royal Trustees on the Sovereign Grant 2025–26 — HM Treasury, 2025.Statutory report; United Kingdom. Full text checked, 2026-10-04.
  • The British Monarchy: FAQs — UCL Constitution Unit, 2025-11 (live explainer).Constitutional explainer. Full text checked (read from an Internet Archive copy), 2026-10-04. Limits: Does not discuss security costs or tourism, so it is not cited for either. Its financial figures predate the 2025–26 Grant; current amounts come from the Royal Trustees’ report and the Commons Library.
  • Sovereign Grant Act 2011: Report of the Royal Trustees on the Sovereign Grant Review 2026 — HM Treasury (Royal Trustees), 2026-06.Statutory review report; United Kingdom. Full text checked, 2026-10-04.
  • Finances of the Monarchy (CBP-9807) — House of Commons Library (David Torrance, Lorna Booth), 2026-06-05.Parliamentary research briefing; United Kingdom. Relevant passages checked (read from an Internet Archive copy), 2026-10-04.
  • Sovereign Grant Bill (bill 4280) — UK Parliament, 2026-09-01.Bill before Parliament (Burnham government). Full text checked, 2026-10-04. Limits: Introduced 1 September 2026 by HM Treasury; all Commons stages 14 September 2026; in the Lords (second reading stage at 4 October 2026). Sets the 2027-28 Grant at £99.9m and the reference percentage at 20.5%; clause 3 reserve-band trigger for a reset.

Counter-evidence and criticism

  • Publish a fuller, auditable monarchy cost statement: Security disclosure could put people at risk; some costs (such as state events) serve wider public purposes and would exist under other arrangements; a statement proves neither value nor misconduct. (House of Commons Library)
  • Test the royal grant against an explicit public purpose: A formula gives stability and keeps decisions at arm’s length from ministers; constitutional preferences are value choices; claimed tourism benefits and costs are both highly uncertain. (House of Commons Library)

Claims held back

  • Undisclosed security costs and speculative tourism arguments (brief threat, cited to S20) — The UCL FAQ does not discuss security or tourism. Needed: Re-sourced to the Commons Library briefing (sections 8.1–8.2); no estimate of either is published here.
  • A total public cost of the monarchy — Security and some other costs are undisclosed, so any total would be invented. Needed: An official reconciled statement (action A27).

“Full text checked” means we read the report itself; “relevant passages” means the sections behind each figure; “summary or abstract only” means we could not read the full study, so no number from it is published here without another source.

Other options compared — not on the shortlist (1)

Other options compared

Options from earlier work on this page that are not on the shortlist. They remain valid choices; their evidence is shown as before.

  • structuralStatus: proposed

    Wider audit scope

    Aims to:
    Independent assurance over spending outside the Grant.
    How:
    Extend National Audit Office access to related costs and to the Royal Household’s use of public funds beyond the Grant accounts.
    Who decides:
    Parliament; National Audit Office.
    Main constraint:
    Legal basis for access.
    Evidence:
    Not evaluated — a mechanism to test, not an evidenced fix
    See the trade-offs and evidence
    What the evidence shows
    The Grant accounts are audited; related costs elsewhere are covered only within each body’s own accounts.
    Resources
    NAO time.
    Consent and decisions needed
    Parliamentary support needed.
    Time
    One to two years.
    Cost and yield
    Small.
    Trade-offs and who pays
    Limited direct effect on spending.
    How we would know it worked
    Leading indicator: Audit reports published. Outcome: Clearer value-for-money evidence. It would not be working if: Reports cannot obtain the needed information.
The options side by side
OptionResourcesTimeEvidenceOutcome to watch
Wider audit scopeNAO time.One to two years.not evaluatedClearer value-for-money evidence.

Plan reviewed 2026-10-04. How we judge evidence.

How this connects