Political funding · Great Britain and Northern Ireland · calendar year 2025

One donor supplied 64% of Reform’s reported private donations in 2025.

Reform reported £18.7m in private donations in 2025, all from individuals and companies; £12.0m came from its largest donor. On the same measure the figure was 21% for the Conservatives, 18% for Labour and 4% for the Liberal Democrats; trade unions, each counted as one donor though pooling many members’ fees, gave 55% of Labour’s private money. Each quarter is published about two months after it ends, so late reports can still change these totals.

Priority (the outcome this page tracks): Political finance the public can trace quickly and completely, under rules that are enforced — measured by disclosure speed, compliance and donor concentration as separate indicators. It does not favour donation caps, more public funding or any party. What would change it →

Evidence last reviewed 4 October 2026

Overview

The short version

Three key measures

  • How much of Reform’s 2025 private money came from one donor?

    64%from one donor

    £12.0m of Reform UK’s £18.7m in reported private donations. Conservative matching gives a lower bound. Concentration is lawful and does not establish influence.

    Parties with at least £1m in private donations · Calendar year 2025

    Definition, limits and source: How much of Reform’s 2025 private money came from one donor?

    £12.0m of Reform UK’s £18.7m in reported private donations came from its largest single donor (its money came only from individuals and companies). Same measure, each party’s own private total as the denominator: Conservative 21%, Labour 18%, Liberal Democrats 4%. A trade union is one donor in the register though its money pools many members’ fees (55% of Labour’s 2025 private money). Donor records are matched conservatively, so shares are lower bounds. Concentration is lawful and is not evidence of influence.

    Site calculation · Electoral Commission, political finance database: donations to political parties, donations export, all registered parties

    Concentration by party →

  • How much of the reported private money in 2025 went to four parties?

    94%of £50.0m

    Private cash and non-cash donations, excluding returned or forfeited gifts. Public funding and loans are separate. Donation shares do not establish bought policy.

    All parties registered in Great Britain and Northern Ireland · Calendar year 2025

    Definition, limits and source: How much of the reported private money in 2025 went to four parties?

    Reform UK £18.7m; Conservative £14.0m; Labour £9.0m; Liberal Democrats £5.0m — out of £50.0m in private donations (cash and non-cash, as reported, excluding returned or forfeited gifts) to all registered parties. Public funds of £15.3m are counted separately and loans are not included. A share of donations is not evidence of bought policy.

    Site calculation · Electoral Commission, political finance database: donations to political parties, donations export, all registered parties

    Who gives, how much and to whom →

  • How much party income in the register is public money?

    23%of 2025 receipts

    £15.3m of Short money, Cranborne money and policy development grants, paid to parties with MPs or peers. It is reported in the same returns as private gifts but is not a donation.

    All registered parties · Calendar year 2025

    Source: How much party income in the register is public money?

    Administrative data · Electoral Commission, political finance database: donations to political parties, donations export, all registered parties

    What the register omits →
Who feels this most?

Concentration matters most to the parties themselves: a party that draws most of its private money from a handful of donors is more exposed if one stops giving, and more open to the perception of obligation — whether or not any influence exists. It matters to voters because the register is the only systematic way to see who funds the people asking for their votes, and it publishes in arrears: a quarter’s donations appear around two months after the quarter ends.

The evidence

Follow political money, then test what it establishes

Who gives, how much and to whom?

Every party must report donations above the thresholds to the Electoral Commission each quarter, naming the donor. In 2025, the latest complete year in our copy of the register, 17 parties reported private donations.

Who funds the parties, and how much did each receive?

Reform UK reported the most private donations in 2025; four parties received 94% of the total.

Private donations reported to the Electoral Commission by recipient party, calendar year 2025, £ million (cash and non-cash, as reported). Ten largest recipients shown.

Parties registered in Great Britain and Northern Ireland · 1 January – 31 December 2025
  • Reform UK£18.7m
  • Conservative£14.0m
  • Labour£9.0m
  • Liberal Democrats£5.0m
  • Co-operative Party£0.9m
  • Your Party£0.7m
  • Sinn Féin£0.4m
  • Green Party (England and Wales)£0.3m
  • The Socialist Party of Great Britain£0.2m
  • The Reclaim Party£0.2m

Public funds received in 2025, £ million (not donations)

  • Conservative£7.3m
  • Liberal Democrats£3.3m
  • Labour£1.0m
  • Reform UK£0.7m
  • Green Party (England and Wales)£0.6m
  • DUP£0.6m
  • Sinn Féin£0.5m
  • SDLP£0.5m
The bars show who received money, not what it bought. Reform UK’s £18.7m was 37% of all private donations reported in 2025, a year with no general election. Totals rise and fall with the electoral cycle, so one year is not a trend. Trade union donations (mostly to Labour) are aggregates of members’ affiliation money; individual and company gifts are single decisions. Both count the same here.

Parties registered in Great Britain and Northern Ireland · 1 January – 31 December 2025 · Administrative data (party returns); totals are a site calculation

Sources, definitions and data — Reform UK reported the most private donations in 2025; four parties received 94% of the total.
Geography:
Parties registered in Great Britain and Northern Ireland — donations above the reporting thresholds, accepted and reported by the party’s central organisation or accounting units
Measure:
£ million, cash terms
Period:
1 January – 31 December 2025
Status:
Administrative data (party returns); totals are a site calculation
Calculation:
Sum of reported values by recipient party, excluding records marked returned or forfeited. Public funds excluded (shown separately). Loans are not in the export and are not added.
Compare with:
Total private donations to all parties: £50.0m.
Not included / breaks:
Donations below the thresholds are never itemised. Reported value differs slightly from the Commission’s accepted-value headline (0.6% for 2025). Late-reported donations can still be added to a past year. This is money received, not money spent at elections.

Source: Electoral Commission, political finance database: donations to political parties, donations export, all registered parties (released 4 October 2026 (date of our export)). Chart DON-01.

View the data as a table
PartyPrivate donationsPublic fundsTotal reported
Reform UK£18.71m£0.68m£19.39m
Conservative£14.02m£7.26m£21.28m
Labour£8.99m£0.96m£9.95m
Liberal Democrats£5.04m£3.25m£8.29m
Co-operative Party£0.93m£0.00m£0.93m
Your Party£0.67m£0.00m£0.67m
Sinn Féin£0.38m£0.47m£0.85m
Green Party (England and Wales)£0.35m£0.60m£0.95m
The Socialist Party of Great Britain£0.22m£0.00m£0.22m
The Reclaim Party£0.18m£0.00m£0.18m
Open Party£0.18m£0.00m£0.18m
Plaid Cymru£0.08m£0.26m£0.34m
Alliance (NI)£0.07m£0.16m£0.23m
SNP£0.05m£0.45m£0.50m
Social Democratic Party£0.05m£0.00m£0.05m
SDLP£0.03m£0.46m£0.49m
UK Independence Party (UKIP)£0.02m£0.00m£0.02m
DUP£0.00m£0.56m£0.56m
Ulster Unionist Party£0.00m£0.07m£0.07m
Traditional Unionist Voice - TUV£0.00m£0.03m£0.03m
Scottish Green Party£0.00m£0.04m£0.04m
People Before Profit£0.00m£0.03m£0.03m

Scroll the table sideways to see every column.

The most recent quarter in the Commission’s register, Q2 2026 (April to June 2026), had £17,532,964 in donations and public funds filed in its returns, against £11,946,577 in Q2 2025 (value as reported; the Commission’s press release headlines value accepted, which differs slightly). Largest recipients: Reform UK £5,552,359, Conservative £4,174,098, Labour £3,638,692, Liberal Democrats £2,306,356. Commission register

Money received is not money spent. At the 2024 general election parties reported campaign spending of £30.1m (Labour), £23.9m (Conservative), £5.6m (Liberal Democrats), £5.5m (Reform UK). There is no single national spending limit that applies to every party. The limit is £54,010 for each seat a party contests, calculated separately for England, Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland — so a party standing everywhere has a much higher limit than one standing in a single nation. A party contesting all 650 seats would have a limit of £35.1m. The limits were raised in November 2023, so 2024 spending is not comparable with earlier elections.

How concentrated is party funding?

How concentrated is party funding?

Concentration varies widely: Reform UK relied most on a few donors in 2025.

Share of each party’s private donations that came from its ten largest donors, 2025 (filled) and since 2001 (open). Parties with at least £1m of private donations in 2025.

Registered parties, Great Britain and Northern Ireland · 2025; and 2001–2025
Top ten donors’ share, 2025Top ten donors’ share, since 2001
  • Reform UK83%
  • Conservative47%
  • Labour67%
  • Liberal Democrats25%
Reform UK’s largest single donor accounted for 64% of its 2025 private donations, and its ten largest for 83%. A concentrated funding model is lawful and is not evidence of improper influence; it describes how exposed a party is to a few funders. Because matching is deliberately conservative, a donor giving through name variants can be split, which understates concentration rather than overstating it.

Registered parties, Great Britain and Northern Ireland · 2025; and 2001–2025 · Site calculation from the register

Sources, definitions and data — Concentration varies widely: Reform UK relied most on a few donors in 2025.
Geography:
Registered parties, Great Britain and Northern Ireland — private donations only; public funds excluded
Measure:
% of the party’s private donations by value
Period:
2025; and 2001–2025
Status:
Site calculation from the register
Calculation:
Donor records grouped only when they share a Companies House number, or an identical normalised name and the same donor type. Looser matches are excluded, so the shares are lower bounds.
Compare with:
A share near 100% means almost all money came from ten donors; a low share means many donors.
Not included / breaks:
No common control between separate companies is inferred. A trade union is one donor even though its money comes from many members. Reform UK’s “since 2001” period starts with its registration.

Source: Electoral Commission, political finance database: donations to political parties, donations export, all registered parties (released 4 October 2026 (date of our export)). Chart DON-03.

View the data as a table
PartyPrivate 2025Largest donorTop 5Top 10Top 10 since 2001Donations 2025
Reform UK£18.7m64.2%76.4%82.9%80.9%197
Conservative£14.0m21.4%36.3%46.6%15.1%613
Labour£9.0m17.6%52.4%67.3%56.3%421
Liberal Democrats£5.0m4.0%15.9%25.4%24.3%1,169

Scroll the table sideways to see every column.

Funding models differ in kind as well as degree. Reform UK relied on a small number of large individual gifts in 2025; the Liberal Democrats drew on many more donors. Labour’s private income includes trade union money, which the register records as one donor per union even though it comes from many members’ affiliation fees.

Who feels this most?

Smaller parties without MPs receive no Short money and must fund campaigns privately, while public funds were 23% of all reported receipts in 2025. A donation is a financial relationship. It is not, by itself, evidence of access, influence, or wrongdoing.

What the legal register leaves out

  • Donations below the reporting thresholds are never itemised, so money arriving in many small amounts is invisible at donor level.
  • Loans are reported separately from donations and under different rules. Summing them would double-count a party’s obligations, and this page never does.
  • Unincorporated associations obscure the original source of the money they pass on.
  • The register records what parties report. The Commission itself notes that reported and accepted values differ, and that late reporting is common.
  • UK-registered companies may donate. A company incorporated in the UK and carrying on business here may donate, regardless of who owns it. The permissibility test is about the company’s registration and trading, not the nationality of its shareholders.
  • What beneficial ownership does and does not reveal. Companies House holds persons-with-significant-control records, so ultimate control is often visible. But control can sit with a foreign parent, a trust, or a chain terminating outside the UK register, and a company’s profits may originate anywhere. The register shows who controls the company, not where the money came from.

Lobbying is a separate register. The statutory register captures a narrow slice of lobbying: paid intermediaries contacting the two most senior levels of a department. For an industry that mostly lobbies for itself, at levels below permanent secretary, it records very little. That is a feature of how the 2014 Act was drawn, not a failure of the registrar.

Proposed changes, not yet law. The Representation of the People Bill completed its Commons stages on 2 September 2026 and was at committee stage, house of lords when checked on 3 October 2026 (no Royal Assent). Its political-finance measures include:

  • A cap on donations from overseas electors. An annual limit — announced at £100,000 — on donations and loans from individuals registered as overseas electors. Announced as applying retrospectively from 25 March 2026 if the Bill is enacted.
  • Know-your-donor checks. A requirement for parties to carry out additional checks on the source of donations before accepting them, rather than relying on the permissibility test alone.
  • Company donation reform. Restricting company donations to companies that pass a significant-control test and have sufficient remaining UK profits (the Bill as introduced used a revenue test; the Lords print, HL Bill 47, uses profits).
  • Closing unincorporated association loopholes. Tightening the rules under which unincorporated associations may make political contributions without disclosing their own funders.

Source: UK Parliament, Representation of the People Bill (HL Bill 47), checked 3 October 2026.

Access and decisions: a documented case chain

The register establishes the first link in any chain. Each later link needs a different kind of record, and the bar for the last is high:

  1. Level 1

    Donation

    Money changed hands, and it is on the Electoral Commission register.

    Needs: An Electoral Commission record.

  2. Level 2

    Access

    A documented meeting, hospitality or contact.

    Needs: A GOV.UK transparency release or an official gifts and hospitality register entry.

  3. Level 3

    Relevant decision

    Government subsequently made a decision affecting the donor’s interests. A temporal association only — the sequence is documented, the connection is not.

    Needs: A procurement record, policy instrument or other official document.

  4. Level 4

    Demonstrated influence

    Evidence connecting the donor or their lobbying to the decision. This is the only level that asserts a link rather than a sequence.

    Needs: An official investigation, select committee report, court finding, regulator ruling, or an admission by the party or government. Media investigations do not qualify.

What does the documentary trail establish?

The donation and the access are documented. No decision or influence is.

Dated events in one case, by type of evidence: donation, access, decision, official finding and gaps. Lines show chronology only.

United Kingdom (central government and a GB-registered party) · October 2020 – July 2022

The Downing Street flat refurbishment, 2020–22

  • Donation
  • Access / contact
  • Decision record
  • Official finding
  • Gap in the record
  • Other event

  1. 19 October 2020 · Donation

    Huntswood Associates Ltd, a company controlled by Lord Brownlow, paid the Conservative Party £67,801.72. The party reported £15,000 of it as a donation; £52,801.72, which covered refurbishment invoices first paid by the Cabinet Office, was not reported.

    Electoral Commission, Report of an investigation in respect of the Conservative and Unionist Party: recording and reporting of payments (9 December 2021)

  2. 29 November 2020 · Access / contact

    In a WhatsApp exchange about approving further works, the then Prime Minister told Lord Brownlow he was “on the great exhibition plan”. The exchange was not disclosed to the Independent Adviser before his May 2021 report.

    Advice from the Independent Adviser on Ministers’ Interests, December 2021 (6 January 2022)

  3. 18 January 2021 · Access / contact

    The then Culture Secretary met the Royal Albert Hall and Lord Brownlow to discuss plans for “Great Exhibition 2.0”, as recorded in the department’s ministerial meetings return.

    DCMS ministerial gifts, hospitality, travel and meetings, January to March 2021 (15 July 2021)

  4. March 2021 · Other event

    The Prime Minister settled the refurbishment costs personally; the supplier, Cabinet Office, party and Lord Brownlow’s company were repaid between 9 and 23 March.

    Annual Report of the Independent Adviser on Ministers’ Interests (28 May 2021)

  5. 28 May 2021 · Official finding

    The Independent Adviser found an interest but no conflict under the Ministerial Code, said the Prime Minister had acted “unwisely”, and found no evidence that Lord Brownlow acted other than altruistically. No breach.

    Annual Report of the Independent Adviser on Ministers’ Interests (28 May 2021)

  6. 9 December 2021 · Official finding

    The Electoral Commission found the whole £67,801.72 was a donation and fined the party £17,800 (£16,250 for an inaccurate donation report; £1,550 for inaccurate accounting records). Lord Brownlow’s direct payments to the supplier were found not to be party donations.

    Electoral Commission, Report of an investigation in respect of the Conservative and Unionist Party: recording and reporting of payments (9 December 2021)

  7. 17 and 23 December 2021 · Official finding

    After the WhatsApp exchange came to light, the Independent Adviser said it did not change his no-conflict finding but would have prompted further questions, and criticised the failure to disclose it.

    Advice from the Independent Adviser on Ministers’ Interests, December 2021 (6 January 2022)

  8. 13 January 2022 · Decision record

    No government decision found: DCMS stated that government was not involved in planning Great Exhibition 2.0 and had provided no funding for it.

    House of Commons written answer 100695 (DCMS) (13 January 2022)

  9. July 2022 · Gap in the record

    DCMS confirmed it holds a minute of the January 2021 meeting but has not published it, so what was discussed is not on the public record.

    House of Commons written answer 33794 (DCMS) (14 July 2022)

The vertical line shows order in time. It does not mean one event caused the next.

This chain shows how far official records can go. They establish a donation that was partly misreported and later penalised, and contacts in which a separate project of interest to the donor came up. They do not establish any government decision in the donor’s favour — the department says it gave no funding — or any influence. An absence of an official finding is not proof that no influence occurred; it is the limit of what the record shows.

United Kingdom (central government and a GB-registered party) · October 2020 – July 2022 · Official records and findings

Sources, definitions and data — The donation and the access are documented. No decision or influence is.
Geography:
United Kingdom (central government and a GB-registered party)
Measure:
dated events
Period:
October 2020 – July 2022
Status:
Official records and findings
Calculation:
Events taken only from official records: the Commission’s investigation report, the Independent Adviser’s published reports and letters, a departmental transparency return and written parliamentary answers. Short quotations are from those documents.
Compare with:
The four-level evidence ladder: donation → access → relevant decision → demonstrated influence.
Not included / breaks:
Media reporting, allegations and unpublished material are excluded. Two sources date one Cabinet Office meeting differently (20 and 22 October 2020); neither date changes the chain.

Source: Electoral Commission, Report of an investigation in respect of the Conservative and Unionist Party: recording and reporting of payments (released 9 December 2021). Chart DON-02.

View the data as a table
DateTypeEventSource
19 October 2020donationHuntswood Associates Ltd, a company controlled by Lord Brownlow, paid the Conservative Party £67,801.72. The party reported £15,000 of it as a donation; £52,801.72, which covered refurbishment invoices first paid by the Cabinet Office, was not reported.Electoral Commission, Report of an investigation in respect of the Conservative and Unionist Party: recording and reporting of payments
29 November 2020accessIn a WhatsApp exchange about approving further works, the then Prime Minister told Lord Brownlow he was “on the great exhibition plan”. The exchange was not disclosed to the Independent Adviser before his May 2021 report.Advice from the Independent Adviser on Ministers’ Interests, December 2021
18 January 2021accessThe then Culture Secretary met the Royal Albert Hall and Lord Brownlow to discuss plans for “Great Exhibition 2.0”, as recorded in the department’s ministerial meetings return.DCMS ministerial gifts, hospitality, travel and meetings, January to March 2021
March 2021otherThe Prime Minister settled the refurbishment costs personally; the supplier, Cabinet Office, party and Lord Brownlow’s company were repaid between 9 and 23 March.Annual Report of the Independent Adviser on Ministers’ Interests
28 May 2021findingThe Independent Adviser found an interest but no conflict under the Ministerial Code, said the Prime Minister had acted “unwisely”, and found no evidence that Lord Brownlow acted other than altruistically. No breach.Annual Report of the Independent Adviser on Ministers’ Interests
9 December 2021findingThe Electoral Commission found the whole £67,801.72 was a donation and fined the party £17,800 (£16,250 for an inaccurate donation report; £1,550 for inaccurate accounting records). Lord Brownlow’s direct payments to the supplier were found not to be party donations.Electoral Commission, Report of an investigation in respect of the Conservative and Unionist Party: recording and reporting of payments
17 and 23 December 2021findingAfter the WhatsApp exchange came to light, the Independent Adviser said it did not change his no-conflict finding but would have prompted further questions, and criticised the failure to disclose it.Advice from the Independent Adviser on Ministers’ Interests, December 2021
13 January 2022decisionNo government decision found: DCMS stated that government was not involved in planning Great Exhibition 2.0 and had provided no funding for it.House of Commons written answer 100695 (DCMS)
July 2022gapDCMS confirmed it holds a minute of the January 2021 meeting but has not published it, so what was discussed is not on the public record.House of Commons written answer 33794 (DCMS)

Scroll the table sideways to see every column.

What this chain establishes

  • Level 1 — donation: documented, including the part that was not reported at the time.
  • Level 2 — access: two documented contacts in which a separate project of interest to the donor was raised.
  • Level 3 — relevant decision: not reached. The only official statement is that government provided no funding for the project.
  • Level 4 — demonstrated influence: not reached. The official findings concern reporting failures and ministerial interests, not influence over a decision.

Counter-evidence: The Independent Adviser found no conflict of interest in either review, and all sums were repaid. The Commission found the reporting offence arose from the party’s systems; the donor had described the payment as a donation.

This case is shown because official bodies investigated it and published their findings, so every link can be checked. It is not a sample of donor behaviour, and no comparison with other donors is implied. Sources checked 3 October 2026.

Shareable visual summary

Visual summary

Image held

The image is not offered for download or sharing until the reasons below are resolved. The chart here is drawn from today’s records.

One donor supplied 64% of Reform’s reported private donations in 2025.

Reform reported £18.7m in private donations in 2025, all from individuals and companies; £12.0m came from its largest donor. On the same measure the figure was 21% for the Conservatives, 18% for Labour and 4% for the Liberal Democrats; trade unions, each counted as one donor though pooling many members’ fees, gave 55% of Labour’s private money. Each quarter is published about two months after it ends, so late reports can still change these totals. A UK Facts calculation from the Electoral Commission register. A donation alone does not show influence or wrongdoing.

Calendar year 2025

  • 64%of Reform UK’s reported private donations from one donor
  • 94%of reported private donations went to four parties
  • £50.0mreported private donations, all parties
  • £15.3mpublic funds, counted separately

Register calculation: cash and non-cash as reported, returned or forfeited gifts excluded; loans not included.

Evidence levels (each needs its own evidence)

  1. Step 1DonationRecorded by the Electoral Commission
  2. Step 2Documented accessMeetings, roles or events on the record
  3. Step 3Relevant decisionA later decision in the donor’s interest
  4. Step 4Demonstrated influenceEvidence the donation changed the decision

Why the supplied image is held

  • No registry record “donations.top10.share” — the figure is not reproduced in the site’s data
  • No registry record “donations.top10.total” — the figure is not reproduced in the site’s data
  • No registry record “donations.private.total” — the figure is not reproduced in the site’s data
  • The 21.9% is not reproduced in the site’s current data, a newer Electoral Commission export gives about 21.7%, and one donor appears twice under two name spellings in the top ten.
Text and data version

One donor supplied 64% of Reform’s reported private donations in 2025. Reform reported £18.7m in private donations in 2025, all from individuals and companies; £12.0m came from its largest donor. On the same measure the figure was 21% for the Conservatives, 18% for Labour and 4% for the Liberal Democrats; trade unions, each counted as one donor though pooling many members’ fees, gave 55% of Labour’s private money. Each quarter is published about two months after it ends, so late reports can still change these totals. A UK Facts calculation from the Electoral Commission register. A donation alone does not show influence or wrongdoing.

Records behind this visual summary
MeasureValuePeriodGeographyTypeSource
Share of Reform UK’s reported private donations from its largest single donorCalculation: largest matched donor £12.00m ÷ Reform UK private donations £18.71m × 100 (conservative donor matching; a lower bound)64%Calendar year 2025Great Britain and Northern Irelandderived calculationElectoral Commission donations export; private = cash and non-cash as reported, returned or forfeited excluded
Share of private donations received by the four largest recipientsCalculation: (Reform UK £18.71m + Conservative and Unionist Party £14.02m + Labour Party £8.99m + Liberal Democrats £5.04m) ÷ £49.96m × 10094%Calendar year 2025Great Britain and Northern Irelandderived calculationElectoral Commission donations export; private = cash and non-cash as reported, returned or forfeited excluded
Reported private donations to all registered parties£50.0mCalendar year 2025Great Britain and Northern Irelandadministrative countElectoral Commission donations export; private = cash and non-cash as reported, returned or forfeited excluded
Public funds reported in the same returns (Short, Cranborne, policy development grants)£15.3mCalendar year 2025Great Britain and Northern Irelandadministrative countElectoral Commission donations export; private = cash and non-cash as reported, returned or forfeited excluded

All visual summaries, their source records and their publication state are listed on Shareable visuals.

Go deeper

Evidence → choices → outcomes

What could improve it?

Political finance that the public can trace quickly and completely, rules that are enforced, and an open choice about how parties are funded.

This domain in the UK SWOT →UK National Action Plan →

How we assessed these options

What would it take to improve this?

What would move the needle?

The outcome we want: Political finance that the public can trace quickly and completely, rules that are enforced, and an open choice about how parties are funded.

The main constraint: Every change needs legislation from MPs whose parties are funded under the current rules, and enforcement by an Electoral Commission whose maximum fine is set in law — and capping donations raises the question of who replaces the money.

Constraint type: legislation, public consent, money.

The options on the table

What is funded now, and the changes assessed against it — the current baseline and the alternatives, before the position today and the actions.

Provisional single-reviewer assessments from the 6 October 2026 review; not approved business cases, and not government policy.

  • Trust in political moneyDelivery RAG: Amber

    Funded now
    Not yet stated in the record.
    The change assessed
    Not yet defined.

    Range if completed: 10.0–19.0 out of 30 (equal weights; not yet assessed: increment beyond baseline (Ad), expected incremental benefit (Bn), incremental affordability (Co))

Alternatives already on record: 15 options listed under the points in the position today (7 without an action record), and 1 earlier option under other options compared. They have not been scored in the review.

The position today

  • What we can build on (1)
  • What is holding us back (3)Some parties depend on very few donors: among parties with at least £1m of private donations, the top ten donors gave between 25% (Liberal Democrats) and 83% (Reform UK) of the total. (2025 · Great Britain)
  • What could improve things (1)Faster, linked reporting with proportionate penalties could be weighed against fully costed options for capping donations and replacing the lost income.
  • What could make it worse (1)

Which quadrant a point sits in is our analytical judgement, not a statistical category. Each point says whether it is a measured fact, our synthesis or a risk.

What we can build on Strengths

What is holding us back Weaknesses

What could improve things Opportunities

What could make it worse Threats

The actions worth examining

These actions concern transparency, accountability and informed choice — not a spending programme, and not a view on which party or system is right.

  1. Make the political-money trail timely and enforceable — not a direct public-spending programme
  2. Cost donation limits together with replacement party finance — not yet costed / funding not identified

  • Action 1A35Policy status: external proposal

    Make the political-money trail timely and enforceable

    Report donations and loans faster in one linked record, and give the Electoral Commission proportionate penalties and investigation capacity.

    The thread: issue, evidence, action

    1. Issue Weakness: The Electoral Commission’s maximum fine for a breach is £20,000. Also: weakness, strength
    2. Evidence Days from accepting a donation to publication
    3. Action A35, this action

    Assessment (draft, 6 October review)

    • A broad priority including this action (GRP-05): Trust in political money

      Delivery RAG: AmberGate: pending

      Range if completed: 10.0–19.0 out of 30 (equal weights; not yet assessed: increment beyond baseline (Ad), expected incremental benefit (Bn), incremental affordability (Co))

      National plan: Kept outside the national lists

    Who decides:
    Parliament, the Electoral Commission and parties (UK)
    Evidence:
    Expert or audit recommendation. Consensus recommendations from an independent standards body and civil society; no evaluated effect on improper influence.
    Expected effect:
    Direction plausible; size not established.
    Cost and funding

    Not yet costed

    Funding: Not a direct public-spending programme

    Why it is shortlisted here: Makes the existing rules visible and enforceable — a precondition for judging any further reform.

    What it takes
    The problem

    Donations appear months after they are accepted, loans sit in a separate record, and the maximum fine is small relative to party finances.

    Who is affected, and where

    Voters, parties and campaigners across the United Kingdom. Territory: UK. Party-finance law is largely UK-wide; Northern Ireland has its own donation-transparency arrangements.

    Policy status

    Proposed by researchers or others, not government policy. Recommended by the Committee on Standards in Public Life (2021) and Transparency International UK. The Representation of the People Bill does not itself raise the Electoral Commission’s maximum fine (£20,000 per offence): its explanatory notes say the government intends to raise it to up to £500,000 in later secondary legislation. Whether the Bill changes reporting frequency was not verified for this review.

    The evidence
    What the research found:
    The Committee on Standards in Public Life recommended raising the maximum fine to 4% of campaign spend or £500,000, whichever is higher; Transparency International UK backs the same and notes the current maximum is £20,000.
    Evaluated on:
    UK party-finance regulation; United Kingdom
    Our recommendation (separate from the research):
    Identify the reporting gaps and the authority each change needs, then legislate and build systems before measuring disclosure delay and completeness.
    Strongest counter-evidence:
    Faster reporting adds burden for small volunteer-run parties, and disclosure alone does not show that money bought influence.
    Cost and funding

    Cost completeness: Not yet costed. Funding: Not a direct public-spending programme.

    • Electoral Commission systems and investigators (administration; paid by regulator): Not yet costed. No official costing found. Fines are not dependable programme finance.
    • Party compliance, including small volunteer-run parties (private contribution; paid by parties): Not yet costed. Private administrative cost; falls hardest on small parties.
    Who pays:
    The Electoral Commission (public budget) for systems and investigators; parties for compliance.
    Financing proposed:
    An approved Commission budget; fines are not dependable finance.
    Gap remaining:
    Administrative costs are not costed.
    What delivery needs
    Skills:
    Investigators and data staff.
    Operational capacity:
    Commission systems.
    Infrastructure:
    A linked donations and loans database.
    Permissions:
    None.
    Law:
    Primary or secondary legislation.
    Public consent:
    MPs whose parties are funded under the current rules.
    First step and stages

    First step: Identify reporting gaps and the authority required for each change. (owner: Electoral Commission with the government)

    1. Legislate — Parliament (proposed stage, not an official timetable)
    2. Build systems — Electoral Commission (proposed stage, not an official timetable)
    3. Audit each reporting cycle — Electoral Commission (proposed stage, not an official timetable)
    Trade-offs
    Who gains and who loses:
    Voters gain information; parties, especially small ones, bear compliance costs.
    What else the money or effort could do:
    Commission resources are not available for other regulation.
    Strongest counterargument:
    Money can move through connected entities that faster reporting does not reach.
    Risks:
    Evasion, burdens on small parties and mistaking donations for proof of purchased policy.
    How we would judge it
    Baseline:
    Time from acceptance to publication — not currently measured on this site.
    Leading indicator:
    Investigations opened and concluded.
    Outcome:
    Disclosure delay, completeness, corrections, enforcement timeliness and concentration as separate measures.
    Continue, adapt or stop:
    Review if late or corrected returns rise as a share of the total.
    Earlier option on this page

    This card replaces the option “Faster, fuller disclosure” (external option). Its evidence: Weekly reporting already applies during UK general election campaigns, showing it is administratively possible. There is no UK evaluation of whether faster disclosure changes donor or party behaviour. Electoral Commission, Political party donations and loans in Great Britain

    This card replaces the option “Stronger enforcement” (external option). Its evidence: The Committee on Standards in Public Life (2021) recommended raising the Commission’s maximum fine to £500,000 or 4% of campaign spend, whichever is higher. No UK evaluation shows the effect of a higher cap on compliance. Committee on Standards in Public Life, Regulating Election Finance

    Sources

    Source published July 2021 (CSPL); May 2024 (TI UK); evidence reviewed 2026-10-04. Reconsider if: The Representation of the People Bill receives Royal Assent; Electoral Commission enforcement statistics.

  • Action 2A36Policy status: external proposal

    Cost donation limits together with replacement party finance

    Compare cap levels and public or membership funding options on the same assumptions, so the trade-off between donor dependence and taxpayer cost is visible.

    The thread: issue, evidence, action

    1. Issue Weakness: Some parties depend on very few donors: among parties with at least £1m of private donations, the top ten donors gave between 25% (Liberal Democrats) and 83% (Reform UK) of the total. Also: opportunity
    2. Evidence Share of private donations going to the four largest recipients; Public funds as a share of reported party receipts
    3. Action A36, this action

    Assessment (draft, 6 October review)

    • A broad priority including this action (GRP-05): Trust in political money

      Delivery RAG: AmberGate: pending

      Range if completed: 10.0–19.0 out of 30 (equal weights; not yet assessed: increment beyond baseline (Ad), expected incremental benefit (Bn), incremental affordability (Co))

      National plan: Kept outside the national lists

    Who decides:
    Parliament, the Electoral Commission and parties (UK)
    Evidence:
    Expert or audit recommendation. Reform proposals with value choices; evidence from other countries is mixed and tests different rules.
    Expected effect:
    Direction plausible; size not established.
    Cost and funding

    Not yet costed

    Funding: Not yet costed / funding not identified

    Why it is shortlisted here: Puts the cap-and-replacement trade-off on one set of assumptions, so the cost to taxpayers is visible.

    What it takes
    The problem

    A few large donors supply much of some parties’ income, but a cap without replacement funding would leave a gap that someone must fill.

    Who is affected, and where

    Parties, donors and taxpayers across the United Kingdom. Territory: UK. Applies to UK-registered parties; Northern Ireland differences not assessed.

    Policy status

    Proposed by researchers or others, not government policy. A general donation cap is not government policy; a cap for overseas electors is in the Representation of the People Bill (existing option on this page).

    The evidence
    What the research found:
    Transparency International UK recommends donation caps without naming a level (sources it cites propose £10,000 per donor per year). A Brazilian study of spending limits found more competition; US evidence finds little sign contributions buy votes. Neither tests a UK donation cap.
    Evaluated on:
    UK party finance (recommendations); Brazil and the United States (studies of different rules); Various
    Our recommendation (separate from the research):
    Publish comparable cap-and-replacement scenarios with clear donor definitions before taking a position.
    Strongest counter-evidence:
    Caps can entrench incumbents, push money to loans or third parties, and public funding means taxpayers fund parties they oppose.
    Cost and funding

    Cost completeness: Not yet costed. Funding: Not yet costed / funding not identified.

    • Replacement public funding for income lost under a cap (recurring spending; paid by central government): Not yet costed. Each cap level is an alternative with its own cost; none has been costed on consistent assumptions.
    Who pays:
    Taxpayers for any replacement public funding; parties lose private income.
    Financing proposed:
    None identified; a cap modelled without replacement finance leaves a funding gap.
    Gap remaining:
    Unknown: depends on the cap level and formula.
    What delivery needs
    Skills:
    Enforcement against splitting gifts.
    Operational capacity:
    An administering body for public funds.
    Infrastructure:
    None.
    Permissions:
    None.
    Law:
    Primary legislation.
    Public consent:
    Cross-party agreement; public attitudes to state funding.
    First step and stages

    First step: Publish comparable scenarios with beneficiary and donor definitions. (owner: Electoral Commission or an independent review)

    1. Model scenarios — Independent review (proposed stage, not an official timetable)
    2. Consult and legislate — Parliament (proposed stage, not an official timetable)
    3. Transition over a full electoral cycle — Electoral Commission (proposed stage, not an official timetable)

    Depends on: A35: reliable disclosure data

    Trade-offs
    Who gains and who loses:
    Parties reliant on large donors lose most; taxpayers pay for replacement funding; effects differ sharply by party.
    What else the money or effort could do:
    Public money for parties is not available for other uses.
    Strongest counterargument:
    Caps restrict legitimate political participation and may favour parties with union affiliation fees or large memberships.
    Risks:
    Incumbent advantage, routes around caps and public objection to taxpayer support.
    How we would judge it
    Baseline:
    Top donors’ share of each party’s private donations (Electoral Commission register).
    Leading indicator:
    Compliance and returned donations.
    Outcome:
    Concentration, participation and viable competition — not a single democracy score.
    Continue, adapt or stop:
    Review if money moves to loans or third-party campaigners.
    Earlier option on this page

    This card replaces the option “A cap on donations” (external option: A general cap is not government policy; an overseas-elector cap is in the Bill.). Its evidence: Evidence from other systems is mixed and context-specific. A study of Brazilian spending limits found more competition and a smaller incumbency advantage; US evidence finds little sign that contributions buy legislators’ votes. Neither study tests a UK donation cap. Avis, Ferraz, Finan & Varjão, Money and Politics: the effects of campaign spending limits (NBER w23508) · Ansolabehere, de Figueiredo & Snyder, Why is there so little money in U.S. politics? (JEP 17(1))

    This card replaces the option “More public funding of parties” (external option). Its evidence: Public funds were 23% of receipts in the 2025 register (proof card 3). Effects of larger schemes abroad depend heavily on design; there is no UK evaluation. Electoral Commission, political finance database: donations to political parties

    Sources

    Source published May 2024 (TI UK); evidence reviewed 2026-10-04. Reconsider if: A government or committee proposal for general caps; Published cost scenarios.

How the options are assessed

One shared record per option — the same one the national plan reads. Delivery RAG, gate and list membership are separate judgements.

  • Trust in political money — Amber delivery RAG; gate pending

Provisional single-reviewer assessments from the 6 October 2026 review; not approved business cases, and not government policy.

  • GRP-05Delivery RAG: AmberGate: pending

    Trust in political money

    A broad priority grouping A35, A36; its scores are its own, never an average of its members.

    Provisional single-reviewer assessment; not an approved business case.

    Who and where
    Population not yet defined. Jurisdiction: not defined.
    Result so far
    Range if completed: 10.0–19.0 out of 30 (equal weights; not yet assessed: increment beyond baseline (Ad), expected incremental benefit (Bn), incremental affordability (Co))
    Funded now (baseline)
    Funded baseline not yet stated
    The change assessed (marginal)
    Marginal change not yet defined
    What the evidence supports—and the next decision

    Political finance transparency, donation rules and enforcement are separate choices. Donor concentration does not prove a purchased policy outcome.

    Codex — AI-assisted analytical follow-up · 8 October 2026. Proposed appraisal design; the attributed scores below are unchanged. No funding or delivery agreement is implied.

    Define the change
    Specify the disclosure or enforcement gap and compare narrowly drafted options against current law and regulator capacity.
    Test whether it works
    Timeliness, completeness, compliance and enforceable cases; public trust is a secondary survey outcome, not proof of causality.
    Establish the cost
    Regulator staff, systems, party and donor compliance, litigation and transition.
    Protect against harm
    Apply rules consistently across parties and preserve lawful political participation and appeal rights.

    Read with the outcome evidence and sources in the full assessment. Monitoring proposals are not existing baseline measurements. A numerical benefit or cost score needs evidence for the defined increment, not just the scale of the problem.

    Full assessment of Trust in political money: ten criteria, scenarios, delivery, costs and monitoring
    The ten criteria (0–3)

    Each criterion is scored 0 to 3 by the reviewer. “Not yet assessed” means unknown: it is never counted as zero.

    1. Scale and severity (Sc)2 of 3 — Serious harm to a defined group or widespread moderate harm

      Reviewer’s reason: Provisional problem-importance judgement from linked site pages; not the scale of achievable benefit.

    2. Increment beyond baseline (Ad)Not yet assessed

      Reviewer’s reason: Separate disclosure, enforcement and donation limits; define regulator powers, legal safeguards and consultation. A missing rating requires a defined marginal change.

    3. Confidence in the proposed action (Ev)0 of 3 — No effect evaluation

      Reviewer’s reason: Disclosure/enforcement recommendations do not establish an effect on trust; voting-system change is a separate constitutional choice.

    4. Expected incremental benefit (Bn)Not yet assessed

      Reviewer’s reason: Unknown unless a reasonably defined target-population benefit can be judged; no bonus merely for spanning domains.

    5. Residual harms (Hm)1 of 3 — Material harm/unresolved mitigation

      Reviewer’s reason: Displacement of funding, legal challenge and unequal burdens; no guaranteed trust gain.

    6. Incremental affordability (Co)Not yet assessed

      Reviewer’s reason: Regulator staffing, IT, compliance, litigation and transition.

    7. Delivery capacity (Ca)2 of 3 — Stretched but plausibly obtainable

      Reviewer’s reason: Separate disclosure, enforcement and donation limits; define regulator powers, legal safeguards and consultation.

    8. Distribution (Fa)2 of 3 — Mixed or broadly neutral with safeguards

      Reviewer’s reason: Provisional distribution judgement for the stated target; verify who pays, who gains and excluded groups.

    9. Meaningful first outcome (Ti)2 of 3 — More than one and up to three years

      Reviewer’s reason: First meaningful outcome, not announcement: Disclosure completeness, timeliness and compliance; trust measured separately.

    10. Readiness (Rd)1 of 3 — Legislation/external agreement or major enabling work

      Reviewer’s reason: Parliament, government and Electoral Commission; Institutional design and safeguards

    Four weightings

    Normalised as 10 × weighted sum ÷ sum of weights, on a 0–30 scale. Where a criterion is not yet assessed, the range is the lowest and highest result if it were later scored 0 or 3 — not a score, a confidence interval or a rank.

    • Equal weights: Range if completed: 10.0–19.0 out of 30. Not yet assessed: increment beyond baseline (Ad), expected incremental benefit (Bn), incremental affordability (Co). Funding gate: not passed.
    • Evidence doubled: Range if completed: 9.1–17.3 out of 30. Not yet assessed: increment beyond baseline (Ad), expected incremental benefit (Bn), incremental affordability (Co). Funding gate: not passed.
    • Scale doubled: Range if completed: 10.9–19.1 out of 30. Not yet assessed: increment beyond baseline (Ad), expected incremental benefit (Bn), incremental affordability (Co). Funding gate: not passed.
    • Cost ignored (the funding gate still applies): Range if completed: 11.1–17.8 out of 30. Not yet assessed: increment beyond baseline (Ad), expected incremental benefit (Bn), incremental affordability (Co). Funding gate: not passed.

    Funding gate: Not passed — the cost is not yet assessed or no allocation is committed for this scope. Ignoring cost in a weighting never removes the gate.

    Delivery RAG and gate

    Delivery RAG shown: AmberReview’s claim: Amber. Best the recorded evidence allows: Amber.

    Review’s reason: Regulator staffing, IT, compliance, litigation and transition.

    Why it is not Green yet

    • Scope (population, place and increment) not verified against the delivery baseline.
    • No verified owner with the powers in place.
    • Delivery capacity not verified.
    • Lifetime incremental costs not complete.
    • No credible funding (a committed allocation for the scope).
    • Safeguards not specified.
    • Monitoring lacks a metric, a data source or a baseline.

    Green needs verified scope, a verified owner with the powers, verified capacity, complete lifetime costs with credible funding, specified safeguards and monitoring with a metric, source and baseline. Amber means appraisal gaps remain; Red means a material delivery obstacle. Red does not mean unimportant.

    Gate: Pending — appraisal incomplete (review label: “Pending: incomplete appraisal”).

    Why: Scores incomplete; Funding gate not passed (cost unknown or no credible funding).

    The gate is separate from national list membership: being listed does not make an option eligible, and an eligible option need not be listed.

    Cost and funding

    Lifetime costing: Not established. Review: “Full incremental costing not established in reviewed material”.

    Still to cost: Regulator staffing, IT, compliance, litigation and transition.

    Funding status: not established in review.

    Owner, powers and capacity

    Proposed owner: Parliament, government and Electoral Commission (proposed, unverified).

    Powers: needs legislation or external agreement. Capacity: unverified.

    Powers and capacity read from the review’s Rd and Ca anchors; no proposed owner has agreed to act (the review: “Proposed owners have not agreed to act”).

    England:
    not assessed
    Scotland:
    not assessed
    Wales:
    not assessed
    Northern Ireland:
    not assessed

    Not defined in the review.

    Dependencies, safeguards and risks

    Depends on: None recorded.

    Safeguards

    • define regulator powers, legal safeguards and consultation (proposed, not yet specified)

    Risks and residual harms: Displacement of funding, legal challenge and unequal burdens; no guaranteed trust gain.

    Monitoring and measured results

    Metric: Disclosure completeness, timeliness and compliance; trust measured separately.

    Data source: Not yet named. Baseline: Not yet established.

    Measures already on the domain page

    A page measure is not necessarily the review’s metric; linking the two is an editorial decision still to be made.

    Evidence for the outcome

    Outcome: Disclosure completeness, timeliness and compliance; trust measured separately.

    Disclosure/enforcement recommendations do not establish an effect on trust; voting-system change is a separate constitutional choice.

    Review record

    Assessment version: working-review-2026-10-06 (GRP-05@working-review-2026-10-06).

    Reviewer: Author of the review blueprint (single reviewer, not named in uk-facts-complete-plan.json). Reviewed: 6 October 2026.

    Scored in the working review of 6 October 2026 on the shared ten-criterion scale (one reviewer); not independently calibrated.

    First 90 days (review): Produce a signed scope and current-delivery baseline; Separate disclosure, enforcement and donation limits; define regulator powers, legal safeguards and consultation. Obtain incremental costs and an accountable decision before expansion.

    Decision route: Institutional design and safeguards

    An editorial screening framework by one reviewer, not a formal appraisal or business case. Proposed owners have not agreed to act.

Decision brief

  • Cost a cap on political donations together with what would replace the money — and the enforcement to make it stick

The leading option set out as a decision someone could take: who decides, who benefits, the best evidence, cost and funding, and the main trade-off. The full research record is one click away.

Decision briefStatutory/accountability reformReviewed 2026-10-04

Cost a cap on political donations together with what would replace the money — and the enforcement to make it stick

The thread: issue, evidence, action

  1. Issue Weakness: Some parties depend on very few donors: among parties with at least £1m of private donations, the top ten donors gave between 25% (Liberal Democrats) and 83% (Reform UK) of the total. Also: opportunity
  2. Evidence Share of private donations going to the four largest recipients; Public funds as a share of reported party receipts
  3. Action Cost donation limits together with replacement party finance
Decision required
Parliament uses the Representation of the People Bill, now in the Lords, to require a statutory review that compares donation-cap designs with replacement-finance options on one set of assumptions, while the government lays the promised secondary legislation raising the Electoral Commission’s maximum fine from £20,000 to up to £500,000.
Who and where
Parties, donors and taxpayers across the UK. Applies in: UK.
Accountable body
Parliament (amendments to the Bill) and the government (secondary legislation on fines)
Intervention
Compare cap levels and replacement-finance designs on one set of assumptions, with aggregation and enforcement specified.
Best evidence, and where it applies
In 2025, Reform UK’s largest donor supplied 64% of its reported private donations; Canada allows only individual donations, capped at $1,775 per party in 2026, with public reimbursement of election expenses.Studied in: UK election and party finance regulation (Review of UK election finance).How closely the comparison transfers to this decision: Canada (federal) — partial.
Extra cost of this change
Capital: none identified in the brief.Recurring: Replacement public funding for income lost under a cap — Not yet costed; Electoral Commission systems and investigators — Not yet costed; Party compliance, including small volunteer-run parties — Not yet costed.
Funding
Mainly a legal or regulatory change: administration costs still need a budget.Committed to this change: none.Possible source, not an award: none identified.Unfunded: No design has been costed on consistent assumptions.
Savings and wider benefits
Not yet specified: no cashable saving or avoided cost has been costed for this change. Expected outcomes are listed one by one in the research appendix and are never added together or counted as money available.
First 90-day step
An amendment at Lords committee or report stage requiring the costed comparison, and the government laying the fine increaseThe proposed first milestone; a 90-day date is not yet specified. Owner: Parliament; the government (MHCLG). Proposed by UK Facts, not an official deadline.
Twelve-month milestone
Not yet specified.Time to a first useful result: The comparison within a year of Royal Assent; any cap only after further primary legislation.
Outcome, and when to scale or stop
Measure: Publication of the costed comparison; returned and late donations.Scale if: Concentration falls without money moving to loans or third parties, and enforcement is timely.Stop if: Not a stop decision: if late or corrected returns rise as a share of the total, review enforcement capacity.
Main trade-off
A cap reduces dependence on large donors but leaves a funding gap that taxpayers, members or no one fills; caps also push money towards loans and third parties unless aggregation and enforcement are tight.
Source and review date
Regulating Election Finance (7 July 2021); Protecting the UK's Democracy: Key Electoral Reforms Recommended by Independent Experts (2024). Reviewed 2026-10-04.

An editorial proposal by UK Facts for discussion, not government policy. Records: A36, A35 · costs C-A36-REPLACEMENT, C-A35-REGULATOR, C-A35-PARTIES

Research appendix: study design, effect sizes and limits, alternatives, full costing, international comparisons and how we would know

1.The change, in plain words

Cost a cap on political donations together with what would replace the money — and the enforcement to make it stick

2.The decision requested

Decision
Amend the Representation of the People Bill to require the Electoral Commission (or an independent review) to publish, within a set period, a costed comparison of at least three designs — a cap at stated levels with no replacement, a cap with matched small-donation public funding, and disclosure-and-enforcement only — and lay the secondary legislation raising the maximum fine.
Accountable institution
Parliament (amendments to the Bill) and the government (secondary legislation on fines)
Geography
UK
Powers
Primary legislation for any general cap or new public funding; secondary legislation for the higher fine, as the Bill’s explanatory notes state; the Electoral Commission regulates under the Political Parties, Elections and Referendums Act 2000.
Delivery partners
Electoral Commission; Political parties (data and consultation); HM Treasury (cost of any public funding); Committee on Standards in Public Life

3.Who it is for, and what changes beyond today

Target population
Parties, donors and taxpayers across the UK.
Eligibility
Donations and loans to registered parties above the reporting threshold (£11,180), including aggregation across connected donors.
Scale
All registered parties.
Baseline
Reported private donations to parties in 2025: £50.0m; public funds £15.3m. Among parties with at least £1m of private donations, Reform UK’s top donor gave 64% and its top ten 83%; Liberal Democrats’s top ten gave 25%. Maximum fine £20,000 per offence. The Bill caps donations from overseas contributors at £100,000 a year and adds risk-assessment checks above £11,180; it was at Lords committee stage on 2 October 2026.

Source: Electoral Commission, political finance database: donations to political parties (Site calculation from the donations export); UK Parliament, Representation of the People Bill: Explanatory Notes (HL Bill 47) (Explanatory notes; clause 62)

Change beyond existing law or funding
The Bill tightens rules on overseas and company donations and the government intends a higher fine by secondary legislation; a general cap is not government policy and no replacement-finance option has been costed. The change is a statutory, costed comparison on consistent assumptions, plus laying the fine increase.

4.How it would work

Do: Compare cap levels and replacement-finance designs on one set of assumptions, with aggregation and enforcement specified Changing: so that the trade-off between donor dependence, party income and taxpayer cost is visible before Parliament chooses

  • Lower concentration of party income among a few donors

    Hypothesis to test

    Depends on cap level, aggregation and enforcement; money can move to loans or third parties.

  • Faster, more complete disclosure and timely enforcement

    Hypothesis to test

    Penalties proportionate to party finances are recommended by the CSPL; no evaluation estimates the deterrent effect.

Outcomes are kept separate and never added into one impact figure.

5.Best evidence

  • Regulating Election Finance

    Author or institution:
    Committee on Standards in Public Life
    Published:
    7 July 2021
    Evaluation period:
    Review of UK election finance
    Design:
    Independent standards review
    Sample or population:
    UK election and party finance regulation
    Effect and uncertainty:
    Raise the maximum fine to 4% of a campaign’s total spend or £500,000, whichever is higher.
    Limits:
    Recommendation; no deterrence estimate.

    Where: Recommendation 37. Affiliation is provenance, not proof of quality.

  • Protecting the UK's Democracy: Key Electoral Reforms Recommended by Independent Experts

    Author or institution:
    Transparency International UK
    Published:
    2024
    Evaluation period:
    Not an evaluation
    Design:
    Synthesis of independent expert recommendations
    Sample or population:
    UK political finance
    Effect and uncertainty:
    Recommends donation caps without naming a level; sources it cites propose £10,000 per donor per year. Studies abroad (spending limits in Brazil, contributions in the US) do not test a UK donation cap.
    Limits:
    Advocacy organisation; no UK cap has been evaluated.

    Where: Recommendation 13 and supporting table (p.13). Affiliation is provenance, not proof of quality.

6.Alternatives, counter-evidence and who loses

Closest feasible alternative
Disclosure and enforcement only: faster reporting, linked loan and donation records and the higher fine, without a cap.
Strongest counter-evidence
Caps can entrench incumbents, push money to loans or third parties, and public funding means taxpayers fund parties they oppose; disclosure does not show that money bought influence.

Source: Transparency International UK, Protecting the UK's Democracy: Key Electoral Reforms Recommended by Independent Experts (Recommendation 13)

Distributional effects
Parties reliant on large donors lose most; taxpayers pay for any replacement; trade-union payments representing many members need separate treatment from individual or company donors; small volunteer-run parties bear compliance costs.
Main downside
A cap without replacement finance may weaken parties’ campaigning and research capacity; with it, the cost falls on taxpayers.

The options compared, including current policy

  • The proposal

    Statutory costed comparison of cap and replacement-finance designs, plus the higher fine

    Who is reached
    All parties, donors and voters
    Evidence
    CSPL and TI UK recommendations; Canadian design
    Likely outcome and timing
    Comparison within a year of Royal Assent
    Cost and funding
    Commission budget; replacement finance not costed
    Main trade-off
    Delays any cap until costed

  • Current policy

    Current policy: the Bill’s overseas-donor cap (£100,000) and donor checks; fine increase by later secondary legislation

    Who is reached
    Overseas contributors; donations over £11,180
    Evidence
    Bill explanatory notes
    Likely outcome and timing
    After Royal Assent
    Cost and funding
    Administrative
    Main trade-off
    Large domestic donors unaffected

  • Alternative

    A £10,000-a-year cap per donor with no replacement funding

    Who is reached
    Large donors and the parties they fund
    Evidence
    Proposed in sources cited by TI UK; untested in the UK
    Likely outcome and timing
    Needs primary legislation
    Cost and funding
    No public cost; party income falls by an uncosted amount
    Main trade-off
    Funding gap; routes around the cap

  • Alternative

    A cap with matched public funding for small donations (Canadian-style mix)

    Who is reached
    All parties; taxpayers
    Evidence
    Canada: individual-only donations capped at $1,775 (2026), expenses reimbursed
    Likely outcome and timing
    Needs primary legislation
    Cost and funding
    Taxpayer cost not costed
    Main trade-off
    Taxpayers fund parties they oppose

7.What other countries or the devolved nations show

Country lesson · Canada (federal), Corporate and union donations banned; per-vote allowance ended March 2015; limits indexed annually

Low donation caps with public reimbursement in Canada

Evidence: Expert or audit recommendationPartial match: some conditions differ

What was changed
Only individual citizens and permanent residents may donate, up to $1,775 a year to each party in 2026; parties are reimbursed 50% of election expenses and candidates 60%; contributors giving over $200 are named.
Study design and population
Operating legal framework; no causal evaluation used here Canadian federal parties, candidates and donors
Measured outcome there
Administrative design, not an evaluated effect: a cap of $1,775 (2026) indexed by $25 a year, disclosure above $200, and public money through expense reimbursement after the per-vote allowance was phased out.
Cost status
Public cost of reimbursements not taken from a primary source here.
What failed or remains uncertain
Removing the per-vote allowance shifted parties towards small-donor fundraising; whether caps changed competition or influence is not established in the sources reviewed. Tax-credit rates were not verified.
Why the UK differs
UK parties rely on large individual and union donations, unions affiliated to Labour make collective payments, and UK public funding (Short money, policy development grants) is small; spending limits are set differently.
First change required here
Model a UK cap at several levels against each party’s reported donations, paired with a defined replacement-finance option, before choosing a level.

Not a UK forecast: the effect above was measured in that place and population. Source: Elections Canada; Justice Laws (Canada), Annual Limits on Contributions – 2026; Canada Elections Act ss.363, 444 (Limits 2026; ss.363, 444). Reviewed 2026-10-04.

8.What delivery needs first

  • law — Primary legislation for a general cap or new public funding; secondary legislation for the higher fine. (Genuine veto: nothing proceeds without it; owner: Parliament and the government)
  • data — Donation-level data by party and donor, with aggregation rules for connected donors and union affiliation payments. (Requirement; owner: Electoral Commission)
  • staff — Electoral Commission investigators to enforce aggregation and anti-avoidance rules. (Scarce resource shared with other priorities; owner: Electoral Commission)

9.What it would cost

How the cost is built up: For each design: private income lost above the cap (by party) − any replacement public funding (taxpayer cost) + Electoral Commission enforcement + party compliance. Fines are not counted as finance.

  • Replacement public funding for income lost under a cap

    Depends on cap level and formula

    Not yet costed (ledger C-A36-REPLACEMENT)

    recurring; price year not stated; Annual; Not yet established

  • Electoral Commission systems and investigators

    Faster reporting, linked records, enforcement

    Not yet costed (ledger C-A35-REGULATOR)

    recurring; price year not stated; Annual; Not yet established

  • Party compliance, including small volunteer-run parties

    All registered parties

    Not yet costed (ledger C-A35-PARTIES)

    recurring; price year not stated; Annual; Not yet established

10.Who pays, and what is missing

Programme envelope (a possible route, not an award)
None identified
Allocation committed to this change
None
Remaining gap
No design has been costed on consistent assumptions.
Proposed financing
The review uses the Electoral Commission’s approved budget; any replacement public funding would need its own vote of money.
Responsible payer
regulator, parties, central government
Budget displaced
Electoral Commission capacity; if replacement funding is chosen, other public spending.

11.First milestone and time to a useful result

An amendment at Lords committee or report stage requiring the costed comparison, and the government laying the fine increase (Owner: Parliament; the government (MHCLG). Proposed by UK Facts, not an official deadline.)

Time to first useful result: The comparison within a year of Royal Assent; any cap only after further primary legislation.

What could delay it: The Bill completes without the amendment Secondary legislation on fines is delayed

12.How we would know

Baseline
Top donors’ shares of each party’s private donations (2025); time from acceptance to publication; fines imposed.
Comparison
Each design against current rules on the same donation data.
Leading indicator
Publication of the costed comparison; returned and late donations.
Follow-up
Concentration, participation, loans and third-party spending after any change, as separate measures.
Continue if
Concentration falls without money moving to loans or third parties, and enforcement is timely.
Adapt if
Money moves to loans or third-party campaigners: extend the cap and aggregation to those routes.
Stop if
Not a stop decision: if late or corrected returns rise as a share of the total, review enforcement capacity.
Thresholds
Not yet set: Cap levels and concentration measures are choices for Parliament; no evaluation justifies a numerical trigger.

What is not yet known, and how to find out

  • Income each party would lose under each cap level (cost)Next step: Calculate from the Electoral Commission donation-level export with aggregation rules.Scope: All registered parties; caps at several levels · Data or quotes needed: Donation-level data by donor; aggregation and union-payment rules · Who can estimate it: Electoral Commission (or UK Facts for an illustrative calculation)
  • Cost of replacement public funding options (cost)Next step: HM Treasury and the Commission to cost matched-funding and per-vote options on the same data.Scope: Each replacement design · Data or quotes needed: Small-donation volumes; vote shares · Who can estimate it: HM Treasury with the Electoral Commission
  • Whether a cap changes influence or competition in the UK (effect)Next step: Not testable in advance; legislate for a review after two elections if a cap is adopted.Defensible route: legal or accountability reform

Sources last checked 4 October 2026 · Owner: Evidence editor (James Harris) · Next check: the first trigger: Electoral Commission quarterly donation and loan publications.

What it would take

The order things have to happen in, who pays, and the effects and appraisals on record.

The order things have to happen in

  1. First, the prerequisite

    Identify reporting gaps and the authority each change needs

    Owner: Electoral Commission with the government

    No date: the timing depends on the steps before it.

  2. Then, the decision

    Legislate on reporting, penalties and any cap

    Owner: Parliament

    No date: the timing depends on the steps before it.

  3. Then, delivery

    Build linked donations-and-loans systems; publish cap scenarios

    Owner: Electoral Commission; independent review

    No date: the timing depends on the steps before it.

  4. Finally, the measured outcome

    Shorter disclosure delay and fewer breaches, with concentration tracked separately

    Owner: Electoral Commission

    No date: the timing depends on the steps before it.

Who pays, and what is still missing

Cost, committed funding and the remaining gap for the same scope and years. A programme envelope is not an award to a project; a proposal is not committed money. None of these costs has been established yet, so no total is shown.

Cost and funding ledger

  • Electoral Commission systems and investigators

    A35 · administration · not costed

    Amount
    Not yet costed
    Who pays
    regulator
    Committed
    None identified
    Proposed, not committed
    —
    Gap
    Not established

  • Party compliance, including small volunteer-run parties

    A35 · private contribution · not costed

    Amount
    Not yet costed
    Who pays
    parties
    Committed
    None identified
    Proposed, not committed
    —
    Gap
    Not established

  • Replacement public funding for income lost under a cap

    A36 · recurring spending · not costed

    Amount
    Not yet costed
    Who pays
    central government
    Committed
    None identified
    Proposed, not committed
    —
    Gap
    Not established

“Not yet costed” means no defensible cost has been found — not that the action is free. Lifetime benefits, benefit-cost ratios and forecast savings are never shown here as money available to spend.

What the evidence says each action changes

No effect has been established for these actions yet: direction plausible; size not established.

How we would know

Days from accepting a donation to publication; Share of private donations going to the four largest recipients; Public funds as a share of reported party receipts.

The outcome measures to watch. A baseline is where we start, not a target; where there is no official target we say so.

Measured results

What each option would be judged on, and the latest value of the measures already on this page. A measure moving is not proof that an option caused it.

Where the ideas come from

Research, counter-evidence and methods (4 sources; 2 claims held back)

Counter-evidence and criticism

  • Make the political-money trail timely and enforceable: Faster reporting adds burden for small volunteer-run parties, and disclosure alone does not show that money bought influence. (Transparency International UK)
  • Cost donation limits together with replacement party finance: Caps can entrench incumbents, push money to loans or third parties, and public funding means taxpayers fund parties they oppose. (Transparency International UK)

Claims held back

  • Whether the Representation of the People Bill changes reporting frequency or the maximum fine — The parliamentary bill page could not be accessed for this review. Needed: Check the bill text as amended.
  • A particular donation-cap level (for example £10,000 a year) — Transparency International UK’s own recommendation names no level; £10,000 comes from older sources it cites. Needed: A current, costed proposal.

“Full text checked” means we read the report itself; “relevant passages” means the sections behind each figure; “summary or abstract only” means we could not read the full study, so no number from it is published here without another source.

Other options compared — not on the shortlist (1)

Other options compared

Options from earlier work on this page that are not on the shortlist. They remain valid choices; their evidence is shown as before.

  • preventionStatus: proposed

    Know-your-donor and company-donation rules

    Aims to:
    Fewer donations whose true source cannot be traced, including through companies without UK revenue and unincorporated associations.
    How:
    Require parties to risk-assess donations over £11,180 before accepting them; limit company donations to companies passing a UK significant-control test with sufficient remaining profits; extend donor rules to unincorporated associations’ own funders.
    Who decides:
    UK Government (bill); Parliament; Electoral Commission (guidance and enforcement); parties (checks).
    Main constraint:
    Checks are only as good as the records behind them; ownership chains outside the UK remain hard to trace.
    Evidence:
    Not evaluated — a mechanism to test, not an evidenced fix
    See the trade-offs and evidence
    What the evidence shows
    These measures are in the Representation of the People Bill and match long-standing Electoral Commission and Committee on Standards in Public Life recommendations. They target gaps the register itself shows (chapter 3); there is no evaluation yet of their effect.
    Policy status
    In the Representation of the People Bill, at committee stage in the House of Lords on 3 October 2026; not law.
    Resources
    Party due-diligence capacity; Commission enforcement.
    Consent and decisions needed
    Passage of the Bill, which can be amended at any stage.
    Time
    From Royal Assent and commencement; effects visible in the following year’s register.
    Cost and yield
    No official costing on this page.
    Trade-offs and who pays
    Reduces untraceable money; adds checks that may deter small legitimate donors.
    How we would know it worked
    Leading indicator: Number of donations returned as impermissible or unverifiable. Outcome: Share of company donations from companies with UK revenue. It would not be working if: Untraceable money shifts to other routes (for example, unincorporated associations or third-party campaigners).
The options side by side
OptionResourcesTimeEvidenceOutcome to watch
Know-your-donor and company-donation rulesParty due-diligence capacity; Commission enforcement.From Royal Assent and commencement; effects visible in the following year’s register.not evaluatedShare of company donations from companies with UK revenue.

Plan reviewed 2026-10-04. How we judge evidence.

How this connects

Sources and methods (16)

Method notes

  • Amounts are integer pence from the register export, formatted at the edge. “Reported value” is what parties reported; the Commission headlines the value accepted, which is slightly lower.
  • Donor matching is deliberately conservative: records merge only on an identical Companies House number, or an identical normalised name with the same Commission donor type. Wrongly merging two people would attribute one person’s giving to another; wrongly splitting one donor only understates a total.
  • Public funds are identified from the Commission’s donor-status and donation-type fields and are excluded from all donor rankings and concentration measures.
  • Each donation is counted once. During a general election parties also file weekly pre-poll reports, and the same donations are reported again in the quarterly returns; the export still carries 692 pre-poll rows (£52.8m) that the Commission’s own de-duplication filter does not catch, and they are removed.
  • Concentration shares are shown only for parties with at least £1m of private donations in the year, because shares of very small totals are unstable.
  • No donor is profiled on this page. Naming in the case chain (chapter 4) is limited to what official findings themselves state.