Pensions · Great Britain, then UK · 1994–95 to 2024–25

Pensioner poverty has halved since 1994–95. What awaits the next generation?

Relative pensioner poverty after housing costs fell from 28.1% in 1994–95 (Great Britain) to 13.9% in 2024–25 (UK). Future retirees face a different test: whether today’s contributions will provide enough income, as the population ages and State Pension costs rise.

Priority (proposed): Protect retirement adequacy for today’s and tomorrow’s pensioners, with financing the public can sustain and fair treatment of low earners and of different generations. What would change it →

Evidence last reviewed 3 October 2026

Overview

The short version

Three key measures

What it means day to day

Today’s pensioners are much less likely to be poor than a generation ago, although the rate has edged up recently. Tomorrow’s pensioners will depend more on what they save at work: automatic enrolment took workplace saving among eligible employees from 55% to 90%, but most save at the minimum on part of their pay, the self-employed are not covered, and women approaching retirement have far less private pension wealth than men. How the State Pension is uprated decides much of its future cost.

The evidence

Retirement income today and the cost of providing it tomorrow

How fast is the population ageing?

More older people change the balance—but definitions matter

People above State Pension age per 1,000 people of working age, UK, 2022 and 2047 (projected; dashed). Pension age and working age follow legislated State Pension age changes.

United Kingdom · 2022, 2047
Per 1,000 working age010020030020222047 (projected)302
The number of people above State Pension age is projected to rise 25.5%, from 12 million to 15.1 million by 2047. But the working-age population also grows, from 43.2 to 49.9 million, so the ratio rises much less — from 278 to 302 per 1,000, under 9%. Planned rises in State Pension age are part of why.

United Kingdom · 2022, 2047 · Official projection

Sources, definitions and data — More older people change the balance—but definitions matter
Geography:
United Kingdom — Usual residents
Measure:
People above State Pension age per 1,000 working age
Period:
2022, 2047
Status:
Official projection
Calculation:
As published (old-age dependency ratio, principal projection).
Compare with:
People above State Pension age: 12m to 15.1m (+25.5%)
Not included / breaks:
This is a population ratio, not workers per pensioner: many working-age people are not employed and some pensioners work. Projections depend on fertility, mortality and migration assumptions.

Source: ONS, National population projections: 2022-based. Chart PEN-01.

View the data as a table
YearPer 1,000 working ageAbove State Pension ageWorking age
202227812m43.2m
2047 (projected)30215.1m49.9m

Scroll the table sideways to see every column.

How much of the future rise is a policy choice?

The OBR estimates the triple lock accounts for around a third of the projected rise in State Pension spending

State Pension spending as a share of GDP: past levels and the OBR’s 2075–76 long-run projections under two uprating rules (dashed).

United Kingdom · Before 2008 to 2075–76
Per cent of GDP0.0%5.0%Pre-20082024–252075 earnings2075 triple lock9.0%
State Pension spending was about 3.5% of GDP for two decades before 2008 and is about 5% now. The OBR projects around 9% by 2075–76 if the triple lock continues, and around 7% if pensions rise with earnings instead. The OBR estimates that the triple lock — a choice — accounts for around a third of the projected rise; most of the rest comes from an ageing population, which is not a choice. The gap between the two rounded scenario figures is not the OBR’s own attribution.

United Kingdom · Before 2008 to 2075–76 · Official projection (conditional)

Sources, definitions and data — The OBR estimates the triple lock accounts for around a third of the projected rise in State Pension spending
Geography:
United Kingdom
Measure:
Per cent of GDP
Period:
Before 2008 to 2075–76
Status:
Official projection (conditional)
Calculation:
Milestones as stated by the OBR; no smooth line is drawn because no annual series is published in one place.
Compare with:
Earnings uprating scenario
Not included / breaks:
Long-run projections hold policy constant and are highly uncertain. The OBR’s separate 2025 decomposition (7.7% by 2073–74) is a different report and is not combined here.

Source: OBR, Fiscal risks and sustainability (July 2026). Chart PEN-02.

View the data as a table
PointPer cent of GDP
Two decades before 2008 (outturn)3.5%
2024–25 (outturn)5%
2075–76, earnings uprating (OBR projection)7%
2075–76, triple lock (OBR baseline projection)9%

Who has enough?

Will people have enough?

A pension system can cost more and still leave some people short

Left: pensioners in relative poverty after housing costs, UK. Right: eligible employees participating in a workplace pension, Great Britain.

United Kingdom (poverty); Great Britain (participation) · Poverty 1994–95–2024–25; participation 2012–2025

Pensioner poverty after housing costs (UK)

1996–2026 displayed window · observations only. Shading marks years outside the displayed record.

Per cent of pensioners0%10%20%30%40%20002010202013.9%

Eligible employees saving in a workplace pension (GB)

1996–2026 displayed window · observations only. Shading marks years outside the displayed record.

Per cent of eligible employeesNo observations shown0%50%100%20002010202090%
Pensioner poverty fell from 28.1% to around 12–14% and has edged up recently (13.9% in 2024–25). Automatic enrolment took participation from 55% to 90% of eligible employees. But today’s pensioners and tomorrow’s savers are different people: participation says nothing about whether 8% of band earnings will be enough, and the self-employed are not covered.

United Kingdom (poverty); Great Britain (participation) · Poverty 1994–95–2024–25; participation 2012–2025 · Official statistics

Sources, definitions and data — A pension system can cost more and still leave some people short
Geography:
United Kingdom (poverty); Great Britain (participation)
Measure:
Per cent
Period:
Poverty 1994–95–2024–25; participation 2012–2025
Status:
Official statistics
Calculation:
As published. Different populations and years; not combined.
Compare with:
Their own earlier values
Not included / breaks:
A genuine policy success by this measure — but participation is not the same as adequacy: it says someone is saving something, not that their contribution rate or pot size will be enough to live on, and the rate varies sharply by employer size (as low as 55% at the smallest employers, over 90% at mid-sized ones). See the master-trust default-fund detail on the funded-pensions page for what these contributions are invested in.

Source: DWP HBAI; DWP Workplace pension participation and savings trends. Chart PEN-03.

View the data as a table
YearParticipation
201255%
201359%
201471%
201575%
201677%
201784%
201887%
201988%
202088%
202188%
202288%
202388%
202489%
202590%
Shareable visual summary

Visual summary

Image held

The image is not offered for download or sharing until the reasons below are resolved. The chart here is drawn from today’s records.

More pensioners — and a growing working-age population too.

ONS 2022-based projection, 2022 to 2047: people above State Pension age 12.0m → 15.1m; working age 43.2m → 49.9m; 278 → 302 pensioners per 1,000 working age. Working age is not the same as employed.

ONS 2022-based principal projection, UK

Group20222047
Above State Pension age12.0m15.1m
Working age43.2m49.9m
Above State Pension age per 1,000 working age278302

The ratio is the published ONS figure, not recalculated from the rounded totals.

Why the supplied image is held

  • The image uses ONS’s 2022-based projection. ONS published 2024-based projections on 28 April 2026, which show slower working-age growth; the page and image both need updating to them.
Text and data version

More pensioners — and a growing working-age population too. ONS 2022-based projection, 2022 to 2047: people above State Pension age 12.0m → 15.1m; working age 43.2m → 49.9m; 278 → 302 pensioners per 1,000 working age. Working age is not the same as employed.

Records behind this visual summary
MeasureValuePeriodGeographyTypeSource
People above State Pension age, 202212.0m2022United Kingdomprojection (projection)ONS, National population projections: 2022-based
People above State Pension age, 2047 (projected)15.1m2047United Kingdomprojection (projection)ONS, National population projections: 2022-based
Working-age population, 202243.2m2022United Kingdomprojection (projection)ONS, National population projections: 2022-based
Working-age population, 2047 (projected)49.9m2047United Kingdomprojection (projection)ONS, National population projections: 2022-based
People above State Pension age per 1,000 working age, 20222782022United Kingdomprojection (projection)ONS, National population projections: 2022-based
People above State Pension age per 1,000 working age, 2047 (projected)3022047United Kingdomprojection (projection)ONS, National population projections: 2022-based

All visual summaries, their source records and their publication state are listed on Shareable visuals.

Go deeper

  • Are pensions enough to live on?
    -15.2percentage points1996-97–2024-25United Kingdom · %
    0204019962026
    29.1% → 13.9%1996-97–2024-25
    Relative poverty after housing costs. A measure of income, not pension wealth.
    Sources and data

    Relative poverty moves with median income: it can fall in a recession if middle incomes fall. After housing costs is the measure most poverty researchers prefer, because rent and mortgage costs vary so much. From 2021/22 DWP links benefit records into the survey, correcting under-reported benefit income. This lowers poverty rates by roughly three points for children, so figures before and after 2021/22 are not directly comparable. Figures to 2001/02 cover Great Britain only.

    Source dataset →
    Period%Status
    1996-9729.1Outturn
    1997-9829.2Outturn
    1998-9928.6Outturn
    1999-0027.7Outturn
    2000-0126Outturn
    2001-0225.7Outturn
    2002-0323.9Outturn
    2003-0420.4Outturn
    2004-0517.3Outturn
    2005-0616.4Outturn
    2006-0718.8Outturn
    2007-0817.7Outturn
    2008-0915.7Outturn
    2009-1015.2Outturn
    2010-1114Outturn
    2011-1213.4Outturn
    2012-1313.3Outturn
    2013-1413.7Outturn
    2014-1513.8Outturn
    2015-1615.7Outturn
    2016-1715.9Outturn
    2017-1816.5Outturn
    2018-1915.9Outturn
    2019-2018.1Outturn
    2020-2114.7Outturn
    2021-2215Outturn
    2022-2312.7Outturn
    2023-2412.3Outturn
    2024-2513.9Outturn
    Who has enough, and who does not.Read the chapter → Are pensions enough to live on?
  • How big will the State Pension bill get?
    +0.6percentage points1996-97–2024-25Great Britain · % of GDP
    04819962026
    5.1% → 5.6%1996-97–2024-25
    Observed pensioner benefit spending as a share of GDP; broader than the State Pension. Forecasts are excluded here.
    Sources and data

    DWP benefits in Great Britain, as recorded in DWP's outturn tables; real terms use the GDP deflator. Excludes HMRC tax credits and Northern Ireland. The latest year or two are forecasts (stored separately).

    Source dataset →
    Period% of GDPStatus
    1996-975.06Outturn
    1997-985.02Outturn
    1998-995.01Outturn
    1999-005.08Outturn
    2000-015.11Outturn
    2001-025.28Outturn
    2002-035.23Outturn
    2003-045.19Outturn
    2004-055.28Outturn
    2005-065.29Outturn
    2006-075.22Outturn
    2007-085.29Outturn
    2008-095.67Outturn
    2009-106.16Outturn
    2010-116.14Outturn
    2011-126.2Outturn
    2012-136.34Outturn
    2013-146.11Outturn
    2014-156.04Outturn
    2015-165.98Outturn
    2016-175.81Outturn
    2017-185.64Outturn
    2018-195.55Outturn
    2019-205.47Outturn
    2020-215.96Outturn
    2021-225.37Outturn
    2022-235.2Outturn
    2023-245.56Outturn
    2024-255.62Outturn
    The OBR projections and what drives them.Read the chapter → How big will the State Pension bill get?
  • Where are pension assets invested?
    -46.0percentage points2006–2025United Kingdom · %
    No observationsshown0408019962026
    61.1% → 15.1%2006–2025
    Equity share of PPF-eligible defined-benefit assets. Not all pensions or defined-contribution funds.
    Sources and data

    Part of the DB 'de-risking' story: schemes have shifted from equities toward bonds/LDI as they mature and as funding levels have improved. Covers PPF-eligible private-sector (and some hybrid) defined benefit schemes only. Excludes unfunded public sector schemes (NHS, Teachers, Civil Service, Armed Forces, Police — see the unfunded-schemes panel on this page), some funded public sector schemes such as the Local Government Pension Scheme (shown separately on this page), schemes with a Crown Minister guarantee, schemes with fewer than two members, and schemes wound up before 6 April 2005. Figures are 'as at 31 March' each year; only years published in the Purple Book's own consolidated summary table are included (2006, 2011, then annually from 2016) — intervening years exist in each year's own PPF edition but are not fabricated here. The Purple Book itself states: "figures for 2023 and after are not directly comparable with those from earlier years" — the 2023 data point onward uses updated s179 valuation assumptions. Trend direction remains informative; year-to-year changes spanning 2022→2023 should not be read as precisely as changes within 2016–2022 or 2023–2025.

    Source dataset →
    Period%Status
    200661.1Outturn
    201141.1Outturn
    201630.3Outturn
    201729Outturn
    201827Outturn
    201924Outturn
    202020.4Outturn
    202119Outturn
    202219.5Outturn
    202318.8Outturn
    202415.5Outturn
    202515.1Outturn
    Definitions matter before any reform.Read the chapter → Where are pension assets invested?

Evidence → choices → outcomes

What could improve it?

Adequate retirement incomes now and for future pensioners, with the costs to employers, employees and taxpayers set out openly.

A pension pot must last through retirement

Saving a pension pot does not ensure a sustainable retirement income. Guided Retirement addresses difficult withdrawal choices; delivery still requires regulations, scheme governance and clear consent. Its eventual effects have not yet been established.

Evidence in the domain SWOT →

These options link to their national assessment, including funding, delivery constraints and remaining uncertainties.

  • Assessed option · provisional

    Claim what people are owed

    Assisted applications for people likely to be entitled to Pension Credit.

    8/10 criteria scored

    Coverage of the appraisal, not an impact score.

    Delivery: Amber

    Whole-life costs incomplete

    Evidence and delivery constraints

    Unclaimed entitlement establishes a gap; effect of this outreach design is untested.

    Specify eligible cohort, trusted outreach, application support and comparison group; arrange benefits-processing capacity.

This domain in the UK SWOT →UK National Action Plan →

How we assessed these options

What would it take to improve this?

What would move the needle?

The outcome we want: Adequate retirement incomes now and for future pensioners, with the costs to employers, employees and taxpayers set out openly.

The main constraint: Every option moves cost or risk between groups — employers, workers’ take-home pay, taxpayers or future pensioners — so the binding decision for DWP, the Treasury and Parliament is who pays, and changes take decades to show in retirement incomes.

Constraint type: public consent, money, legislation.

The options on the table

What is funded now, and the changes assessed against it — the current baseline and the alternatives, before the position today and the actions.

Provisional single-reviewer assessments from the 6 October 2026 review; not approved business cases, and not government policy.

  • Pension money into UK assetsDelivery RAG: Amber

    Funded now
    Not yet stated in the record.
    The change assessed
    Not yet defined.

    Range if completed: 10.0–16.0 out of 30 (equal weights; not yet assessed: expected incremental benefit (Bn), incremental affordability (Co))

  • Phase pension-saving reform with low-income protectionDelivery RAG: Amber

    Funded now
    An IFS recommendation, not government policy. Powers to apply contributions from the first pound exist (2023 Act) but are not yet used; the government’s Pensions Commission was reviewing adequacy. Separately, on 29 September 2026 the Burnham government said the State Pension triple lock will be kept until April 2030 and then adjusted (a rise of at least inflation or 2.5%, with a link to keep pace with earnings over time), to be legislated this Parliament; that changes the State Pension, not workplace saving.
    The change assessed
    Appraise a defined contribution/default change including opt-outs and low take-home pay.

    Range if completed: 11.0–17.0 out of 30 (equal weights; not yet assessed: expected incremental benefit (Bn), incremental affordability (Co))

Assessed with another page as home

These options also bear on this topic. The full assessment sits on the home page named under each.

  • Claim what people are owedDelivery RAG: Amber

    Home: Benefits.

    Funded now
    Pension Credit and DWP take-up campaigns already exist; a targeted, evaluated outreach model is a UK Facts proposal.
    The change assessed
    Assisted applications for people likely to be entitled to Pension Credit.

    Range if completed: 16.0–22.0 out of 30 (equal weights; not yet assessed: expected incremental benefit (Bn), incremental affordability (Co))

Alternatives already on record: 22 options listed under the points in the position today (15 without an action record), and 3 earlier options under other options compared. They have not been scored in the review.

The position today

  • What we can build on (2)
  • What is holding us back (3)Saving a pension pot does not ensure a sustainable retirement income. Guided Retirement addresses difficult withdrawal choices; delivery still requires regulations, scheme governance and clear consent. Its eventual effects have not yet been established. (July 2026 policy framework · Great Britain)
  • What could improve things (1)A phased saving reform that protects low earners’ take-home pay, alongside help to claim Pension Credit, could improve future and current retirement incomes together.
  • What could make it worse (3)

Which quadrant a point sits in is our analytical judgement, not a statistical category. Each point says whether it is a measured fact, our synthesis or a risk.

What we can build on Strengths

What is holding us back Weaknesses

What could improve things Opportunities

What could make it worse Threats

  • Pension consolidation and domestic investment must protect savers’ risk-adjusted returns. The 2025 Investment Review sets out policy aims; it does not establish that any particular UK allocation will outperform a diversified alternative.

    Risk, not a certaintyConfidence: Moderate· UK workplace pensions; LGPS in England and Wales

    Source: HM Treasury, DWP and MHCLG, Pensions Investment Review: Final Report and consultation responses (Summary and policy aims)

    Options assessed against this point: Pension money into UK assets (Amber delivery RAG)

  • On current policy the OBR projects State Pension spending rising from about 5% of GDP to about 9% by 2075–76 — about 7% with earnings uprating instead of the triple lock.

    Risk, not a certaintyConfidence: Moderate

    Source: Office for Budget Responsibility, Fiscal risks and sustainability (July 2026) (State pension long-run projection)

    What government has committed to

    Policy: The Triple Lock is maintained until April 2030; from then it will be 'adjusted' so the State Pension rises by at least inflation or 2.5% and by more if needed to keep pace with earnings over time. The government estimates savings of £15bn a year by the end of the 2030s and £50bn a year by 2050 (nominal), and will legislate this Parliament.

    Who and when:
    Burnham government (from 20 July 2026), 29 September 2026.
    Since 20 July 2026:
    Made by the current government. Before 29 September 2026 the stated commitment (re-stated in DWP's analysis) was uprating by the Triple Lock throughout this Parliament; the change is the post-April 2030 rule. DWP published supporting analysis the same day (real-terms savings £11bn in 2039-40 and £30bn in 2049-50; illustrative, not forecasts). Not yet legislated or assessed by the OBR.
    Source:
    Prime Minister's Office, Prime Minister Andy Burnham sets out plans for a new National Care Service (Opening bullets and paras on the Triple Lock ('maintained until April 2030'; adjusted thereafter; legislate this Parliament; £15bn a year by end of 2030s, £50bn by 2050))

    Checked 4 October 2026. A commitment is not delivery.

    Options (4)
    • Change the uprating rule (triple lock)

      Uprating by earnings over time rather than the highest of three measures; OBR projected about 7% of GDP by 2075-76 instead of about 9%.

      Who: HM Treasury and DWP; Parliament · Evidence: Modelled scenario · Status: Announced proposal

      Source: Office for Budget Responsibility, Fiscal risks and sustainability, July 2025 (State pension long-run projection (domain source P-OBR-FRS))

    • Raise State Pension age further

      Fewer years of State Pension per person; the third statutory review (launched July 2025) will advise.

      Who: DWP and Parliament · Evidence: Modelled scenario · Status: Established

      Source: Department for Work and Pensions, Third State Pension age review (collection) (Collection summary (Pensions Act 2014 review; independent report by Dr Suzy Morrissey; GAD report))

    • Broaden National Insurance to pension and investment income

      Spreads the cost of pensions beyond working-age earnings.

      Who: HM Treasury and Parliament · Evidence: Untested proposal · Status: External proposal

    • Raise productivity so a smaller workforce supports the same provision

      Higher output per worker raises the tax base relative to pension spending.

      Who: HM Treasury · Evidence: Expert or audit recommendation · Status: External proposal · Works through Economy & cost of living: Higher output per worker raises the tax base relative to pension spending.

      Source: Resolution Foundation / LSE Centre for Economic Performance, Ending Stagnation: A New Economic Strategy for Britain (Final report PDF p.30 (printed p.29, '10 key steps', step 1); PDF p.9 executive summary (domain locators S01))

  • Contribution rises timed badly can squeeze take-home pay and push up opt-outs among those least able to save.

    Risk, not a certaintyConfidence: Moderate

    Source: Institute for Fiscal Studies / abrdn Financial Fairness Trust, The Pensions Review: final recommendations (Printed p.60)

    Options assessed against this point: Phase pension-saving reform with low-income protection (Amber delivery RAG)

    What government has committed to

    No commitment found. No government commitment to raise minimum automatic-enrolment contributions was found. Powers to lower the AE age and remove the lower earnings limit exist (2023 Act) but require consultation before use; separately, from 29 April 2026 salary sacrificed for employer pension contributions is made liable to National Insurance.

    Searched: gov.uk search API (relevance and org-filtered, from 2026-07-20) and HM Treasury/DESNZ/DWP publication lists 15 Jul-4 Oct 2026; No 10 news list; Parliament written-questions API (answered from 2026-07-21); 'auto-enrolment contributions', 'minimum contribution', written questions

    Checked 4 October 2026. A commitment is not delivery.

    Options (3)

The actions worth examining

Our shortlist for this page. Research quality, policy status, cost and funding are judged separately; none of these is government policy unless its status says so.Our shortlist. None is government policy unless its status says so.

  1. Improve pension saving while protecting low take-home pay — costed proposal; funding not committed
  2. Help eligible people claim support they already qualify for — not yet costed / funding not identified
  • Action 1A24Policy status: external proposal

    Improve pension saving while protecting low take-home pay

    Require an employer contribution for almost everyone and phase higher default saving for those earning more, alongside a clear state-pension target.

    Assessment (draft, 6 October review)

    Who decides:
    DWP and HM Treasury, with Parliament (Great Britain)
    Evidence:
    Modelled scenario. Microsimulation of a specified package; effects on wages and opt-outs are assumptions, not observations.
    Expected effect:
    Direction plausible; size not established.
    Cost and funding

    £5bn a year, a modelled year at 2025 earnings, not a forecast for a particular year, 2025 prices; 2 further cost lines

    Funding: Costed proposal; funding not committed

    Why it is shortlisted here: The clearest costed proposal for future adequacy, with employer, employee and Exchequer costs published separately.

    What it takes
    The problem

    Many employees save too little for retirement under the current 8% minimum, while low earners cannot afford to give up pay now.

    Who is affected, and where

    Employees in the United Kingdom, especially those saving little or nothing. Territory: Great Britain. Automatic enrolment is GB legislation with parallel Northern Ireland law; the state pension is UK-wide.

    Policy status

    Proposed by researchers or others, not government policy. An IFS recommendation, not government policy. Powers to apply contributions from the first pound exist (2023 Act) but are not yet used; the government’s Pensions Commission was reviewing adequacy. Separately, on 29 September 2026 the Burnham government said the State Pension triple lock will be kept until April 2030 and then adjusted (a rise of at least inflation or 2.5%, with a link to keep pace with earnings over time), to be legislated this Parliament; that changes the State Pension, not workplace saving.

    The evidence
    What the research found:
    The modelled package (a 3% employer floor for earnings of £4,000+; default 3% of the first £9,000 and 10% from £9,000 to £90,000) adds about £5.0bn a year of employer and £6.0bn of employee contributions, and up to £3.7bn a year of upfront tax relief, in 2025 prices.
    Evaluated on:
    Private-sector employees aged 16–74 (ASHE 2021, uprated to 2025); United Kingdom, 2025 earnings
    Our recommendation (separate from the research):
    Consult on precise parameters and show effects by income, age and employer size, with employer, employee and Exchequer costs kept separate.
    Strongest counter-evidence:
    Employer costs are likely to come out of wages; higher defaults lower take-home pay now and may raise opt-outs.
    Effects on record
    • Retirement saving of employees who save little or nothing today: Direction plausible; size not established. modelled, moderate confidence; United Kingdom employees. Modelled contributions (about £11bn a year more) are an input; retirement incomes depend on decades of returns and behaviour.
    • Take-home pay now: A cost or harm; size not established. modelled, moderate confidence; United Kingdom employees. The IFS tax-relief estimate assumes employer contributions are passed through to wages.
    Cost and funding

    Cost completeness: Modelled cost benchmark; implementation costing to verify. Funding: Costed proposal; funding not committed.

    • Extra employer pension contributions (private contribution; paid by employers): £5bn a year, a modelled year at 2025 earnings, not a forecast for a particular year, 2025 prices. £3.5bn for current non-savers and £1.4bn for current savers in defined-contribution schemes.
    • Extra employee pension contributions (private contribution; paid by employees): £6bn a year, a modelled year at 2025 earnings, not a forecast for a particular year, 2025 prices. All from current defined-contribution savers.
    • Upfront income tax relief on the extra contributions (tax relief; paid by central government): up to £3.7bn a year, a modelled year at 2025 earnings; falls to at most £2.1bn in the long run, 2025 prices. An upper bound (“up to £3.7bn”) that assumes employer contributions are passed through to lower wages and no salary sacrifice.
    • Employers (proposed in the IFS package): £5bn — not committed (no allocation). May be passed on to workers through lower pay growth.
    • Employees (proposed in the IFS package): £6bn — not committed (no allocation). Lower take-home pay now for more income later.
    • Exchequer tax relief (no funding decision): amount not established — not committed (no allocation). Up to £3.7bn a year in the short run; no source of funding identified.
    Who pays:
    Employers (about £5.0bn a year) and employees (about £6.0bn a year) through contributions; the Exchequer through tax relief (up to £3.7bn a year at first).
    Financing proposed:
    Contributions from employers and employees; tax relief needs a government funding choice. Proposed offsets cannot be spent twice.
    Gap remaining:
    Nothing is committed; the Exchequer cost has no funding source.
    What delivery needs
    Skills:
    Payroll and pension-provider administration.
    Operational capacity:
    Employer payroll readiness, especially small firms.
    Infrastructure:
    Pension schemes able to take small pots.
    Permissions:
    Regulator guidance.
    Law:
    Primary or secondary legislation.
    Public consent:
    Employers and employees accepting lower pay now.
    First step and stages

    First step: Consult on precise parameters and publish effects by income, age and employer size. (owner: DWP with HM Treasury)

    1. Consult — DWP (proposed stage, not an official timetable)
    2. Legislate and announce a phase-in — Parliament (proposed stage, not an official timetable)
    3. Phase in with affordability checks — Employers and The Pensions Regulator (proposed stage, not an official timetable)

    Depends on: A state-pension target decided at the same time

    Trade-offs
    Who gains and who loses:
    Gains for future pensioners who save little now; costs for employers and for employees’ take-home pay; about 60% of the tax relief would go to people below the higher-rate threshold.
    What else the money or effort could do:
    Tax relief competes with other spending; lower pay now competes with current living standards.
    Strongest counterargument:
    Workers on low pay may need income now more than pension later.
    Risks:
    Lower wage growth, rising opt-outs and pressure on households already unable to save.
    How we would judge it
    Baseline:
    Share of eligible employees saving in a workplace pension (DWP).
    Leading indicator:
    Contribution rates and opt-outs.
    Outcome:
    Coverage, contributions, take-home pay and projected adequacy under published assumptions.
    Continue, adapt or stop:
    Pause the next phase if opt-outs rise sharply or low earners’ net pay falls more than modelled.
    Earlier option on this page

    This card replaces the option “Higher automatic-enrolment contributions” (proposed: Powers to apply contributions from the first pound exist (2023 Act) but are not yet used.). Its evidence: Modelling suggests 8% is unlikely on its own to maintain living standards; 12% is commonly proposed. Effects on take-home pay and opt-outs are uncertain. Pensions Policy Institute, "Automatic Enrolment Contributions Briefing Paper"

    Sources

    Source published 2 July 2025; evidence reviewed 2026-10-04. Reconsider if: The Pensions Commission reports; The government uses the 2023 Act powers; New OBR long-run projections.

  • Action 2A25Policy status: site-editorial action

    Help eligible people claim support they already qualify for

    Use lawful data matching and assisted applications to reach people likely to be entitled, then verify and pay their claims.

    Assessment (draft, 6 October review)

    Who decides:
    DWP, councils and advice providers (Great Britain)
    Evidence:
    Untested proposal. The size of unclaimed entitlement is measured; what outreach would achieve has not been evaluated here.
    Expected effect:
    Direction plausible; size not established.
    Cost and funding

    up to £2.5bn a year, 2023–24, cash (nominal) prices; 1 further cost line, some not yet costed

    Funding: Not yet costed / funding not identified

    Why it is shortlisted here: Protects today’s poorest pensioners, whose entitlement already exists in law.

    Builds on the option Protect low earners, carers and the self-employed compared below.

    What it takes
    The problem

    Hundreds of thousands of pensioner families entitled to Pension Credit do not claim it.

    Who is affected, and where

    Pensioner families in Great Britain entitled to Pension Credit who do not claim. Territory: Great Britain. Northern Ireland administers its own social security; not assessed.

    Policy status

    UK Facts proposal. Pension Credit and DWP take-up campaigns already exist; a targeted, evaluated outreach model is a UK Facts proposal.

    The evidence
    What the research found:
    62% of entitled people claimed Pension Credit in 2023–24; up to 910,000 families did not claim, and up to £2.5bn went unclaimed — about £2,600 a year per family.
    Evaluated on:
    Pensioner families in the Family Resources Survey; Great Britain, 2023–24
    Our recommendation (separate from the research):
    Test targeted outreach with an evaluation before claiming any take-up effect, and budget for the extra entitlement it would pay.
    Strongest counter-evidence:
    Survey-based estimates can misclassify households as entitled, so a statistical estimate is not individual eligibility.
    Effects on record
    • Income of eligible pensioners who start claiming: Direction plausible; size not established. plausible spillover, limited confidence; Great Britain. An unclaimed family misses about £2,600 a year on average, but how many more would claim after outreach has not been evaluated.
    Cost and funding

    Cost completeness: Partly costed. Funding: Not yet costed / funding not identified.

    • Extra Pension Credit paid if more entitled people claim (household transfer; paid by central government): up to £2.5bn a year, 2023–24, cash (nominal) prices. Up to £2.5bn went unclaimed in 2023–24: the ceiling if every entitled family claimed. Successful take-up raises spending; a realistic increase depends on what outreach achieves, which is not established.
    • Outreach, data matching and assisted applications (administration; paid by central government, councils): Not yet costed. Administration by DWP, councils and advice services.
    Who pays:
    Central government: extra Pension Credit payments and administration; councils and advice services for assisted applications.
    Financing proposed:
    Benefit spending is demand-led; outreach needs an administration budget.
    Gap remaining:
    Outreach is not costed; extra entitlement could be up to £2.5bn a year if every entitled family claimed.
    What delivery needs
    Skills:
    Advisers trained in Pension Credit.
    Operational capacity:
    DWP processing.
    Infrastructure:
    Data-matching systems.
    Permissions:
    Lawful data-sharing gateways.
    Law:
    Existing powers; check data-sharing basis.
    Public consent:
    Older people’s willingness to be contacted.
    First step and stages

    First step: Identify likely unmet entitlement without treating a statistical estimate as individual eligibility. (owner: DWP with councils)

    1. Test outreach in defined areas — DWP and councils (proposed stage, not an official timetable)
    2. Verify awards and measure retention — DWP (proposed stage, not an official timetable)
    Trade-offs
    Who gains and who loses:
    Gains for low-income pensioners; higher spending for the Exchequer.
    What else the money or effort could do:
    Administration and benefit spending compete with other priorities.
    Strongest counterargument:
    Successful take-up raises spending; a campaign that does not reach the right people wastes money.
    Risks:
    Privacy, digital exclusion and contacting people who are not entitled.
    How we would judge it
    Baseline:
    Pension Credit take-up (DWP), 62% by caseload in 2023–24.
    Leading indicator:
    Eligible claimants reached and successful awards.
    Outcome:
    Take-up by caseload and expenditure; income gains; processing time.
    Continue, adapt or stop:
    Continue where awards per contact beat a comparison area; stop otherwise.
    Sources

    Source published 30 October 2025; evidence reviewed 2026-10-04. Reconsider if: The next take-up release; An evaluation of a Pension Credit campaign.

    Also on: Benefits — one shared record, so its cost is counted once.

How the options are assessed

One shared record per option — the same one the national plan reads. Delivery RAG, gate and list membership are separate judgements.

  • Pension money into UK assets — Amber delivery RAG; gate reframe
  • Phase pension-saving reform with low-income protection — Amber delivery RAG; gate pending

Provisional single-reviewer assessments from the 6 October 2026 review; not approved business cases, and not government policy.

  • A58Delivery RAG: AmberGate: reframe

    Pension money into UK assets

    Proposed new action A58; sourced research home and appraisal design; scope and funding remain provisional.

    Provisional single-reviewer assessment; not an approved business case.

    Who and where
    Population not yet defined. Jurisdiction: not defined.
    Result so far
    Range if completed: 10.0–16.0 out of 30 (equal weights; not yet assessed: expected incremental benefit (Bn), incremental affordability (Co))
    Funded now (baseline)
    Funded baseline not yet stated
    The change assessed (marginal)
    Marginal change not yet defined
    What the evidence supports—and the next decision

    A domestic allocation is not automatically additional UK investment, and a national benefit is not the same as a saver’s return.

    Codex — AI-assisted analytical follow-up · 8 October 2026. Proposed appraisal design; the attributed scores below are unchanged. No funding or delivery agreement is implied.

    Define the change
    Compare a specified investable project pipeline and fee structure with existing diversified portfolios; identify what prevents private funding now.
    Test whether it works
    Additional capital formation and risk-adjusted net returns, fees and liquidity for savers. Do not count purchases of existing shares as new productive assets.
    Establish the cost
    Administration, fees, guarantees and the opportunity cost of returns forgone; stress poor returns and correlated UK exposure.
    Protect against harm
    Preserve trustee duties, diversification and saver interests. Government preference is not evidence of investment suitability.

    Read with the outcome evidence and sources in the full assessment. Monitoring proposals are not existing baseline measurements. A numerical benefit or cost score needs evidence for the defined increment, not just the scale of the problem.

    Full assessment of Pension money into UK assets: ten criteria, scenarios, delivery, costs and monitoring
    The ten criteria (0–3)

    Each criterion is scored 0 to 3 by the reviewer. “Not yet assessed” means unknown: it is never counted as zero.

    1. Scale and severity (Sc)2 of 3 — Serious harm to a defined group or widespread moderate harm

      Reviewer’s reason: Provisional problem-importance judgement from linked site pages; not the scale of achievable benefit.

    2. Increment beyond baseline (Ad)1 of 3 — Small or poorly supported increment

      Reviewer’s reason: Define a change beyond existing commitments; test investable demand, fiduciary safeguards, liquidity and net additional capital. A missing rating requires a defined marginal change.

    3. Confidence in the proposed action (Ev)0 of 3 — No effect evaluation

      Reviewer’s reason: No evaluated additional investment from the specified pledge; relabelling holdings is not new investment.

    4. Expected incremental benefit (Bn)Not yet assessed

      Reviewer’s reason: Unknown unless a reasonably defined target-population benefit can be judged; no bonus merely for spanning domains.

    5. Residual harms (Hm)1 of 3 — Material harm/unresolved mitigation

      Reviewer’s reason: Portfolio concentration and poorer returns; existing pledge fails additionality.

    6. Incremental affordability (Co)Not yet assessed

      Reviewer’s reason: Administration, fees, guarantees if any and savers’ risk-adjusted opportunity cost.

    7. Delivery capacity (Ca)2 of 3 — Stretched but plausibly obtainable

      Reviewer’s reason: Define a change beyond existing commitments; test investable demand, fiduciary safeguards, liquidity and net additional capital.

    8. Distribution (Fa)1 of 3 — Material disadvantage to vulnerable groups

      Reviewer’s reason: Provisional distribution judgement for the stated target; verify who pays, who gains and excluded groups.

    9. Meaningful first outcome (Ti)1 of 3 — More than three but less than ten years

      Reviewer’s reason: First meaningful outcome, not announcement: Net new productive investment and saver returns after costs.

    10. Readiness (Rd)2 of 3 — Named commissioning/allocation/coordination step

      Reviewer’s reason: Treasury, pension trustees, regulators and investment managers; Reframe or retain outside eligible shortlist

    Four weightings

    Normalised as 10 × weighted sum ÷ sum of weights, on a 0–30 scale. Where a criterion is not yet assessed, the range is the lowest and highest result if it were later scored 0 or 3 — not a score, a confidence interval or a rank.

    • Equal weights: Range if completed: 10.0–16.0 out of 30. Not yet assessed: expected incremental benefit (Bn), incremental affordability (Co). Funding gate: not passed.
    • Evidence doubled: Range if completed: 9.1–14.5 out of 30. Not yet assessed: expected incremental benefit (Bn), incremental affordability (Co). Funding gate: not passed.
    • Scale doubled: Range if completed: 10.9–16.4 out of 30. Not yet assessed: expected incremental benefit (Bn), incremental affordability (Co). Funding gate: not passed.
    • Cost ignored (the funding gate still applies): Range if completed: 11.1–14.4 out of 30. Not yet assessed: expected incremental benefit (Bn), incremental affordability (Co). Funding gate: not passed.

    Funding gate: Not passed — the cost is not yet assessed or no allocation is committed for this scope. Ignoring cost in a weighting never removes the gate.

    Delivery RAG and gate

    Delivery RAG shown: AmberReview’s claim: Amber. Best the recorded evidence allows: Amber.

    Review’s reason: Administration, fees, guarantees if any and savers’ risk-adjusted opportunity cost.

    Why it is not Green yet

    • Scope (population, place and increment) not verified against the delivery baseline.
    • No verified owner with the powers in place.
    • Delivery capacity not verified.
    • Lifetime incremental costs not complete.
    • No credible funding (a committed allocation for the scope).
    • Safeguards not specified.
    • Monitoring lacks a metric, a data source or a baseline.

    Green needs verified scope, a verified owner with the powers, verified capacity, complete lifetime costs with credible funding, specified safeguards and monitoring with a metric, source and baseline. Amber means appraisal gaps remain; Red means a material delivery obstacle. Red does not mean unimportant.

    Gate: Reframe — the option needs a different scope (review label: “Reframe: insufficient additionality”).

    Why: Scores incomplete; Increment beyond baseline scored 1 (needs a specific material change); Funding gate not passed (cost unknown or no credible funding).

    The gate is separate from national list membership: being listed does not make an option eligible, and an eligible option need not be listed.

    Cost and funding

    Lifetime costing: Not established. Review: “Full incremental costing not established in reviewed material”.

    Still to cost: Administration, fees, guarantees if any and savers’ risk-adjusted opportunity cost.

    Funding status: not established in review.

    Owner, powers and capacity

    Proposed owner: Treasury, pension trustees, regulators and investment managers (proposed, unverified).

    Powers: needs a decision or allocation. Capacity: unverified.

    Powers and capacity read from the review’s Rd and Ca anchors; no proposed owner has agreed to act (the review: “Proposed owners have not agreed to act”).

    England:
    not assessed
    Scotland:
    not assessed
    Wales:
    not assessed
    Northern Ireland:
    not assessed

    Not defined in the review.

    Dependencies, safeguards and risks

    Depends on: None recorded.

    Safeguards

    • test investable demand, fiduciary safeguards, liquidity and net additional capital (proposed, not yet specified)

    Risks and residual harms: Portfolio concentration and poorer returns; existing pledge fails additionality.

    Monitoring and measured results

    Metric: Net new productive investment and saver returns after costs.

    Data source: Not yet named. Baseline: Not yet established.

    Evidence for the outcome

    Outcome: Net new productive investment and saver returns after costs.

    No evaluated additional investment from the specified pledge; relabelling holdings is not new investment.

    Review record

    Assessment version: working-review-2026-10-06 (A58@working-review-2026-10-06).

    Reviewer: Author of the review blueprint (single reviewer, not named in uk-facts-complete-plan.json). Reviewed: 6 October 2026.

    Scored in the working review of 6 October 2026 on the shared ten-criterion scale (one reviewer); not independently calibrated.

    First 90 days (review): Produce a signed scope and current-delivery baseline; Define a change beyond existing commitments; test investable demand, fiduciary safeguards, liquidity and net additional capital. Obtain incremental costs and an accountable decision before expansion.

    Decision route: Reframe or retain outside eligible shortlist

    An editorial screening framework by one reviewer, not a formal appraisal or business case. Proposed owners have not agreed to act.

  • A24Delivery RAG: AmberGate: pending

    Phase pension-saving reform with low-income protection

    Existing action A24, assessed at the same scope.

    Provisional single-reviewer desk assessment, 6 October 2026.

    Who and where
    Employees in the United Kingdom, especially those saving little or nothing. (from the action record) Jurisdiction: Great Britain.
    Result so far
    Range if completed: 11.0–17.0 out of 30 (equal weights; not yet assessed: expected incremental benefit (Bn), incremental affordability (Co))
    Funded now (baseline)
    An IFS recommendation, not government policy. Powers to apply contributions from the first pound exist (2023 Act) but are not yet used; the government’s Pensions Commission was reviewing adequacy. Separately, on 29 September 2026 the Burnham government said the State Pension triple lock will be kept until April 2030 and then adjusted (a rise of at least inflation or 2.5%, with a link to keep pace with earnings over time), to be legislated this Parliament; that changes the State Pension, not workplace saving. (from the action record)
    The change assessed (marginal)
    Appraise a defined contribution/default change including opt-outs and low take-home pay. (from the 6 October review)
    What the evidence supports—and the next decision

    Participation, adequacy and retirement-income decisions are different pension outcomes; higher contributions may also reduce current disposable income.

    Codex — AI-assisted analytical follow-up · 8 October 2026. Proposed appraisal design; the attributed scores below are unchanged. No funding or delivery agreement is implied.

    Define the change
    Separate coverage, contribution and low-income protection options, defining affected workers and the existing pension and tax baseline.
    Test whether it works
    Participation, contributions, projected income with uncertainty, opt-outs and present hardship; account for fees and longevity.
    Establish the cost
    Employer and worker contributions, tax relief, administration and support, distinguishing transfers from resource costs.
    Protect against harm
    Protect low earners and informed choices; do not assume a larger pot guarantees a sustainable retirement income.

    Read with the outcome evidence and sources in the full assessment. Monitoring proposals are not existing baseline measurements. A numerical benefit or cost score needs evidence for the defined increment, not just the scale of the problem.

    Full assessment of Phase pension-saving reform with low-income protection: ten criteria, scenarios, delivery, costs and monitoring
    The ten criteria (0–3)

    Each criterion is scored 0 to 3 by the reviewer. “Not yet assessed” means unknown: it is never counted as zero.

    1. Scale and severity (Sc)2 of 3 — Serious harm to a defined group or widespread moderate harm

      Reviewer’s reason: Problem scale judged from the linked domain evidence; not a population estimate of those helped.

    2. Increment beyond baseline (Ad)2 of 3 — Specific material change to existing delivery

      Reviewer’s reason: Appraise a defined contribution/default change including opt-outs and low take-home pay. This is a provisional marginal-change judgement, to confirm against commissioned delivery.

    3. Confidence in the proposed action (Ev)1 of 3 — Indirect, mixed, modelled or weak causal support

      Reviewer’s reason: Modelled retirement outcomes, not an observed benefit for this reform.

    4. Expected incremental benefit (Bn)Not yet assessed

      Reviewer’s reason: Unknown: no sufficiently supported magnitude for this exact change.

    5. Residual harms (Hm)1 of 3 — Material harm/unresolved mitigation

      Reviewer’s reason: Lower current income, employer incidence and uncertainty in future returns.

    6. Incremental affordability (Co)Not yet assessed

      Reviewer’s reason: Unknown: the proposed increment has not been costed and matched to an approved affordable allocation in this review. Existing programme envelopes are not that allocation.

    7. Delivery capacity (Ca)2 of 3 — Stretched but plausibly obtainable

      Reviewer’s reason: No use of pension assets as free government money.

    8. Distribution (Fa)2 of 3 — Mixed or broadly neutral with safeguards

      Reviewer’s reason: Distribution assessed against the target group and the burdens described here: Lower current income, employer incidence and uncertainty in future returns.

    9. Meaningful first outcome (Ti)0 of 3 — Ten years or more

      Reviewer’s reason: Timing judgement concerns the first meaningful outcome in: Net saving and opt-outs early; retirement adequacy over decades. It does not imply all long-term benefits arrive then.

    10. Readiness (Rd)1 of 3 — Legislation/external agreement or major enabling work

      Reviewer’s reason: Update cohort modelling and consult on who pays before committing. Owner: DWP, Treasury, employers and pension providers.

    Four weightings

    Normalised as 10 × weighted sum ÷ sum of weights, on a 0–30 scale. Where a criterion is not yet assessed, the range is the lowest and highest result if it were later scored 0 or 3 — not a score, a confidence interval or a rank.

    • Equal weights: Range if completed: 11.0–17.0 out of 30. Not yet assessed: expected incremental benefit (Bn), incremental affordability (Co). Funding gate: not passed.
    • Evidence doubled: Range if completed: 10.9–16.4 out of 30. Not yet assessed: expected incremental benefit (Bn), incremental affordability (Co). Funding gate: not passed.
    • Scale doubled: Range if completed: 11.8–17.3 out of 30. Not yet assessed: expected incremental benefit (Bn), incremental affordability (Co). Funding gate: not passed.
    • Cost ignored (the funding gate still applies): Range if completed: 12.2–15.6 out of 30. Not yet assessed: expected incremental benefit (Bn), incremental affordability (Co). Funding gate: not passed.

    Funding gate: Not passed — the cost is not yet assessed or no allocation is committed for this scope. Ignoring cost in a weighting never removes the gate.

    Delivery RAG and gate

    Delivery RAG shown: AmberReview’s claim: Amber. Best the recorded evidence allows: Amber.

    Review’s reason: Full incremental costing and allocation remain unverified. No use of pension assets as free government money.

    Why it is not Green yet

    • Scope (population, place and increment) not verified against the delivery baseline.
    • No verified owner with the powers in place.
    • Delivery capacity not verified.
    • Lifetime incremental costs not complete.
    • No credible funding (a committed allocation for the scope).
    • Safeguards not specified.
    • Monitoring lacks a metric, a data source or a baseline.

    Green needs verified scope, a verified owner with the powers, verified capacity, complete lifetime costs with credible funding, specified safeguards and monitoring with a metric, source and baseline. Amber means appraisal gaps remain; Red means a material delivery obstacle. Red does not mean unimportant.

    Gate: Pending — appraisal incomplete (review label: “Pending scope, cost and funding appraisal”).

    Why: Scores incomplete; Funding gate not passed (cost unknown or no credible funding).

    The gate is separate from national list membership: being listed does not make an option eligible, and an eligible option need not be listed.

    Cost and funding

    Lifetime costing: Partial — some lines costed, no whole-life total.

    • Extra employer pension contributions (modelled benchmark; C-A24-EMPLOYER)
    • Extra employee pension contributions (modelled benchmark; C-A24-EMPLOYEE)
    • Upfront income tax relief on the extra contributions (modelled benchmark; C-A24-RELIEF)

    Still to cost: Full incremental costing and allocation remain unverified. No use of pension assets as free government money.

    Funding status: costed, not committed.

    Owner, powers and capacity

    Proposed owner: DWP, Treasury, employers and pension providers. (proposed, unverified).

    Powers: needs legislation or external agreement. Capacity: unverified.

    Powers and capacity read from the review’s Rd and Ca anchors; no proposed owner has agreed to act (the review: “Proposed owners have not agreed to act”).

    England:
    DWP and HM Treasury, with Parliament (action record)
    Scotland:
    DWP and HM Treasury, with Parliament (action record)
    Wales:
    DWP and HM Treasury, with Parliament (action record)
    Northern Ireland:
    not assessed

    Automatic enrolment is GB legislation with parallel Northern Ireland law; the state pension is UK-wide.

    Dependencies, safeguards and risks

    Depends on: No use of pension assets as free government money.

    Safeguards

    None specified yet.

    Risks and residual harms: Lower current income, employer incidence and uncertainty in future returns.

    Monitoring and measured results

    Metric: Net saving and opt-outs early; retirement adequacy over decades.

    Data source: Not yet named. Baseline: Not yet established.

    Measures already on the domain page

    A page measure is not necessarily the review’s metric; linking the two is an editorial decision still to be made.

    Evidence for the outcome

    Outcome: Net saving and opt-outs early; retirement adequacy over decades.

    Modelled retirement outcomes, not an observed benefit for this reform.

    Effect records for this action

    • Retirement saving of employees who save little or nothing today: size not established (modelled, moderate confidence; United Kingdom employees)
    • Take-home pay now: size not established (modelled, moderate confidence; United Kingdom employees)
    Review record

    Assessment version: working-review-2026-10-06 (A24@working-review-2026-10-06).

    Reviewer: Author of the review blueprint (single reviewer, not named in uk-facts-complete-plan.json). Reviewed: 6 October 2026.

    Carried from the earlier domain review (C record): must be calibrated jointly with the G/W/E/NG/NW/NE records before any combined comparison.

    Decision route: Update cohort modelling and consult on who pays before committing.

    An earlier assessment exists on the 4 October 2026 selection table (nine H/M/L bands; superseded 7 October 2026). Its bands are kept, not converted into these scores.

    An editorial screening framework by one reviewer, not a formal appraisal or business case. Proposed owners have not agreed to act.

Decision brief

  • Give almost every employee an employer pension contribution, and raise default saving for middle and higher earners — phased, with low earners’ take-home pay protected

The leading option set out as a decision someone could take: who decides, who benefits, the best evidence, cost and funding, and the main trade-off. The full research record is one click away.

Decision briefPublic-policy proposalReviewed 2026-10-04

Give almost every employee an employer pension contribution, and raise default saving for middle and higher earners — phased, with low earners’ take-home pay protected

Decision required
DWP and the Treasury consult on the IFS package as a costed option for the Pensions Commission’s final report: a 3% employer contribution for anyone earning £4,000 or more whether or not they save themselves, and a higher default total for those earning more, announced years ahead and phased in large employers first — decided together with a target level for the state pension.
Who and where
Private-sector employees in Great Britain, especially those not saving in a workplace pension and middle earners contributing only the minimum. Applies in: Great Britain.
Accountable body
Department for Work and Pensions with HM Treasury; Parliament for legislation
Intervention
Require an employer contribution for almost every employee and raise the default total for middle and higher earners, phased in with years of notice.
Best evidence, and where it applies
IFS modelling (2025): about £5.0bn a year more from employers and £6.0bn from employees, and up to £3.7bn a year of upfront tax relief; the share of 25- to 34-year-old savers projected to fall short of their target retirement income drops from 38% to 25%. Modelled, not observed, and it assumes opt-outs do not change.Studied in: Private-sector employees aged 16–74 (ASHE 2021) for costs; 25- to 59-year-old defined contribution savers (Wealth and Assets Survey) for distributional effects (Costs on 2021 earnings uprated to 2025; retirement projections over working lives).How closely the comparison transfers to this decision: Australia (national) — partial.
Extra cost of this change
Capital: none identified in the brief.Recurring: Extra employer contributions (all employers, a modelled year) — £5bn a year, a modelled year at 2025 earnings, not a forecast for a particular year, 2025 prices; Extra employee contributions (all employees, a modelled year) — £6bn a year, a modelled year at 2025 earnings, not a forecast for a particular year, 2025 prices; Upfront tax relief on the extra contributions (Exchequer) — up to £3.7bn a year, a modelled year at 2025 earnings; falls to at most £2.1bn in the long run, 2025 prices; Worked example, part-time earner on £8,000: employer contribution — £240 per employee a year; Worked example, low earner on £15,000: extra employer contribution — £187.2 per employee a year; Worked example, low earner on £15,000: change in default employee contribution — £-18 per employee a year; Worked example, low earner on £15,000: change in income tax relief (Exchequer) — £-3.6 per employee a year; Worked example, middle earner on £35,000: extra employer contribution — £187.2 per employee a year; Worked example, middle earner on £35,000: extra default employee contribution — £382 per employee a year; Worked example, middle earner on £35,000: extra income tax relief (Exchequer) — £76.4 per employee a year; Worked example, higher earner on £60,000: extra employer contribution — £187.2 per employee a year; Worked example, higher earner on £60,000: extra default employee contribution — £1,660.4 per employee a year; Worked example, higher earner on £60,000: extra income tax relief (Exchequer) — £664.16 per employee a year.One-off or mixed: Employer and payroll administration for the new triggers — not yet established.
Funding
Not funded: the change has a cost estimate, but no funding is committed.Committed to this change: none.Possible source, not an award: none identified.Unfunded: The whole Exchequer cost (up to £3.7bn a year at first) is unfunded; nothing is committed and the change is not government policy.
Savings and wider benefits
Not yet specified: no cashable saving or avoided cost has been costed for this change. Expected outcomes are listed one by one in the research appendix and are never added together or counted as money available.
First 90-day step
DWP publishes a consultation on the contribution parameters with worked examples and distributional tables by earnings, age and employer size, feeding the Pensions Commission’s final report.The proposed first milestone; a 90-day date is not yet specified. Owner: DWP with HM Treasury. Proposed by UK Facts, not an official deadline.
Twelve-month milestone
Not yet specified.Time to a first useful result: Opt-out and opt-down rates within a year of the first large-employer phase; effects on pay growth over two to three years; retirement incomes only over decades.
Outcome, and when to scale or stop
Measure: Opt-out and opt-down rates, especially among employees earning £10,000 to £20,000 and in small firms.Scale if: Opt-outs stay close to the pre-reform level and low earners’ take-home pay moves no more than modelled, while contributions rise for the groups targeted.Stop if: Low earners’ take-home pay falls well beyond the modelled path, or employers cut jobs or hours attributably.
Main trade-off
Lower take-home pay now — mostly for middle earners, because employers are expected to pass their extra cost into slower pay growth — and an Exchequer cost that has no funding source.
Source and review date
The Pensions Review: final recommendations (full report, PDF) (2 July 2025); Pensions 2050: evidence and future priorities – interim report of the second Pensions Commission (19 May 2026 (supporting data added 15 June 2026)). Reviewed 2026-10-04.

An editorial proposal by UK Facts for discussion, not government policy. Records: A24 · effects E-A24-SAVING, E-A24-TAKEHOME · costs C-A24-EMPLOYER, C-A24-EMPLOYEE, C-A24-RELIEF

Research appendix: study design, effect sizes and limits, alternatives, full costing, international comparisons and how we would know

1.The change, in plain words

Give almost every employee an employer pension contribution, and raise default saving for middle and higher earners — phased, with low earners’ take-home pay protected

2.The decision requested

Decision
Commission a DWP consultation on the IFS parameters, with published worked examples and distributional analysis by earnings, age and employer size, so that the Pensions Commission’s final report (planned for spring 2027) has a fully costed contribution option; decide the state-pension target at the same time; and, if adopted, announce the change several years before it applies, starting with large employers.
Accountable institution
Department for Work and Pensions with HM Treasury; Parliament for legislation
Geography
Great Britain
Powers
Pensions Act 2008 (automatic enrolment; annual threshold review under section 14) and later amending Acts. Powers to calculate contributions from the first pound already exist (2023 Act), but a contribution paid whether or not the employee saves, a £4,000 trigger, ages 16–74 and a new default schedule need legislation — DWP to confirm whether primary or secondary. Northern Ireland would need parallel law.
Delivery partners
The Pensions Regulator; Employers and payroll software providers; Pension schemes, including Nest; HMRC (tax relief); The Pensions Commission (final report, spring 2027)

3.Who it is for, and what changes beyond today

Target population
Private-sector employees in Great Britain, especially those not saving in a workplace pension and middle earners contributing only the minimum.
Eligibility
As modelled by IFS: employer contribution of at least 3% of earnings up to £50,270 for anyone earning £4,000+ a year; default total of £270 plus 10% of earnings between £9,000 and £90,000 for those earning £10,000+; ages 16–74; employees may opt down without losing the employer contribution; thresholds uprated with earnings.
Scale
Every employer and eligible employee by design, because it changes statutory minimums. The bounded first stage is the IFS’s own suggestion — large employers first — which also lets opt-outs and pay effects be measured before smaller firms join.
Baseline
90% of eligible employees saved in a workplace pension in 2025 (DWP). The minimum is 8% of earnings between £6,240 and £50,270, at least 3% from the employer, for employees aged 22 to state pension age earning £10,000 or more; these thresholds are held for 2026–27 while the Pensions Commission works. Its interim report (May 2026) estimates that 43% of working-age people (15 million) are undersaving against target retirement incomes and that a third of eligible private-sector employees contribute only the minimum. On current policy the OBR projects State Pension spending rising from about 5% of GDP to about 9% by 2075–76 (about 7% with earnings uprating instead of the triple lock).

Source: Department for Work and Pensions, Workplace pension participation and savings trends: 2009 to 2025 (Participation of eligible employees); Department for Work and Pensions, Review of the Automatic Enrolment Earnings Trigger and Qualifying Earnings Band for 2026/27 (Thresholds for 2026–27); Department for Work and Pensions (Pensions Commission), Pensions 2050: evidence and future priorities – interim report of the second Pensions Commission (Paras 9 and 19); Office for Budget Responsibility, Fiscal risks and sustainability (July 2026) (State pension long-run projection)

Change beyond existing law or funding
Beyond current law: an employer contribution that no longer depends on the employee saving, starting from the first pound for anyone earning £4,000+; wider ages; a higher default total aimed at middle and higher earners; and a published state-pension target. Worked examples (UK Facts arithmetic on 2026–27 thresholds, employer paying the minimum, no opt-out): someone earning £8,000 gets an employer contribution of £240 a year where today they get none unless they opt in; on £15,000 the employer pays £187 more and the default employee contribution falls by £18; on £35,000 the employer pays £187 more and the employee £382 more (total £2,301 → £2,870); on £60,000 the employer pays £187 more and the employee £1,660 more (total £3,522 → £5,370).

4.How it would work

Do: Require an employer contribution for almost every employee and raise the default total for middle and higher earners, phased in with years of notice Changing: more money paid into pensions, especially for people not saving today and for middle earners at the minimum, at the cost of take-home pay now

  • More retirement saving and higher projected retirement incomes for people who under-save today

    Modelled, not observedEffect record E-A24-SAVING

    IFS: about £11bn a year more saved; retirement incomes about 6% higher overall, with larger rises in the bottom half; the share of 25- to 34-year-old savers short of their target replacement rate falls from 38% to 25% (42% to 39% for 50- to 59-year-olds, who have less time to benefit).

  • Lower take-home pay now

    Modelled, not observedEffect record E-A24-TAKEHOME

    Recorded as a harm. If announced in 2025–26 for 2029–30 and fully passed through, average nominal earnings would grow 8.7% rather than 9.3% over those years. Employers’ cost is about 0.5% of total pay, over 1% in hospitality and in firms with fewer than 25 employees. The lowest fifth by take-home pay sees one of the smallest falls; the middle the largest.

  • Opt-outs and employees’ own contributions

    Hypothesis to test

    IFS assumes no change in opt-outs. Making the employer contribution unconditional removes one reason to stay in, so some employees may stop contributing; opt-outs have stayed below 11% under the current system. This is what a large-employer first phase should measure.

Outcomes are kept separate and never added into one impact figure.

5.Best evidence

  • The Pensions Review: final recommendations (full report, PDF)

    Author or institution:
    Jonathan Cribb, Carl Emmerson, Paul Johnson, Heidi Karjalainen, Laurence O’Brien (Institute for Fiscal Studies), funded by abrdn Financial Fairness Trust
    Published:
    2 July 2025
    Evaluation period:
    Costs on 2021 earnings uprated to 2025; retirement projections over working lives
    Design:
    Microsimulation of a specified package against two alternatives (8% and 12% from the first pound)
    Sample or population:
    Private-sector employees aged 16–74 (ASHE 2021) for costs; 25- to 59-year-old defined contribution savers (Wealth and Assets Survey) for distributional effects
    Effect and uncertainty:
    £5.0bn employer and £6.0bn employee contributions a year; up to £3.7bn upfront relief, at most £2.1bn long run (2025 prices); retirement incomes +6%. “Indicative”: no behavioural response modelled.
    Limits:
    Assumes no change in opt-outs or work and full pass-through of employer costs to wages; individual-level modelling ignores couples, housing costs and inheritances.

    Where: Printed pp.12–13, 33–35, 44–47, 54–61 (Table 4.1). Affiliation is provenance, not proof of quality.

  • Pensions 2050: evidence and future priorities – interim report of the second Pensions Commission

    Author or institution:
    Second Pensions Commission (Baroness Drake, Sir Ian Cheshire, Professor Nick Pearce), published by DWP
    Published:
    19 May 2026 (supporting data added 15 June 2026)
    Evaluation period:
    Automatic enrolment 2012–2025; projections of retirement incomes
    Design:
    Evidence review and projections (official interim report)
    Sample or population:
    Working-age population of the UK; eligible private-sector employees
    Effect and uncertainty:
    43% (15 million) undersaving against target replacement rates (45% for those retiring in the 2020s and 54% in the 2050s under a slower state-pension path); a third of eligible private-sector employees at the minimum; opt-outs below 11%.
    Limits:
    Interim; makes no recommendation on rates yet and says any change would not be for this parliament.

    Where: Paras 9–10, 18–20, 1.36. Affiliation is provenance, not proof of quality.

6.Alternatives, counter-evidence and who loses

Closest feasible alternative
Use the powers already legislated in 2023 to apply the 8% minimum from the first pound. IFS models it as £1.4bn more from employers, £3.8bn from employees and £1.4bn upfront relief — cheaper for the Exchequer but with the largest percentage rise for people just over the £10,000 trigger and nothing for the fifth of employees who are not members.
Strongest counter-evidence
Australia’s Retirement Income Review concluded that most rises in compulsory employer contributions came out of growth in take-home pay (one study found pass-through close to 100%, another about 80% over two to three years). The IFS makes the same assumption: an employer contribution is largely paid by workers.

Source: Australian Government, The Treasury, Retirement Income Review: Final Report (Chapter 2C, pp.159–160); Institute for Fiscal Studies (in partnership with abrdn Financial Fairness Trust), The Pensions Review: final recommendations (full report, PDF) (Printed p.32 and footnote 9)

Distributional effects
Low earners between £4,000 and £10,000, many of them part-time women, get an employer contribution for the first time; employees of Pakistani and Bangladeshi origin, who opt out more often, gain disproportionately. Middle earners give up the most take-home pay. About 60% of the upfront tax relief goes to people earning below £50,270. Small firms and hospitality face the largest cost rise. Today’s pensioners are not helped (see the Pension Credit take-up action on this page).
Main downside
Middle earners’ pay grows more slowly for a benefit decades away, and the Exchequer gives up up to £3.7bn a year with no funding decision.

The options compared, including current policy

  • The proposal

    The IFS package, phased and announced years ahead (this brief)

    Who is reached
    Almost all employees; employer contribution for the fifth not saving; more saving for middle and higher earners
    Evidence
    Modelled (IFS 2025); no behavioural response included
    Likely outcome and timing
    Contributions rise from the first phase; retirement incomes about 6% higher in the long run
    Cost and funding
    About £5.0bn employers and £6.0bn employees a year; Exchequer up to £3.7bn a year, unfunded
    Main trade-off
    Slower pay growth now, mostly for middle earners
  • Current policy

    Current policy: 8% of earnings between £6,240 and £50,270, held for 2026–27, while the Pensions Commission reports

    Who is reached
    Employees aged 22 to state pension age earning £10,000+ who do not opt out
    Evidence
    Observed: participation up from 55% in 2012 to about 9 in 10; a third at the minimum
    Likely outcome and timing
    No change in saving; final Commission report planned for spring 2027
    Cost and funding
    No new cost
    Main trade-off
    43% of working-age people undersaving on the Commission’s estimate
  • Alternative

    8% from the first pound (powers legislated in 2023)

    Who is reached
    Current savers, with the biggest percentage rise for those just over £10,000
    Evidence
    Modelled (IFS Table 4.1)
    Likely outcome and timing
    Retirement incomes about 4% higher
    Cost and funding
    £1.4bn employers, £3.8bn employees, £1.4bn upfront relief a year
    Main trade-off
    Hits the lowest-paid savers hardest; nothing for non-members
  • Alternative

    12% from the first pound (6% employer)

    Who is reached
    All current savers
    Evidence
    Modelled (IFS Table 4.1)
    Likely outcome and timing
    Retirement incomes about 9% higher
    Cost and funding
    £9.9bn employers, £8.9bn employees, £6.4bn upfront relief a year
    Main trade-off
    Take-home pay falls by over 4% in the bottom half if employers pass costs through
  • Alternative

    Set a state-pension target first (the companion decision)

    Who is reached
    All future pensioners, with the biggest percentage gain for lower-income retirees
    Evidence
    IFS costing; OBR long-run projection
    Likely outcome and timing
    Under the triple lock the state pension reaches about 33% of median full-time earnings by 2043 (central case) from 30.2%; OBR projects spending of about 9% of GDP by 2075–76 on current policy
    Cost and funding
    A 33% target costs about £15bn a year more in 2050 than keeping 30.2%
    Main trade-off
    Higher taxes or lower spending elsewhere later; does not address middle earners’ replacement rates

7.What other countries or the devolved nations show

Country lesson · Australia (national), From 1992 (3% of earnings), 9% from 2002, 12% from 1 July 2025

Compulsory employer pension contributions in Australia — and who really pays for them

Evidence: Expert or audit recommendationPartial match: some conditions differ

What was changed
The superannuation guarantee: employers must pay a minimum share of each eligible employee’s earnings into a pension fund, whatever the employee saves, up to a maximum contribution base. The rate rose in legislated steps; from 1 July 2026 it is paid with each payday.
Study design and population
A government-commissioned review (2020) of the evidence, including two micro-econometric studies of how rate rises passed into wages, plus official rate tables. Not a trial. Employees in Australia. The self-employed are not covered; at the time of the review, some low earners and under-18s working part-time were also excluded.
Measured outcome there
The review concluded that most increases in the guarantee came out of growth in take-home pay: one study using linked tax records found pass-through close to 100%, another about 80% over two to three years; two macro studies found no significant pass-through. Net unpaid guarantee was A$2.3bn in 2016–17 (3.9% of what was owed), more often affecting lower-paid employees.
Cost status
No cost is transferred to the UK. The review’s central finding is that workers largely pay for employer contributions through slower pay growth.
What failed or remains uncertain
Higher compulsory contributions are not costless to workers; low earners already reach high replacement rates through the means-tested Age Pension, and the review warned that compulsory rates set too high cut their living standards while working; non-payment by employers is concentrated on the lower-paid; pass-through estimates differ by method.
Why the UK differs
UK automatic enrolment lets employees opt out and lose the employer contribution; the IFS proposal adds only a 3% non-contingent employer floor, far below 12%; the UK state pension is flat-rate rather than means-tested; Australian award-based wage setting differs.
First change required here
Cost any UK rise on the assumption that employers pass it into pay, announce it years ahead as the IFS suggests, and phase it in large employers first so opt-outs and pay effects can be measured.

Not a UK forecast: the effect above was measured in that place and population. Source: Australian Government, The Treasury, Retirement Income Review: Final Report (Overview; chapter 2C pp.159–160; section 3D); Australian Taxation Office, Super guarantee: rates and maximum contribution base (Table 21). Reviewed 2026-10-04.

8.What delivery needs first

  • law — Legislation for an unconditional employer contribution, the £4,000 trigger, wider ages and the new default schedule (Great Britain), with parallel Northern Ireland law. (Genuine veto: nothing proceeds without it; owner: DWP; Parliament)
  • dependency — A state-pension target set at the same time, because the right private-saving default depends on what the state pension will provide. (Requirement; owner: DWP and HM Treasury)
  • infrastructure — Payroll software able to apply two triggers (£4,000 for the employer contribution, £10,000 for the default) and pension schemes able to take many very small contributions without high charges. (Requirement; owner: Payroll providers; pension schemes; The Pensions Regulator)
  • public consent — Employers and employees accepting slower pay growth now; years of notice so pay settlements can adjust. (Scarce resource shared with other priorities; owner: DWP with employer and worker representatives)
  • data — Contribution, opt-out and opt-down data by earnings and employer size from the first-phase employers. (Requirement; owner: The Pensions Regulator; DWP analysts)

9.What it would cost

How the cost is built up: Aggregate (ledger): employer contributions + employee contributions + upfront tax relief, each a modelled year at 2025 earnings, kept separate because different people pay them. The worked examples show the same rules for one employee a year at 2026–27 thresholds; they illustrate who pays and must not be scaled up or added to the aggregate. The Exchequer examples cover only income tax relief on the employee’s contribution; if employers pass their extra cost into lower pay, the Exchequer also loses income tax and NICs on that pay (included in the IFS aggregate).

10.Who pays, and what is missing

Programme envelope (a possible route, not an award)
None identified
Allocation committed to this change
None
Remaining gap
The whole Exchequer cost (up to £3.7bn a year at first) is unfunded; nothing is committed and the change is not government policy.
Proposed financing
Contributions are paid by employers and employees under the new legal minimums, not from public budgets. The Exchequer’s tax-relief cost has no funding decision: IFS suggests small broad-based tax rises or carefully designed cuts to some pensions tax relief could make the package revenue-neutral, but neither is proposed by government.
Responsible payer
employers, employees, central government
Budget displaced
Up to £3.7bn a year of tax revenue in the short run, competing with other spending or tax cuts; for households, take-home pay now.

11.First milestone and time to a useful result

DWP publishes a consultation on the contribution parameters with worked examples and distributional tables by earnings, age and employer size, feeding the Pensions Commission’s final report. (Owner: DWP with HM Treasury. Proposed by UK Facts, not an official deadline.)

Time to first useful result: Opt-out and opt-down rates within a year of the first large-employer phase; effects on pay growth over two to three years; retirement incomes only over decades.

What could delay it: The Pensions Commission reports in spring 2027 and the government responds The Commission says changes in rates would not be for the current parliament Employers absorb recent rises in National Insurance and the minimum wage A state-pension target can be agreed alongside

12.How we would know

Baseline
Participation (90% of eligible employees, 2025), contribution rates by earnings band, opt-out and cessation rates, and median pay growth, before any announcement.
Comparison
A phased start — large employers first, smaller employers later — compared with employers not yet in scope, using payroll and pension-scheme data.
Leading indicator
Opt-out and opt-down rates, especially among employees earning £10,000 to £20,000 and in small firms.
Follow-up
Annually through phase-in: contributions by earnings, take-home pay against the modelled path, employer pay settlements, and projected replacement rates by cohort.
Continue if
Opt-outs stay close to the pre-reform level and low earners’ take-home pay moves no more than modelled, while contributions rise for the groups targeted.
Adapt if
Opt-outs or opt-downs rise among low earners, or small firms face compliance costs well above expectations: adjust triggers (for example, link the employer trigger to the National Insurance secondary threshold, as IFS suggests) before the next phase.
Stop if
Low earners’ take-home pay falls well beyond the modelled path, or employers cut jobs or hours attributably.
Thresholds
Not yet set: Numerical levels need a DWP impact assessment and an evaluation design for the phased roll-out; neither exists yet.

What is not yet known, and how to find out

  • What would employers’ payroll and administration costs be for the two new triggers? (cost)Next step: Include a compliance-cost survey in the DWP consultation and impact assessment.Scope: All employers, by size, from announcement to full phase-in · Data or quotes needed: Payroll software change costs; employer time per employee; small-employer survey · Who can estimate it: DWP impact assessment team with The Pensions Regulator
  • How many employees would stop contributing once the employer contribution no longer depends on them? (effect)Next step: Run the large-employer first phase as a bounded pilot with pre-specified opt-out measures, as IFS suggests.Defensible route: bounded pilot
  • How far would employers pass the extra cost into pay, and over what period? (effect)Next step: Track pay settlements in first-phase employers against later-phase employers; review the Australian evidence alongside.Defensible route: evaluation of existing delivery
  • Can the change be made with the 2023 Act powers or does it need new primary legislation? (legal)Next step: DWP legal advice published with the consultation.
  • What state-pension target will be set alongside? (delivery)Next step: Pensions Commission final report and government response (spring 2027 onward).

Sources last checked 4 October 2026 · Owner: Evidence editor (James Harris) · Next check: the first trigger: Pensions Commission report.

More decision briefs on other pages

What it would take

The order things have to happen in, who pays, and the effects and appraisals on record.

The order things have to happen in

  1. First, the prerequisite

    Set a state-pension target and test outreach for Pension Credit

    Owner: DWP and HM Treasury; councils

    No date: the timing depends on the steps before it.

  2. Then, the decision

    Consult on precise contribution parameters and legislate

    Owner: DWP; Parliament

    No date: the timing depends on the steps before it.

  3. Then, delivery

    Phase in with payroll readiness and affordability checks

    Owner: Employers; The Pensions Regulator

    No date: the timing depends on the steps before it.

  4. Finally, the measured outcome

    Higher contributions without a rise in opt-outs; Pension Credit take-up rising

    Owner: DWP statistics

    No date: the timing depends on the steps before it.

Who pays, and what is still missing

Cost, committed funding and the remaining gap for the same scope and years. A programme envelope is not an award to a project; a proposal is not committed money. No total is shown because these costs are on different bases or periods and cannot be added.

Who would pay for the IFS saving package (A24)

£ a year, 2025 prices. Outline = cost; solid = committed; hatched = proposed, not committed; empty = no funding identified.

  • Extra employer pension contributions, a modelled year at 2025 earnings, not a forecast for a particular year: cost £5bn; nothing committed; proposed £5bn

  • Extra employee pension contributions, a modelled year at 2025 earnings, not a forecast for a particular year: cost £6bn; nothing committed; proposed £6bn

Contributions in a modelled year at 2025 earnings. Nothing is committed: both depend on legislation. The Exchequer’s tax-relief cost (up to £3.7bn a year at first) is shown in the table because it is an upper bound, not a central estimate.

Cost and funding ledger

  • Extra employer pension contributions

    A24 · private contribution · modelled benchmark

    Amount
    £5bn a year, a modelled year at 2025 earnings, not a forecast for a particular year, 2025 prices
    Who pays
    employers
    Committed
    None identified
    Proposed, not committed
    £5bn (Employers (proposed in the IFS package))
    Gap
    £5bn
  • Extra employee pension contributions

    A24 · private contribution · modelled benchmark

    Amount
    £6bn a year, a modelled year at 2025 earnings, not a forecast for a particular year, 2025 prices
    Who pays
    employees
    Committed
    None identified
    Proposed, not committed
    £6bn (Employees (proposed in the IFS package))
    Gap
    £6bn
  • Upfront income tax relief on the extra contributions

    A24 · tax relief · modelled benchmark

    Amount
    up to £3.7bn a year, a modelled year at 2025 earnings; falls to at most £2.1bn in the long run, 2025 prices
    Who pays
    central government
    Committed
    None identified
    Proposed, not committed
    Exchequer tax relief (no funding decision)
    Gap
    Not established
  • Extra Pension Credit paid if more entitled people claim

    A25 · household transfer · partial

    Amount
    up to £2.5bn a year, 2023–24, cash (nominal) prices
    Who pays
    central government
    Committed
    None identified
    Proposed, not committed
    —
    Gap
    Not established
  • Outreach, data matching and assisted applications

    A25 · administration · not costed

    Amount
    Not yet costed
    Who pays
    central government, councils
    Committed
    None identified
    Proposed, not committed
    —
    Gap
    Not established

“Not yet costed” means no defensible cost has been found — not that the action is free. Lifetime benefits, benefit-cost ratios and forecast savings are never shown here as money available to spend.

Effects on record, with evidence ratings (3 records)

What the evidence says each action changes

Effects on record — these measure different outcomes, so they are not drawn on one scale
ActionOutcome and areaEffectCompared withEvidence
Improve pension saving while protecting low take-home payRetirement saving of employees who save little or nothing today Pensions and retirementDirection plausible; size not established—modelled; moderate confidence; United Kingdom employeesModelled contributions (about £11bn a year more) are an input; retirement incomes depend on decades of returns and behaviour.
Improve pension saving while protecting low take-home payTake-home pay now Work and pay · harmSize not established—modelled; moderate confidence; United Kingdom employeesThe IFS tax-relief estimate assumes employer contributions are passed through to wages.
Help eligible people claim support they already qualify forIncome of eligible pensioners who start claiming Pensions and retirementDirection plausible; size not established—plausible spillover; limited confidence; Great BritainAn unclaimed family misses about £2,600 a year on average, but how many more would claim after outreach has not been evaluated.

How we would know

Pensioners in relative poverty after housing costs; Eligible employees saving in a workplace pension; Pension Credit take-up (people).

The outcome measures to watch. A baseline is where we start, not a target; where there is no official target we say so.

Measured results

What each option would be judged on, and the latest value of the measures already on this page. A measure moving is not proof that an option caused it.

Where the ideas come from

Research, counter-evidence and methods (7 sources; 1 claim held back)
  • Households Below Average Income: FYE 1995 to FYE 2025 — Department for Work and Pensions, 2026-03-26.Official statistics; Great Britain to 2001–02; United Kingdom from 2002–03. Relevant passages checked, 2026-10-04.
  • Workplace pension participation and savings trends: 2009 to 2025 — Department for Work and Pensions, date not stated.Official statistics; Great Britain. Relevant passages checked, 2026-10-04.
  • Pension Schemes Act 2026: Guided Retirement guiding principles — Department for Work and Pensions, 2026-07-13.Policy paper; Great Britain. Relevant passages checked, 2026-10-08. Limits: Policy design and implementation requirements, not an evaluation of achieved retirement outcomes.
  • Income-related benefits: estimates of take-up, financial year ending 2024 — Department for Work and Pensions, 2025-10-30.Official statistics; Great Britain. Relevant passages checked, 2026-10-04.
  • The Pensions Review: final recommendations — Institute for Fiscal Studies / abrdn Financial Fairness Trust (Jonathan Cribb, Carl Emmerson, Paul Johnson, Heidi Karjalainen, Laurence O’Brien), 2025-07-02.Policy review with microsimulation of automatic-enrolment reforms; Private-sector employees aged 16–74 (ASHE 2021, earnings uprated to 2025 prices); United Kingdom (automatic enrolment: Great Britain; Northern Ireland has parallel legislation). Relevant passages checked (read from an Internet Archive copy), 2026-10-04. Limits: Not a 12% package (12% appears only as a comparison). Modelled costs, not an approved settlement; transition and administration not included.
  • Pensions Investment Review: Final Report and consultation responses — HM Treasury, DWP and MHCLG, 2025-05-29.Policy paper; UK workplace pensions; LGPS in England and Wales. Relevant passages checked, 2026-10-08. Limits: Supports the stated problem or design consideration, not the causal effect or cost of the proposed action.
  • Fiscal risks and sustainability (July 2026) — Office for Budget Responsibility, date not stated.Official long-run projection; United Kingdom. Relevant passages checked, 2026-10-04.

Counter-evidence and criticism

Claims held back

  • The 8% minimum is unlikely to maintain living standards; 12% is commonly proposed — The underlying modelling (PPI) was not re-checked in this review, and the IFS package is not a 12% rate. Needed: Check the PPI source before reusing.

“Full text checked” means we read the report itself; “relevant passages” means the sections behind each figure; “summary or abstract only” means we could not read the full study, so no number from it is published here without another source.

Other options compared — not on the shortlist (3)

Other options compared

Options from earlier work on this page that are not on the shortlist. They remain valid choices; their evidence is shown as before.

  • structuralStatus: proposed

    Change the uprating rule (triple lock)

    Aims to:
    A lower long-run State Pension bill.
    How:
    Uprate by earnings (or a smoothed rule) instead of the highest of earnings, prices or 2.5%.
    Who decides:
    HM Treasury and DWP; Parliament.
    Main constraint:
    Lower pensions relative to the triple-lock path for future pensioners.
    Evidence:
    Moderate evidence — evaluated, with limits on scope or transfer
    See the trade-offs and evidence
    What the evidence shows
    OBR scenario: around 7% of GDP by 2075–76 with earnings uprating, against 9% under the triple lock.
    Resources
    Legislation; none operationally.
    Consent and decisions needed
    Highly contested; pensioners vote at high rates.
    Time
    Effects build over decades.
    Cost and yield
    Saves around 2% of GDP by the 2070s (OBR scenario).
    Trade-offs and who pays
    Lower future pension incomes; risk to pensioner poverty.
    How we would know it worked
    Leading indicator: Projected spending in OBR updates. Outcome: Spending share and pensioner poverty. It would not be working if: Pensioner poverty rises sharply.
  • structuralStatus: legislated

    Raise State Pension age further

    Aims to:
    Fewer years of State Pension per person.
    How:
    Link pension age to life expectancy or bring planned rises forward.
    Who decides:
    DWP and Parliament.
    Main constraint:
    Unequal healthy life expectancy: people in deprived areas have fewer healthy years before pension age.
    Evidence:
    Moderate evidence — evaluated, with limits on scope or transfer
    See the trade-offs and evidence
    What the evidence shows
    The OBR’s 2025 decomposition attributes about −1 percentage point of GDP to planned and assumed pension-age rises.
    Policy status
    Rises to 67 and 68 already legislated; timing under review.
    Resources
    Legislation.
    Consent and decisions needed
    Contested, especially for manual workers.
    Time
    Long notice periods are expected.
    Cost and yield
    Saves money; costs shift to working-age benefits for those unable to work.
    Trade-offs and who pays
    Hits those with shorter healthy lives hardest.
    How we would know it worked
    Leading indicator: Employment rates of people in their 60s. Outcome: Spending share and poverty among 60–67s. It would not be working if: Rising poverty and sickness benefits among people waiting for pension age.
  • immediate reliefStatus: proposed

    Protect low earners, carers and the self-employed

    Aims to:
    Fewer people reaching pension age with little private saving.
    How:
    Credits for carers, coverage for the self-employed, help with Pension Credit take-up.
    Who decides:
    DWP and HMRC.
    Main constraint:
    Designing a mechanism for the self-employed.
    Evidence:
    Limited evidence — plausible mechanism, little direct evaluation
    See the trade-offs and evidence
    What the evidence shows
    Pension Credit take-up is incomplete and the self-employed were excluded from automatic enrolment; specific schemes for them are largely untested in the UK.
    Resources
    Administration and modest spending.
    Consent and decisions needed
    Broad support in principle.
    Time
    Within a few years.
    Cost and yield
    No single official costing.
    Trade-offs and who pays
    Targeting adds complexity.
    How we would know it worked
    Leading indicator: Pension Credit take-up; self-employed saving rates. Outcome: Pensioner poverty among renters and single women. It would not be working if: No change in take-up or coverage.
The options side by side
OptionResourcesTimeEvidenceOutcome to watch
Change the uprating rule (triple lock)Legislation; none operationally.Effects build over decades.moderateSpending share and pensioner poverty.
Raise State Pension age furtherLegislation.Long notice periods are expected.moderateSpending share and poverty among 60–67s.
Protect low earners, carers and the self-employedAdministration and modest spending.Within a few years.limitedPensioner poverty among renters and single women.

Plan reviewed 2026-10-04. How we judge evidence.

How this connects

Sources and methods (5)

Method notes

  • Projections are conditional on policy and demographic assumptions and are not forecasts.
  • Poverty is after housing costs; participation is among employees eligible for automatic enrolment.