Could Britain’s Armed Forces fight and sustain a major conflict?

The problem

Spending and headcount do not show whether forces can deploy and sustain operations; the last public assessment found warfighting readiness in doubt, with stockpile shortages and personnel lost faster than recruited.

Who is affected, and where

The armed forces and the UK population they protect; allies relying on UK commitments. Territory: UK. Defence is reserved to the UK government.

Policy status

UK Facts proposal. The 2026 Defence Investment Plan sets the funded profile to 2029–30 and the 2025 Strategic Defence Review the priorities. Ranking readiness ahead of new announcements within that profile is a UK Facts proposal, not MOD policy.

The evidence

What the research found:

The Defence Committee (January 2024) found warfighting readiness in doubt, with capability shortfalls, stockpile shortages and personnel lost faster than recruited. At March 2026, 16 of 39 rated MOD major projects were Red and 5 ratings were withheld. Trained strength was 122,230 in April 2026.

Evaluated on:

UK armed forces (Defence Committee inquiry); MOD major projects (NISTA ratings); United Kingdom, 2024–2026

Our recommendation (separate from the research):

Publish readiness proxies the MOD judges safe (trained strength against requirement, equipment availability bands, stock replenishment milestones) and fund those gaps before new programmes.

Strongest counter-evidence:

New capability takes a decade to field, so deferring orders to fund readiness now can leave gaps later; industrial capacity needs long, stable orders; some readiness data cannot be published.

Effects on record

• Forces able to deploy and sustain agreed commitments: Direction plausible; size not established. plausible spillover, limited confidence; United Kingdom. Readiness data are largely classified; public proxies are partial.

Cost and funding

Cost completeness: Published programme envelope; project costs still needed. Funding: Programme funding exists; project allocation unconfirmed.

• Defence Investment Plan spending profile, 2026–27 to 2029–30 (departmental settlement) (recurring spending; paid by central government): £297.7bn in total, 2026–27 to 2029–30, cash (nominal) prices. UK Facts sum of the four published years (cash). It is the whole defence budget, not an allocation to readiness; it includes capital (£26.6bn rising to £34.5bn) and resource spending.
• Trained people, maintenance, munitions and support for agreed commitments (recurring spending; paid by central government): Not yet costed. Not published, partly for security reasons. Full capability packages and sustainment must be costed, not just purchase prices.
• Defence Investment Plan settlement, 2026–27 to 2029–30: £297.7bn, 2026–27 to 2029–30 — not committed (programme envelope, not a project award). The 3% (next Parliament) and 3.5% (2035) of GDP ambitions are not allocations.

Who pays:

Taxpayers through the MOD budget; trade-offs fall on other defence programmes or other public spending.

Financing proposed:

Reprioritisation within the Defence Investment Plan profile. Aspirational GDP targets (3% next Parliament; 3.5% by 2035) are not programme allocations.

Gap remaining:

Unknown: the cost of closing readiness gaps is not published, partly for security reasons.

What delivery needs

Skills:

Trained personnel and instructors; engineers for maintenance.

Operational capacity:

Training pipelines and maintenance depots.

Infrastructure:

Munitions production and storage.

Permissions:

Export licensing and allied agreements for some supply.

Law:

None new.

Public consent:

Acceptance of trade-offs between new equipment and readiness.

First step and stages

First step: Identify the binding readiness gaps against agreed commitments and match them to funded lines in the investment plan. (owner: MOD (Chief of Defence Staff and Permanent Secretary))

1. Near-term retention and maintenance actions — MOD and services (proposed stage, not an official timetable)
2. Multi-year munitions and training contracts — MOD (Defence Equipment and Support) (proposed stage, not an official timetable)
3. Publish readiness proxies each year — MOD; Defence Committee scrutiny (proposed stage, not an official timetable)

Depends on: A23: contracts that deliver munitions and maintenance on time; Retention of trained personnel

Trade-offs

Who gains and who loses:

Benefits are collective security; costs fall on taxpayers and on programmes delayed to fund readiness.

What else the money or effort could do:

Money for stocks and maintenance is not available for new platforms or other public spending.

Strongest counterargument:

Deterrence depends on future capability too; cutting new programmes may weaken industry and alliances.

Risks:

Industrial lead times, cost escalation, retention problems and limited public data.

How we would judge it

Baseline:

Trained strength 122,230 (April 2026); 16 of 39 rated MOD major projects Red (March 2026).

Leading indicator:

Trained strength against requirement; munitions contract milestones.

Outcome:

Published readiness proxies and equipment availability, where disclosure is safe.

Continue, adapt or stop:

Revisit priorities if trained strength keeps falling or Red-rated projects do not move to Amber.

Sources

• House of Commons Defence Committee, Ready for War?, Summary (2024-02-04; relevant passages checked)
• National Infrastructure and Service Transformation Authority, NISTA Major Projects Annual Report 2025–26 (ratings at 31 March 2026), MOD delivery confidence ratings (2026-07-13; relevant passages checked)
• Ministry of Defence and HM Treasury, The Defence Investment Plan, Table 1 (2026-06-30; relevant passages checked)
• Royal United Services Institute, Procurement Reform Starts with Requirement Formulation and the Supply Chain, Opening paragraphs (2024-07-29; full text checked)
• National Audit Office, The Equipment Plan 2023 to 2033, Summary (2023-12; relevant passages checked)

Source published February 2024 (Defence Committee); June 2026 (Defence Investment Plan); July 2026 (NISTA); evidence reviewed 2026-10-04. Reconsider if: A new Defence Committee readiness report; The next spending review sets defence beyond 2029–30; A new NISTA annual report.

The problem

Weak specification and thin contract-management capacity stop public purchases turning into the services and capabilities intended.

Who is affected, and where

Users of publicly contracted services and capabilities; suppliers, including small firms. Territory: UK. The Procurement Act 2023 applies to UK-wide and English bodies and Wales and Northern Ireland; Scotland largely keeps its own regime, not assessed here.

Policy status

UK Facts proposal. Builds on rules already in force: the Procurement Act 2023 (from 24 February 2025) requires KPIs and performance publication for larger contracts. Applying an outcome-and-milestone baseline to a named set of renewing contracts is a UK Facts proposal.

The evidence

What the research found:

The Institute for Government finds government buys more than £400bn a year and that late commercial involvement, over-specified procurements, poor data and weak contract-management capacity block delivery. RUSI argues defence requirements should be set with budget and technical authority together. The NAO found the MOD’s 2023–2033 equipment plan £16.9bn over budget.

Evaluated on:

UK central government procurement (interviews); MOD equipment programmes (audit and commentary); United Kingdom, 2023–2026

Our recommendation (separate from the research):

Publish outcome, whole-life cost and milestones for a defined set of renewing contracts and report them through delivery; fund commercial staff from named budgets where justified.

Strongest counter-evidence:

More reporting can deter small suppliers and add cost; outcome contracts are hard to specify for complex services; social-value requirements complicate price comparison.

Effects on record

• Contracts delivering the specified service on time and near cost: Direction plausible; size not established. plausible spillover, limited confidence; United Kingdom. Recommended by research and audit; no evaluation estimates the effect.
• Defence equipment programmes delivered closer to budget and schedule: Direction plausible; size not established. plausible spillover, limited confidence; United Kingdom. Audit and expert recommendations, not an evaluation: no source estimates how much better contract management would reduce overruns, and policy changes cause some of them.

Cost and funding

Cost completeness: Not yet costed. Funding: Not yet costed / funding not identified.

• Commercial staff, contract oversight, transition, maintenance and supplier compliance (administration; paid by central government, councils): Not yet costed. Total procurement spending is not a fund or a savings base; no source estimates savings from better contract management.

Who pays:

Contracting authorities’ running budgets (commercial staff and oversight); suppliers bear compliance and reporting costs, partly passed back in prices.

Financing proposed:

From named procurement or programme budgets where a business case justifies it. Total procurement spending is a measure of buying, not a spare fund or a proven savings base.

Gap remaining:

Unknown: commercial capability has not been costed for any defined set of contracts.

What delivery needs

Skills:

Commercial and contract-management professionals; technical specifiers.

Operational capacity:

Time for pre-market engagement and in-life management.

Infrastructure:

The central digital platform and contract data.

Permissions:

None.

Law:

Procurement Act 2023 duties already apply.

Public consent:

Suppliers willing to bid on outcome terms.

First step and stages

First step: Apply the approach to a defined set of renewing contracts and publish their baseline cost, outcome and milestones. (owner: Cabinet Office with lead departments (MOD for defence))

1. Select renewing contracts and publish baselines — Cabinet Office, departments (proposed stage, not an official timetable)
2. Design outcomes before tender — Contracting authorities (proposed stage, not an official timetable)
3. Report milestones and outcomes through the contract — Contracting authorities; NAO (proposed stage, not an official timetable)

Depends on: Procurement Act reporting data; A42 for innovation trials within the same rules

Trade-offs

Who gains and who loses:

Service users gain if delivery improves; incumbent suppliers may lose; small firms gain or lose depending on reporting burden.

What else the money or effort could do:

Commercial staff are scarce; deploying them on these contracts leaves others less managed.

Strongest counterargument:

Procurement failures often stem from policy changes and unrealistic budgets, which better contract management cannot fix.

Risks:

Box-ticking reporting, supplier withdrawal and gaming of outcome measures.

How we would judge it

Baseline:

Government major projects rated Red: 34 of 172 rated (NISTA, March 2026).

Leading indicator:

Share of renewing contracts with published outcomes, whole-life cost and milestones.

Outcome:

Delivery against milestones, change orders, late payment and supplier participation.

Continue, adapt or stop:

Expand where contracts meet milestones closer to cost than comparable contracts; drop measures that deter bidders without improving delivery.

Earlier option on this page

This card replaces the option “Realistic procurement and an affordable equipment plan” (operating). Its evidence: The NAO found the 2023–2033 Equipment Plan unaffordable by £16.9bn (central estimate), driven by nuclear and naval cost growth. Repeated NAO reports link over-commitment to delays and cost growth. National Audit Office, The Equipment Plan 2023 to 2033 (December 2023)

Sources

• Institute for Government, The role of procurement in delivering mission-led government, Report PDF pp.4–5, p.19 (2025-09-23; relevant passages checked)
• Royal United Services Institute, Procurement Reform Starts with Requirement Formulation and the Supply Chain, “Defining Procurement Requirements” (2024-07-29; full text checked)
• National Audit Office, The Equipment Plan 2023 to 2033, Summary (2023-12; relevant passages checked)
• National Infrastructure and Service Transformation Authority, NISTA Major Projects Annual Report 2025–26 (ratings at 31 March 2026), Ratings by department (2026-07-13; relevant passages checked)
• Institute for Government, The role of procurement in delivering mission-led government, PDF p.4 (2025-09-23; relevant passages checked)

Source published September 2025 (IfG); July 2024 (RUSI); December 2023 (NAO); July 2026 (NISTA); evidence reviewed 2026-10-04. Reconsider if: First central publication of Procurement Act KPI data; A new NISTA annual report; An evaluation of outcome-based contracts.