Money & government · Follow the money

The £59.2bn tax gap dwarfs the figures politicians and media fixate on

Public debate moves between very large numbers that measure very different things. This page puts them side by side with the accounting basis, period and geography visible, so you can judge which are comparable — and which are not.

A note on this page

Every figure here is sourced from HMRC, the OBR, NAO, ONS, Ofwat, the Home Office, UCL, or the High Pay Centre — official data, peer-reviewed research, and regulatory authorities. No opinion. No agenda beyond the numbers. Links are at the bottom.

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The Pareto Analysis

Where is the money actually going?

If we applied Pareto logic — focus 80% of effort where 80% of the problem is — immigration drops off the priority list. The bars below are proportional to the actual £ figures. This is UK Facts’ own analytical framing, not a neutral ranking — judge for yourself whether the comparison holds.

These bars are not measuring the same kind of thing.The tax gap is HMRC’s own THEORETICAL estimate of uncollected tax, not recoverable revenue. Asylum and energy-support figures are actual government SPENDING. Water dividends are private company payments to shareholders, not public money. The migrant fiscal-contribution figure is an academic research estimate for a different population (EEA migrants) over a different period (2001–2011). Putting them on one scale shows relative SIZE — it does not mean any one of them could simply be redirected to fund another.
CorporateCorporation Tax gap (HMRC 2024–25, theoretical)
£21bn/yr

About 35% of the total tax gap. Theoretical estimate of tax not collected, not recoverable revenue.

CorporateWater company dividends (annualised avg 1991–2023)
£2.4bn/yr

£78bn total (nominal, not inflation-adjusted) in 32 years — while £60bn+ debt accumulated

CorporateEnergy company bailout cost to taxpayer (2022–23)
£23bn/yr

Energy Price Guarantee alone — while BP, Shell, Centrica posted record profits of £58bn+ in same year

CorporateTotal UK tax gap (HMRC 2024–25, theoretical)
£59.2bn/yr

6.4% of tax due. A theoretical estimate of the difference between tax owed and collected — HMRC recovers only a fraction through compliance activity.

ImmigrationAsylum hotel accommodation (NAO/Home Office 2023–24)
£3.1bn/yr

The figure politicians and media fixate on

ImmigrationTotal asylum support budget (2023–24)
£4.7bn/yr

Hotels + processing + all other asylum costs — total immigration system

ContributionMigrants' net fiscal contribution (UCL/CReAM)
£20bn+

EEA migrants contributed net positive £20bn+ to public finances 2001–2011 — the money flowing IN

Corporate tax gap is bigger than total asylum budget
26×
Water companies took out 26 years' worth of current asylum hotel costs in total dividends
12×
Energy windfall profits in ONE year vs asylum hotel costs
Section 2

Immigration: The Full Ledger

Media coverage fixates on the cost side of immigration. Here is the full picture — what immigration actually costs AND what it contributes. Without this, the debate is not honest.

📤 What immigration costs

Asylum hotel accommodation
2023–24 · NAO / Home Office annual report
£3.1bn
Total asylum support (all costs)
2023–24 · Home Office / NAO
£4.7bn
Number in hotel accommodation (peak)
Sept 2023 · Home Office
~56,000

📥 What immigration contributes

Net fiscal contribution (EEA migrants)
2001–2011 · UCL CReAM / Dustmann & Frattini
+£20bn+
EEA migrants paid vs received in benefits
2001–2011 · UCL peer-reviewed
64% more
NHS staff who are non-UK nationals
Sept 2023 · NHS Workforce Stats
1 in 5
Internationally-trained nurses (NHS England)
2024 · Migration Observatory
33.4%
Internationally-trained doctors
2024 · Migration Observatory
31.9%

If we deported every non-UK national from the NHS tomorrow…

1 in 5 NHS staff are non-UK nationals. 1 in 3 nurses and doctors are internationally trained. Removing them would:

~250,000
NHS workers lost overnight
10–15 years
Time to train domestic replacements at scale
£15–25bn+
Estimated cost to train and recruit UK replacements

This is a hypothetical scenario, not a proposed or occurring policy. The workforce numbers above are directly counted; the replacement cost and training-time figures are estimates, not published outturns. What they directly show: the NHS currently relies heavily on non-UK-national and internationally-trained staff — a fact, not an interpretation. Whether the NHS “would not function” without them is this page’s own reasonable inference from that reliance, not itself a measured figure.

Section 3

The tax gap: £59.2bn theoretical, 2024–25

HMRC publishes an annual "tax gap" — the difference between the tax owed and the tax actually collected. This is not a campaign group's estimate. It is the government's own number.

£59.2bn
Total UK tax gap 2024–25
Theoretical estimate, not recoverable revenue
~£21bn
Corporation Tax gap alone
About 35% of the total gap; 18.1% of CT liability unpaid
10×
Tax gap vs asylum hotels
Corporate tax gap alone is 10× the hotel bill
£468bn
Lost in last 10 years
If the tax gap had been closed over a decade

What closing the tax gap could fund instead (annual)

Close the entire asylum accommodation bill — and have £15.8bn left over
Double the NHS capital budget
Build 150,000 social homes per year
Fund the entire UK schools budget increase needed
Fix social care (estimated annual gap)

Source: HMRC Measuring Tax Gaps 2024. Allocations are illustrative of scale, not policy proposals.

Section 4

Water Companies: 34 Years of Extraction

Water was privatised in 1989. Since then, customers have seen bills rise, sewage dumped in rivers, and companies rack up enormous debts — while shareholders extracted vast sums.

£78bn
Total dividends paid since privatisation (nominal, not inflation-adjusted)
1991–2023 · Financial Times analysis; a separate real-terms recalculation by the University of Greenwich puts the equivalent figure at ~£61.8bn
£60bn+
Combined debt accumulated by water companies
Debt was zero at privatisation in 1989
£10.4bn
Thames Water dividends alone
While Thames Water now faces special administration

Thames Water: How it happened

1989
Privatised with zero debt. Government wrote off £5bn of existing debt as a "dowry"
2000s
Macquarie (Australian investment bank) acquires Thames Water. Debt-funded dividend extraction begins.
2006–2017
Macquarie extracts £2.8bn in dividends. Debt rises from ~£2bn to ~£10bn.
2017–2022
Infrastructure funds (Omers, CPPIB, Hermes etc.) own it. More dividends. Debt keeps climbing. Sewage spills accelerate.
2023
Thames Water near collapse. Ofwat finds dividend rule breaches. £158m payment flagged.
31 Mar 2024
Statutory net debt: £17.6bn (FY2023-24 annual report). Debt has continued rising since, reported approaching £18.5–20bn through 2025–2026, with government considering special administration (effective renationalisation) at taxpayer cost.

Two figures, side by side

£78bn
Water company dividends (1991–2023, nominal)
Your bills paid for this. Sewage went in rivers. Pipes leak.
£3.1bn/yr
Asylum hotel costs (2023–24)
This is what leads the news every week.

Water companies extracted the equivalent of 26 years of current asylum hotel costs — from monopoly customers with no choice — while loading the companies with debt that taxpayers may ultimately have to absorb.

A comparison of scale, not a claim that one figure could substitute for the other: dividends are private payments to shareholders over 33 years; asylum hotel costs are annual public spending in one year. Neither can be redirected into the other.

Section 5

Energy: Record Profits, Public Bailout

In 2022–23, as households struggled with energy bills, three major energy companies posted combined profits of around £58bn. In the same year, the OBR costed the total net cost of the government's energy support schemes at £51.1bn — money added to the national debt that taxpayers are paying interest on. (Total UK government borrowing that year was £139.2bn, of which the £51.1bn energy support cost was one part — not the whole borrowing figure.)

Company profits (2022)

Shell£32.2bn
Record profit — more than doubled year-on-year
BP£23bn
Record profit — more than doubled year-on-year
Centrica (British Gas)£3.3bn
Tripled year-on-year
~£58bn combined
in a single year while households froze

£32.2bn (Shell) and £23bn (BP) are GBP conversions of their own USD-denominated "adjusted"/"underlying" profit measures (~$39.9bn and ~$27.7bn), not GBP figures the companies themselves reported.

Government response — your money

Energy Price Guarantee (households)
2022–23 · OBR confirmed
£23bn
Energy Bill Relief Scheme (businesses)
2022–23
£8.1bn
Energy Bills Support Scheme (£400 rebate)
2022–23
£11bn
Bulb Energy bailout
Largest ever UK energy company bailout
£6.5bn
£51.1bn total
taxpayer money spent on energy support 2022–23

The numbers, compared

Energy companies posted ~£58bn in profits the same year the OBR costed the government's energy support schemes at ~£51.1bn to stop households freezing. The windfall tax raised ~£3–4bn — a fraction of the profits. The cost of energy support remains on the national debt, accruing interest. By comparison, the asylum hotel bill is roughly 17× smaller than the energy subsidy figure.

Section 6

Executive Pay: 122 Workers to One CEO

The High Pay Centre tracks FTSE 100 CEO pay annually. The ratio has grown from roughly 60:1 in 1998 to 122:1 today — and the gap is compounding.

The ratio

122:1
Median FTSE 100 CEO pay vs median UK worker (2024–25)
Median FTSE 100 CEO pay£4.58m
Median UK full-time worker£37,430
Pay ratio122:1
Days for CEO to earn median salary3 days

Source: High Pay Centre CEO Pay Report 2025

Water company bonuses blocked by Ofwat

In 2023–24, Ofwat blocked 73% of water company executive bonus payments from being charged to customers. Six companies were subsequently banned from paying bonuses at all from 2024–25 under the Water (Special Measures) Act 2025.

Thames WaterBonus rule breach: £158.3m payment flagged; £131.3m clawback ordered
Yorkshire WaterBonus payments blocked from customer bills
Anglian WaterBanned from paying bonuses 2024–25
Southern WaterBanned from paying bonuses 2024–25
United UtilitiesBanned from paying bonuses 2024–25
Wessex WaterBanned from paying bonuses 2024–25

Source: Ofwat enforcement decisions 2023–25

What the Pareto principle tells us

The figures differ greatly in scale. Comparing them side by side helps readers judge which areas could make the largest difference to the public finances.

Frequently covered relative to £ scale

  • Asylum hotel costs: £3.1bn/yr (NAO/Home Office)
  • "Illegal" immigration via small boats: ~£500m/yr processing costs
  • Migrants "taking jobs": not supported by employment data
  • Migrants "using public services": while contributing net positive £20bn+

Larger by £ scale, less frequently covered

  • Corporation Tax gap: ~£21bn/yr theoretical, about 35% of the total gap (HMRC, 2024-25)
  • Water company dividends: £78bn nominal extracted over 34 years (FT analysis)
  • Energy bailout: £51.1bn cost of government energy support (OBR) same year companies made £58bn profit
  • FTSE 100 CEO pay: 122× median worker — fourth year at record high
  • Total tax gap: £59.2bn/yr theoretical (HMRC 2024-25) — a measure of tax not collected, not a recoverable sum

A note on media and political framing

This page does not argue immigration has no cost — it does, and those costs are documented above. It sets the cost and revenue figures above — asylum accommodation, the corporate tax gap, water company dividends, and energy sector profits and bailouts — at comparable scale, so readers can compare their relative size directly rather than encounter them in isolation.

Media and political attention to these figures is not proportional to their scale. Large companies routinely run lobbying, public-affairs, and advertising operations; individual welfare or asylum claimants generally do not have comparable access to media or policy channels. Readers can draw their own conclusions about what that difference means for how these issues are covered.

All sources — primary official data