Half the government’s tracked pledges still lack a costed timetable.

The problem

Half the commitments tracked on this site lack a dated, costed plan, and departments have not published outcome delivery plans since July 2021, so delivery is hard to judge against what was promised.

Who is affected, and where

Voters, Parliament and the people who use the services each commitment affects. Territory: UK. UK government departments; many commitments apply to England only. Devolved governments publish their own programmes and are not covered here.

Policy status

Proposed by researchers or others, not government policy. Recommended by the National Audit Office (October 2024). Outcome delivery plans were produced after the 2020 Spending Review and published in July 2021, but not since; ministers told a Commons committee in 2023 that they were used internally. UK Facts’ own registry tracks plan, authority, delivery and outcome for each tracked commitment — a site-editorial complement, not a substitute.

The evidence

What the research found:

The NAO recommends publishing departmental outcome delivery plans and cross-cutting mission plans at least annually, plus a summary of spending choices after each spending review. It finds government “prone to under-estimate on costs and over-promise on outcomes”.

Evaluated on:

UK central government planning and spending, 1998–2024; UK central government

Our recommendation (separate from the research):

Fill the missing owner, baseline, outcome, budget and milestone fields for every tracked commitment, publish them in the next planning cycle, and report plan completeness and service outcomes separately.

Strongest counter-evidence:

Plans continued inside government after 2021 without visible effect; published targets can be gamed and add workload, and publication is not delivery.

Cost and funding

Cost completeness: Not yet costed. Funding: Not a direct public-spending programme.

• Departmental analytical, finance and delivery staff time for published plans (administration; paid by central government): Not yet costed. No grant programme, but existing staff time has an opportunity cost; it is not zero. The NAO does not cost its recommendation.

Who pays:

Departments, from administrative budgets: analytical, finance and delivery staff time. There is no grant programme, but the staff time is a real cost.

Financing proposed:

A named departmental or Cabinet Office allocation, or an explicit statement of which existing work gives way.

Gap remaining:

Staff time not costed — not zero.

What delivery needs

Skills:

Analysts, finance and delivery staff.

Operational capacity:

Departmental performance data matched to each commitment.

Infrastructure:

A public register of commitments with revision history.

Permissions:

None.

Law:

None: an administrative decision.

Public consent:

Ministers accepting public milestones that may be missed.

First step and stages

First step: Complete the missing owner, baseline, outcome, budget and milestone fields for each tracked commitment. (owner: Cabinet Office with each department (UK Facts for its own registry))

1. Complete the missing fields — Departments; UK Facts for its registry (proposed stage, not an official timetable)
2. Publish in the next planning cycle — Cabinet Office and HM Treasury (proposed stage, not an official timetable)
3. Report against stable milestones — Departments, scrutinised by Parliament and the NAO (proposed stage, not an official timetable)

Depends on: A matching official statistic for each commitment; Funding decisions at fiscal events

Trade-offs

Who gains and who loses:

Voters and Parliament gain information; the cost falls on departmental staff time.

What else the money or effort could do:

Analyst and finance time not spent on delivery itself.

Strongest counterargument:

Fixed public targets can distort priorities and invite gaming; plans existed internally without improving outcomes.

Risks:

Target gaming, bureaucratic workload, and treating publication as delivery.

How we would judge it

Baseline:

Share of tracked commitments with a dated, costed plan (this site’s delivery board).

Leading indicator:

Plans published with owner, baseline, budget and milestones for each commitment.

Outcome:

Timely service outcomes for each commitment, reported separately from plan completeness.

Continue, adapt or stop:

Treat plan completeness as an input only; judge success on measured outcomes, and flag any commitment whose milestones slip without a published explanation.

Earlier option on this page

This card replaces the option “Publish a delivery plan for every commitment” (external option: Recommended by the NAO; this site has not found current published plans for the commitments tracked here.). Its evidence: The NAO recommends publishing departmental outcome delivery plans at least annually; plans were produced after the 2020 Spending Review and published in July 2021, but have not been published since (paragraph 1.17). That is an audit judgement, not an evaluation showing plans improve delivery. National Audit Office, Lessons learned: a planning and spending framework that enables long-term value for money (October 2024)

Sources

• National Audit Office, Lessons learned: a planning and spending framework that enables long-term value for money (HC 234, Session 2024-25), Summary paragraph 11, recommendation (a) (printed p.9) (2024-10-27; relevant passages checked)
• National Audit Office, Lessons learned: a planning and spending framework that enables long-term value for money (HC 234, Session 2024-25), Paragraph 1.17 (printed p.18): plans not published since July 2021 (2024-10-27; relevant passages checked)
• National Audit Office, Lessons learned: a planning and spending framework that enables long-term value for money (HC 234, Session 2024-25), Paragraph 2.52 (printed p.40) (2024-10-27; relevant passages checked)
• National Audit Office, Lessons learned: a planning and spending framework that enables long-term value for money (HC 234, Session 2024-25), Paragraph 2.16 (printed p.26): plans kept internally; some metrics poorly aligned to outcomes (2024-10-27; relevant passages checked)

Source published 27 October 2024 (NAO); evidence reviewed 2026-10-04. Reconsider if: The government publishes outcome delivery plans; The Budget confirms or changes funding for tracked commitments; A further NAO report on planning and spending.

The problem

Spending decisions are short-term and reactive, and debt interest and borrowing limit choices without saying which spending is least valuable.

Who is affected, and where

Users of public services and taxpayers across the UK. Territory: UK. Applies to UK departments; devolved governments set their own budgets within block grants, not assessed here.

Policy status

UK Facts proposal. Builds on existing practice: Spending Review 2025 set departmental budgets to 2028–29 and the Green Book (2026) and NAO recommend realistic costs and evaluation. A published “cost of current standards” baseline for each service is a UK Facts proposal.

The evidence

What the research found:

The NAO found a short-term, reactive approach with no cultural shift to long-term value for money, and recommended annual departmental and cross-cutting delivery plans and publication of completed evaluations.

Evaluated on:

UK central government spending reviews, 1998–2024; NAO audit synthesis

Our recommendation (separate from the research):

Publish service baselines and the cost of maintaining standards before each spending review; name the budget reduced whenever money is reallocated.

Strongest counter-evidence:

Planning documents can become paperwork; targets invite gaming; services whose savings are easy to measure may be cut ahead of more valuable ones.

Cost and funding

Cost completeness: Not yet costed. Funding: Not yet costed / funding not identified.

• Analytical and delivery capacity to publish service baselines and outcome measures (administration; paid by central government): Not yet costed. Existing staff time has an opportunity cost. Cash-releasing savings must be shown separately from service improvements.

Who pays:

HM Treasury and departments (analytical and delivery staff time).

Financing proposed:

None. No automatic savings are assumed; any reprioritisation must name the budget reduced and the service forgone.

Gap remaining:

Unknown: analytical capacity has not been costed.

What delivery needs

Skills:

Analysts, evaluators and finance staff.

Operational capacity:

Consistent cost and outcome data across departments.

Infrastructure:

None beyond data systems.

Permissions:

None.

Law:

None required.

Public consent:

Ministers accepting published trade-offs.

First step and stages

First step: Publish consistent baselines and the cost of maintaining present service standards for the next planning cycle. (owner: HM Treasury)

1. Agree service baselines and outcome measures — HM Treasury and departments (proposed stage, not an official timetable)
2. Use them in the next spending review — HM Treasury (proposed stage, not an official timetable)
3. Compare forecasts with outturn each year without rewriting the baseline — HM Treasury; NAO (proposed stage, not an official timetable)

Depends on: A47: one ledger of costs and funding; Departmental evaluation capacity

Trade-offs

Who gains and who loses:

Services with weak outcome data risk losing out; users of high-value but hard-to-measure services need protection.

What else the money or effort could do:

Analytical time spent on baselines is not spent on policy development.

Strongest counterargument:

Spending choices are political; better data cannot settle which outcomes matter most.

Risks:

Gaming, optimistic assumptions and cutting what is easy to measure.

How we would judge it

Baseline:

Debt interest £108.9bn and borrowing £134.3bn in 2025–26 (OBR databank).

Leading indicator:

Share of departmental budgets with published baselines and outcome measures.

Outcome:

Forecast-versus-outturn gaps in cost and outcomes; maintenance backlogs.

Continue, adapt or stop:

Review if published baselines are not used in allocation decisions within one spending review.

Sources

• National Audit Office, Lessons learned: a planning and spending framework that enables long-term value for money (HC 234, Session 2024-25), Summary paragraph 11 (2024-10-27; relevant passages checked)
• HM Treasury, The Green Book (2026), Chapters 6–9; affordability criteria (2026-02-05; relevant passages checked)
• National Audit Office, Lessons learned: a planning and spending framework that enables long-term value for money (HC 234, Session 2024-25), Summary (2024-10-27; relevant passages checked)

Source published October 2024 (NAO); February 2026 (Green Book); evidence reviewed 2026-10-04. Reconsider if: The next spending review; New NAO work on spending frameworks.