Revenue options · United Kingdom · costings for 2027–28 to 2029–30

Billions in possible tax revenue. Who would actually pay?

HMRC’s June 2025 illustrative estimate: one penny on the basic rate of income tax, from April 2026, would raise about £8.3bn in 2027–28. That date has passed and later Budgets changed the baseline, so treat it as an order of magnitude. VAT, National Insurance and collecting unpaid tax offer different yields, costs and trade-offs; the estimates cannot simply be added together.

Priority: Compare credible net revenue choices and their distributional and economic effects. What would change it →

Evidence last reviewed 3 October 2026

Overview

The short version

Three key measures

Who pays, who gains

Broad taxes raise the most because almost everyone pays them; taxes on wealth reach few households because wealth is highly concentrated. Which is fairer is a value judgement this page does not make. What could be funded is a separate decision again: revenue raised is not earmarked, and turning money into shorter waiting lists or more homes needs staff, buildings and time that a revenue estimate does not show.

The evidence

What could raise money, from whom, and on what conditions

What could each option raise under a specified design?

The biggest yields come from broad taxes on income, work and spending — and a higher capital gains rate would lose money

Estimated additional revenue for specific designs, grouped by kind. Rate and base changes: HMRC ready-reckoner, 2027–28, £bn cash. Each row is a separate illustrative change, not additive, and scales differ between groups.

United Kingdom · Rate changes: 2027–28 for a change made in April 2026. Compliance: 2029–30. Wealth Tax Commission: 2020 study.

Collect tax already due (a year)

  • Compliance and debt package (Autumn Budget 2024, extended since)Annual, by 2029–30; already in the forecasts£10.0bn
  • Further compliance beyond the packageNo robust estimate: the tax gap is not a measure of what more enforcement would collect

Change rates or bases — HMRC ready-reckoner, 2027–28 (a year, each change on its own)

  • Employer National Insurance +1 percentage point£11.3bn
  • VAT standard rate +1 percentage point£9.2bn
  • Income tax basic rate +1p£8.3bn
  • Employee National Insurance main rate +1 percentage point£5.3bn
  • Corporation tax main rate +1 percentage point£3.9bn
  • Income tax higher rate +1p£2.1bn
  • Income tax additional rate +1p£0.27bn
  • Inheritance tax standard rate +1 percentage point£0.24bn
  • Capital gains tax higher rate +10 percentage pointsLoses money: sales are delayed or avoided£-2.1bn

Property and wealth (a year)

  • Annual wealth tax, 0.6% above £2m (Wealth Tax Commission illustration)Per year after administration costs; 2020 study, not an official costing£10.0bn
  • Annual wealth tax, 2% above £10mNo robust estimate: no primary costing found (an earlier “£17bn” is withdrawn)
  • Council tax revaluation or reformNo official yield: depends entirely on design; many proposals are revenue-neutral

One-off receipts (total, not a year)

  • One-off wealth tax, 1% a year for five years above £500,000 (Wealth Tax Commission)Total over five years, not per year£260.0bn
A point on a broad base — employer National Insurance, VAT or the basic rate of income tax — raises £8–11bn a year. Narrower taxes on the wealthiest raise far less per point, and the HMRC estimate for a 10-point rise in the higher capital gains rate is negative, because people delay or avoid selling assets. No range is published for these figures, so none is shown. Rows cannot be added: several changes would interact.

United Kingdom · Rate changes: 2027–28 for a change made in April 2026. Compliance: 2029–30. Wealth Tax Commission: 2020 study. · HMRC estimates are official statistics on an illustrative basis; the compliance yield is a government costing; Wealth Tax Commission figures are independent research

Sources, definitions and data — The biggest yields come from broad taxes on income, work and spending — and a higher capital gains rate would lose money
Geography:
United Kingdom
Measure:
£ billion a year (one-off group: £ billion total)
Period:
Rate changes: 2027–28 for a change made in April 2026. Compliance: 2029–30. Wealth Tax Commission: 2020 study.
Status:
HMRC estimates are official statistics on an illustrative basis; the compliance yield is a government costing; Wealth Tax Commission figures are independent research
Calculation:
HMRC £ million converted to £ billion. No adjustment for overlap; no group total.
Compare with:
Total public sector receipts £1,231.3bn in 2025–26
Not included / breaks:
Ready-reckoner figures are direct effects of small changes and include some behavioural response; large changes cause proportionately larger responses. Pension fund investment is excluded: it is financing capital, not tax revenue. The Energy Profits Levy and Digital Services Tax are excluded because their receipts are already in the forecasts.

Source: HMRC, Direct effects of illustrative tax changes (June 2025) (released 24 June 2025). Chart REV-01.

View the data as a table
GroupDesignEstimateBasis
Collect tax already dueCompliance and debt package (Autumn Budget 2024, extended since)£10.0bnAnnual, by 2029–30; already in the forecasts
Collect tax already dueFurther compliance beyond the packageNo robust estimate
Change rates or basesEmployer National Insurance +1 percentage point£11.25bn2027–28, HMRC ready-reckoner
Change rates or basesVAT standard rate +1 percentage point£9.20bn2027–28, HMRC ready-reckoner
Change rates or basesIncome tax basic rate +1p£8.25bn2027–28, HMRC ready-reckoner
Change rates or basesEmployee National Insurance main rate +1 percentage point£5.30bn2027–28, HMRC ready-reckoner
Change rates or basesCorporation tax main rate +1 percentage point£3.90bn2027–28, HMRC ready-reckoner
Change rates or basesIncome tax higher rate +1p£2.15bn2027–28, HMRC ready-reckoner
Change rates or basesIncome tax additional rate +1p£0.27bn2027–28, HMRC ready-reckoner
Change rates or basesInheritance tax standard rate +1 percentage point£0.24bn2027–28, HMRC ready-reckoner
Change rates or basesCapital gains tax higher rate +10 percentage points£-2.06bn2027–28, HMRC ready-reckoner
Property and wealthAnnual wealth tax, 0.6% above £2m (Wealth Tax Commission illustration)£10.0bnPer year after administration costs; 2020 study, not an official costing
Property and wealthAnnual wealth tax, 2% above £10mNo robust estimate
Property and wealthCouncil tax revaluation or reformNo robust estimate
One-off receiptsOne-off wealth tax, 1% a year for five years above £500,000 (Wealth Tax Commission)£260bn totalTotal over five years, not per year

Scroll the table sideways to see every column.

Shareable visual summary

Visual summary

Editorial explainer

An explanation of how to read the evidence. It shows no statistic.

A big number is not a costed revenue plan.

Collecting existing taxes, changing tax rules and selling assets need different costings. One-off proceeds and recurring revenue are different things.

How to read it

  1. Step 1Collect what is owed
  2. Step 2Change the rules
  3. Step 3Sell or lease assets
  4. Step 4Cost each separately

Editorial explainer: no statistic is shown.

Editorial explainer. No statistic is shown.
Download image (PNG, 1024 by 1536 pixels)

A big number is not a costed revenue plan.

A big number is not a costed revenue plan — editorial explainer from UK Facts.
Text and data version

A big number is not a costed revenue plan. Collecting existing taxes, changing tax rules and selling assets need different costings. One-off proceeds and recurring revenue are different things.

Editorial explainer: no statistic is shown.

Image description: A big number is not a costed revenue plan — editorial explainer from UK Facts.

All visual summaries, their source records and their publication state are listed on Shareable visuals.

Chapter 1

Collect more of the tax already due

HMRC’s tax gap is the difference between the tax that should in theory be paid and what is paid. Most of it is not deliberate: HMRC’s illustrative split puts the largest parts down to failure to take reasonable care and error, with disputed legal interpretation and non-payment (including insolvency) close behind. That is why the gap is not a pot that enforcement can empty.

Why is most of the tax gap hard to collect?

Most unpaid tax comes from carelessness and error, not evasion

HMRC illustrative tax gap by behaviour, 2024–25, £bn. Total £59.2bn.

United Kingdom · 2024–25 (projected)
  • Failure to take reasonable care£20.8bn
  • Error£9.3bn
  • Evasion£7.1bn
  • Legal interpretationDisputes over what the law requires£6.9bn
  • Non-paymentIncludes insolvency£5.7bn
  • Criminal attacks£5.0bn
  • Hidden economy£3.6bn
  • Avoidance£0.8bn
Evasion, avoidance and criminal attacks together are about 22% of the gap. The rest — carelessness, error, legal disputes, non-payment and the hidden economy — needs different tools: better guidance and record-keeping, clearer law, debt collection. Some, such as tax lost in insolvencies, is largely unrecoverable. Any claim to “close the gap” should say which part it targets.

United Kingdom · 2024–25 (projected) · Illustrative: HMRC labels this split as less certain than the estimates by type of tax

Sources, definitions and data — Most unpaid tax comes from carelessness and error, not evasion
Geography:
United Kingdom
Measure:
£ billion
Period:
2024–25 (projected)
Status:
Illustrative: HMRC labels this split as less certain than the estimates by type of tax
Calculation:
As published.
Compare with:
Total tax gap £59.2bn
Not included / breaks:
Behaviours are HMRC classifications and overlap at the margins.

Source: HMRC, Measuring tax gaps 2026 edition, 1. Tax gaps: summary (estimates for the 2024 to 2025 tax year), Table 7.1 (released 23 June 2026). Chart REV-04.

View the data as a table
Behaviour£bn
Failure to take reasonable care20.8
Error9.3
Evasion7.1
Legal interpretation6.9
Non-payment5.7
Criminal attacks5.0
Hidden economy3.6
Avoidance0.8

HMRC compliance and debt collection (closing part of the tax gap)

£10bn a year by 2029–30

Government estimate for the Autumn Budget 2024 package

Recurring or one-off:
Recurring, building up to 2029–30. Already announced, so already in the fiscal forecasts.
What is costed:
The package recruits 5,500 new compliance caseworkers, retains about 1,200 debt-management staff and recruits 1,200 more, alongside other measures set out at Autumn Budget 2024 and later fiscal events.
Context:
HMRC estimates the total tax gap at £59.2bn in 2024–25 (6.4% of theoretical liabilities). The Corporation Tax gap is £21.0bn (18.1% of liability): £17.3bn small businesses, £1.5bn mid-sized, £2.3bn large. The tax gap is an estimate of tax not paid, not a sum that can be collected: it includes insolvency, error and legal interpretation.
Overlaps:
Any further “close the tax gap” yield overlaps with this package. The large-business share of the Corporation Tax gap (£2.3bn) also overlaps with the multinational option.
Delivery constraints:
Yield depends on recruiting and training the additional staff, so it builds up over several years.
Withdrawn from this page:
A bar showing the whole ~£21bn Corporation Tax gap as an “opportunity” was removed: the gap measures non-payment, not a costed yield.

Sources: HM Treasury, Autumn Budget 2024 (HC 295) (30 October 2024); HMRC, Measuring tax gaps 2026 edition, 1. Tax gaps: summary (estimates for the 2024 to 2025 tax year) (23 June 2026)

What specific avoidance looks like in practice: Tax Policy Associates has documented individual schemes, for example one fragmenting a workforce across thousands of shell companies to claim small-business reliefs. These are illustrations, not a share of the national total. Tax Policy Associates.

Chapter 2

Change rates, bases or reliefs

The most reliable revenue comes from small changes to the biggest taxes, because their bases are large and taxpayers respond only modestly. A new wealth tax counts as a tax change too, even if no existing headline rate moves. Taxes already in place — the Energy Profits Levy and the Digital Services Tax — are already in the forecasts, so their receipts are not new money.

Taxing large multinational digital businesses

No official costing of further measures

The existing Digital Services Tax raised £944m in 2025–26

Recurring or one-off:
Recurring. The DST is already in place, so its receipts are already in the forecasts.
What is costed:
The 2% Digital Services Tax raised £380m in 2021–22, £567m in 2022–23, £678m in 2023–24, £808m in 2024–25 and £944m in 2025–26. The government describes it as an interim measure it will remove once a global agreement on taxing rights is in place.
Context:
No primary source was found that costs a specific further measure aimed at profit shifting by large technology companies.
Overlaps:
Overlaps with the large-business share of the Corporation Tax gap and with HMRC compliance work.
Delivery constraints:
Depends on international agreement.
Withdrawn from this page:
A “£2–4bn a year” estimate was removed: no primary source was found for it.

Sources: HM Treasury/HMRC, Digital Services Tax review report (26 November 2025); HMRC, Tax and NICs receipts for the UK: statistics table (Digital Services Tax) (22 September 2026)

Energy Profits Levy (North Sea windfall tax)

£8.5bn in total, 2025–26 to 2030–31

OBR forecast at the Autumn Budget 2025 for the levy as legislated

Recurring or one-off:
Recurring until the levy ends (31 March 2030, or earlier if prices fall below the Energy Security Investment Mechanism thresholds for six months). Already in the forecast.
What is costed:
The levy has raised more than £11bn since it was introduced in May 2022 (HM Treasury, December 2025).
Context:
Because the levy already exists, its receipts are not new money. Only a higher rate or a later end date would raise more, and no official costing of either was found.
Overlaps:
Charged on the same ring-fenced profits as North Sea Corporation Tax and the Supplementary Charge.
Delivery constraints:
Receipts depend on oil and gas prices and on North Sea production and investment.
Withdrawn from this page:
A claim that a “sustained” windfall tax could raise £5–10bn a year, and an £11.6bn operator-profit figure, were removed: neither had a primary source.

Sources: HM Treasury, written answer to UIN 93531 (Energy Profits Levy) (answered 1 December 2025); OBR, Oil and gas revenues (November 2025 Economic and fiscal outlook) (November 2025)

Chapter 3

Reform property and wealth taxation

Wealth is taxed today mainly when it changes hands — capital gains tax on sales, inheritance tax on death, stamp duty on property — and through council tax, still based on 1991 values in England. Each route has a different evidence base. HMRC’s estimates show that raising capital gains rates sharply can reduce revenue; the Wealth Tax Commission’s figures for an annual tax are independent research, not an official costing.

Annual wealth tax

No official costing

No HMRC or OBR costing of an annual UK wealth tax was found

Recurring or one-off:
An annual tax would be recurring. The Wealth Tax Commission’s preferred design was one-off.
What is costed:
The Wealth Tax Commission recommended against an annual wealth tax and in favour of reforming existing taxes on wealth. As an illustration, an annual 0.6% tax on wealth above £2m could raise £10bn a year after administrative costs; evidence from other countries suggests 7–17% of the base would be lost to avoidance at a 1% rate. Its preferred one-off tax (1% a year for five years above £500,000 per person) could raise £260bn in total.
Context:
A new wealth tax would be a tax change even though existing headline rates would not change. The £260bn is a one-off total over five years, not an annual yield.
Overlaps:
Interacts with Capital Gains Tax and Inheritance Tax, which already tax the same wealth when sold or passed on.
Delivery constraints:
Regular valuation, liquidity problems for asset-rich, cash-poor payers, and behavioural responses; a new administrative system would be needed.
Withdrawn from this page:
A “£17bn” mid-point for a 2% tax above £10m, attributed to the Commission, IPPR and Warwick, was removed: the Commission did not publish it and no primary costing was found.

Source: Wealth Tax Commission, A wealth tax for the UK: final report (9 December 2020)

Chapter 4

Ownership and asset options

Public ownership changes who receives a company’s profits; it does not create tax revenue, and it requires buying the company and taking on its debt. Pension fund investment is different again: steering private pension savings towards UK assets is a question of financing capital, not Exchequer revenue, so it is not on this page’s yield chart (see pensions).

Rail passenger services in public ownership

Up to £150m a year in fees

Department for Transport estimate of fees no longer paid to private operators

Recurring or one-off:
Recurring saving, not new tax revenue. Current policy, implemented as contracts expire.
What is costed:
Operators transfer to public ownership under the Passenger Railway Services (Public Ownership) Act 2024 as their contracts end.
Context:
A saving on fees, not a reclaim of past profits, and already government policy.
Overlaps:
None of the tax options.
Delivery constraints:
Savings arrive only as each contract expires.
Withdrawn from this page:
A “~£500m a year” operator-profit figure was removed: no primary source.

Source: Department for Transport, First train services to return to public ownership revealed (4 December 2024)

Water companies in public ownership

Not a revenue measure; no official costing

Dividends are private payments to shareholders, not lost tax

Recurring or one-off:
One-off cost to acquire, with recurring effects either way.
What is costed:
Companies in England and Wales declared £1.0bn of dividends for 2023–24 and £0.645bn for 2024–25. Sector net debt was £76.3bn at 31 March 2025 (Ofwat).
Context:
Public ownership would mean compensating shareholders and taking on or refinancing the companies’ debt. The net effect depends on the price paid and the cost of borrowing — set out with adjustable assumptions in the model.
Overlaps:
None of the tax options.
Delivery constraints:
Requires legislation and a valuation of the companies.
Withdrawn from this page:
A “£2.4bn” dividend figure shown as annual revenue was removed: dividends are not revenue the government could collect.

Source: Ofwat, Monitoring financial resilience report 2024-25 (November 2025)

Model

Public ownership of water: what it would cost and save

Ofwat’s own figures, with the assumptions that decide the answer on sliders you can move.

Model

Public ownership of the electricity grid

Ofgem’s figures on financing costs, the debt taken on, and who would carry the risk of overruns.

Chapter 5

Revenue range, timing and overlap

Nothing on this page should be added up. The compliance package, the Energy Profits Levy and the Digital Services Tax are already in the forecasts; compliance yield and any multinational measure draw on the same Corporation Tax gap; capital gains and inheritance tax changes interact with any wealth tax; and one-off totals cannot be set against yearly flows.

What has to happen before money arrives?

Broad rate changes can raise money within a year; new wealth and property taxes need new systems first

Qualitative delivery requirements for each kind of option. Text states, not scores.

United Kingdom (council tax: England) · As of October 2026
OptionLegislationAdministrationTaxpayer responseFirst receiptsWho paysUncertainty
Compliance packageMostly not requiredFunded: 5,500 compliance caseworkers and about 2,400 debt postsSome shifting to harder-to-detect non-complianceBuilds from 2025–26Non-compliant taxpayers, mostly small businessesModerate: depends on recruitment
Broad rate rise (income tax, NICs, VAT)Required: Finance ActExisting systemsModest; included in HMRC figuresNext tax yearBroad: most workers or consumersLow for small changes
Capital gains or inheritance tax changesRequired: Finance ActExisting systemsLarge: timing of sales and giftsOne to two years (paid after disposals)Concentrated on wealthier householdsHigh: yields can turn negative
Annual wealth taxRequired: new taxRequired: new valuation systemLarge: 7–17% of the base lost at a 1% rate (Commission’s evidence)Several yearsRichest householdsHigh: no official costing
Council tax revaluationRequiredRequired: revaluation of every home (England last valued 1991)LimitedSeveral yearsDepends on design; shifts bills between areas and homesUnknown: no official costing
The quickest, most certain money comes from small changes to big existing taxes, because the systems exist and the behavioural response is modest. Options aimed at the wealthiest are slower and less certain: they need valuations, new administration, or face large behavioural responses. That is a statement about delivery, not about which option is fairer or more desirable — a separate value judgement.

United Kingdom (council tax: England) · As of October 2026 · Editorial assessment, sourced

Sources, definitions and data — Broad rate changes can raise money within a year; new wealth and property taxes need new systems first
Geography:
United Kingdom (council tax: England)
Measure:
Not quantitative
Period:
As of October 2026
Status:
Editorial assessment, sourced
Calculation:
UK Facts summary of the sources listed for each option on this page.

Source: Wealth Tax Commission, A wealth tax for the UK: final report (released 9 December 2020). Chart REV-02.

View the data as a table
OptionLegislationAdministrationTaxpayer responseFirst receiptsCostWho paysUncertainty
Compliance packageMostly not requiredFunded: 5,500 compliance caseworkers and about 2,400 debt postsSome shifting to harder-to-detect non-complianceBuilds from 2025–26Netted off in the costingNon-compliant taxpayers, mostly small businessesModerate: depends on recruitment
Broad rate rise (income tax, NICs, VAT)Required: Finance ActExisting systemsModest; included in HMRC figuresNext tax yearLowBroad: most workers or consumersLow for small changes
Capital gains or inheritance tax changesRequired: Finance ActExisting systemsLarge: timing of sales and giftsOne to two years (paid after disposals)LowConcentrated on wealthier householdsHigh: yields can turn negative
Annual wealth taxRequired: new taxRequired: new valuation systemLarge: 7–17% of the base lost at a 1% rate (Commission’s evidence)Several yearsMaterial; netted off in the Commission’s £10bn illustrationRichest householdsHigh: no official costing
Council tax revaluationRequiredRequired: revaluation of every home (England last valued 1991)LimitedSeveral yearsRevaluation cost unknownDepends on design; shifts bills between areas and homesUnknown: no official costing

Scroll the table sideways to see every column.

Chapter 6

Who pays, who gains — and what could be funded?

Who would a wealth tax fall on?

The richest tenth of households hold 41% of household wealth; the poorer half hold 10%

Share of total household wealth (property, pensions, financial and physical), Great Britain, 2020–22 (filled) and 2018–20 (open).

Great Britain · 2020–22 and 2018–20
2020–222018–20
  • Richest tenth of households40.7%
  • Poorer half of households9.8%
Wealth is far more concentrated than income, so taxes on wealth fall on a small number of households and their yield depends on how those households respond. The share held by the richest tenth fell between the last two survey periods, partly because pension wealth is valued with interest rates that rose. That valuation effect is a reminder that wealth figures move with markets.

Great Britain · 2020–22 and 2018–20 · Official statistics (Wealth and Assets Survey)

Sources, definitions and data — The richest tenth of households hold 41% of household wealth; the poorer half hold 10%
Geography:
Great Britain — Private households
Measure:
% of total household wealth
Period:
2020–22 and 2018–20
Status:
Official statistics (Wealth and Assets Survey)
Calculation:
Wealth held by each group divided by total household wealth, from stored ONS series.
Not included / breaks:
Survey-based: the very wealthiest are under-represented. Pension wealth is a large part of the total and is not easily taxed annually.

Source: ONS, Household total wealth in Great Britain: April 2020 to March 2022. Chart REV-03.

View the data as a table
Group2020–222018–20
Richest tenth of households40.7%43.5%
Poorer half of households9.8%8.7%

Go deeper

Evidence → choices → outcomes

What could improve it?

Credible extra net receipts, chosen as clear alternatives, with who pays shown before any decision.

These options link to their national assessment, including funding, delivery constraints and remaining uncertainties.

  • Assessed option · provisional

    Close capital-tax reliefs rather than raise rates

    7/10 criteria scored

    Coverage of the appraisal, not an impact score.

    Delivery: Amber

    Whole-life costs incomplete

    Evidence and delivery constraints

    Illustrative rate changes and another party’s design do not cost the proposed relief package. Effects depend on exact reliefs and behaviour.

    Name reliefs, thresholds, interactions and transition; obtain distributional/behavioural costing and administrative assessment.

    Equality and opportunity listEvidence and assessment

  • Assessed option · provisional

    Property and land tax reform

    8/10 criteria scored

    Coverage of the appraisal, not an impact score.

    Delivery: Amber

    Whole-life costs incomplete

    Evidence and delivery constraints

    Modelled designs exist; exact tax base, jurisdiction and transition are not specified.

    Separate council-tax revaluation, land/property tax and transaction-tax changes; model losers and deferral options.

    Equality and opportunity listEvidence and assessment

  • Assessed option · provisional

    Collect the tax already due

    8/10 criteria scored

    Coverage of the appraisal, not an impact score.

    Delivery: Amber

    Whole-life costs incomplete

    Evidence and delivery constraints

    Compliance activity can yield revenue; the return from the proposed extra high-wealth focus is not established here.

    Reconcile existing forecast baseline; define cases, staff, legal powers and collection horizon; audit net additional receipts.

    Equality and opportunity listEvidence and assessment

  • Assessed option · provisional

    Utilities: stop overpaying for finance, make failure cost shareholders

    7/10 criteria scored

    Coverage of the appraisal, not an impact score.

    Delivery: Red

    Whole-life costs incomplete

    Evidence and delivery constraints

    Site scenarios are not demonstrated savings. Price controls, insolvency, refinancing and asset ownership have different counterfactuals.

    Separate sectors and instruments; assess legal/regulatory powers, financing, compensation, investment and service quality.

    Equality and opportunity listEvidence and assessment

This domain in the UK SWOT →UK National Action Plan →

How we assessed these options

What would it take to improve this?

What would move the needle?

The outcome we want: Credible extra net receipts, chosen as clear alternatives, with who pays shown before any decision.

The main constraint: Every option has payers and behavioural responses, estimates sit on different baselines and years, and some designs need a revaluation or new valuation system first — so the binding decisions for HM Treasury and Parliament are who pays and which single package to pursue, not how many billions can be added up.

Constraint type: public consent, evidence, legislation.

The options on the table

What is funded now, and the changes assessed against it — the current baseline and the alternatives, before the position today and the actions.

Provisional single-reviewer assessments from the 6 October 2026 review; not approved business cases, and not government policy.

  • Close capital-tax reliefs rather than raise ratesDelivery RAG: Amber

    Funded now
    Baseline: CGT rates of 18% and 24% since October 2024; business asset disposal relief rising to 18% from April 2026; a £2.5m allowance for agricultural and business property relief from April 2026. Closing further reliefs instead of raising rates is a UK Facts framing of options, not government policy.
    The change assessed
    Not yet defined.

    Range if completed: 11.0–20.0 out of 30 (equal weights; not yet assessed: increment beyond baseline (Ad), expected incremental benefit (Bn), incremental affordability (Co))

  • Property and land tax reformDelivery RAG: Amber

    Funded now
    Not yet stated in the record.
    The change assessed
    Not yet defined.

    Range if completed: 13.0–19.0 out of 30 (equal weights; not yet assessed: expected incremental benefit (Bn), incremental affordability (Co))

  • A tax on the very top fortunes: three designsDelivery RAG: Red

    Funded now
    Not yet stated in the record.
    The change assessed
    Not yet defined.

    Range if completed: 9.0–18.0 out of 30 (equal weights; not yet assessed: increment beyond baseline (Ad), expected incremental benefit (Bn), incremental affordability (Co))

Assessed with another page as home

These options also bear on this topic. The full assessment sits on the home page named under each.

  • Collect the tax already dueDelivery RAG: Amber

    Home: Follow the money.

    Funded now
    A large package is already funded and running: Autumn Budget 2024 expected £6.5bn a year by 2029–30 from 5,000 extra compliance staff and 1,800 debt-management staff. Later measures raised this: HMRC’s August 2026 update gives £10bn of additional tax revenue a year by 2029–30 and plans for 5,500 new compliance caseworkers (more than 2,400 compliance staff recruited since Autumn Budget 2024). That yield is already in the fiscal forecasts. Any further package beyond it is a UK Facts proposal.
    The change assessed
    Not yet defined.

    Range if completed: 13.0–19.0 out of 30 (equal weights; not yet assessed: expected incremental benefit (Bn), incremental affordability (Co))

  • Utilities: stop overpaying for finance, make failure cost shareholdersDelivery RAG: Red

    Home: Energy.

    Funded now
    Not yet stated in the record.
    The change assessed
    Not yet defined.

    Range if completed: 9.0–18.0 out of 30 (equal weights; not yet assessed: increment beyond baseline (Ad), expected incremental benefit (Bn), incremental affordability (Co))

Alternatives already on record: 23 options listed under the points in the position today (13 without an action record), and 3 earlier options under other options compared. They have not been scored in the review.

The position today

  • What we can build on (2)
  • What is holding us back (3)Estimates rest on different years, baselines and behaviour: HMRC’s lines are single small changes, the IFS tax options predate Budget 2025, and the IFS council-tax modelling uses 2019 values — so they cannot be added together.
  • What could improve things (1)Comparing a broad-tax package, a compliance package and a revenue-neutral property-tax reform on one baseline would show real choices — and that the property reform redistributes rather than raises money.
  • What could make it worse (2)

Which quadrant a point sits in is our analytical judgement, not a statistical category. Each point says whether it is a measured fact, our synthesis or a risk.

What we can build on Strengths

What is holding us back Weaknesses

What could improve things Opportunities

What could make it worse Threats

The actions worth examining

Our shortlist for this page. Research quality, policy status, cost and funding are judged separately; none of these is government policy unless its status says so.Our shortlist. None is government policy unless its status says so.

  1. Close capital-tax reliefs before raising rates, with an official costing — not a direct public-spending programme
  2. Reform property taxes without hiding the losers — not yet costed / funding not identified
  3. Show tax choices with their real trade-offs — not a direct public-spending programme

And 1 more in the full list.

  • Action 1A62Policy status: external proposal

    Close capital-tax reliefs before raising rates, with an official costing

    Narrowing or removing specific reliefs (such as business asset disposal relief or the uplift at death) raises revenue by widening the base, with less behavioural loss than higher rates, once each measure has an official costing.

    The thread: issue, evidence, action

    1. Issue Weakness: Reliefs narrow the capital taxes: business asset disposal relief cost about £1.0bn in 2023–24 and agricultural and business property relief about £1.9bn in 2022–23, while gains held at death are not taxed and HMRC does not estimate their cost. The OBR expects behaviour to remove about 60% of the static yield of the 2024 capital gains tax rate rises. Also: threat
    2. Evidence Cost of business asset disposal relief; Capital gains tax receipts
    3. Action A62, this action

    Assessment (draft, 6 October review)

    Who decides:
    HM Treasury and HMRC, with Parliament through a Finance Act (UK)
    Evidence:
    Modelled scenario. Official costings show large behavioural responses to rate rises; independent modelling costs packages that close reliefs together with higher rates; no official costing of closing reliefs alone exists.
    Expected effect:
    Direction plausible; size not established.
    Cost and funding

    Not yet costed

    Funding: Not a direct public-spending programme

    Why it is shortlisted here: The national capital-reliefs option (Equality list): reliefs narrow the capital taxes and rate rises lose much of their yield to behaviour, but closing reliefs alone has no official costing; asking for one, measure by measure, is the bounded step. It builds on the capital-taxes option card, which stays.

    Builds on the option Reform taxes on capital gains and inheritance compared below.

    What it takes
    The problem

    Reliefs narrow the capital taxes: business asset disposal relief cost about £1.0bn in 2023–24 and agricultural and business property relief about £1.9bn in 2022–23, gains at death are not taxed or costed, and the OBR expects behaviour to remove about 60% of the static yield from the 2024 rate rises.

    Who is affected, and where

    People who realise or pass on capital gains and estates in the UK — concentrated at the top: 45% of capital gains tax came from gains of £5m or more in 2024–25. Territory: UK. Capital gains tax and inheritance tax are reserved and UK-wide.

    Policy status

    Proposed by researchers or others, not government policy. Baseline: CGT rates of 18% and 24% since October 2024; business asset disposal relief rising to 18% from April 2026; a £2.5m allowance for agricultural and business property relief from April 2026. Closing further reliefs instead of raising rates is a UK Facts framing of options, not government policy.

    The evidence
    What the research found:
    The OBR expects behaviour to cut the static yield of the 2024 rate rises by about 60% (from £5.9bn to £2.4bn in 2029–30). CenTax estimates a package that equalises rates, removes uplift at death and taxes gains on emigration would raise about £14bn a year.
    Evaluated on:
    UK capital gains taxpayers (OBR and HMRC costings; CenTax using HMRC data); United Kingdom
    Transfer to this case:
    Costings depend on behavioural assumptions the OBR calls among the most uncertain.
    Our recommendation (separate from the research):
    Ask HMRC and the OBR to cost, measure by measure, removing uplift at death, restricting business asset disposal relief and holdover relief, and publish the costings before choosing between reliefs and rates.
    Strongest counter-evidence:
    The independent package raises rates and closes reliefs together; closing reliefs alone has no official costing, and relief costs are not the yield from removing them.
    Cost and funding

    Cost completeness: Not yet costed. Funding: Not a direct public-spending programme.

      Who pays:
      Taxpayers with large gains and estates; HMRC for administration.
      Financing proposed:
      Not applicable: a revenue measure.
      Gap remaining:
      Unknown: the yield of closing each relief, after behaviour, and the cost of uplift at death have not been estimated officially.
      What delivery needs
      Skills:
      HMRC policy and costing staff.
      Operational capacity:
      HMRC compliance.
      Infrastructure:
      Existing tax systems.
      Permissions:
      None.
      Law:
      Finance Act changes.
      Public consent:
      Parliamentary approval.
      First step and stages

      First step: HM Treasury asks HMRC and the OBR to publish costings of removing uplift at death and restricting business asset disposal and holdover relief, each with its behavioural assumptions. (owner: HM Treasury with HMRC and the OBR)

      1. Cost each relief change — HMRC and the OBR (proposed stage, not an official timetable)
      2. Decide in a Budget — HM Treasury (proposed stage, not an official timetable)
      3. Monitor receipts and claims — HMRC (proposed stage, not an official timetable)

      Depends on: OBR certification of costings

      Trade-offs
      Who gains and who loses:
      Falls on people with large gains and estates; business owners selling up and family farms and businesses are the main groups affected.
      What else the money or effort could do:
      Political capital and Finance Act time; possible effects on business succession and investment.
      Strongest counterargument:
      Reliefs encourage enterprise and family business continuity; removing them may reduce investment or move people abroad.
      Risks:
      Behaviour reducing yield (delay, emigration, restructuring); complexity at transition.
      How we would judge it
      Baseline:
      2024–25: £24.2bn CGT liabilities on £127bn of gains; business asset disposal relief claimed on £18.5bn of gains.
      Leading indicator:
      Official costings published.
      Outcome:
      CGT and IHT receipts against forecasts; claims of reliefs.
      Continue, adapt or stop:
      Compare receipts with the costing; review where behaviour removes more than forecast.
      Sources

      Source published 22 January 2026 (HMRC reliefs); 27 August 2026 (CGT statistics); 30 October 2024 (OBR); evidence reviewed 2026-10-07. Reconsider if: The Budget on 28 October 2026; The next tax relief statistics.

    • Action 2A22Policy status: external proposal

      Reform property taxes without hiding the losers

      Revalue homes and relate council tax more closely to current value, with central funding adjusted between councils and protection or deferral for cash-poor owners — publishing who gains and who loses before deciding.

      The thread: issue, evidence, action

      1. Issue Weakness: Council tax bands in England still rest on April 1991 values, and the top band pays three times the bottom band although those homes were worth at least eight times as much in 1991. Also: threat, opportunity, strength
      2. Evidence Council tax: top-band bill as a multiple of the bottom band
      3. Action A22, this action

      Assessment (draft, 6 October review)

      • A new scope of this action (A22v2): Property and land tax reform

        Delivery RAG: AmberGate: pending

        Range if completed: 13.0–19.0 out of 30 (equal weights; not yet assessed: expected incremental benefit (Bn), incremental affordability (Co))

        National plan: Equality and opportunity list

      Who decides:
      HM Treasury and MHCLG; the Valuation Office Agency; councils; Parliament (England)
      Evidence:
      Modelled scenario. A detailed IFS microsimulation of specified reforms on 2019 values; no reform has been implemented in England to evaluate.
      Expected effect:
      Direction plausible; size not established.
      Cost and funding

      Not yet costed

      Funding: Not yet costed / funding not identified

      Why it is shortlisted here: The clearest case where a reform is revenue-neutral by design and must show who loses.

      What it takes
      The problem

      Council tax in England still rests on 1991 values and is regressive with respect to property value, while transaction taxes discourage moving.

      Who is affected, and where

      Households and councils in England (council tax); home buyers (stamp duty land tax). Territory: England. Council tax and land transaction taxes are devolved; Wales is running its own council tax reform, and Scotland and Northern Ireland have separate systems, not assessed here.

      Policy status

      Proposed by researchers or others, not government policy. Full revaluation is not government policy for England. Budget 2025 added a High Value Council Tax Surcharge on homes worth £2m or more from April 2028 (around £430m a year to central government), which is already in the Budget arithmetic. A wider revenue-neutral reform is the IFS’s proposal.

      The evidence
      What the research found:
      A proportional, revalued council tax would cut net bills by 0.5–0.9% of household income on average for the bottom half of incomes and raise them by 0.7% for the top tenth; 10.1 million households would gain over £200 a year and 4.2 million lose over £200. In London about 17% of the poorest fifth would lose over £200 a year. A pure revaluation changes few bills by more than £50.
      Evaluated on:
      Households in England (IFS model, Q1 2019 property values); England, revenue-neutral reforms with full adjustment of central funding
      Transfer to this case:
      Values and incomes have moved since 2019; results need re-running on current data.
      Our recommendation (separate from the research):
      Publish household and council-level winners and losers for a specified design, with transition relief and deferral, before any decision; keep a revenue-neutral reform separate from new revenue.
      Strongest counter-evidence:
      Cash-poor owners of valuable homes (often pensioners) and low-income renters in expensive areas can lose; large bill changes provoke resistance; deferral schemes can undermine revenue if poorly designed.
      Effects on record
      • Net council tax bills of lower-income households: Direction plausible; size not established. modelled, moderate confidence; England. IFS revenue-neutral microsimulation on 2019 values with central funding fully adjusted: average cuts of 0.5–0.9% of household income for the bottom half. Re-running on current values is needed.
      • Higher bills for owners of high-value homes, including some cash-poor and low-income households: A cost or harm; size not established. modelled, moderate confidence; England. Losses could be softened by council tax support, transition relief or deferral, each with a cost.
      Cost and funding

      Cost completeness: Not yet costed. Funding: Not yet costed / funding not identified.

      • Revaluation of homes, appeals, transition relief and deferral schemes (administration; paid by central government, councils): Not yet costed. No official costing of a full revaluation. Transition relief and deferral reduce or delay receipts and must be costed with the design.
      Who pays:
      Owners of higher-value homes, especially in London and the South East, pay more; the Valuation Office Agency and councils bear revaluation and appeals costs; central government bears any transition relief.
      Financing proposed:
      A revenue-neutral design finances its own tax cuts and cannot fund other programmes. A revenue-raising variant would need its own costing.
      Gap remaining:
      Unknown: revaluation, appeals and transition relief have not been costed.
      What delivery needs
      Skills:
      Valuers and appeals capacity.
      Operational capacity:
      A revaluation of every home in England.
      Infrastructure:
      Valuation data systems.
      Permissions:
      None.
      Law:
      Primary legislation.
      Public consent:
      Acceptance of large bill changes in some areas; equalisation between councils.
      First step and stages

      First step: Publish household and council-level winners and losers for one specified, revenue-neutral design on current values. (owner: HM Treasury and MHCLG (or independent modellers))

      1. Model and consult on a specified design — HM Treasury, MHCLG (proposed stage, not an official timetable)
      2. Revalue and legislate — Valuation Office Agency; Parliament (proposed stage, not an official timetable)
      3. Phase in with transition relief and deferral — Councils; HM Treasury (proposed stage, not an official timetable)

      Depends on: A21: shown as an alternative, not added to other receipts; Valuation Office capacity (also needed for the 2028 surcharge)

      Trade-offs
      Who gains and who loses:
      On the IFS modelling, low- and middle-income households and the North and Midlands gain on average; high-income households and much of London and its commuter belt lose.
      What else the money or effort could do:
      Valuation and political capacity spent here is not available for other tax reforms.
      Strongest counterargument:
      Higher bills can fall on households with valuable homes but low incomes; stability may matter more than accuracy to many taxpayers.
      Risks:
      Abrupt bill changes, appeals backlogs and falls in some property values.
      How we would judge it
      Baseline:
      Council tax bands in England based on April 1991 values.
      Leading indicator:
      A published distributional analysis for a specified design.
      Outcome:
      Tax relative to property value and income; moves; stable council resources.
      Continue, adapt or stop:
      Do not proceed without transition protection for low-income losers; review if appeals overwhelm valuation capacity.
      Sources

      Source published 2020 (IFS R168); November 2025 (surcharge); evidence reviewed 2026-10-04. Reconsider if: The High Value Council Tax Surcharge starts (April 2028); Wales completes its revaluation; New IFS or government modelling on current values.

    • Action 3A21Policy status: external proposal

      Show tax choices with their real trade-offs

      Publish a few fully specified tax packages on one baseline and price year, showing net yield after behaviour and administration, who pays, and what each could fund — as alternatives, not a shopping basket.

      The thread: issue, evidence, action

      1. Issue Weakness: Estimates rest on different years, baselines and behaviour: HMRC’s lines are single small changes, the IFS tax options predate Budget 2025, and the IFS council-tax modelling uses 2019 values — so they cannot be added together. Also: weakness (Public finances), opportunity
      2. Evidence Public sector current receipts
      3. Action A21, this action

      Assessment (draft, 6 October review)

      Not assessed in the 6 October review; this action stays in the topic plan with its own evidence.

      Who decides:
      HM Treasury and Parliament (Finance Act); HMRC (collection); devolved governments for devolved taxes (UK)
      Evidence:
      Modelled scenario. HMRC and IFS costings are modelled estimates of specified changes; behaviour and interactions make larger packages uncertain.
      Expected effect:
      Direction plausible; size not established.
      Cost and funding

      Not yet costed

      Funding: Not a direct public-spending programme

      Why it is shortlisted here: The page’s core job: alternatives with their losers, not a shopping basket of additive billions.

      Builds on the option Raise a broad-based tax compared below.

      What it takes
      The problem

      Revenue estimates use different baselines, years and behavioural assumptions, so headline billions are added up as if they were compatible and free of losers.

      Who is affected, and where

      UK taxpayers (households and businesses) and users of the services the receipts would fund. Territory: UK. Most taxes are UK-wide; Scotland sets income tax rates and bands, and Wales part of income tax; property and land taxes are devolved — packages must say which apply where.

      Policy status

      Proposed by researchers or others, not government policy. Tax rises are not committed beyond those already legislated. The IFS sets out options; UK Facts publishes them as alternatives. Budget 2025 (26 November 2025) changed the baseline, so earlier option costings need updating.

      The evidence
      What the research found:
      HMRC’s ready reckoner puts +1p on the basic rate of income tax at about £8.25bn in 2027–28, while +10 points on the higher rate of capital gains tax loses about £2.1bn. The IFS finds broad-based rates the most straightforward way to raise large sums, and warns that behavioural responses, interactions and devolved arrangements change net yields.
      Evaluated on:
      UK tax base in HMRC and IFS models; United Kingdom, 2025–2030 forecast period
      Our recommendation (separate from the research):
      Show each package on one baseline and price year as an alternative, with who pays, net yield and the service it could fund; never add incompatible ready-reckoner lines.
      Strongest counter-evidence:
      Higher taxes reduce household and business incomes and can weaken incentives; mobile bases such as capital gains respond strongly; manifesto commitments limit which rates can rise.
      Effects on record
      • Household and business incomes after tax: A cost or harm; size not established. modelled, moderate confidence; United Kingdom. Who pays depends entirely on the package; the benefit side depends on what the receipts fund, counted once.
      Cost and funding

      Cost completeness: Not yet costed. Funding: Not a direct public-spending programme.

      • Modelling and publication of specified tax packages; HMRC administration of any change (administration; paid by central government): Not yet costed. The tax itself is paid by households and firms and is not a cost line here. HMRC ready-reckoner yields cannot be added together.
      Who pays:
      Taxpayers bear any tax rise (households, employers and, through prices and wages, workers and consumers); HMRC bears administration; publishing the packages costs analytical time.
      Financing proposed:
      Not a financing source until legislated and in the forecast. A package’s receipts can fund one use once.
      Gap remaining:
      Not applicable: this is a choice of who pays, not a spending line. Modelling capacity is not costed.
      What delivery needs
      Skills:
      Tax modelling (HMRC, OBR, independent researchers).
      Operational capacity:
      HMRC systems for any new base.
      Infrastructure:
      None for rate changes on existing taxes.
      Permissions:
      None.
      Law:
      Finance Act for any change.
      Public consent:
      A parliamentary vote; manifesto commitments.
      First step and stages

      First step: Choose a defined package and price year, then publish reproducible assumptions and who pays. (owner: HM Treasury (or UK Facts for illustrative packages))

      1. Specify packages on one baseline — HM Treasury / independent modellers (proposed stage, not an official timetable)
      2. Consult and legislate — Parliament (proposed stage, not an official timetable)
      3. Collect and compare outturn with the costing — HMRC; OBR (proposed stage, not an official timetable)

      Depends on: A47: each receipt counted once in the ledger; An up-to-date post-Budget baseline

      Trade-offs
      Who gains and who loses:
      Depends entirely on the tax: broad rates fall on most workers or consumers; capital taxes on wealthier households; business taxes partly on workers and customers.
      What else the money or effort could do:
      Raising tax for one service rules out using the same receipts for another or for reducing borrowing.
      Strongest counterargument:
      Spending restraint or growth could close gaps without tax rises; tax rises can weaken growth.
      Risks:
      Avoidance, volatile receipts and hidden burdens on groups not obvious from the headline rate.
      How we would judge it
      Baseline:
      Public sector current receipts £1,231.3bn in 2025–26 (OBR databank).
      Leading indicator:
      Packages published with one baseline and distributional tables.
      Outcome:
      Net receipts against costing; incidence across households and firms; compliance costs.
      Continue, adapt or stop:
      Revisit a package when outturn falls materially short of its costing.
      Sources

      Source published October 2025 (IFS); June 2025 (HMRC); evidence reviewed 2026-10-04. Reconsider if: A Budget changes the tax baseline; HMRC publishes a new ready reckoner.

      Also on: Public finances — one shared record, so its cost is counted once.

    • Action 4A19Policy status: funded programme

      Collect more tax through specific, auditable compliance work

      Target a named part of the gap with a specific intervention (support, digital checks or enforcement), and count only the extra cash collected beyond what forecasts already include.

      The thread: issue, evidence, action

      1. Issue Weakness (Follow the money): The estimated tax gap was £59.2bn (6.4% of tax due). £20.8bn came from failure to take reasonable care and £9.3bn from error; £36.7bn arose among small businesses.How acting here reaches it: Specific, auditable compliance work collects part of the tax gap that the follow-the-money page breaks down by tax and behaviour.
      2. Evidence Tax gap, share of tax due
      3. Action A19, this action

      Assessment (draft, 6 October review)

      Who decides:
      HMRC and HM Treasury; Parliament for new powers; the OBR certifies costings (UK)
      Evidence:
      Expert or audit recommendation. An NAO audit supports the logic of compliance work but shows that average past returns do not reveal the return to extra staff.
      Expected effect:
      Direction plausible; size not established.
      Cost and funding

      Not yet costed

      Funding: Not yet costed / funding not identified

      Why it is shortlisted here: Compliance is often presented as painless; this counts only cash beyond what the forecasts already include.

      What it takes
      The problem

      Headline tax-gap figures are treated as money waiting to be collected, but just over half the gap comes from error and failure to take reasonable care, about three-fifths of it arises among small businesses, and the extra yield from more enforcement is not known.

      Who is affected, and where

      UK taxpayers in the targeted segment (for example small businesses), and everyone who relies on public services. Territory: UK. HMRC administers UK taxes; Scottish and Welsh income tax and devolved taxes (Revenue Scotland, Welsh Revenue Authority) need their own arrangements, not assessed here.

      Policy status

      A funded programme already exists. A large package is already funded and running: Autumn Budget 2024 expected £6.5bn a year by 2029–30 from 5,000 extra compliance staff and 1,800 debt-management staff. Later measures raised this: HMRC’s August 2026 update gives £10bn of additional tax revenue a year by 2029–30 and plans for 5,500 new compliance caseworkers (more than 2,400 compliance staff recruited since Autumn Budget 2024). That yield is already in the fiscal forecasts. Any further package beyond it is a UK Facts proposal.

      The evidence
      What the research found:
      The NAO found compliance yield of £15.8bn in 2024–25 is revenue “collected or protected”, not cash; it equals about £95 per £1 of staff pay but about £58 per £1 with overheads, and HMRC could not say what marginal return further investment would bring.
      Evaluated on:
      HMRC’s large business directorate (about 2,000 groups); United Kingdom, 2017–18 to 2024–25
      Transfer to this case:
      Large-business returns do not transfer to small businesses, where most of the gap arises.
      Our recommendation (separate from the research):
      Publish, for any new package, the targeted gap, the expected cash beyond forecast, its cost including overheads and appeals, and taxpayer-service effects — and report cash collected each year.
      Strongest counter-evidence:
      Returns diminish as easier cases are worked; yield includes revenue “protected” that never arrives as cash; wrongly challenged taxpayers bear real costs.
      Effects on record
      • Net tax receipts beyond forecast: Direction plausible; size not established. plausible spillover, limited confidence; United Kingdom. HMRC could not tell the NAO the marginal return to further investment; average yield ratios overstate it, and yield is not all cash.
      • Costs to compliant taxpayers wrongly challenged: A cost or harm; size not established. plausible spillover, limited confidence; United Kingdom. A risk to monitor through upheld disputes and service measures; not quantified.
      Cost and funding

      Cost completeness: Not yet costed. Funding: Not yet costed / funding not identified.

      • HMRC staff, training, systems, appeals and overheads for a further compliance package (administration; paid by central government): Not yet costed. Staff-only return ratios omit overheads (the NAO puts large-business returns at about £95 per £1 of staff pay but about £58 with overheads), and average returns are not marginal returns. Collections must be profiled over several years.
      Who pays:
      HMRC (taxpayers) for staff, systems and appeals; compliant taxpayers and their advisers for time spent on checks.
      Financing proposed:
      None. The £6.5bn a year from the 2024 package is already counted in the forecasts and cannot pay for anything new; a further package needs its own HMRC funding and an independently scrutinised costing of net cash.
      Gap remaining:
      Unknown: no further package has been specified or costed.
      What delivery needs
      Skills:
      Trained compliance and debt staff, who take time to become productive.
      Operational capacity:
      HMRC case-management and IT systems; tribunal capacity for disputes.
      Infrastructure:
      Data matching and digital records.
      Permissions:
      None beyond existing powers for most work.
      Law:
      New powers only for specific measures.
      Public consent:
      Public acceptance of checks; safeguards for taxpayers.
      First step and stages

      First step: Name one part of the gap, the intervention, and what the current forecast already assumes for it. (owner: HMRC with HM Treasury)

      1. Pilot the intervention on a defined segment — HMRC (proposed stage, not an official timetable)
      2. Cost and certify the net cash beyond forecast — HMRC, HM Treasury, OBR (proposed stage, not an official timetable)
      3. Scale only if cash collected holds up over several years — HMRC (proposed stage, not an official timetable)

      Depends on: Recruitment and training under the 2024 package; OBR certification of any new costing

      Trade-offs
      Who gains and who loses:
      Falls on non-compliant taxpayers, mostly small businesses; compliant firms gain from a level playing field; mistaken challenges burden honest taxpayers.
      What else the money or effort could do:
      HMRC staff on compliance are not answering customer queries or processing repayments.
      Strongest counterargument:
      Much of the gap is error, which simpler rules or better service may reduce more cheaply than enforcement.
      Risks:
      Spending the same forecast revenue twice; overstating yield; harming taxpayer service.
      How we would judge it
      Baseline:
      Tax gap 6.4% of liabilities (£59.2bn) in 2024–25 (HMRC).
      Leading indicator:
      Cash collected from the targeted segment, reported separately from assessed yield.
      Outcome:
      Net cash beyond forecast, errors, disputes upheld and taxpayer service levels.
      Continue, adapt or stop:
      Stop or redesign if cash collected falls well below the costing, or upheld disputes and service complaints rise.
      Earlier option on this page

      This card replaces the option “Collect more of tax already due” (funded). Its evidence: Government costing of £10bn a year by 2029–30. HMRC attributes most of the gap to error and failure to take reasonable care (£20.8bn and £9.3bn), which enforcement alone reaches imperfectly. HM Revenue and Customs, HMRC performance update: 2026 to 2027 quarter 1 · HM Treasury, Autumn Budget 2024 (HC 295) · HMRC, Measuring tax gaps 2026 edition, 1. Tax gaps: summary (estimates for the 2024 to 2025 tax year)

      Sources

      Source published February 2026 (NAO); October 2024 (Budget); June 2026 (HMRC tax gap); evidence reviewed 2026-10-04. Reconsider if: HMRC publishes outturn for the 2024 package; A new tax gap edition; A fiscal event announces further compliance funding.

      Also on: Follow the money — one shared record, so its cost is counted once.

    How the options are assessed

    One shared record per option — the same one the national plan reads. Delivery RAG, gate and list membership are separate judgements.

    • Close capital-tax reliefs rather than raise rates — Amber delivery RAG; gate pending
    • Property and land tax reform — Amber delivery RAG; gate pending
    • A tax on the very top fortunes: three designs — Red delivery RAG; gate pending

    Provisional single-reviewer assessments from the 6 October 2026 review; not approved business cases, and not government policy.

    • A62Delivery RAG: AmberGate: pending

      Close capital-tax reliefs rather than raise rates

      Existing action A62, assessed at the same scope.

      Provisional single-reviewer assessment; not an approved business case.

      Who and where
      People who realise or pass on capital gains and estates in the UK — concentrated at the top: 45% of capital gains tax came from gains of £5m or more in 2024–25. (from the action record) Jurisdiction: UK.
      Result so far
      Range if completed: 11.0–20.0 out of 30 (equal weights; not yet assessed: increment beyond baseline (Ad), expected incremental benefit (Bn), incremental affordability (Co))
      Funded now (baseline)
      Baseline: CGT rates of 18% and 24% since October 2024; business asset disposal relief rising to 18% from April 2026; a £2.5m allowance for agricultural and business property relief from April 2026. Closing further reliefs instead of raising rates is a UK Facts framing of options, not government policy. (from the action record)
      The change assessed (marginal)
      Marginal change not yet defined
      What the evidence supports—and the next decision

      Closing a relief is not one policy. The current tax baseline, behavioural response and distribution differ by relief.

      Codex — AI-assisted analytical follow-up · 8 October 2026. Proposed appraisal design; the attributed scores below are unchanged. No funding or delivery agreement is implied.

      Define the change
      List each relief, eligibility rule and reform option; compare with the law and rates actually in force.
      Test whether it works
      Net receipts, avoidance, investment and distribution against a published behavioural model; compare forecasts with outturn after implementation.
      Establish the cost
      Administration, transition and compliance plus behavioural revenue loss. Do not add static estimates or count the same tax base twice.
      Protect against harm
      Consider legitimate reliance, liquidity, avoidance displacement and legal transition arrangements.

      Read with the outcome evidence and sources in the full assessment. Monitoring proposals are not existing baseline measurements. A numerical benefit or cost score needs evidence for the defined increment, not just the scale of the problem.

      Full assessment of Close capital-tax reliefs rather than raise rates: ten criteria, scenarios, delivery, costs and monitoring
      The ten criteria (0–3)

      Each criterion is scored 0 to 3 by the reviewer. “Not yet assessed” means unknown: it is never counted as zero.

      1. Scale and severity (Sc)2 of 3 — Serious harm to a defined group or widespread moderate harm

        Reviewer’s reason: Provisional problem-importance judgement from linked site pages; not the scale of achievable benefit.

      2. Increment beyond baseline (Ad)Not yet assessed

        Reviewer’s reason: Name reliefs, thresholds, interactions and transition; obtain distributional/behavioural costing and administrative assessment. A missing rating requires a defined marginal change.

      3. Confidence in the proposed action (Ev)1 of 3 — Indirect, mixed, modelled or weak causal support

        Reviewer’s reason: Illustrative rate changes and another party’s design do not cost the proposed relief package. Effects depend on exact reliefs and behaviour.

      4. Expected incremental benefit (Bn)Not yet assessed

        Reviewer’s reason: Unknown unless a reasonably defined target-population benefit can be judged; no bonus merely for spanning domains.

      5. Residual harms (Hm)1 of 3 — Material harm/unresolved mitigation

        Reviewer’s reason: Forestalling, avoidance and investment effects; progressivity must be demonstrated.

      6. Incremental affordability (Co)Not yet assessed

        Reviewer’s reason: Net receipts after behaviour, administration and transition; investment and compliance effects.

      7. Delivery capacity (Ca)2 of 3 — Stretched but plausibly obtainable

        Reviewer’s reason: Name reliefs, thresholds, interactions and transition; obtain distributional/behavioural costing and administrative assessment.

      8. Distribution (Fa)2 of 3 — Mixed or broadly neutral with safeguards

        Reviewer’s reason: Provisional distribution judgement for the stated target; verify who pays, who gains and excluded groups.

      9. Meaningful first outcome (Ti)2 of 3 — More than one and up to three years

        Reviewer’s reason: First meaningful outcome, not announcement: Net receipts, incidence and behavioural response.

      10. Readiness (Rd)1 of 3 — Legislation/external agreement or major enabling work

        Reviewer’s reason: Treasury, HMRC and Parliament; Specify tax package and official costing

      Four weightings

      Normalised as 10 × weighted sum ÷ sum of weights, on a 0–30 scale. Where a criterion is not yet assessed, the range is the lowest and highest result if it were later scored 0 or 3 — not a score, a confidence interval or a rank.

      • Equal weights: Range if completed: 11.0–20.0 out of 30. Not yet assessed: increment beyond baseline (Ad), expected incremental benefit (Bn), incremental affordability (Co). Funding gate: not passed.
      • Evidence doubled: Range if completed: 10.9–19.1 out of 30. Not yet assessed: increment beyond baseline (Ad), expected incremental benefit (Bn), incremental affordability (Co). Funding gate: not passed.
      • Scale doubled: Range if completed: 11.8–20.0 out of 30. Not yet assessed: increment beyond baseline (Ad), expected incremental benefit (Bn), incremental affordability (Co). Funding gate: not passed.
      • Cost ignored (the funding gate still applies): Range if completed: 12.2–18.9 out of 30. Not yet assessed: increment beyond baseline (Ad), expected incremental benefit (Bn), incremental affordability (Co). Funding gate: not passed.

      Funding gate: Not passed — the cost is not yet assessed or no allocation is committed for this scope. Ignoring cost in a weighting never removes the gate.

      Delivery RAG and gate

      Delivery RAG shown: AmberReview’s claim: Amber. Best the recorded evidence allows: Amber.

      Review’s reason: Net receipts after behaviour, administration and transition; investment and compliance effects.

      Why it is not Green yet

      • Scope (population, place and increment) not verified against the delivery baseline.
      • No verified owner with the powers in place.
      • Delivery capacity not verified.
      • Lifetime incremental costs not complete.
      • No credible funding (a committed allocation for the scope).
      • Safeguards not specified.
      • Monitoring lacks a metric, a data source or a baseline.

      Green needs verified scope, a verified owner with the powers, verified capacity, complete lifetime costs with credible funding, specified safeguards and monitoring with a metric, source and baseline. Amber means appraisal gaps remain; Red means a material delivery obstacle. Red does not mean unimportant.

      Gate: Pending — appraisal incomplete (review label: “Pending: incomplete appraisal”).

      Why: Scores incomplete; Funding gate not passed (cost unknown or no credible funding).

      The gate is separate from national list membership: being listed does not make an option eligible, and an eligible option need not be listed.

      Cost and funding

      Lifetime costing: Not established. Review: “Full incremental costing not established in reviewed material”.

      Still to cost: Net receipts after behaviour, administration and transition; investment and compliance effects.

      Funding status: not a spending proposal.

      Owner, powers and capacity

      Proposed owner: Treasury, HMRC and Parliament (proposed, unverified).

      Powers: needs legislation or external agreement. Capacity: unverified.

      Powers and capacity read from the review’s Rd and Ca anchors; no proposed owner has agreed to act (the review: “Proposed owners have not agreed to act”).

      England:
      HM Treasury and HMRC, with Parliament through a Finance Act (action record)
      Scotland:
      HM Treasury and HMRC, with Parliament through a Finance Act (action record)
      Wales:
      HM Treasury and HMRC, with Parliament through a Finance Act (action record)
      Northern Ireland:
      HM Treasury and HMRC, with Parliament through a Finance Act (action record)

      Capital gains tax and inheritance tax are reserved and UK-wide.

      Dependencies, safeguards and risks

      Depends on: None recorded.

      Safeguards

      None specified yet.

      Risks and residual harms: Forestalling, avoidance and investment effects; progressivity must be demonstrated.

      Monitoring and measured results

      Metric: Net receipts, incidence and behavioural response.

      Data source: Not yet named. Baseline: Not yet established.

      Measures already on the domain page

      A page measure is not necessarily the review’s metric; linking the two is an editorial decision still to be made.

      Evidence for the outcome

      Outcome: Net receipts, incidence and behavioural response.

      Illustrative rate changes and another party’s design do not cost the proposed relief package. Effects depend on exact reliefs and behaviour.

      Review record

      Assessment version: working-review-2026-10-06 (A62@working-review-2026-10-06).

      Reviewer: Author of the review blueprint (single reviewer, not named in uk-facts-complete-plan.json). Reviewed: 6 October 2026.

      Scored in the working review of 6 October 2026 on the shared ten-criterion scale (one reviewer); not independently calibrated.

      First 90 days (review): Produce a signed scope and current-delivery baseline; Name reliefs, thresholds, interactions and transition; obtain distributional/behavioural costing and administrative assessment. Obtain incremental costs and an accountable decision before expansion.

      Decision route: Specify tax package and official costing

      An editorial screening framework by one reviewer, not a formal appraisal or business case. Proposed owners have not agreed to act.

    • A22v2Delivery RAG: AmberGate: pending

      Property and land tax reform

      A new scope of action A22 (A22v2); A22 itself is unchanged and nothing is inherited from it.

      Provisional single-reviewer assessment; not an approved business case.

      Who and where
      Population not yet defined. Jurisdiction: not defined.
      Result so far
      Range if completed: 13.0–19.0 out of 30 (equal weights; not yet assessed: expected incremental benefit (Bn), incremental affordability (Co))
      Funded now (baseline)
      Funded baseline not yet stated
      The change assessed (marginal)
      Marginal change not yet defined
      What the evidence supports—and the next decision

      Revaluation, recurrent property taxation and land taxation have different incidence. A common label does not define a reform.

      Codex — AI-assisted analytical follow-up · 8 October 2026. Proposed appraisal design; the attributed scores below are unchanged. No funding or delivery agreement is implied.

      Define the change
      Specify the tax base, jurisdiction, valuation date, rates and transition; compare revenue-neutral and revenue-raising designs separately.
      Test whether it works
      Bills by income, wealth, tenure and place; revenues, valuation accuracy, housing transactions and behavioural response.
      Establish the cost
      Valuation, administration, appeals and transition relief, with net receipts under alternative behaviour assumptions.
      Protect against harm
      Test cash-poor owners, renters and local-authority distribution; deferment must have transparent interest and recovery rules.

      Read with the outcome evidence and sources in the full assessment. Monitoring proposals are not existing baseline measurements. A numerical benefit or cost score needs evidence for the defined increment, not just the scale of the problem.

      Full assessment of Property and land tax reform: ten criteria, scenarios, delivery, costs and monitoring
      The ten criteria (0–3)

      Each criterion is scored 0 to 3 by the reviewer. “Not yet assessed” means unknown: it is never counted as zero.

      1. Scale and severity (Sc)2 of 3 — Serious harm to a defined group or widespread moderate harm

        Reviewer’s reason: Provisional problem-importance judgement from linked site pages; not the scale of achievable benefit.

      2. Increment beyond baseline (Ad)3 of 3 — Substantial clearly distinct increment; not novelty alone

        Reviewer’s reason: Separate council-tax revaluation, land/property tax and transaction-tax changes; model losers and deferral options. A missing rating requires a defined marginal change.

      3. Confidence in the proposed action (Ev)1 of 3 — Indirect, mixed, modelled or weak causal support

        Reviewer’s reason: Modelled designs exist; exact tax base, jurisdiction and transition are not specified.

      4. Expected incremental benefit (Bn)Not yet assessed

        Reviewer’s reason: Unknown unless a reasonably defined target-population benefit can be judged; no bonus merely for spanning domains.

      5. Residual harms (Hm)1 of 3 — Material harm/unresolved mitigation

        Reviewer’s reason: Concentrated losers and valuation disputes; revenue-neutral change funds no extra spending.

      6. Incremental affordability (Co)Not yet assessed

        Reviewer’s reason: Valuation, administration, transition relief, net receipts and behavioural response by jurisdiction.

      7. Delivery capacity (Ca)2 of 3 — Stretched but plausibly obtainable

        Reviewer’s reason: Separate council-tax revaluation, land/property tax and transaction-tax changes; model losers and deferral options.

      8. Distribution (Fa)2 of 3 — Mixed or broadly neutral with safeguards

        Reviewer’s reason: Provisional distribution judgement for the stated target; verify who pays, who gains and excluded groups.

      9. Meaningful first outcome (Ti)1 of 3 — More than three but less than ten years

        Reviewer’s reason: First meaningful outcome, not announcement: Household liabilities, liquidity hardship, mobility and revenue.

      10. Readiness (Rd)1 of 3 — Legislation/external agreement or major enabling work

        Reviewer’s reason: Treasury, valuation bodies and relevant governments; Distributional and transition appraisal

      Four weightings

      Normalised as 10 × weighted sum ÷ sum of weights, on a 0–30 scale. Where a criterion is not yet assessed, the range is the lowest and highest result if it were later scored 0 or 3 — not a score, a confidence interval or a rank.

      • Equal weights: Range if completed: 13.0–19.0 out of 30. Not yet assessed: expected incremental benefit (Bn), incremental affordability (Co). Funding gate: not passed.
      • Evidence doubled: Range if completed: 12.7–18.2 out of 30. Not yet assessed: expected incremental benefit (Bn), incremental affordability (Co). Funding gate: not passed.
      • Scale doubled: Range if completed: 13.6–19.1 out of 30. Not yet assessed: expected incremental benefit (Bn), incremental affordability (Co). Funding gate: not passed.
      • Cost ignored (the funding gate still applies): Range if completed: 14.4–17.8 out of 30. Not yet assessed: expected incremental benefit (Bn), incremental affordability (Co). Funding gate: not passed.

      Funding gate: Not passed — the cost is not yet assessed or no allocation is committed for this scope. Ignoring cost in a weighting never removes the gate.

      Delivery RAG and gate

      Delivery RAG shown: AmberReview’s claim: Amber. Best the recorded evidence allows: Amber.

      Review’s reason: Valuation, administration, transition relief, net receipts and behavioural response by jurisdiction.

      Why it is not Green yet

      • Scope (population, place and increment) not verified against the delivery baseline.
      • No verified owner with the powers in place.
      • Delivery capacity not verified.
      • Lifetime incremental costs not complete.
      • No credible funding (a committed allocation for the scope).
      • Safeguards not specified.
      • Monitoring lacks a metric, a data source or a baseline.

      Green needs verified scope, a verified owner with the powers, verified capacity, complete lifetime costs with credible funding, specified safeguards and monitoring with a metric, source and baseline. Amber means appraisal gaps remain; Red means a material delivery obstacle. Red does not mean unimportant.

      Gate: Pending — appraisal incomplete (review label: “Pending: incomplete appraisal”).

      Why: Scores incomplete; Funding gate not passed (cost unknown or no credible funding).

      The gate is separate from national list membership: being listed does not make an option eligible, and an eligible option need not be listed.

      Cost and funding

      Lifetime costing: Not established. Review: “Full incremental costing not established in reviewed material”.

      Still to cost: Valuation, administration, transition relief, net receipts and behavioural response by jurisdiction.

      Funding status: not established in review.

      Owner, powers and capacity

      Proposed owner: Treasury, valuation bodies and relevant governments (proposed, unverified).

      Powers: needs legislation or external agreement. Capacity: unverified.

      Powers and capacity read from the review’s Rd and Ca anchors; no proposed owner has agreed to act (the review: “Proposed owners have not agreed to act”).

      England:
      not assessed
      Scotland:
      not assessed
      Wales:
      not assessed
      Northern Ireland:
      not assessed

      Not defined in the review.

      Dependencies, safeguards and risks

      Depends on: None recorded.

      Safeguards

      None specified yet.

      Risks and residual harms: Concentrated losers and valuation disputes; revenue-neutral change funds no extra spending.

      Monitoring and measured results

      Metric: Household liabilities, liquidity hardship, mobility and revenue.

      Data source: Not yet named. Baseline: Not yet established.

      Measures already on the domain page

      A page measure is not necessarily the review’s metric; linking the two is an editorial decision still to be made.

      Evidence for the outcome

      Outcome: Household liabilities, liquidity hardship, mobility and revenue.

      Modelled designs exist; exact tax base, jurisdiction and transition are not specified.

      Review record

      Assessment version: working-review-2026-10-06 (A22v2@working-review-2026-10-06).

      Reviewer: Author of the review blueprint (single reviewer, not named in uk-facts-complete-plan.json). Reviewed: 6 October 2026.

      Scored in the working review of 6 October 2026 on the shared ten-criterion scale (one reviewer); not independently calibrated.

      First 90 days (review): Produce a signed scope and current-delivery baseline; Separate council-tax revaluation, land/property tax and transaction-tax changes; model losers and deferral options. Obtain incremental costs and an accountable decision before expansion.

      Decision route: Distributional and transition appraisal

      An editorial screening framework by one reviewer, not a formal appraisal or business case. Proposed owners have not agreed to act.

    • A63Delivery RAG: RedGate: pending

      A tax on the very top fortunes: three designs

      Proposed new action A63; sourced research home and appraisal design; scope and funding remain provisional.

      Provisional single-reviewer assessment; not an approved business case.

      Who and where
      Population not yet defined. Jurisdiction: not defined.
      Result so far
      Range if completed: 9.0–18.0 out of 30 (equal weights; not yet assessed: increment beyond baseline (Ad), expected incremental benefit (Bn), incremental affordability (Co))
      Funded now (baseline)
      Funded baseline not yet stated
      The change assessed (marginal)
      Marginal change not yet defined
      What the evidence supports—and the next decision

      One-off wealth taxation, annual taxation and narrower asset-based reforms cannot share one revenue or feasibility estimate.

      Codex — AI-assisted analytical follow-up · 8 October 2026. Proposed appraisal design; the attributed scores below are unchanged. No funding or delivery agreement is implied.

      Define the change
      Keep three explicitly defined designs with separate thresholds, bases, residence rules and valuation dates.
      Test whether it works
      Net receipts, avoidance and migration scenarios, compliance and distribution. A migration count alone does not identify a tax effect.
      Establish the cost
      Valuation, enforcement, administration and liquidity arrangements; allow for responses and existing taxes on the same assets.
      Protect against harm
      Specify appeals, instalments and treatment of illiquid businesses and pensions; do not book an illustrative yield as funding.

      Read with the outcome evidence and sources in the full assessment. Monitoring proposals are not existing baseline measurements. A numerical benefit or cost score needs evidence for the defined increment, not just the scale of the problem.

      Full assessment of A tax on the very top fortunes: three designs: ten criteria, scenarios, delivery, costs and monitoring
      The ten criteria (0–3)

      Each criterion is scored 0 to 3 by the reviewer. “Not yet assessed” means unknown: it is never counted as zero.

      1. Scale and severity (Sc)2 of 3 — Serious harm to a defined group or widespread moderate harm

        Reviewer’s reason: Provisional problem-importance judgement from linked site pages; not the scale of achievable benefit.

      2. Increment beyond baseline (Ad)Not yet assessed

        Reviewer’s reason: Separate annual wealth tax, minimum effective tax and one-off levy; define base, residence, valuation and anti-avoidance. A missing rating requires a defined marginal change.

      3. Confidence in the proposed action (Ev)1 of 3 — Indirect, mixed, modelled or weak causal support

        Reviewer’s reason: Revenue estimates differ by design and assumptions; artifact labels a prominent yield unverified. No agreed package is costed.

      4. Expected incremental benefit (Bn)Not yet assessed

        Reviewer’s reason: Unknown unless a reasonably defined target-population benefit can be judged; no bonus merely for spanning domains.

      5. Residual harms (Hm)1 of 3 — Material harm/unresolved mitigation

        Reviewer’s reason: Valuation/staff constraints; emigration, avoidance, liquidity and legal risk.

      6. Incremental affordability (Co)Not yet assessed

        Reviewer’s reason: Valuation, enforcement, liquidity arrangements, net revenue and behavioural scenarios for each design.

      7. Delivery capacity (Ca)1 of 3 — Binding scarce resource

        Reviewer’s reason: Separate annual wealth tax, minimum effective tax and one-off levy; define base, residence, valuation and anti-avoidance.

      8. Distribution (Fa)2 of 3 — Mixed or broadly neutral with safeguards

        Reviewer’s reason: Provisional distribution judgement for the stated target; verify who pays, who gains and excluded groups.

      9. Meaningful first outcome (Ti)1 of 3 — More than three but less than ten years

        Reviewer’s reason: First meaningful outcome, not announcement: Net receipts, effective burdens and avoidance; spending outcomes separately.

      10. Readiness (Rd)1 of 3 — Legislation/external agreement or major enabling work

        Reviewer’s reason: Treasury, HMRC and Parliament; Separate three design appraisals

      Four weightings

      Normalised as 10 × weighted sum ÷ sum of weights, on a 0–30 scale. Where a criterion is not yet assessed, the range is the lowest and highest result if it were later scored 0 or 3 — not a score, a confidence interval or a rank.

      • Equal weights: Range if completed: 9.0–18.0 out of 30. Not yet assessed: increment beyond baseline (Ad), expected incremental benefit (Bn), incremental affordability (Co). Funding gate: not passed.
      • Evidence doubled: Range if completed: 9.1–17.3 out of 30. Not yet assessed: increment beyond baseline (Ad), expected incremental benefit (Bn), incremental affordability (Co). Funding gate: not passed.
      • Scale doubled: Range if completed: 10.0–18.2 out of 30. Not yet assessed: increment beyond baseline (Ad), expected incremental benefit (Bn), incremental affordability (Co). Funding gate: not passed.
      • Cost ignored (the funding gate still applies): Range if completed: 10.0–16.7 out of 30. Not yet assessed: increment beyond baseline (Ad), expected incremental benefit (Bn), incremental affordability (Co). Funding gate: not passed.

      Funding gate: Not passed — the cost is not yet assessed or no allocation is committed for this scope. Ignoring cost in a weighting never removes the gate.

      Delivery RAG and gate

      Delivery RAG shown: RedReview’s claim: Red. Best the recorded evidence allows: Red.

      Review’s reason: Valuation/staff constraints; emigration, avoidance, liquidity and legal risk.

      Why it is not Green yet

      • Delivery obstacle: Valuation/staff constraints; emigration, avoidance, liquidity and legal risk..
      • Scope (population, place and increment) not verified against the delivery baseline.
      • No verified owner with the powers in place.
      • Delivery capacity not verified.
      • Lifetime incremental costs not complete.
      • No credible funding (a committed allocation for the scope).
      • Safeguards not specified.
      • Monitoring lacks a metric, a data source or a baseline.

      Green needs verified scope, a verified owner with the powers, verified capacity, complete lifetime costs with credible funding, specified safeguards and monitoring with a metric, source and baseline. Amber means appraisal gaps remain; Red means a material delivery obstacle. Red does not mean unimportant.

      Gate: Pending — appraisal incomplete (review label: “Pending: incomplete appraisal”).

      Why: Scores incomplete; Funding gate not passed (cost unknown or no credible funding).

      The gate is separate from national list membership: being listed does not make an option eligible, and an eligible option need not be listed.

      Cost and funding

      Lifetime costing: Not established. Review: “Full incremental costing not established in reviewed material”.

      Still to cost: Valuation, enforcement, liquidity arrangements, net revenue and behavioural scenarios for each design.

      Funding status: not established in review.

      Owner, powers and capacity

      Proposed owner: Treasury, HMRC and Parliament (proposed, unverified).

      Powers: needs legislation or external agreement. Capacity: binding constraint.

      Powers and capacity read from the review’s Rd and Ca anchors; no proposed owner has agreed to act (the review: “Proposed owners have not agreed to act”).

      England:
      not assessed
      Scotland:
      not assessed
      Wales:
      not assessed
      Northern Ireland:
      not assessed

      Not defined in the review.

      Dependencies, safeguards and risks

      Depends on: None recorded.

      Safeguards

      None specified yet.

      Risks and residual harms: Valuation/staff constraints; emigration, avoidance, liquidity and legal risk.

      Monitoring and measured results

      Metric: Net receipts, effective burdens and avoidance; spending outcomes separately.

      Data source: Not yet named. Baseline: Not yet established.

      Evidence for the outcome

      Outcome: Net receipts, effective burdens and avoidance; spending outcomes separately.

      Revenue estimates differ by design and assumptions; artifact labels a prominent yield unverified. No agreed package is costed.

      Review record

      Assessment version: working-review-2026-10-06 (A63@working-review-2026-10-06).

      Reviewer: Author of the review blueprint (single reviewer, not named in uk-facts-complete-plan.json). Reviewed: 6 October 2026.

      Scored in the working review of 6 October 2026 on the shared ten-criterion scale (one reviewer); not independently calibrated.

      First 90 days (review): Produce a signed scope and current-delivery baseline; Separate annual wealth tax, minimum effective tax and one-off levy; define base, residence, valuation and anti-avoidance. Obtain incremental costs and an accountable decision before expansion.

      Decision route: Separate three design appraisals

      An editorial screening framework by one reviewer, not a formal appraisal or business case. Proposed owners have not agreed to act.

    Decision briefs

    • Revalue council tax in England — publish who gains and who loses before deciding
    • Price one package, then compare how to pay: the £138m Connect to Work still needs from 2029/30

    The leading option set out as a decision someone could take: who decides, who benefits, the best evidence, cost and funding, and the main trade-off. The full research record is one click away.

    Decision briefPublic-policy proposalReviewed 2026-10-04

    Revalue council tax in England — publish who gains and who loses before deciding

    The thread: issue, evidence, action

    1. Issue Weakness: Council tax bands in England still rest on April 1991 values, and the top band pays three times the bottom band although those homes were worth at least eight times as much in 1991. Also: threat, opportunity, strength
    2. Evidence Council tax: top-band bill as a multiple of the bottom band
    3. Action Reform property taxes without hiding the losers
    Decision required
    HM Treasury and MHCLG publish household- and council-level winners and losers for one revenue-neutral council tax design on current values, with the cost of transition relief and a deferral option for cash-poor owners, and then decide whether to legislate for a revaluation.
    Who and where
    Households and councils in England. Applies in: England.
    Accountable body
    HM Treasury and the Ministry of Housing, Communities and Local Government
    Intervention
    Revalue homes and relate council tax more closely to current value, adjusting central funding between councils.
    Best evidence, and where it applies
    IFS microsimulation: a revalued, proportional council tax would cut bills by 0.5–0.9% of income on average for the bottom half and raise them by 0.7% for the top tenth; 10.1 million households would gain over £200 a year and 4.2 million lose over £200.Studied in: Households in England (Modelled on 2019 property values and incomes).How closely the comparison transfers to this decision: Wales — high; Ireland — partial.
    Extra cost of this change
    Capital: none identified in the brief.Recurring: none identified in the brief.One-off or mixed: Revaluation of homes, appeals, transition relief and deferral — Not yet costed; Distributional analysis on current values — not yet established.
    Funding
    Mainly a legal or regulatory change: administration costs still need a budget.Committed to this change: none.Possible source, not an award: none identified.Unfunded: Revaluation, appeals and transition relief are not costed for England; the 2005 Welsh transition cost was not found in an official source.
    Savings and wider benefits
    Not yet specified: no cashable saving or avoided cost has been costed for this change. Expected outcomes are listed one by one in the research appendix and are never added together or counted as money available.
    First 90-day step
    A published household- and council-level winners-and-losers analysis for one specified revenue-neutral design on current values, with transition relief costedThe proposed first milestone; a 90-day date is not yet specified. Owner: HM Treasury and MHCLG. Proposed by UK Facts, not an official deadline.
    Twelve-month milestone
    Not yet specified.Time to a first useful result: The analysis within a year; bills could change only after legislation and a revaluation.
    Outcome, and when to scale or stop
    Measure: Publication of the analysis and the cost of protections.Scale if: Low-income losers are protected within a costed scheme and appeals stay within VOA capacity.Stop if: Protections cannot be funded or appeals overwhelm valuation capacity.
    Main trade-off
    Bills in England still rest on 1991 values; correcting that raises bills for owners of higher-value homes, including some pensioners and low-income households in London, who need protection that costs money.
    Source and review date
    Revaluation and reform: bringing council tax in England into the 21st century (IFS Report R168) (2020). Reviewed 2026-10-04.

    An editorial proposal by UK Facts for discussion, not government policy. Records: A22 · effects E-A22-LOWINCOME, E-A22-LOSERS · costs C-A22-REVALUATION

    Research appendix: study design, effect sizes and limits, alternatives, full costing, international comparisons and how we would know

    1.The change, in plain words

    Revalue council tax in England — publish who gains and who loses before deciding

    2.The decision requested

    Decision
    Commission and publish a distributional analysis of one specified revenue-neutral design on current values — bands or proportional rate, central funding adjusted between councils, transition relief over a stated period and a deferral scheme — as the first step towards a decision on legislation.
    Accountable institution
    HM Treasury and the Ministry of Housing, Communities and Local Government
    Geography
    England
    Powers
    Analysis needs no new powers; a revaluation and new bands need primary legislation. Council tax is devolved: Wales has legislated its own revaluation for 2028.
    Delivery partners
    Valuation Office Agency; Councils (billing authorities); Independent modellers (IFS, Resolution Foundation); HM Treasury (High Value Council Tax Surcharge interaction)

    3.Who it is for, and what changes beyond today

    Target population
    Households and councils in England.
    Eligibility
    Every dwelling in England for revaluation; transition relief and deferral for households facing large rises who are on low incomes or cash-poor.
    Scale
    England-wide reform, preceded by one published analysis; no change to total council tax revenue in the revenue-neutral design.
    Baseline
    Council tax bands in England are based on April 1991 values. Budget 2025 added a High Value Council Tax Surcharge on homes worth £2m or more from April 2028. When Wales revalued in 2005, 33.3% of homes moved up at least one band and 8.0% moved down.

    Source: Institute for Fiscal Studies, Revaluation and reform: bringing council tax in England into the 21st century (IFS Report R168) (Key findings 1–4); HM Treasury / MHCLG, High Value Council Tax Surcharge (policy paper) (Policy paper text); Valuation Office Agency, Band changes due to the 2005 revaluation in Wales (FOI release) (Table 1)

    Change beyond existing law or funding
    Full revaluation is not government policy for England; the surcharge only touches homes over £2m. The change is a published, current-value distributional analysis with costed protections — the decision the IFS work cannot make on 2019 values.

    4.How it would work

    Do: Revalue homes and relate council tax more closely to current value, adjusting central funding between councils Changing: so that bills rise for owners of homes that have gained most in value and fall for others, with no change in total revenue

    • Lower net council tax bills for lower-income households on average

      Modelled, not observedEffect record E-A22-LOWINCOME

      IFS microsimulation on 2019 values; must be re-run on current values.

    • Higher bills for owners of high-value homes, including some cash-poor and low-income households

      Modelled, not observedEffect record E-A22-LOSERS

      Can be softened by transition relief, council tax support or deferral, each with a cost.

    Outcomes are kept separate and never added into one impact figure.

    5.Best evidence

    • Revaluation and reform: bringing council tax in England into the 21st century (IFS Report R168)

      Author or institution:
      Institute for Fiscal Studies
      Published:
      2020
      Evaluation period:
      Modelled on 2019 property values and incomes
      Design:
      Microsimulation of revenue-neutral reforms
      Sample or population:
      Households in England
      Effect and uncertainty:
      Proportional revalued council tax: bills fall by 0.5–0.9% of income on average for the bottom half, rise by 0.7% for the top tenth; 10.1 million households gain over £200 a year and 4.2 million lose over £200; about 17% of the poorest fifth in London lose over £200 a year.
      Limits:
      Values and incomes have moved since 2019; results depend on how central funding is adjusted between councils.

      Where: Key findings 1–4. Affiliation is provenance, not proof of quality.

    6.Alternatives, counter-evidence and who loses

    Closest feasible alternative
    Keep 1991 bands and rely on the High Value Council Tax Surcharge, or add bands at the top and bottom without revaluing.
    Strongest counter-evidence
    Cash-poor owners of valuable homes and low-income renters in expensive areas can lose; large bill changes provoke resistance; deferral schemes can undermine revenue if poorly designed.

    Source: Institute for Fiscal Studies, Revaluation and reform: bringing council tax in England into the 21st century (IFS Report R168) (Key findings)

    Distributional effects
    On the IFS modelling, low- and middle-income households and the North and Midlands gain on average; high-income households and much of London and its commuter belt lose.
    Main downside
    Wales in 2005 saw four times as many homes move up as down, which made revaluation politically costly; England’s 35-year gap would produce larger changes.

    The options compared, including current policy

    • The proposal

      Revenue-neutral revaluation on current values with transition relief and deferral

      Who is reached
      All households in England; lower-income households gain on average
      Evidence
      IFS microsimulation; Wales 2005 outcome data
      Likely outcome and timing
      Analysis within a year; bills after legislation and revaluation
      Cost and funding
      Administration and relief not costed; revenue-neutral
      Main trade-off
      Concentrated losers, including some cash-poor owners

    • Current policy

      Current policy: 1991 bands plus the High Value Council Tax Surcharge from April 2028

      Who is reached
      Owners of homes worth £2m or more
      Evidence
      Budget 2025 policy paper
      Likely outcome and timing
      From April 2028
      Cost and funding
      About £430m a year to central government (in the Budget arithmetic)
      Main trade-off
      Leaves the regressive structure below £2m unchanged

    • Alternative

      Add bands at the top and bottom without revaluing

      Who is reached
      Highest- and lowest-band households
      Evidence
      Not modelled in the sources reviewed
      Likely outcome and timing
      Faster; no revaluation
      Cost and funding
      Not costed
      Main trade-off
      Keeps 1991 relativities between areas

    7.What other countries or the devolved nations show

    Country lesson · Wales, Values at 1 April 2003, bills from 1 April 2005; transition to March 2008; next revaluation legislated for 2028

    Revaluing council tax in Wales in 2005

    Evidence: Observational analysisClose match to the UK decision

    What was changed
    Every home in Wales was revalued for council tax and a new top band (Band I) added, with transitional relief phasing in rises of more than one band over three years.
    Study design and population
    Administrative outcome data; no formal evaluation found 1,317,450 dwellings in Wales
    Measured outcome there
    438,760 homes (33.3%) moved up at least one band and 105,380 (8.0%) moved down; 5,550 entered Band I. About four times as many moved up as down.
    Cost status
    The cost of the 2005 transitional relief was not found in an official source; the revaluation used Valuation Office Agency capacity.
    What failed or remains uncertain
    The skew towards rises (house prices had grown faster than expected) made revaluation politically costly and England postponed its own; the planned 2028 Welsh revaluation is legislated but its band design was not final in September 2026.
    Why the UK differs
    England has not revalued since 1991 values, so bill changes would be much larger than in Wales in 2005; England’s council funding system redistributes differently.
    First change required here
    Publish household and council-level winners and losers for a specified revenue-neutral English design on current values, with the transitional relief costed, before any decision.

    Not a UK forecast: the effect above was measured in that place and population. Source: Valuation Office Agency, Band changes due to the 2005 revaluation in Wales (FOI release) (Table 1); legislation.gov.uk, Local Government Finance (Wales) Act 2024 (asc 6) (Section 20). Reviewed 2026-10-04.

    Country lesson · Ireland, Introduced July 2013; revaluations at November 2021 and November 2025

    A property tax on current values with deferral in Ireland

    Evidence: Observational analysisPartial match: some conditions differ

    What was changed
    A Local Property Tax on self-assessed current home values in bands, collected by the national tax authority (including at source from wages and pensions), with full or half deferral for owners on low incomes.
    Study design and population
    Administrative data and government reviews; no causal evaluation Residential property owners in Ireland
    Measured outcome there
    Liability of €605m for 2026, with €506m collected by August 2026; the deferral option lets low-income owners postpone payment with interest at 3% a year.
    Cost status
    Collection is within Revenue’s administration; a separate cost was not found.
    What failed or remains uncertain
    Revaluation was repeatedly deferred and band widths changed to limit increases; the 2015 independent review could not be read directly.
    Why the UK differs
    It replaced no existing tax and funds local authorities differently; Irish values and incomes differ; self-assessment was paired with national collection powers HMRC does not use for council tax.
    First change required here
    Include a costed deferral option for cash-poor owners in any English revaluation design, with the interest rate and recovery on sale stated.

    Not a UK forecast: the effect above was measured in that place and population. Source: Revenue Commissioners (Ireland), Local Property Tax: history, valuation bands and deferral (Revenue pages) and Property Tax statistics update, August 2026 (LPT pages; statistics update p.4). Reviewed 2026-10-04.

    8.What delivery needs first

    • law — Primary legislation for revaluation and any new band structure. (Genuine veto: nothing proceeds without it; owner: Parliament)
    • staff — Valuation Office Agency capacity to revalue every home and handle appeals. (Scarce resource shared with other priorities; owner: Valuation Office Agency)
    • data — Current property values and household incomes linked for the distributional analysis. (Requirement; owner: HM Treasury, MHCLG and the VOA)
    • public consent — Losers are concentrated and visible; protections must be designed and costed before the decision. (Requirement; owner: HM Treasury and MHCLG)

    9.What it would cost

    How the cost is built up: Analysis + VOA revaluation (staff and data) + appeals + transition relief (forgone receipts during phasing) + deferral (delayed receipts and recovery costs). The tax itself is revenue-neutral and is not a cost.

    • Revaluation of homes, appeals, transition relief and deferral

      England: every home revalued for council tax

      Not yet costed (ledger C-A22-REVALUATION)

      mixed; price year not stated; Revaluation year plus transition period; Not yet established

    • Distributional analysis on current values

      One specified design

      Not yet established one analysis

      one-off revenue; price year not stated; Before any decision; Not yet established

    10.Who pays, and what is missing

    Programme envelope (a possible route, not an award)
    None identified
    Allocation committed to this change
    None
    Remaining gap
    Revaluation, appeals and transition relief are not costed for England; the 2005 Welsh transition cost was not found in an official source.
    Proposed financing
    A revenue-neutral design finances its own bill cuts from bill rises and cannot fund other programmes; administration and transition relief need their own budget line.
    Responsible payer
    households, councils, central government
    Budget displaced
    VOA and departmental time; transition relief reduces receipts during phasing, borne by central government or councils depending on design.

    11.First milestone and time to a useful result

    A published household- and council-level winners-and-losers analysis for one specified revenue-neutral design on current values, with transition relief costed (Owner: HM Treasury and MHCLG. Proposed by UK Facts, not an official deadline.)

    Time to first useful result: The analysis within a year; bills could change only after legislation and a revaluation.

    What could delay it: No linked property-value and income data are made available The decision is deferred until after the 2028 surcharge starts VOA capacity is committed to business rates

    12.How we would know

    Baseline
    Bills by band and value on 1991 bands; distribution of council tax as a share of income (IFS, 2019 values).
    Comparison
    The published design against current bills, by income decile, region, tenure and age.
    Leading indicator
    Publication of the analysis and the cost of protections.
    Follow-up
    If enacted: bills relative to value and income after transition; appeals; deferral take-up and recovery; council resources.
    Continue if
    Low-income losers are protected within a costed scheme and appeals stay within VOA capacity.
    Adapt if
    The share of low-income losers in a region is high: lengthen transition or widen council tax support.
    Stop if
    Protections cannot be funded or appeals overwhelm valuation capacity.
    Thresholds
    Not yet set: Thresholds for acceptable losses should come from the published analysis and a costed protection scheme.

    What is not yet known, and how to find out

    • What a full English revaluation, appeals and transition relief would cost (cost)Next step: VOA and MHCLG to cost revaluation and appeals; HM Treasury to cost relief for the specified design.Scope: Every home in England; transition period · Data or quotes needed: VOA staffing and data costs; appeal rates; modelled relief · Who can estimate it: Valuation Office Agency with MHCLG and HM Treasury
    • Distributional results on current values (effect)Next step: Re-run the microsimulation on current values and incomes.Defensible route: further research
    • What Wales’s 2028 design will be (data)Next step: Watch for the Welsh Government’s final band and multiplier decision as a direct comparator.

    Sources last checked 4 October 2026 · Owner: Evidence editor (James Harris) · Next check: the first trigger: A government decision or consultation on council tax revaluation in England.

    Decision briefPublic-policy proposalReviewed 2026-10-04

    Price one package, then compare how to pay: the £138m Connect to Work still needs from 2029/30

    The thread: issue, evidence, action

    1. Issue Weakness: Estimates rest on different years, baselines and behaviour: HMRC’s lines are single small changes, the IFS tax options predate Budget 2025, and the IFS council-tax modelling uses 2019 values — so they cannot be added together. Also: weakness (Public finances), opportunity
    2. Evidence Public sector current receipts
    3. Action Show tax choices with their real trade-offs
    Decision required
    At the next Spending Review, HM Treasury and DWP decide how to pay the £138m that Connect to Work’s business case says it needs for 2029/30 onwards — reprioritise a named DWP budget, use a specific tax change, or borrow — on the same year and price basis, showing who pays and what is given up.
    Who and where
    People who would start Connect to Work’s supported-employment offer in 2029/30; UK taxpayers. Applies in: England and Wales.
    Accountable body
    HM Treasury and the Department for Work and Pensions
    Intervention
    Price the remaining requirement and set the financing routes side by side on the same year and price basis.
    Best evidence, and where it applies
    DWP’s published business case: whole-life funding requirement £1,177.1m (2023/24 to 2031/32); £114m confirmed for 2025/26 and £978m for 2026/27 to 2028/29; £138m for 2029/30 and beyond still to be requested.Studied in: Connect to Work programme, England and Wales (2023/24 to 2031/32 (programme life)).
    Extra cost of this change
    Capital: none identified in the brief.Recurring: Connect to Work funding still to be requested for 2029/30 onwards — £138,000,000 remaining requirement.One-off or mixed: Treasury and DWP analysis of the financing routes — Not yet costed.
    Funding
    Not funded yet: a possible funding route exists, but nothing is allocated to this change.Committed to this change: none.Possible source, not an award: none identified.Unfunded: £138m for 2029/30 onwards is not committed.
    Savings and wider benefits
    Not yet specified: no cashable saving or avoided cost has been costed for this change. Expected outcomes are listed one by one in the research appendix and are never added together or counted as money available.
    First 90-day step
    DWP publishes a re-profiled 2029/30 requirement and HM Treasury sets out the three financing routes for it ahead of the Spending ReviewThe proposed first milestone; a 90-day date is not yet specified. Owner: HM Treasury and DWP. Proposed by UK Facts, not an official deadline.
    Twelve-month milestone
    Not yet specified.Time to a first useful result: At the next Spending Review.
    Outcome, and when to scale or stop
    Measure: Whether the Spending Review names the source.Scale if: The tail is financed from a named source and the programme reaches its planned starts.Stop if: The programme’s own evaluation shows no employment effect — then the tail should not be financed at all.
    Main trade-off
    Finishing the programme costs £138m that must come from somewhere: a named DWP budget, a tax on someone or future taxpayers.
    Source and review date
    Connect to Work: Programme Business Case 2 summary (30 July 2026); Direct effects of illustrative tax changes (June 2025) (24 June 2025). Reviewed 2026-10-04.

    An editorial proposal by UK Facts for discussion, not government policy. Records: A21 · effects E-A21-INCOMES · costs C-A21-MODELLING

    Research appendix: study design, effect sizes and limits, alternatives, full costing, international comparisons and how we would know

    1.The change, in plain words

    Price one package, then compare how to pay: the £138m Connect to Work still needs from 2029/30

    2.The decision requested

    Decision
    Price the remaining Connect to Work requirement on 2029/30 prices and compare three financing routes on that basis — reprioritisation within DWP’s departmental budget (naming the line reduced), a specific tax change re-costed for 2029/30, or borrowing — with incidence, and record the choice at the Spending Review.
    Accountable institution
    HM Treasury and the Department for Work and Pensions
    Geography
    England and Wales
    Powers
    Spending Review settlements and Supply Estimates; a Finance Act for any tax route.
    Delivery partners
    Accountable bodies delivering Connect to Work (councils and combined authorities); HMRC (re-costing any tax route); Office for Budget Responsibility

    3.Who it is for, and what changes beyond today

    Target population
    People who would start Connect to Work’s supported-employment offer in 2029/30; UK taxpayers.
    Eligibility
    The Connect to Work programme in England and Wales as specified in Programme Business Case 2.
    Scale
    £138m requested for 2029/30 onwards (mostly 2029/30); grant unit cost £3,886 per participant start (nominal).
    Baseline
    Whole-life funding requirement £1,177.1m (2023/24 to 2031/32). Funding confirmed: £114m for 2025/26 (Autumn Budget 2024) and £978m for 2026/27 to 2028/29 (Spending Review 2025). £138m for 2029/30 and beyond “will be requested in a future Spending Review”. About 300,000 starts planned by the end of 2029/30.

    Source: Department for Work and Pensions, Connect to Work: Programme Business Case 2 summary (Paragraphs 1.1.6, 3.1.1–3.1.2; Tables 9–10)

    Change beyond existing law or funding
    The programme to 2028/29 is funded; this brief concerns only the uncommitted tail. The change is to decide its financing explicitly, on a compatible year and basis, instead of leaving it to a later settlement by default.

    4.How it would work

    Do: Price the remaining requirement and set the financing routes side by side on the same year and price basis Changing: so that the decision to finish the programme names who pays and which other spending, if any, is given up

    • Lower disposable income for the taxpayers of whichever tax is used, if a tax route is chosen

      Modelled, not observedEffect record E-A21-INCOMES

      The incidence depends on the tax; HMRC’s ready reckoner stops at 2028–29, so any 2029/30 tax option needs re-costing.

    • Connect to Work participants in 2029/30 receive support rather than the programme ending early

      Hypothesis to test

      Employment effects belong to the programme’s own evaluation (national brief at /employment#brief-A09), not to the financing choice.

    Outcomes are kept separate and never added into one impact figure.

    5.Best evidence

    • Connect to Work: Programme Business Case 2 summary

      Author or institution:
      Department for Work and Pensions
      Published:
      30 July 2026
      Evaluation period:
      2023/24 to 2031/32 (programme life)
      Design:
      Programme business case (financial case)
      Sample or population:
      Connect to Work programme, England and Wales
      Effect and uncertainty:
      Whole-life requirement £1,177.1m; confirmed £114m (2025/26) and £978m (2026/27 to 2028/29); £138m for 2029/30 onwards unconfirmed; about 300,000 starts; £3,886 grant per start (nominal).
      Limits:
      Totals carry no stated price basis; tabled spending is below confirmed funding in early years (90.7 against £114m in 2025/26), so the tail may be re-profiled.

      Where: Section 3.1 and Tables 9–10. Affiliation is provenance, not proof of quality.

    • Direct effects of illustrative tax changes (June 2025)

      Author or institution:
      HM Revenue & Customs
      Published:
      24 June 2025
      Evaluation period:
      2026–27 to 2028–29
      Design:
      Modelled costings of illustrative tax changes
      Sample or population:
      UK tax base
      Effect and uncertainty:
      The smallest published income tax steps yield more than £138m: 1p on the additional rate raises £230m in 2028–29; £100 on the personal allowance about £1.0bn (2028–29).
      Limits:
      No 2029–30 column, so no line can be matched to the year without a new costing; lines cannot be added.

      Where: Publication_Format sheet. Affiliation is provenance, not proof of quality.

    6.Alternatives, counter-evidence and who loses

    Closest feasible alternative
    Let the programme end its intake in 2028/29 when committed funding runs out, or fund the tail from DWP underspends if they arise.
    Strongest counter-evidence
    A tax rise for a £138m tail is out of proportion: published tax steps raise far more, so reprioritisation is the realistic route — which means naming another programme that loses.

    Source: Institute for Fiscal Studies, Options for tax increases (IFS Green Budget 2025 chapter) (Key findings)

    Distributional effects
    Participants in 2029/30 gain support; the reprioritised budget’s users lose; a tax route falls on whoever pays that tax; borrowing falls on future taxpayers.
    Main downside
    Making the choice explicit exposes the losing budget early, which can make the Spending Review harder.

    The options compared, including current policy

    • The proposal

      Reprioritise a named DWP budget line to cover the £138m

      Who is reached
      2029/30 participants; users of the reduced line lose
      Evidence
      Business case financial tables
      Likely outcome and timing
      From 2029/30 if agreed at the Spending Review
      Cost and funding
      £138m from within DWP
      Main trade-off
      Another programme shrinks

    • Alternative

      A specific tax change re-costed for 2029/30

      Who is reached
      Taxpayers of that tax
      Evidence
      HMRC ready reckoner (to 2028–29 only)
      Likely outcome and timing
      Needs a Finance Act
      Cost and funding
      Smallest published steps raise far more than needed
      Main trade-off
      Disproportionate for a £138m need

    • Alternative

      Borrow the £138m

      Who is reached
      Future taxpayers
      Evidence
      OBR debt-interest sensitivities
      Likely outcome and timing
      Immediate
      Cost and funding
      Adds to debt and interest
      Main trade-off
      Uses fiscal headroom for current spending

    • Current policy

      Current policy: request at a future Spending Review, source unnamed

      Who is reached
      Uncertain
      Evidence
      Business case paragraph 3.1.2
      Likely outcome and timing
      Decided later
      Cost and funding
      Not committed
      Main trade-off
      Default may be an early end to intake

    7.What other countries or the devolved nations show

    No comparable evaluation found.

    Searched: Evaluations of rules requiring the financing source for a specific programme to be named (hypothecation, pay-as-you-go budgeting such as the US statutory PAYGO rules, and multi-year programme funding in OECD budgeting reviews).

    Next step: Record at the next Spending Review whether the £138m is allocated, from which budget, and what that budget then delivers; compare with the business case.

    8.What delivery needs first

    • dependency — The next Spending Review covering 2029/30. (Genuine veto: nothing proceeds without it; owner: HM Treasury)
    • data — A 2029/30 baseline: re-profiled programme spend and any tax option re-costed for that year. (Requirement; owner: DWP and HMRC)

    9.What it would cost

    How the cost is built up: The package (£138m, nominal) financed by one of: named DWP reprioritisation, a re-costed tax change, or borrowing (plus its interest). Analysis time is the only cost of the comparison itself.

    • Connect to Work funding still to be requested for 2029/30 onwards

      Programme grant and delivery, mostly 2029/30

      £138,000,000 remaining requirement

      recurring; nominal (no price basis stated for totals) prices; 2029/30 to 2031/32; Modelled cost

      The package being financed; it overlaps the national Connect to Work brief and is counted once in the ledger there.

      Source: Department for Work and Pensions, Connect to Work: Programme Business Case 2 summary (Paragraph 3.1.2)

    • Treasury and DWP analysis of the financing routes

      One package on one baseline

      Not yet costed (ledger C-A21-MODELLING)

      one-off revenue; price year not stated; Before the Spending Review; Not yet established

    10.Who pays, and what is missing

    Programme envelope (a possible route, not an award)
    None identified
    Allocation committed to this change
    None
    Remaining gap
    £138m for 2029/30 onwards is not committed.
    Proposed financing
    A future Spending Review allocation, as the business case states; this brief compares how that allocation would be financed.
    Responsible payer
    central government, households
    Budget displaced
    Under reprioritisation, a named DWP budget line; under a tax route, the taxpayers concerned; under borrowing, future debt interest.

    11.First milestone and time to a useful result

    DWP publishes a re-profiled 2029/30 requirement and HM Treasury sets out the three financing routes for it ahead of the Spending Review (Owner: HM Treasury and DWP. Proposed by UK Facts, not an official deadline.)

    Time to first useful result: At the next Spending Review.

    What could delay it: The Spending Review timetable moves Programme spend is re-profiled so the tail changes

    12.How we would know

    Baseline
    £138m unconfirmed for 2029/30 onwards (business case, July 2026).
    Comparison
    The chosen route against the alternatives on the same year and basis.
    Leading indicator
    Whether the Spending Review names the source.
    Follow-up
    Outturn of the losing budget and the programme’s 2029/30 starts.
    Continue if
    The tail is financed from a named source and the programme reaches its planned starts.
    Adapt if
    Spend is re-profiled: re-price the tail before the decision.
    Stop if
    The programme’s own evaluation shows no employment effect — then the tail should not be financed at all.
    Thresholds
    Not yet set: Programme thresholds belong to DWP’s evaluation plan, not to the financing choice.

    What is not yet known, and how to find out

    • The 2029/30 requirement after re-profiling (cost)Next step: DWP to publish an updated profile with the next business-case review.Scope: Connect to Work 2029/30 to 2031/32 · Data or quotes needed: Updated starts and spend profile · Who can estimate it: Department for Work and Pensions
    • Which DWP line would be reduced and what it delivers (data)Next step: HM Treasury and DWP to name it in the Spending Review options.

    Sources last checked 4 October 2026 · Owner: Evidence editor (James Harris) · Next check: ONS public sector finances, UK: September 2026 (21 October 2026) or the first trigger: A change to Connect to Work funding beyond 2029–30.

    More decision briefs on other pages

    What it would take

    The order things have to happen in, who pays, and the effects and appraisals on record.

    The order things have to happen in

    1. First, the prerequisite

      Fix one post-Budget baseline and price year for all packages

      Owner: HM Treasury and HMRC (or independent modellers)

      No date: the timing depends on the steps before it.

    2. Then, the decision

      Choose one package and legislate

      Owner: HM Treasury; Parliament (Finance Act)

      No date: the timing depends on the steps before it.

    3. Then, delivery

      High Value Council Tax Surcharge starts: targeted valuation of homes worth £2m+

      Owner: Valuation Office Agency; councils collect for central government

      April 2028 — source

    4. Finally, the measured outcome

      Net receipts against costing; incidence by household

      Owner: HMRC; OBR

      No date: the timing depends on the steps before it.

    5. First, the prerequisite

      Publish official costings of closing specific capital-tax reliefs, with behavioural assumptions

      Owner: HMRC and the OBR

      No date: the timing depends on the steps before it.

    Who pays, and what is still missing

    Cost, committed funding and the remaining gap for the same scope and years. A programme envelope is not an award to a project; a proposal is not committed money. None of these costs has been established yet, so no total is shown.

    Cost and funding ledger

    • Modelling and publication of specified tax packages; HMRC administration of any change

      A21 · administration · not costed

      Amount
      Not yet costed
      Who pays
      central government
      Committed
      None identified
      Proposed, not committed
      —
      Gap
      Not established

    • HMRC staff, training, systems, appeals and overheads for a further compliance package

      A19 · administration · not costed

      Amount
      Not yet costed
      Who pays
      central government
      Committed
      None identified
      Proposed, not committed
      —
      Gap
      Not established

    • Revaluation of homes, appeals, transition relief and deferral schemes

      A22 · administration · not costed

      Amount
      Not yet costed
      Who pays
      central government, councils
      Committed
      None identified
      Proposed, not committed
      —
      Gap
      Not established

    “Not yet costed” means no defensible cost has been found — not that the action is free. Lifetime benefits, benefit-cost ratios and forecast savings are never shown here as money available to spend.

    Effects on record, with evidence ratings (5 records)

    What the evidence says each action changes

    Effects on record — these measure different outcomes, so they are not drawn on one scale
    ActionOutcome and areaEffectCompared withEvidence
    Collect more tax through specific, auditable compliance workNet tax receipts beyond forecast Public finances and taxDirection plausible; size not established—plausible spillover; limited confidence; United KingdomHMRC could not tell the NAO the marginal return to further investment; average yield ratios overstate it, and yield is not all cash.
    Collect more tax through specific, auditable compliance workCosts to compliant taxpayers wrongly challenged Public finances and tax · harmSize not established—plausible spillover; limited confidence; United KingdomA risk to monitor through upheld disputes and service measures; not quantified.
    Show tax choices with their real trade-offsHousehold and business incomes after tax Poverty and inequality · harmSize not established—modelled; moderate confidence; United KingdomWho pays depends entirely on the package; the benefit side depends on what the receipts fund, counted once.
    Reform property taxes without hiding the losersNet council tax bills of lower-income households Poverty and inequalityDirection plausible; size not established—modelled; moderate confidence; EnglandIFS revenue-neutral microsimulation on 2019 values with central funding fully adjusted: average cuts of 0.5–0.9% of household income for the bottom half. Re-running on current values is needed.
    Reform property taxes without hiding the losersHigher bills for owners of high-value homes, including some cash-poor and low-income households Poverty and inequality · harmSize not established—modelled; moderate confidence; EnglandLosses could be softened by council tax support, transition relief or deferral, each with a cost.

    How we would know

    Public sector current receipts; Tax gap, share of tax due; Council tax: top-band bill as a multiple of the bottom band; and 2 more.

    The outcome measures to watch. A baseline is where we start, not a target; where there is no official target we say so.

    Measured results

    What each option would be judged on, and the latest value of the measures already on this page. A measure moving is not proof that an option caused it.

    Where the ideas come from

    Research, counter-evidence and methods (14 sources; 1 claim held back)
    • Direct effects of illustrative tax changes (June 2025) — HM Revenue and Customs, 2025-06-24.Official statistics (ready reckoner); United Kingdom. Relevant passages checked, 2026-10-04. Limits: Each line is a single change on HMRC’s baseline; lines cannot be added up, and larger changes have larger behavioural effects.
    • Revaluation and reform: bringing council tax in England into the 21st century (IFS Report R168) — Institute for Fiscal Studies (Stuart Adam, Louis Hodge, David Phillips, Xiaowei Xu), 2020.Revenue-neutral microsimulation of council tax revaluation and reform, with funding equalisation between councils; England. Relevant passages checked (The publisher page blocks scripted access; the summary briefing PDF and full report PDF were downloaded from ifs.org.uk and the summary read in full.), 2026-10-04. Limits: Revenue-neutral by design; 2019 values; results depend on whether central funding is adjusted between councils.
    • Options for tax increases (IFS Green Budget 2025 chapter) — Institute for Fiscal Studies (Stuart Adam, Isaac Delestre, Helen Miller), 2025-10-13.Fiscal and distributional analysis of specified tax options with indicative costings; United Kingdom (property taxes mainly England). Relevant passages checked (read from an Internet Archive copy), 2026-10-04. Limits: A pre-Budget options paper, partly overtaken by Budget 2025 (26 November 2025). Indicative costings are not comparable with each other or with today’s baseline without re-modelling.
    • Council tax needs urgent reform - not being frozen in time in 1991 (IFS comment) — Institute for Fiscal Studies (David Phillips), 2024-06-06.Short expert comment drawing on the IFS 2020 report. Full text checked (read from an Internet Archive copy), 2026-10-04. Limits: A press comment, not analysis. Property-tax claims on this site cite the IFS 2020 report (P-IFS-R168-2020) instead.
    • Tax relief statistics (January 2026) — HM Revenue and Customs, 2026-01-22.Official statistics; United Kingdom. Relevant passages checked, 2026-10-07. Limits: Relief costs are not the revenue from removing a relief, because behaviour would change. Private residence relief is estimated from other data; APR and BPR forecasts predate the April 2026 reform.
    • Economic and fiscal outlook – October 2024 — Office for Budget Responsibility, 2024-10-30.Official forecast and costing certification; United Kingdom. Relevant passages checked, 2026-10-07. Limits: The OBR calls these among the most uncertain costings; elasticities are not published.
    • The Green Book (2026) — HM Treasury, 2026-02-05.Official appraisal guidance. Relevant passages checked, 2026-10-04. Limits: Guidance; a positive benefit-cost ratio identifies no funding source.
    • Taxing large businesses (HC 1647, Session 2024–26) — National Audit Office, 2026-02-27.Value-for-money audit of HMRC’s large business directorate; About 2,000 large business groups; about 2,500 full-time-equivalent HMRC staff; United Kingdom. Relevant passages checked, 2026-10-04. Limits: Large businesses only. Yield is skewed by a few very large interventions and is not a measure of cash that would be raised by expanding enforcement.
    • Autumn Budget 2024 (HC 295): “Closing the tax gap” — HM Treasury, 2024-10-30.Budget document; United Kingdom. Relevant passages checked, 2026-10-04. Limits: The £6.5bn is already in the fiscal forecasts, so it cannot fund anything new. No separate HMRC investment amount is stated in this section.
    • Measuring tax gaps 2026 edition: tax gap estimates for 2024 to 2025 — HM Revenue and Customs, 2026-06-23.Official statistics; United Kingdom. Relevant passages checked, 2026-10-04. Limits: An estimate of tax not paid, including error, insolvency and legal disputes — not a measure of what extra enforcement could collect.
    • High Value Council Tax Surcharge (policy paper) — HM Treasury / MHCLG, 2025-11-26.Budget policy paper; England. Relevant passages checked, 2026-10-04. Limits: A Budget 2025 measure: its receipts are already in the Budget arithmetic and cannot be counted again as new money.
    • Reforming Capital Gains Tax: the myths and the reality — CenTax (Advani A, Lonsdale A, Summers A), 2024-10.Independent costing; United Kingdom. Relevant passages checked, 2026-10-07. Limits: Independent, not an official costing; raises rates and closes reliefs together, so it does not cost “close reliefs instead of raising rates”.
    • Public finances databank (September 2026); outturn consistent with ONS/HM Treasury Public sector finances, 22 September 2026 — Office for Budget Responsibility, September 2026.Official statistics (outturn and forecast); United Kingdom. Relevant passages checked, 2026-10-04.
    • HMRC tax receipts and National Insurance contributions for the UK (annual table) — HM Revenue and Customs, 2026-09-22.Official statistics; United Kingdom. Relevant passages checked, 2026-10-07. Limits: Cash receipts by year paid; capital gains tax is paid in arrears and moves with sales brought forward ahead of rate changes.

    Counter-evidence and criticism

    • Show tax choices with their real trade-offs: Higher taxes reduce household and business incomes and can weaken incentives; mobile bases such as capital gains respond strongly; manifesto commitments limit which rates can rise. (Institute for Fiscal Studies)
    • Collect more tax through specific, auditable compliance work: Returns diminish as easier cases are worked; yield includes revenue “protected” that never arrives as cash; wrongly challenged taxpayers bear real costs. (National Audit Office)
    • Reform property taxes without hiding the losers: Cash-poor owners of valuable homes (often pensioners) and low-income renters in expensive areas can lose; large bill changes provoke resistance; deferral schemes can undermine revenue if poorly designed. (Institute for Fiscal Studies)
    • Close capital-tax reliefs before raising rates, with an official costing: The independent package raises rates and closes reliefs together; closing reliefs alone has no official costing, and relief costs are not the yield from removing them. (CenTax)

    Claims held back

    • A property-tax package can be compared as an additional revenue source — S16 is a short comment and the IFS reforms it summarises are revenue-neutral; the Budget 2025 surcharge (about £430m a year) is already in the forecasts. Needed: A separately costed revenue-raising design on current values.

    “Full text checked” means we read the report itself; “relevant passages” means the sections behind each figure; “summary or abstract only” means we could not read the full study, so no number from it is published here without another source.

    Other options compared — not on the shortlist (3)

    Other options compared

    Options from earlier work on this page that are not on the shortlist. They remain valid choices; their evidence is shown as before.

    • structuralStatus: external option

      Raise a broad-based tax

      Aims to:
      Large, relatively certain recurring revenue.
      How:
      A small increase in income tax, National Insurance or VAT applied to a very large base.
      Who decides:
      HM Treasury; Parliament (Finance Act).
      Main constraint:
      Political commitments about rates; effects on work incentives or prices.
      Evidence:
      Strong evidence — evaluated, and transferable to this case
      See the trade-offs and evidence
      What the evidence shows
      HMRC ready-reckoner yields for 1-point changes (£8–11bn a year) are well established and include behavioural effects for small changes.
      Resources
      None beyond existing systems.
      Consent and decisions needed
      Finance Act vote; most households pay.
      Time
      From the next tax year.
      Cost and yield
      Low administration cost.
      Trade-offs and who pays
      Falls on most workers or consumers; VAT is regressive relative to income.
      How we would know it worked
      Leading indicator: Receipts outturn against the costing. Outcome: Borrowing or funded services as planned. It would not be working if: Receipts fall short as earnings or spending respond.
    • structuralStatus: external option

      Reform taxes on capital gains and inheritance

      Aims to:
      More revenue from wealth when it is sold or passed on.
      How:
      Change rates, reliefs or exemptions in capital gains and inheritance tax.
      Who decides:
      HM Treasury; HMRC; Parliament.
      Main constraint:
      Large timing responses; receipts are volatile.
      Evidence:
      Moderate evidence — evaluated, with limits on scope or transfer
      See the trade-offs and evidence
      What the evidence shows
      HMRC estimates show rate rises on capital gains can lose money (−£2.1bn for +10 points on the higher rate), while 1 point on inheritance tax raises only about £0.2bn. Reforming reliefs rather than rates is the route the Wealth Tax Commission favoured; no official costing of a package is cited here.
      Resources
      Existing systems.
      Consent and decisions needed
      Finance Act; concentrated payers.
      Time
      One to two years after a change, as disposals and deaths occur.
      Cost and yield
      Low administration cost.
      Trade-offs and who pays
      Can lock in assets and discourage sales; concentrated on wealthier households.
      How we would know it worked
      Leading indicator: CGT and IHT receipts against costings. Outcome: Sustained higher receipts after the first years. It would not be working if: Forestalling inflates early receipts, then receipts fall.
    • structuralStatus: proposed

      Introduce an annual wealth tax

      Aims to:
      New recurring revenue from the stock of wealth.
      How:
      Annual charge on net wealth above a threshold, requiring valuation of assets.
      Who decides:
      HM Treasury; HMRC; Parliament.
      Main constraint:
      Valuation, liquidity, mobility of the very wealthy.
      Evidence:
      Limited evidence — plausible mechanism, little direct evaluation
      See the trade-offs and evidence
      What the evidence shows
      Independent research only: the Wealth Tax Commission illustrated £10bn a year from 0.6% above £2m, after administration costs, and found 7–17% of the base lost to avoidance at a 1% rate in other countries. It recommended against an annual tax.
      Resources
      A new valuation and administration system.
      Consent and decisions needed
      New primary legislation; contested.
      Time
      Several years to build systems.
      Cost and yield
      No official costing.
      Trade-offs and who pays
      Payers may leave or restructure; illiquid owners may need to sell.
      How we would know it worked
      Leading indicator: Valuation system operational; returns filed. Outcome: Net receipts against estimate. It would not be working if: Base shrinks well beyond the 7–17% range.
    The options side by side
    OptionResourcesTimeEvidenceOutcome to watch
    Raise a broad-based taxNone beyond existing systems.From the next tax year.strongBorrowing or funded services as planned.
    Reform taxes on capital gains and inheritanceExisting systems.One to two years after a change, as disposals and deaths occur.moderateSustained higher receipts after the first years.
    Introduce an annual wealth taxA new valuation and administration system.Several years to build systems.limitedNet receipts against estimate.

    Plan reviewed 2026-10-07. How we judge evidence.

    How this connects

    Sources and methods (12)

    Method notes

    • No figures on this page are added together. Several options overlap or interact, some are already in the forecasts, and some are one-off totals.
    • HMRC ready-reckoner figures are for small illustrative changes in isolation; large or combined changes need a full costing.
    • Recurring yields (a year) and one-off sums (a total) are shown in separate groups with different scales.
    • This page covers revenue. Spending choices are compared on the public finances page.