Growth & productivity · UK and G7 · investment 2024
Britain invests the smallest share of GDP in the G7.
UK investment was 18.7% of GDP in 2024, compared with 21.8% for the other G7 economies’ median. It has been bottom or second-bottom since 1992; delivery also depends on skills, power and planning.
Priority: Raise productive investment and productivity through appraised, complementary reforms. What would change it →
Evidence last reviewed 3 October 2026
Overview
The short version
Three key measures
How much of its income does the UK invest?
18.7% of GDP
Whole-economy investment (business, government and housing) as a share of GDP in 2024, not a cash total. The other G7 economies’ median was 21.8%: Germany 20.5%, United States 21.3%, Italy 21.5%, France 22.1%, Canada 22.9%, Japan 27.8%. The UK was the lowest of the seven in 23 of the 33 years from 1992 and second-lowest in the rest.
Investment over the long run →UK and G7 · 2024
Source: How much of its income does the UK invest?
Official estimate · World Bank, World Development Indicators: Gross fixed capital formation (% of GDP), NE.GDI.FTOT.ZS
What does electricity cost a medium-sized industrial user?
25.1p/kWh
UK, 2025 H2, including levies but not VAT, for users of 2,000–19,999 MWh a year. Germany 16.7p and France 10.6p in the same band and period. Very large users and household tariffs are different measures.
Power, grid and industrial costs →UK, Germany, France · 2025 H2
Source: What does electricity cost a medium-sized industrial user?
Official statistic · DESNZ, International non-domestic energy prices, QEP Table 5.4.2 (Medium band, incl. taxes excl. VAT)
How many homes did England add last year?
208,600homes
Net additions to the housing stock in 2024–25, against the roughly 300,000 a year implied by the government’s 1.5 million homes aim. Homes, grid links and roads all depend on the same planning and construction capacity.
Housing and infrastructure delivery →England · 2024–25
Source: How many homes did England add last year?
Official statistic · MHCLG, Housing supply: net additional dwellings, England, Live Table 120
Who feels this most?
Weak productivity is not spread evenly. Output per hour is above the UK average only in London and South East; in 10 of the 12 nations and regions it is below, by up to 15%. Over time, output per hour is what allows pay to rise — see what happened to pay and productivity.
The evidence
From weak investment to the capacity to grow
How does UK investment compare with its peers?
The UK has invested a smaller share of its income than the typical G7 economy every year since 1991
Gross fixed capital formation (business, government and dwellings) as a percentage of GDP, current prices: the UK and the median of the other six G7 economies, 1990–2024.
1996–2026 displayed window · observations only. Shading marks years outside the displayed record.
United Kingdom; United States, Germany, France, Italy, Japan, Canada · 1990 to 2024 (years in which all seven countries have data) · Official estimates compiled by the World Bank from national accounts; recent years are revised
Sources, definitions and data — The UK has invested a smaller share of its income than the typical G7 economy every year since 1991
- Geography:
- United Kingdom; United States, Germany, France, Italy, Japan, Canada — Whole economy
- Measure:
- % of GDP
- Period:
- 1990 to 2024 (years in which all seven countries have data)
- Status:
- Official estimates compiled by the World Bank from national accounts; recent years are revised
- Calculation:
- One international source and definition for every country. The grey line is the median of the six other G7 countries in each year — a UK Facts calculation; every country is listed in the data table.
- Compare with:
- Median of the other six G7 economies
- Not included / breaks:
- Investment is an input, not an outcome: this chart does not estimate how much growth the gap has cost. Japan’s high ratio partly reflects its economic structure. Intangible investment (software, R&D, brands) is only partly captured in GFCF.
Source: World Bank, World Development Indicators: Gross fixed capital formation (% of GDP), NE.GDI.FTOT.ZS (released WDI update, 13 July 2026). Chart GROW-01.
View the data as a table
| Year | United Kingdom | United States | Germany | France | Italy | Japan | Canada | Median of other six |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1990 | 24.0 | 21.3 | 24.4 | 23.4 | 22.9 | 36.7 | 21.7 | 23.1 |
| 1991 | 21.1 | 20.1 | 24.8 | 23.2 | 22.5 | 36.1 | 20.3 | 22.8 |
| 1992 | 19.7 | 19.8 | 25.0 | 21.9 | 21.9 | 34.6 | 19.4 | 21.9 |
| 1993 | 18.8 | 20.1 | 24.0 | 20.5 | 19.6 | 33.5 | 18.7 | 20.3 |
| 1994 | 19.3 | 20.4 | 24.0 | 20.1 | 19.3 | 32.3 | 19.4 | 20.3 |
| 1995 | 18.3 | 20.9 | 23.5 | 19.7 | 19.9 | 32.0 | 18.3 | 20.4 |
| 1996 | 18.9 | 21.3 | 22.9 | 19.5 | 19.7 | 33.1 | 18.8 | 20.5 |
| 1997 | 17.5 | 21.6 | 22.6 | 19.0 | 19.6 | 32.1 | 20.3 | 20.9 |
| 1998 | 18.0 | 22.3 | 22.7 | 19.3 | 20.0 | 30.4 | 20.6 | 21.4 |
| 1999 | 17.9 | 22.8 | 22.8 | 20.2 | 20.4 | 30.0 | 20.2 | 21.6 |
| 2000 | 18.2 | 23.1 | 22.9 | 20.9 | 21.2 | 29.7 | 19.6 | 22.1 |
| 2001 | 18.1 | 22.5 | 21.5 | 20.9 | 21.2 | 29.0 | 20.2 | 21.4 |
| 2002 | 18.1 | 21.5 | 19.9 | 20.3 | 21.8 | 27.6 | 20.0 | 20.9 |
| 2003 | 17.9 | 21.6 | 19.3 | 20.5 | 21.3 | 26.8 | 20.0 | 20.9 |
| 2004 | 17.8 | 22.1 | 18.8 | 20.8 | 21.4 | 26.4 | 20.9 | 21.1 |
| 2005 | 18.1 | 22.9 | 18.8 | 21.3 | 21.7 | 26.9 | 21.8 | 21.8 |
| 2006 | 18.4 | 23.0 | 19.5 | 21.9 | 21.9 | 27.1 | 22.9 | 22.4 |
| 2007 | 18.8 | 22.3 | 19.7 | 22.6 | 22.0 | 26.5 | 23.3 | 22.5 |
| 2008 | 18.4 | 21.2 | 20.0 | 22.9 | 21.6 | 26.4 | 23.5 | 22.2 |
| 2009 | 17.0 | 18.8 | 18.8 | 21.4 | 20.3 | 24.7 | 22.3 | 20.9 |
| 2010 | 16.6 | 18.3 | 19.2 | 21.5 | 20.2 | 23.6 | 23.5 | 20.9 |
| 2011 | 16.2 | 18.7 | 20.0 | 21.7 | 19.9 | 24.3 | 23.5 | 20.9 |
| 2012 | 16.3 | 19.5 | 20.0 | 21.7 | 18.5 | 24.8 | 24.5 | 20.8 |
| 2013 | 16.6 | 19.8 | 19.6 | 21.3 | 17.3 | 25.5 | 24.2 | 20.5 |
| 2014 | 17.2 | 20.4 | 19.8 | 21.0 | 16.8 | 26.4 | 24.4 | 20.7 |
| 2015 | 17.9 | 20.6 | 19.7 | 20.6 | 17.1 | 26.4 | 23.9 | 20.6 |
| 2016 | 18.6 | 20.7 | 20.0 | 20.9 | 17.3 | 26.1 | 22.8 | 20.8 |
| 2017 | 19.0 | 21.0 | 20.1 | 21.4 | 17.6 | 26.4 | 22.7 | 21.2 |
| 2018 | 18.7 | 21.3 | 20.8 | 21.9 | 18.0 | 26.7 | 22.7 | 21.6 |
| 2019 | 18.8 | 21.3 | 21.2 | 22.4 | 18.1 | 27.2 | 22.6 | 21.9 |
| 2020 | 18.2 | 21.6 | 21.3 | 22.4 | 18.2 | 27.1 | 23.2 | 22.0 |
| 2021 | 18.5 | 21.3 | 21.2 | 23.5 | 20.8 | 27.1 | 23.8 | 22.4 |
| 2022 | 19.0 | 21.3 | 21.6 | 23.5 | 21.8 | 27.8 | 23.1 | 22.4 |
| 2023 | 18.9 | 21.4 | 21.2 | 22.8 | 22.7 | 27.8 | 23.0 | 22.7 |
| 2024 | 18.7 | 21.3 | 20.5 | 22.1 | 21.5 | 27.8 | 22.9 | 21.8 |
Scroll the table sideways to see every column.
Investment over the long run
“Underinvests” here means one thing: the UK spends a smaller share of its national income on new buildings, machinery, networks, homes and software than comparable economies. It does not mean every project is underfunded, and a higher share is not automatically better — what matters is whether the investment becomes something productive in use.
The UK’s low share is not one bad year. It has been at or near the bottom of the G7 for three decades, and its own share has not been near the 1989 peak of 24.7% of GDP since. Business investment is the largest part. Public sector net investment roughly halved from 3.1% of GDP in 2009–10 to 1.5% in 2013–14; the OBR forecasts it between 2.5% and 2.8% a year to 2030–31.
Where does the UK sit among the G7 now?
In 2024 the UK invested the smallest share of GDP in the G7
Gross fixed capital formation as a percentage of GDP, 2024 (filled dot) and 2007 (open dot), G7 economies.
- Japan27.8%
- Canada22.9%
- France22.1%
- Italy21.5%
- United States21.3%
- Germany20.5%
- United Kingdom18.7%
G7 economies · 2007 and 2024 · Official estimates; latest year subject to revision
Sources, definitions and data — In 2024 the UK invested the smallest share of GDP in the G7
- Geography:
- G7 economies
- Measure:
- % of GDP
- Period:
- 2007 and 2024
- Status:
- Official estimates; latest year subject to revision
- Calculation:
- As published by the World Bank (NE.GDI.FTOT.ZS).
- Compare with:
- 2007, the last year before the financial crisis
Source: World Bank, World Development Indicators: Gross fixed capital formation (% of GDP), NE.GDI.FTOT.ZS (released WDI update, 13 July 2026). Chart GROW-03.
View the data as a table
| Country | 2024 | 2007 |
|---|---|---|
| Japan | 27.8 | 26.5 |
| Canada | 22.9 | 23.3 |
| France | 22.1 | 22.6 |
| Italy | 21.5 | 22.0 |
| United States | 21.3 | 22.3 |
| Germany | 20.5 | 19.7 |
| United Kingdom | 18.7 | 18.8 |
Has UK investment always been this low?
UK investment has not been near its 1989 peak since
UK gross fixed capital formation as a percentage of GDP, current prices, calendar-year average of four quarters, 1955–2025.
1996–2026 displayed window · observations only. Shading marks years outside the displayed record.
United Kingdom · 1955 to 2025 (complete years only) · Official statistics; revised back in time with each Blue Book
Sources, definitions and data — UK investment has not been near its 1989 peak since
- Geography:
- United Kingdom — Whole economy
- Measure:
- % of GDP
- Period:
- 1955 to 2025 (complete years only)
- Status:
- Official statistics; revised back in time with each Blue Book
- Calculation:
- UK Facts calculation: quarterly current-price GFCF divided by current-price GDP from the same ONS release, averaged over the four quarters of each year.
- Compare with:
- Decade averages: 1970s 21.3%, 1980s 20.6%, 2010s 17.8%
- Not included / breaks:
- ONS’s ratio differs slightly from the World Bank figure used for the G7 comparison because of vintage and annualisation. Use this chart for the UK’s own history only.
Source: ONS, Quarterly national accounts: gross fixed capital formation and GDP at current prices, NPQS (GFCF) ÷ YBHA (GDP). Chart GROW-04.
View the data as a table
| Year | % of GDP |
|---|---|
| 1955 | 14.4 |
| 1956 | 15.2 |
| 1957 | 16.0 |
| 1958 | 16.4 |
| 1959 | 16.1 |
| 1960 | 17.3 |
| 1961 | 18.3 |
| 1962 | 18.0 |
| 1963 | 18.2 |
| 1964 | 19.6 |
| 1965 | 19.6 |
| 1966 | 19.6 |
| 1967 | 20.1 |
| 1968 | 20.9 |
| 1969 | 20.5 |
| 1970 | 22.1 |
| 1971 | 22.1 |
| 1972 | 22.1 |
| 1973 | 23.0 |
| 1974 | 23.0 |
| 1975 | 20.7 |
| 1976 | 19.9 |
| 1977 | 19.5 |
| 1978 | 20.1 |
| 1979 | 21.0 |
| 1980 | 20.2 |
| 1981 | 18.9 |
| 1982 | 18.9 |
| 1983 | 18.9 |
| 1984 | 19.9 |
| 1985 | 20.2 |
| 1986 | 20.1 |
| 1987 | 21.4 |
| 1988 | 23.2 |
| 1989 | 24.7 |
| 1990 | 23.8 |
| 1991 | 21.4 |
| 1992 | 19.8 |
| 1993 | 19.0 |
| 1994 | 18.6 |
| 1995 | 18.4 |
| 1996 | 18.9 |
| 1997 | 17.6 |
| 1998 | 18.0 |
| 1999 | 18.0 |
| 2000 | 18.3 |
| 2001 | 18.2 |
| 2002 | 18.2 |
| 2003 | 17.9 |
| 2004 | 17.9 |
| 2005 | 18.2 |
| 2006 | 18.4 |
| 2007 | 18.9 |
| 2008 | 18.4 |
| 2009 | 17.0 |
| 2010 | 16.7 |
| 2011 | 16.3 |
| 2012 | 16.4 |
| 2013 | 16.8 |
| 2014 | 17.4 |
| 2015 | 18.2 |
| 2016 | 18.8 |
| 2017 | 19.2 |
| 2018 | 18.9 |
| 2019 | 19.0 |
| 2020 | 18.5 |
| 2021 | 18.8 |
| 2022 | 19.3 |
| 2023 | 19.0 |
| 2024 | 18.7 |
| 2025 | 18.8 |
Finance only works when projects can be delivered
More money does not by itself produce more output. A wind farm needs a grid connection, a factory needs power at a price it can pay, a housing estate needs permission and builders, and all of them need people to run them. When one of these binds, extra finance mostly raises prices or sits waiting. Each box below names what you can measure to see whether that step is the bottleneck.
GROW-02 · Which constraints bind together?
Money, a project, power, permission and people are needed at the same time
Equal-sized steps: a mechanism, not a model. The diagram does not say which constraint matters most, and the effects of easing each one overlap — they cannot be added up.
Mechanism diagram — arrows show how one step depends on another, not measured effects
Finance
Business, pension and public money willing to fund long-lived projects.
Observable: business investment 10.9% of GDP (2026 Q2); 17 pension providers’ 5%-in-UK private-markets pledge by 2030.
Capital markets and pension financeA viable project
Finance only flows to projects that can be built and earn a return; projects only start if finance is available. Each depends on the other.
Observable: planning decisions, final investment decisions, project pipelines.
Why doesn’t Britain invest in Britain?
Power and grid
A connection date and an affordable electricity price.
Observable: 283 GW retained in NESO’s reformed connections pipeline (8 December 2025); industrial price 25.1p/kWh.
Britain’s grid queuePlanning and infrastructure
Permission to build, and the roads, water and connections a site needs.
Observable: 208,600 net additional homes in England in 2024–25; decision times on major applications.
Housing and planningWorkforce and skills
People to build, run and maintain the asset.
Observable: apprenticeship starts and achievements (England), vacancies in construction and engineering.
Skills and apprenticeshipsManagement and adoption
Firms able to use new equipment and technology well.
Observable: business use of AI and other technologies (survey-based), R&D spending.
Innovation: diffusion
A completed productive asset
A factory, wind farm, home, network or software system actually in use.
Observable: completions, connections energised, capital stock per worker.
Investment over the long runOutput and pay
More output per hour worked, which is what allows real pay to rise over time.
Observable: output per hour worked; real pay.
What happened to pay and productivity?
Who feels this most?
Where is output per hour lowest?
Output per hour is below the UK average in 10 of 12 nations and regions
Gross value added per hour worked, current prices, index UK = 100, ITL1 regions and nations, 2023 (filled dot) and 1998 (open dot).
- London129
- South East108
- Scotland99
- North West95
- East of England95
- South West92
- Yorkshire and the Humber88
- Northern Ireland88
- North East85
- East Midlands85
- West Midlands85
- Wales85
UK nations and English regions (ITL1) · 1998 and 2023 · Official statistics; next release 5 November 2026
Sources, definitions and data — Output per hour is below the UK average in 10 of 12 nations and regions
- Geography:
- UK nations and English regions (ITL1) — Workplace-based output and hours
- Measure:
- Index, UK = 100
- Period:
- 1998 and 2023
- Status:
- Official statistics; next release 5 November 2026
- Calculation:
- As published by ONS (Table 2).
- Compare with:
- UK = 100 in each year
- Not included / breaks:
- Relative position only: a region can grow while its index falls if the UK grows faster. Current prices, so price differences between regions are not removed.
Source: ONS, Annual regional labour productivity, PRODBYREG Table 2 (output per hour, current prices, UK = 100) (released 19 June 2025). Chart GROW-05.
View the data as a table
| Area | 2023 | 1998 |
|---|---|---|
| London | 128.5 | 132.6 |
| South East | 107.7 | 110.8 |
| Scotland | 98.9 | 91.9 |
| North West | 94.8 | 92.4 |
| East of England | 94.7 | 99.0 |
| South West | 92.5 | 92.3 |
| Yorkshire and the Humber | 87.9 | 88.3 |
| Northern Ireland | 87.6 | 80.6 |
| North East | 85.4 | 88.4 |
| East Midlands | 85.3 | 88.6 |
| West Midlands | 85.2 | 88.4 |
| Wales | 84.9 | 87.0 |
The dot plot axis runs from 70 to 140 (index points, not a zero-based quantity) so the regional differences are legible.
Shareable visual summary
Visual summary
Image heldThe image is not offered for download or sharing until the reasons below are resolved. The chart here is drawn from today’s records.
Britain invests the smallest share of GDP in the G7.
UK investment was 18.7% of GDP in 2024, compared with 21.8% for the other G7 economies’ median. It has been bottom or second-bottom since 1992; delivery also depends on skills, power and planning. Whole-economy investment as a share of GDP (World Bank), not a cash total or business investment alone.
Investment (GFCF), % of GDP, 2024 (same 0–30% scale)
- United Kingdom18.7%
- Median of the other six G7 economies21.8%
World Bank annual series for all seven economies; the ONS quarterly UK ratio is a different vintage and is not used for this comparison.
Industrial electricity price, 2025 H2 (pence per kWh, same scale)
- UK25.1p/kWh
- Germany16.7p/kWh
- France10.6p/kWh
DESNZ international comparison; one consumption band and tax basis for all three countries.
Why the supplied image is held
- Prints 18.9%; the current record is 19.0% for 2026 Q2 (Business and public investment (GFCF) as a share of GDP, current prices)
- The image prints 18.9% investment for 2026 Q1; ONS published 19.0% for Q2 on 30 September 2026. The electricity prices also need their tax basis (including taxes, excluding VAT) stated.
Text and data version
Britain invests the smallest share of GDP in the G7. UK investment was 18.7% of GDP in 2024, compared with 21.8% for the other G7 economies’ median. It has been bottom or second-bottom since 1992; delivery also depends on skills, power and planning. Whole-economy investment as a share of GDP (World Bank), not a cash total or business investment alone.
| Measure | Value | Period | Geography | Type | Source |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| UK gross fixed capital formation, % of GDP (World Bank) | 18.7% | 2024 | United Kingdom | observed count | World Bank, World Development Indicators: Gross fixed capital formation |
| Median of the other six G7 economies, GFCF % of GDP (World Bank)Calculation: Median of the US, Germany, France, Italy, Japan and Canada | 21.8% | 2024 | G7 excluding the UK | derived calculation | World Bank, World Development Indicators: Gross fixed capital formation |
| Business and public investment (GFCF) as a share of GDP, current pricesCalculation: Gross Fixed Capital Formation (total, current prices) (£m, current prices) ÷ Nominal GDP (£m, current prices) × 100 | 19.0% | 2026 Q2 | United Kingdom | derived calculation | UK Facts |
| Industrial electricity price, UK | 25.1p/kWh | 2025 H2 | United Kingdom | observed count | Department for Energy Security and Net Zero |
| Industrial electricity price, France | 10.6p/kWh | 2025 H2 | France | observed count | Department for Energy Security and Net Zero |
| Industrial electricity price, Germany | 16.7p/kWh | 2025 H2 | Germany | observed count | Department for Energy Security and Net Zero |
All visual summaries, their source records and their publication state are listed on Shareable visuals.
More questions
Which investments give the biggest return?Official and independent estimates differ by type of investment, horizon and method — and none can simply be added together.A side-by-side of published multipliers and benefit-cost ratios, with their ranges.Read the chapter → Which investments give the biggest return? Which constraints bind together?Finance, power, permission and people are needed at the same time; a reform to one can be wasted if another binds.The dependency map on this page.Read the chapter → Which constraints bind together?
Evidence → choices → outcomes
What could improve it?
More productive assets built and in use, and rising output per hour across the UK.
These options link to their national assessment, including funding, delivery constraints and remaining uncertainties.
Assessed option · provisional
Turn investment promises into a deliverable pipeline
Approved-versus-aspirational status, milestones and completed assets in the infrastructure pipeline.
8/10 criteria scored
Coverage of the appraisal, not an impact score.
Delivery: Amber
Whole-life costs incomplete
Evidence and delivery constraints
Macro modelling and delivery audits support the rationale; they do not evaluate the incremental publication or coordination change.
Distinguish funded projects from aspirations; sequence resources; name owners and independent assurance; protect maintenance.
Assessed option · provisional
City-region growth powers: access to jobs, productivity, earnings and inclusion in defined places
7/10 criteria scored
Coverage of the appraisal, not an impact score.
Delivery: Red
Whole-life costs incomplete
Evidence and delivery constraints
Regional productivity gaps establish need, not the causal benefit of an unspecified devolution package.
Specify powers, stable budgets and accountability; integrate transport, housing and skills; assess local capacity.
Assessed option · provisional
Skills in the building trades
8/10 criteria scored
Coverage of the appraisal, not an impact score.
Delivery: Amber
Whole-life costs incomplete
Evidence and delivery constraints
Historical apprenticeship returns support consideration, not the marginal return from this shortage-trades expansion.
Identify trades and locations; secure paid placements, trainers, facilities and employer demand; measure completion and retention.
Assessed option · provisional
Turn housing permissions into completed homes
8/10 criteria scored
Coverage of the appraisal, not an impact score.
Delivery: Red
Whole-life costs incomplete
Evidence and delivery constraints
Housing constraints and modelled supply responses support the case; no evaluated national effect for this exact site-unblocking package.
Select sites; resolve land, planning, utilities, transport and viability; commission tenure mix and delivery agreements.
Assessed option · provisional
Connect the power Britain needs
8/10 criteria scored
Coverage of the appraisal, not an impact score.
Delivery: Red
Whole-life costs incomplete
Evidence and delivery constraints
Engineering need and queue evidence exist; the marginal effects of queue reform and industrial bill relief are different questions.
Separate queue management, network reinforcement and industrial levies; identify projects, kit, engineers and regulator decisions.
Assessed option · provisional
Turn research into products and adoption
7/10 criteria scored
Coverage of the appraisal, not an impact score.
Delivery: Amber
Whole-life costs incomplete
Evidence and delivery constraints
The artifact offers weak support for its spinout/procurement package. Smart Grants evaluation is relevant to a different instrument and cannot validate the whole bundle.
Separate spinout terms, procurement trials, grants and firm adoption; define market failure, beneficiaries and comparator.
Assessed option · provisional
Cut EU trade friction with a scoped food-and-farm deal
Conclude the SPS agreement.
8/10 criteria scored
Coverage of the appraisal, not an impact score.
Delivery: Red
Whole-life costs incomplete
Evidence and delivery constraints
Observed trade friction does not identify the effect of a future agreement; scope and baseline need updating.
Define covered goods, alignment, oversight and border changes; secure agreement and business transition.
Assessed option · provisional
Make childcare places work for working parents
Test additional capacity, affordability and parental employment.
8/10 criteria scored
Coverage of the appraisal, not an impact score.
Delivery: Amber
Whole-life costs incomplete
Evidence and delivery constraints
IFS finds employment effects depend on the hours offered. This is indirect evidence for filling today’s local supply gaps. A September 2026 process evaluation exists; it is not a causal national impact estimate.
Verify unmet demand, existing awards and provider viability; cost places, workforce, premises, operating subsidy and parental fees. Track access and sustained parental work. Proposed owners: councils, DfE and providers in England; separate devolved arrangements.
How we assessed these options
What would it take to improve this?
What would move the needle?
The outcome we want: More productive assets built and in use, and rising output per hour across the UK.
The main constraint: Funding commitments now exist, but the same construction workforce, grid connections and planning capacity are needed by housing, energy and transport at once — so the binding choice for HM Treasury, NISTA and departments is sequencing and delivery capacity, not another announcement.
Constraint type: workforce, infrastructure, coordination.
The options on the table
What is funded now, and the changes assessed against it — the current baseline and the alternatives, before the position today and the actions.
Provisional single-reviewer assessments from the 6 October 2026 review; not approved business cases, and not government policy.
Steady public investment through a published pipelineDelivery RAG: Amber
- Funded now
- Already government policy: the 10 Year Infrastructure Strategy (June 2025) commits at least £725bn over a decade and launched an online Infrastructure Pipeline in July 2025, updated at least every six months. UK Facts’ addition is to separate approved from aspirational projects on the page and to count completed, used assets rather than announcements.
- The change assessed
- Approved-versus-aspirational status, milestones and completed assets in the infrastructure pipeline.
Range if completed: 15.0–21.0 out of 30 (equal weights; not yet assessed: expected incremental benefit (Bn), incremental affordability (Co))
City-region growth powersDelivery RAG: Red
- Funded now
- Not yet stated in the record.
- The change assessed
- Not yet defined.
Range if completed: 8.0–17.0 out of 30 (equal weights; not yet assessed: increment beyond baseline (Ad), expected incremental benefit (Bn), incremental affordability (Co))
Transport access to jobsDelivery RAG: Amber
- Funded now
- Funded baseline: the Local Authority Bus Grant (£510.8m revenue in 2026–27 including a £30m uplift) and a £2 single-fare cap outside London for 2027 (£400m for England, announced 22 July 2026). Appraising one corridor for access to jobs, with a comparison, is a UK Facts proposal, not government policy.
- The change assessed
- Appraise one defined corridor/service intervention where journey reliability, hours or cost constrain access to jobs.
Range if completed: 14.0–20.0 out of 30 (equal weights; not yet assessed: expected incremental benefit (Bn), incremental affordability (Co))
Assessed with another page as home
These options also bear on this topic. The full assessment sits on the home page named under each.
Skills in the building tradesDelivery RAG: Amber
Home: Education.
- Funded now
- Baseline: a construction skills package of over £600m (March 2025), ten construction Technical Excellence Colleges, £287m for post-16 places including construction courses (July 2026), and free apprenticeship training for eligible under-25s from August 2026. Completion support targeted at shortage trades is a UK Facts proposal, not government policy.
- The change assessed
- Not yet defined.
Range if completed: 15.0–21.0 out of 30 (equal weights; not yet assessed: expected incremental benefit (Bn), incremental affordability (Co))
Homes built, not just permittedDelivery RAG: Red
Home: Housing.
- Funded now
- Not yet stated in the record.
- The change assessed
- Not yet defined.
Range if completed: 14.0–20.0 out of 30 (equal weights; not yet assessed: expected incremental benefit (Bn), incremental affordability (Co))
Grid connections and industrial powerDelivery RAG: Red
Home: Energy.
- Funded now
- Baseline: Ofgem approved the connections reform (Gate 2 firm queue) on 15 April 2025; NESO and the networks are issuing offers (Phase 1 deadline extended to 31 October 2026); Great British Grid was announced on 29 September 2026; industrial price relief (BICS) opens from April 2027. Enforcing the timetable and publishing time to connect as a regular measure is a UK Facts proposal, not government policy.
- The change assessed
- Not yet defined.
Range if completed: 13.0–19.0 out of 30 (equal weights; not yet assessed: expected incremental benefit (Bn), incremental affordability (Co))
Turn research into products and adoptionDelivery RAG: Amber
Home: Innovation.
- Funded now
- Not yet stated in the record.
- The change assessed
- Not yet defined.
Range if completed: 11.0–20.0 out of 30 (equal weights; not yet assessed: increment beyond baseline (Ad), expected incremental benefit (Bn), incremental affordability (Co))
Cut EU trade friction with a scoped food-and-farm dealDelivery RAG: Red
Home: Brexit.
- Funded now
- Agreed in principle in May 2025; at September 2026 the FSA reported negotiations “at an advanced stage” after the July 2026 summit was postponed, with implementation planning assuming summer 2027 and legislation expected through an anticipated European Partnership Bill. Not yet an operating agreement.
- The change assessed
- Conclude the SPS agreement.
Range if completed: 11.0–17.0 out of 30 (equal weights; not yet assessed: expected incremental benefit (Bn), incremental affordability (Co))
Childcare places that parents can actually useDelivery RAG: Amber
Home: Education.
- Funded now
- Funded baseline (England): 30 hours a week for 38 weeks for working parents of children from 9 months (since September 2025), the universal 15 hours for 3–4-year-olds, and 15 hours for disadvantaged 2-year-olds, with £9.5bn for early years in 2026–27; school-based nursery and capital grants add places. Commissioning extra places only where a local gap is shown is a UK Facts proposal, not government policy.
- The change assessed
- Commission specified additional places/hours in demonstrated local supply gaps beyond the funded baseline; adult-carer support remains a separate option.
Range if completed: 16.0–22.0 out of 30 (equal weights; not yet assessed: expected incremental benefit (Bn), incremental affordability (Co))
Employer-linked shortage training beyond constructionDelivery RAG: Amber
Home: Jobs & pay.
- Funded now
- Not yet stated in the record.
- The change assessed
- Appraise a defined adult or technical training cohort with employer placements in a verified non-construction shortage.
Range if completed: 15.0–21.0 out of 30 (equal weights; not yet assessed: expected incremental benefit (Bn), incremental affordability (Co))
Existing-firm management and technology adoptionDelivery RAG: Amber
Home: Innovation.
- Funded now
- Funded baseline: Help to Grow: Management (participants pay £750) continues; Made Smarter Adoption runs in all nine English regions (£16m in 2025–26); the Business Growth Service is the national brand. A comparison-based test of diagnostic and adoption support with a productivity outcome is a UK Facts proposal, not government policy.
- The change assessed
- Test targeted diagnostic advice and adoption support for existing firms, with a comparator and a defined productivity outcome.
Range if completed: 15.0–21.0 out of 30 (equal weights; not yet assessed: expected incremental benefit (Bn), incremental affordability (Co))
Alternatives already on record: 42 options listed under the points in the position today (30 without an action record), and 3 earlier options under other options compared. They have not been scored in the review.
The position today
Which quadrant a point sits in is our analytical judgement, not a statistical category. Each point says whether it is a measured fact, our synthesis or a risk.
What we can build on Strengths
The UK has real assets to build on: it is one of the world’s largest services exporters and has research-intensive universities.
Measured factConfidence: Moderate· 2023 (report data to 2023)· United Kingdom
Source: Resolution Foundation / LSE Centre for Economic Performance, Ending Stagnation: A New Economic Strategy for Britain (PDF p.30 (services exports); p.39 (universities and research))
What government has committed to
Policy: The Modern Industrial Strategy (June 2025) backs eight growth sectors, including professional and financial services and creative industries, with “a record £86bn” for R&D over the Spending Review.
- Who and when:
- Starmer government (to July 2026), 23 June 2025.
- Since 20 July 2026:
- Kept by the Burnham government. The Chancellor treats the eight sectors as current, and the Economic Secretary says the financial services strategy “remains fully committed” (10 September 2026). Source: HM Treasury, Chancellor John Healey’s Growth Speech 2026 (7 September 2026) (“one of our eight Industrial Strategy growth sectors as a government”).
- Source:
- Department for Business and Trade, Modern Industrial Strategy: year one (8 July 2026) (Printed p.25)
Checked 4 October 2026. A commitment is not delivery.
Options (3)
Keep a stable long-term framework for the sectors where the UK is strong
Predictable policy lets firms in services and research-intensive sectors invest against a known framework.
Who: HM Treasury; Department for Business, Innovation, Science and Trade · Evidence: Expert or audit recommendation · Status: External proposal
Source: Resolution Foundation / LSE Centre for Economic Performance, Ending Stagnation: A New Economic Strategy for Britain (PDF p.29)
Back local industrial strategies built on university and services clusters
Puts regional strengths behind local growth plans led by mayors.
Who: No 10 North; mayors · Evidence: Untested proposal · Status: Announced proposal
Source: Prime Minister’s Office, 10 Downing Street, PM statement to the House of Commons: 1 September 2026 (“We will back local industrial strategies”)
Give productive investment a stable delivery pipeline
Turns the strengths into investment by publishing which projects are approved and funded.
Who: NISTA; HM Treasury · Evidence: Modelled scenario · Status: Established
Source: HM Treasury and NISTA, UK Infrastructure: A 10 Year Strategy (Paragraphs 1.24, 1.28–1.32)
A ten-year infrastructure plan is in place: at least £725bn of government funding over the decade and an online pipeline of projects with their funding status, updated at least every six months.
Measured factConfidence: High· June 2025 onwards· United Kingdom
Source: HM Treasury and NISTA, UK Infrastructure: A 10 Year Strategy (Paragraphs 1.24 and 1.28–1.30)
Options assessed against this point: Steady public investment through a published pipeline (Amber delivery RAG)
What government has committed to
Funding: At least £725bn of government funding for infrastructure over the next decade, with an online Infrastructure Pipeline updated “initially at least every six months”.
- Who and when:
- Starmer government (to July 2026), 19 June 2025.
- Since 20 July 2026:
- Kept by the Burnham government. The Burnham government is implementing the strategy (10 September 2026) but has not restated the £725bn; the last pipeline update found is 9 March 2026. Source: National Infrastructure and Service Transformation Authority, New members appointed to NISTA expert advisory council (10 September 2026) (Chief Secretary’s quote).
- Source:
- HM Treasury and NISTA, UK Infrastructure: A 10 Year Strategy (Paragraphs 1.24 and 1.30)
Checked 4 October 2026. A commitment is not delivery.
Options (3)
ShortlistedGive productive investment a stable delivery pipeline
Separates approved from aspirational projects and counts completed assets, so the commitment can be checked.
Who: NISTA; HM Treasury · Evidence: Modelled scenario · Status: Established
Source: HM Treasury and NISTA, UK Infrastructure: A 10 Year Strategy (Paragraphs 1.28–1.32)
Hold the pipeline to its six-month update cycle
Date-stamped updates keep the funding status of each project current.
Who: NISTA · Evidence: Untested proposal · Status: Site-editorial action
Source: National Infrastructure and Service Transformation Authority, Infrastructure pipeline update signals future workforce needs (9 March 2026) (Press release text)
Let Parliament designate the most important projects, with a fixed legal challenge window
Fewer post-consent delays mean funded projects reach completion.
Who: HM Treasury; departments; Parliament · Evidence: Untested proposal · Status: Announced proposal
Source: HM Treasury, Chancellor takes axe to delays holding back growth (7 September 2026) (Main text)
Public net investment is forecast at 2.5–2.8% of GDP to 2030–31, well above its post-2010 low of 1.5% in 2013–14.
Measured factConfidence: Moderate· 2013–14 outturn; 2026–27 to 2030–31 forecast· United Kingdom
Source: Office for Budget Responsibility, Public finances databank (September 2026); outturn consistent with ONS/HM Treasury Public sector finances, 22 September 2026 (Aggregates (per cent of GDP): public sector net investment)
Options assessed against this point: Steady public investment through a published pipeline (Amber delivery RAG)
What government has committed to
Target: The fiscal rules let the government borrow for investment, and capital budgets are set for five years and extended every two. The fiscal rules require the current budget to be in surplus in 2029-30 and public sector net financial liabilities to be falling as a share of GDP by 2029-30.
- Who and when:
- Starmer government (to July 2026), 30 October 2024.
- Since 20 July 2026:
- Kept by the Burnham government. Chancellor John Healey: the Prime Minister and he are “in lockstep in our commitment to meeting the fiscal rules at the upcoming Budget” (28 October 2026), with a buffer for uncertainty. Source: HM Treasury, Chancellor John Healey’s Growth Speech 2026 (7 September 2026) (Paragraph beginning “The Prime Minister and I are in lockstep”).
- Source:
- HM Treasury, Charter for Budget Responsibility: Autumn 2025 (laid February 2026) (Paragraphs 3.6–3.7 (fiscal mandate and supplementary target))
Checked 4 October 2026. A commitment is not delivery.
Options (3)
ShortlistedGive productive investment a stable delivery pipeline
Keeps the higher investment envelope tied to projects that can be delivered.
Who: NISTA; HM Treasury · Evidence: Modelled scenario · Status: Established
Source: HM Treasury and NISTA, UK Infrastructure: A 10 Year Strategy (Paragraphs 1.21–1.23)
Keep multi-year capital budgets, with some programmes funded for up to ten years
Protects investment from being cut first when budgets tighten.
Who: HM Treasury · Evidence: Expert or audit recommendation · Status: Established
Source: HM Treasury and NISTA, UK Infrastructure: A 10 Year Strategy (Paragraphs 1.22–1.23)
Rebalance public investment per head across regions
Changes where investment goes rather than how much.
Who: HM Treasury; No 10 North · Evidence: Untested proposal · Status: Announced proposal
Source: Cabinet Office, Rewiring the State – Cabinet Statement (31 July 2026) (Section I(b))
The UK has the world’s second-largest offshore wind fleet, after China, and offshore wind generated 52.0 TWh of UK electricity in 2025, more than any other low-carbon source.
Measured factConfidence: Moderate· End of 2025 (ranking); 2025 (generation)· United Kingdom (ranking: global)
Source: Global Wind Energy Council, Global Offshore Wind Report 2026 (Report landing page (five largest markets by total capacity)); Department for Energy Security and Net Zero, Digest of UK Energy Statistics (DUKES) 2026: Chapter 5 — Electricity (Table 5.6 (generation by fuel))
What government has committed to
Target: The Clean Power 2030 Action Plan sets a pathway to a clean power system by 2030.
- Who and when:
- Starmer government (to July 2026), 13 December 2024.
- Since 20 July 2026:
- Not confirmed either way since the change of Prime Minister on 20 July 2026. Burnham-government releases refer to a “transition to clean power” and announced a Great British Grid on 29 September 2026, but none restates 2030 as a dated target; the Prime Minister said in September 2026 that he is determined to reach net zero by 2050 (press reports).
- Source:
- Department for Energy Security and Net Zero, Clean Power 2030 Action Plan (Publication summary)
Checked 4 October 2026. A commitment is not delivery.
Options (1)
Prioritise grid connections for built and consented offshore wind
Lets existing and new capacity be used rather than constrained; the page’s grid option covers the connection reforms.
Who: NESO, Ofgem and DESNZ · Evidence: Untested proposal · Status: External proposal
What is holding us back Weaknesses
Total investment was 18.7% of GDP in 2024, the lowest in the G7 (the other six had a median of 21.8%); the UK was lowest in 23 of the 33 years since 1992.
Measured factConfidence: High· 2024 (G7 comparison since 1992)· United Kingdom and G7
Source: World Bank, World Development Indicators: Gross fixed capital formation (% of GDP) (NE.GDI.FTOT.ZS)
Options assessed against this point: Steady public investment through a published pipeline (Amber delivery RAG)
What government has committed to
Policy: Cut the Green Book discount rate from 3.5% to 3% and add “economic potential analysis”; align public financial institutions (backed by £200bn) to government priorities; add four National Wealth Fund strategic partners.
- Who and when:
- Burnham government (from 20 July 2026), 7 September 2026.
- Since 20 July 2026:
- Made by the current government. No target for total investment exists; the Green Book text had not been revised by 4 October 2026.
- Source:
- HM Treasury, Chancellor John Healey’s Growth Speech 2026 (7 September 2026) (Section “Investment”)
Checked 4 October 2026. A commitment is not delivery.
Options (4)
ShortlistedGive productive investment a stable delivery pipeline
Predictable public projects crowd in private investment.
Who: NISTA; HM Treasury · Evidence: Modelled scenario · Status: Established
Source: Office for Budget Responsibility, Public investment and potential output (Discussion Paper No. 5) (Paragraph 4.7)
Apply a 3% discount rate with economic-potential appraisal
More long-lived projects pass appraisal, especially outside high-productivity areas.
Who: HM Treasury · Evidence: Untested proposal · Status: Announced proposal
Source: HM Treasury, Chancellor John Healey’s Growth Speech 2026 (7 September 2026) (Section “Investment”)
Faster consent for infrastructure and homes
Judicial-review reform for all major infrastructure and planning reform cut delays to private projects.
Who: MHCLG; HM Treasury; Ministry of Justice · Evidence: Modelled scenario · Status: Announced proposal
Source: HM Treasury, Chancellor takes axe to delays holding back growth (7 September 2026) (Main text)
Pension savings into UK productive assets
The voluntary Mansion House Accord directs more defined-contribution savings to private markets, including UK assets.
Who: Pension providers; HM Treasury · Evidence: Untested proposal · Status: Announced proposal
Source: HM Treasury, Economic Secretary to the Treasury speech at UK Private Capital (10 September 2026) (Passage on the Accord)
The government reports flat on-site labour productivity in construction and a significant construction workforce deficit.
Measured factConfidence: Moderate· 2025 (citing 2024 analysis)· United Kingdom
Source: HM Treasury and NISTA, UK Infrastructure: A 10 Year Strategy (Paragraph 1.28 (citing the National Infrastructure Commission, 2024))
What government has committed to
Funding: £625m in England between 2025-26 and 2028-29 to boost construction training, expected to deliver up to 60,000 workers.
- Who and when:
- Starmer government (to July 2026), 19 June 2025.
- Since 20 July 2026:
- Not confirmed either way since the change of Prime Minister on 20 July 2026. DfE published construction skills capacity fund awards on 28 July 2026, but their link to the £625m was not verified; no Burnham statement on the package was found.
- Source:
- HM Treasury and NISTA, UK Infrastructure: A 10 Year Strategy (Paragraph 1.61 (printed p.30))
Checked 4 October 2026. A commitment is not delivery.
Options (4)
ShortlistedSequence reforms that depend on the same people and infrastructure
Matches project timing to the construction workforce available, so shortages do not stall several programmes at once.
Who: NISTA; HM Treasury · Evidence: Untested proposal · Status: Site-editorial action
Source: HM Treasury and NISTA, UK Infrastructure: A 10 Year Strategy (Paragraph 1.28)
Target training with the pipeline’s workforce-demand model
Directs training places to the trades the pipeline will need.
Who: NISTA; Skills England · Evidence: Modelled scenario · Status: Established
Source: National Infrastructure and Service Transformation Authority, Infrastructure pipeline update signals future workforce needs (9 March 2026) (Workforce demand passage)
Pay small firms to take on young apprentices
A £2,000 payment lowers the cost of training new entrants.
Who: Department for Education; DWP · Evidence: Untested proposal · Status: Announced proposal
Source: Department for Education / DWP, £2,000 boost for small businesses who take on young apprentices (1 October 2026) (Press release text)
Use standard designs and longer contracts for roads and rail
Repeatable work raises on-site productivity.
Who: HM Treasury; Department for Transport · Evidence: Expert or audit recommendation · Status: External proposal
Source: Competition and Markets Authority, Public procurement in the national interest: reflections from the CMA (8 September 2026) (“Civil engineering” box)
Output per hour was below the UK average in 10 of 12 nations and regions in 2023: London produced about 29% more per hour than the UK average and Wales about 15% less.
Measured factConfidence: High· 2023· UK nations and English regions (ITL1)
Source: Office for National Statistics, Annual regional labour productivity (PRODBYREG) (Table 2 (output per hour, current prices, UK = 100))
Options assessed against this point: City-region growth powers (Red delivery RAG)
What government has committed to
Policy: Rewiring the State: mayors keep a share of business rates from April 2027 and a share of local income tax in place of central grants from April 2028; a white paper with the timetable is due in autumn 2026. It names over-centralisation as a drag on local economies and national productivity.
- Who and when:
- Burnham government (from 20 July 2026), 31 July 2026.
- Since 20 July 2026:
- Made by the current government.
- Source:
- Cabinet Office, Rewiring the State – Cabinet Statement (31 July 2026) (Section I(a)–(b); Section III)
Checked 4 October 2026. A commitment is not delivery.
Options (4)
Fiscal devolution: a share of income tax and business rates for mayors
Areas that grow their tax base keep more of the gain, and decisions on local growth move to local leaders.
Who: HM Treasury, MHCLG and mayoral strategic authorities · Evidence: Untested proposal · Status: Announced proposal
Source: Cabinet Office, Rewiring the State – Cabinet Statement (31 July 2026) (Section I(b); Section III)
Multi-year transport budgets for city regions
Lets regions plan connections that widen labour markets, without year-to-year stop-start.
Who: DfT and HM Treasury with mayors · Evidence: Untested proposal · Status: External proposal
Change appraisal so it does not systematically favour already-productive areas
Projects outside London and the South East score on the gains they could unlock, not only today’s values.
Who: HM Treasury (Green Book) · Evidence: Untested proposal · Status: External proposal
Publish the infrastructure pipeline’s approved projects and milestones, region by region
Makes visible whether committed capital reaches the regions furthest below average.
Who: NISTA with HM Treasury · Evidence: Modelled scenario · Status: Established
Source: HM Treasury and NISTA, UK Infrastructure: A 10 Year Strategy (Paragraphs 1.24 and 1.28–1.30)
Bus use in England was still below its pre-pandemic level in the year to March 2025 — 3.7 billion journeys, 90% of 2019–20 — and local bus fares rose 7% in the year against 3% for consumer prices. There is no current official measure of travel times to jobs: the journey time statistics stopped in 2025, with 2019 the last year.
Measured factConfidence: Moderate· Year ending March 2025· England
Source: Department for Transport, Annual bus statistics: year ending March 2025 (Main points; tables BUS01 and BUS04); Department for Transport, Journey time statistics: user engagement exercise, summary of responses (Decision)
Options assessed against this point: City-region growth powers (Red delivery RAG); Transport access to jobs (Amber delivery RAG)
What government has committed to
Funding: Single bus fares capped at £2 outside London from 1 January 2027 for the rest of the year (£400m for England), alongside more than £3bn for buses over three years and a £30m uplift to the Local Authority Bus Grant.
- Who and when:
- Burnham government (from 20 July 2026), 22 July 2026.
- Since 20 July 2026:
- Made by the current government.
Checked 7 October 2026. A commitment is not delivery.
Options (4)
Tests whether a defined service change raises employment before money is spread across the network.
Who: Mayoral combined authorities with DfT · Evidence: Observational analysis · Status: External proposal
Source: Urban Studies 59(2):301–322, Does better job accessibility help people gain employment? The role of public transport in Great Britain (Abstract); What Works Centre for Local Economic Growth, Evidence review: transport (Summary of findings)
Cap single fares at £2 outside London in 2027
Cheaper fares raise bus use; the 2023 cap raised patronage by about 5%.
Who: DfT with operators · Evidence: Experimental or quasi-experimental evaluation · Status: Funded programme
Source: Prime Minister’s Office, HM Treasury and Department for Transport, Cheaper travel for millions with a third off fares (Opening paragraphs); Department for Transport (Frontier Economics and SYSTRA), Evaluation of the first 10 months of the £2 bus fare cap (Section 5.2.3, Table 5)
Take buses under local public control (franchising)
Authorities set routes, timetables and fares across the network.
Who: Local transport and combined authorities · Evidence: Untested proposal · Status: Established
Source: legislation.gov.uk, Bus Services Act 2025 (c. 24) (Introductory text)
Fund local bus services through the Local Authority Bus Grant
Revenue support keeps unprofitable but needed routes running.
Who: DfT and local transport authorities · Evidence: Untested proposal · Status: Funded programme
Source: Department for Transport, Local Authority Bus Grant: revenue allocations 2026 to 2029 (Totals)
What could improve things Opportunities
Using pipeline data to sequence projects against the workforce, grid and planning capacity they share could turn committed funding into completed assets sooner.
Depends on: Pipeline projects are classified by approval and funding status, and prerequisites (consents, connections, skills) are scheduled before dependent projects.
Our synthesisConfidence: Moderate
Source: HM Treasury and NISTA, UK Infrastructure: A 10 Year Strategy (Annex paragraph 3); Office for Budget Responsibility, Public investment and potential output (Discussion Paper No. 5) (Paragraph 4.7); Resolution Foundation / LSE Centre for Economic Performance, Ending Stagnation: A New Economic Strategy for Britain (PDF p.30)
Options assessed against this point: Steady public investment through a published pipeline (Amber delivery RAG); Homes built, not just permitted (Red delivery RAG)
What government has committed to
Policy: The Infrastructure Pipeline will “enable strategic management of the delivery and sequencing of government projects” and inform skills demand.
- Who and when:
- Starmer government (to July 2026), 19 June 2025.
- Since 20 July 2026:
- Not confirmed either way since the change of Prime Minister on 20 July 2026. No Burnham-era statement on sequencing was found; the Rewiring the State statement adds more flexibility within mayors’ integrated settlements.
- Source:
- HM Treasury and NISTA, UK Infrastructure: A 10 Year Strategy (Annex paragraph 3 (printed p.99))
Checked 4 October 2026. A commitment is not delivery.
Options (4)
ShortlistedSequence reforms that depend on the same people and infrastructure
A published dependency map shows which projects compete for the same workforce, grid and consents.
Who: NISTA; HM Treasury · Evidence: Untested proposal · Status: Site-editorial action
Source: HM Treasury and NISTA, UK Infrastructure: A 10 Year Strategy (Paragraph 1.28; Annex paragraph 3)
ShortlistedGive productive investment a stable delivery pipeline
Pipeline data are the input the sequencing needs.
Who: NISTA · Evidence: Modelled scenario · Status: Established
Source: HM Treasury and NISTA, UK Infrastructure: A 10 Year Strategy (Paragraphs 1.28–1.32)
Give the Treasury strategic ownership of a long-term civil-engineering plan
Multi-year settlements and a transparent pipeline let suppliers plan capacity.
Who: HM Treasury · Evidence: Expert or audit recommendation · Status: External proposal
Source: Competition and Markets Authority, Public procurement in the national interest: reflections from the CMA (8 September 2026) (“Civil engineering” box)
Devolve transport budgets to city regions with multi-year settlements
Local sequencing of local schemes, as in the Bee Network model.
Who: HM Treasury; MHCLG; No 10 North · Evidence: Untested proposal · Status: Announced proposal
Source: Cabinet Office, Rewiring the State – Cabinet Statement (31 July 2026) (Section III (integrated settlements))
What could make it worse Threats
Construction capacity, financing costs and stop-start decisions can block delivery; the NAO finds spending decisions have been short-term and reactive.
Risk, not a certaintyConfidence: Moderate
Source: HM Treasury and NISTA, UK Infrastructure: A 10 Year Strategy (Paragraph 1.28); National Audit Office, Lessons learned: a planning and spending framework that enables long-term value for money (HC 234, Session 2024-25) (Summary)
Options assessed against this point: Homes built, not just permitted (Red delivery RAG)
What government has committed to
Policy: Five-year capital budgets extended every two years, with some programmes funded for up to ten years to avoid “cliff edge” budgets.
- Who and when:
- Starmer government (to July 2026), 19 June 2025.
- Since 20 July 2026:
- Not confirmed either way since the change of Prime Minister on 20 July 2026. Rewiring the State refers to “the upcoming Spending Review” without restating multi-year capital; the Burnham government added judicial-review reform and a fixed challenge window (7 September 2026).
- Source:
- HM Treasury and NISTA, UK Infrastructure: A 10 Year Strategy (Paragraphs 1.22–1.23 (printed p.18))
Checked 4 October 2026. A commitment is not delivery.
Options (4)
Give productive investment a stable delivery pipeline
A published, stable pipeline reduces stop-start decisions.
Who: NISTA; HM Treasury · Evidence: Modelled scenario · Status: Established
Source: HM Treasury and NISTA, UK Infrastructure: A 10 Year Strategy (Paragraphs 1.22–1.23)
Commit to a fixed multi-year capital envelope
Schemes are not cancelled mid-delivery when budgets tighten.
Who: HM Treasury · Evidence: Expert or audit recommendation · Status: Established
Source: HM Treasury and NISTA, UK Infrastructure: A 10 Year Strategy (Paragraphs 1.22–1.23)
A fixed legal challenge window and parliamentary designation
Limits litigation delay after consent.
Who: HM Treasury; Parliament · Evidence: Untested proposal · Status: Announced proposal
Source: HM Treasury, Chancellor takes axe to delays holding back growth (7 September 2026) (Main text)
Publish plans and a long-term value-for-money action plan
Addresses the short-term, reactive decisions the NAO describes.
Who: HM Treasury; Cabinet Office · Evidence: Expert or audit recommendation · Status: External proposal
Source: National Audit Office, Lessons learned: a planning and spending framework that enables long-term value for money (HC 234, Session 2024-25) (Summary paragraph 4; recommendations (a)–(b))
Water could limit growth: without action England faces a public water supply deficit of up to 5 billion litres a day by 2055, and in late September 2026 ten of the fourteen Environment Agency areas were in drought, with temporary use (hosepipe) bans affecting around 30 million people.
Risk, not a certaintyConfidence: Moderate· Projection to 2055; drought status September 2026· England
Source: Environment Agency, National Framework for Water Resources 2025: water for growth, nature and a resilient future (Executive summary); Environment Agency, Dry weather and drought in England: 18 to 24 September 2026 (Summary; Water company actions)
What government has committed to
Policy: The water white paper commits to nine new reservoirs, halving leakage by 2050 (30% by 2032), smart meters for half of homes and businesses by 2030, statutory resilience standards and a single regulator replacing Ofwat.
- Who and when:
- Starmer government (to July 2026), 20 January 2026.
- Since 20 July 2026:
- Not confirmed either way since the change of Prime Minister on 20 July 2026. No Burnham-government statement on the white paper was found. Drought management continues through weekly National Drought Group meetings (Environment Agency, September 2026).
- Source:
- Department for Environment, Food & Rural Affairs, A new vision for water (white paper) (Key figures, PDF p.11; Water Security chapter, PDF p.42)
Checked 4 October 2026. A commitment is not delivery.
Options (6)
Meter homes in water-stressed areas, with a social tariff (on Follow the money)
Metered charging cut household use by 18–22% in England’s first universal programme; a social tariff limits the cost to low-income households.
Who: Defra and the water regulator, with water companies · Evidence: Experimental or quasi-experimental evaluation · Status: External proposal · Works through Follow the money: Bill-funded metering and tariffs are how demand falls; the money is followed on that page.
Source: University of Southampton, Department of Economics (Discussion Paper 1801), The effects of the Universal Metering Programme on water consumption, welfare and equity (Abstract)
Build the planned reservoirs and transfers on time
Adds supply in the regions where deficits are projected to remain even after demand falls.
Who: Water companies, the regulator and Defra (planning) · Evidence: Modelled scenario · Status: Announced proposal
Source: Department for Environment, Food & Rural Affairs, A new vision for water (white paper) (Key figures, PDF p.11); Environment Agency, National Framework for Water Resources 2025: water for growth, nature and a resilient future (Executive summary)
Leakage targets backed by penalties
Water lost from pipes is water not available to customers; companies have committed to halve leakage by 2050.
Who: The water regulator · Evidence: Expert or audit recommendation · Status: Announced proposal
Source: Department for Environment, Food & Rural Affairs, A new vision for water (white paper) (Water Security chapter, PDF p.42)
Statutory resilience standards for water supply, as for other critical infrastructure
Sets a minimum level of service in drought that companies must plan and fund for.
Who: Defra and the new regulator · Evidence: Expert or audit recommendation · Status: Announced proposal
Source: Department for Environment, Food & Rural Affairs, A new vision for water (white paper) (Executive summary, PDF p.9)
A national water grid moving supply from wetter to drier regions
Transfers water to the South East, East and Midlands, where deficits concentrate.
Who: Regional water resources groups and Defra · Evidence: Untested proposal · Status: External proposal
Shift farm support towards drought resilience (on-farm storage, soil and drought-tolerant crops)
Reduces the harvest loss when summers are dry.
Who: Defra · Evidence: Untested proposal · Status: External proposal
Infrastructure and services are not being adapted to the climate already arriving: the Climate Change Committee judged the UK’s preparations inadequate and found no adaptation outcome, of the 46 it assessed, with evidence of good delivery.
Risk, not a certaintyConfidence: High· Assessment published April 2025· United Kingdom
Source: Climate Change Committee, Progress in adapting to climate change – 2025 report to Parliament (Executive summary, printed pp.10 and 16)
What government has committed to
Policy: The third National Adaptation Programme (NAP3) is the statutory adaptation plan; the Climate Change Committee found in April 2025 “little evidence of a change of course” under the new government.
- Who and when:
- Earlier UK government (before July 2024), 17 July 2023.
- Since 20 July 2026:
- Not confirmed either way since the change of Prime Minister on 20 July 2026. No Burnham-government adaptation statement was found; the next statutory programme is not yet published.
- Source:
- Department for Environment, Food & Rural Affairs, The Third National Adaptation Programme (NAP3) (Publication page (published 17 July 2023))
Checked 4 October 2026. A commitment is not delivery.
Options (2)
Fund adaptation at the scale the Climate Change Committee assesses as needed
Moves outcomes from “insufficient” to measurable delivery across infrastructure, health and homes.
Who: HM Treasury with departments · Evidence: Expert or audit recommendation · Status: External proposal
Source: Climate Change Committee, Progress in adapting to climate change – 2025 report to Parliament (Executive summary, printed p.10)
Allocate flood-defence money by the risk map and report homes better protected (on Housing)
The adaptation decision with an official risk map and a funded programme today.
Who: Defra and the Environment Agency · Evidence: Expert or audit recommendation · Status: Funded programme · Works through Housing: Flood risk to homes is the largest mapped adaptation risk; allocating by it is where adaptation delivery can be measured first.
Source: National Audit Office, Resilience to flooding (Summary, paragraph 16)
The actions worth examining
Our shortlist for this page. Research quality, policy status, cost and funding are judged separately; none of these is government policy unless its status says so.Our shortlist. None is government policy unless its status says so.
Action 1A03Policy status: established
Give productive investment a stable delivery pipeline
Publish which pipeline projects are approved and funded, with milestones and maintenance, so firms can invest in skills and capacity ahead of delivery — then judge success by assets completed and used.
The thread: issue, evidence, action
- Issue Weakness: Total investment was 18.7% of GDP in 2024, the lowest in the G7 (the other six had a median of 21.8%); the UK was lowest in 23 of the 33 years since 1992. Also: opportunity, strength, strength
- Evidence Total investment (gross fixed capital formation); Business investment
- Action A03, this action
Assessment (draft, 6 October review)
This action: Steady public investment through a published pipeline
Delivery RAG: AmberGate: pending
Range if completed: 15.0–21.0 out of 30 (equal weights; not yet assessed: expected incremental benefit (Bn), incremental affordability (Co))
National plan: Growth and prosperity list
- Who decides:
- HM Treasury and NISTA, with spending departments, devolved governments and local delivery bodies (UK)
- Evidence:
- Modelled scenario. The OBR has modelled what extra public investment does to potential output in general; no study measures the effect of a published pipeline itself.
- Expected effect:
- Direction plausible; size not established.
- Cost and funding
£725bn in total, “Over the next decade” from June 2025; Spending Review 2025 totals to 2029–30, then grown with forecast inflation (HM Treasury footnote 12). Exact fiscal years are not stated for the headline., cash (nominal) prices; 1 further cost line, some not yet costed
Funding: Programme funding exists; project allocation unconfirmed
Why it is shortlisted here: Investment is the page’s central weakness; the pipeline exists, so the test is approved projects completed and used.
What it takes
The problem
UK investment has been low and erratic, so builders, suppliers and investors cannot plan the people and capacity that projects need.
Who is affected, and where
Users of transport, energy, water, digital and public-service infrastructure across the UK; construction firms and their workforce. Territory: UK. The Infrastructure Pipeline covers UK government projects plus regulated sectors and mayoral authorities; devolved governments run their own capital programmes, not assessed here.
Policy status
Already in place. Already government policy: the 10 Year Infrastructure Strategy (June 2025) commits at least £725bn over a decade and launched an online Infrastructure Pipeline in July 2025, updated at least every six months. UK Facts’ addition is to separate approved from aspirational projects on the page and to count completed, used assets rather than announcements.
The evidence
- What the research found:
- A permanent rise in public investment of 1% of GDP raises potential output by about 0.4% after five years and 2.4% after 50 years, if projects are as productive as average public capital (OBR). The Resolution Foundation/LSE inquiry found UK firms invested about 20% less than US, French and German firms since 2005.
- Evaluated on:
- UK public capital stock (OBR model); United Kingdom, 5- and 50-year horizons
- Transfer to this case:
- The OBR result is for investment of average productivity; a specific project can do better or worse.
- Our recommendation (separate from the research):
- Report each pipeline project as approved, funded, in delivery or complete, with whole-life and maintenance costs; never present a growth multiplier as a substitute for project costing.
- Strongest counter-evidence:
- Higher capital spending can be wasted where projects are poorly appraised or managed; the NAO finds spending decisions have been short-term, and the Green Book warns of optimism bias. Borrowing to invest raises debt interest, and construction labour is already short.
Effects on record
- Potential output: Direction plausible; size not established. modelled, limited confidence; United Kingdom. The OBR’s +0.4% of potential output after five years (2.4% after 50) is for a permanent rise of 1% of GDP in investment of average productivity — not an estimate for a pipeline, and not cash for the Exchequer.
Cost and funding
Cost completeness: Published programme envelope; project costs still needed. Funding: Programme funding exists; project allocation unconfirmed.
- 10 Year Infrastructure Strategy: government infrastructure funding (programme envelope) (capital; paid by central government, councils): £725bn in total, “Over the next decade” from June 2025; Spending Review 2025 totals to 2029–30, then grown with forecast inflation (HM Treasury footnote 12). Exact fiscal years are not stated for the headline., cash (nominal) prices. “At least £725bn”, an internal HM Treasury calculation. It includes housing and energy capital, so it overlaps the Social and Affordable Homes Programme (C-SAHP-ENVELOPE, A02) and Warm Homes funding (A18): never add it to them. Not an award to any project.
- Project capital, maintenance, financing and workforce costs for pipeline projects (capital; paid by central government, councils, bill-payers, private investors): Not yet costed. Costs exist project by project (the Pipeline lists projects of £25m+ economic and £15m+ social). A national growth multiplier is not a substitute for project costing.
- Ten-year infrastructure funding commitment (at least £725bn): £725bn — not committed (programme envelope, not a project award). Covers housing and energy capital too; the same money cannot be claimed again for A02 or A18. Project awards come through departmental business cases.
- Who pays:
- Central and local government capital budgets (taxpayers, and future taxpayers through borrowing); bill-payers for regulated water and energy projects; private investors for privately financed schemes.
- Financing proposed:
- Departmental capital settlements to 2029–30 from Spending Review 2025; beyond that, the Strategy’s commitment to grow capital with inflation. Additional projects need an explicit tax, reprioritisation or borrowing decision.
- Gap remaining:
- Unknown at project level: the £725bn is a ten-year cross-sector envelope, and project costs, maintenance and financing are published only project by project.
What delivery needs
- Skills:
- Construction and engineering workforce, which the Strategy says is in significant deficit.
- Operational capacity:
- Appraisal and commercial capacity in departments and NISTA.
- Infrastructure:
- Grid connections, planning consents and supply chains for each project.
- Permissions:
- Development consent and local planning decisions.
- Law:
- Existing powers; the Planning and Infrastructure Act 2025 changes consenting.
- Public consent:
- Local acceptance of major projects; trade-offs with other spending.
First step and stages
First step: For each sector, publish which pipeline projects have approved, funded business cases and which are aspirations, with a milestone for each. (owner: NISTA with HM Treasury and departments)
- Classify pipeline projects by approval and funding status — NISTA (proposed stage, not an official timetable)
- Appraise and sequence before procurement — Departments, HM Treasury (proposed stage, not an official timetable)
- Report milestones, completion and use for each project — NISTA and delivery bodies (proposed stage, not an official timetable)
Depends on: A01: consents that become starts; A45: shared construction workforce and grid capacity; Spending Review capital settlements
Trade-offs
- Who gains and who loses:
- Benefits depend on where projects are built and who uses them; costs fall on taxpayers, bill-payers and communities near construction.
- What else the money or effort could do:
- Capital and construction workers used on one project are not available for others or for current services.
- Strongest counterargument:
- Stable plans can lock in poor projects; flexibility to cancel weak schemes also has value.
- Risks:
- Cost escalation, labour shortages, interest costs and counting announcements as delivery.
How we would judge it
- Baseline:
- Gross fixed capital formation as a share of GDP (UK 18.7% in 2024, lowest in the G7).
- Leading indicator:
- Share of pipeline projects with a funded business case and published milestones.
- Outcome:
- Assets completed and in use; reliability; productivity, with an explicit attribution limit.
- Continue, adapt or stop:
- Continue where projects reach milestones near their published cost; review the pipeline when completions fall persistently behind plan.
Earlier option on this page
This card replaces the option “Higher and steadier public investment” (operating: The OBR’s latest forecast has public sector net investment at 2.6% of GDP in 2026–27, 2.5% by 2030–31.). Its evidence: The OBR estimates that a sustained rise in public investment of 1% of GDP raises potential output by about 0.4% after five years and 2.4% after 50 years, if the projects are as productive as the average. The IMF found that in advanced economies a rise of 1 percentage point of GDP raised output by about 0.4% in the same year and 1.5% after four years — but much less where investment was managed inefficiently, and not significantly at all when it was budget-neutral. Both are averages: individual projects range from poor to very high value for money. OBR, Discussion Paper No.5: Public investment and potential output (August 2024) · IMF, World Economic Outlook, October 2014, Chapter 3: Is it time for an infrastructure push? · OBR, Public finances databank: public sector net investment
Sources
- HM Treasury and NISTA, UK Infrastructure: A 10 Year Strategy, Paragraphs 1.24, 1.28–1.32; Annex (2025-06-19; relevant passages checked)
- Office for Budget Responsibility, Public investment and potential output (Discussion Paper No. 5), Paragraph 4.7 (2024-08; relevant passages checked)
- Resolution Foundation / LSE Centre for Economic Performance, Ending Stagnation: A New Economic Strategy for Britain, PDF p.29 (2023-12-04; relevant passages checked)
- National Audit Office, Lessons learned: a planning and spending framework that enables long-term value for money (HC 234, Session 2024-25), Summary paragraph 11 (2024-10-27; relevant passages checked)
- HM Treasury, The Green Book (2026), Chapters 6–9 (2026-02-05; relevant passages checked)
Source published June 2025 (10 Year Strategy); August 2024 (OBR); December 2023 (Resolution Foundation/LSE); evidence reviewed 2026-10-04. Reconsider if: The next Infrastructure Pipeline update; A Spending Review resets capital budgets; An evaluation of pipeline effects on construction capacity.
Also on: Economy — one shared record, so its cost is counted once.
Action 2A67Policy status: external proposal
Appraise one bus corridor where cost, hours or reliability stop people reaching jobs
A defined change to one corridor or service (hours, frequency, reliability or fares) where journeys to work are the constraint makes jobs reachable for people without a car, tested against a comparison corridor.
The thread: issue, evidence, action
- Issue Weakness: Bus use in England was still below its pre-pandemic level in the year to March 2025 — 3.7 billion journeys, 90% of 2019–20 — and local bus fares rose 7% in the year against 3% for consumer prices. There is no current official measure of travel times to jobs: the journey time statistics stopped in 2025, with 2019 the last year.
- Evidence Local bus passenger journeys
- Action A67, this action
Assessment (draft, 6 October review)
This action: Transport access to jobs
Delivery RAG: AmberGate: pending
Range if completed: 14.0–20.0 out of 30 (equal weights; not yet assessed: expected incremental benefit (Bn), incremental affordability (Co))
National plan: Related option, assessed separately
- Who decides:
- Local transport authorities and mayoral combined authorities (franchising or enhanced partnerships under the Bus Services Act 2025), with the Department for Transport (England)
- Evidence:
- Observational analysis. British studies associate better public transport access with higher employment, one using instrumental variables; the fare-cap evaluation measured patronage, not jobs; reviews of road and rail investment find mixed employment effects and possible displacement.
- Expected effect:
- Direction plausible; size not established.
- Cost and funding
Not yet costed
Funding: Not yet costed / funding not identified
Why it is shortlisted here: The transport-access option (related to city-region growth, NG2): bus use and access to jobs matter most to people without a car, but no UK study measures the employment effect of a bus change; appraising one corridor against a comparison is the bounded step. City-region growth powers themselves (A57) are not yet a bounded option.
What it takes
The problem
Bus use in England has not recovered to its pre-pandemic level and fares have risen faster than prices; areas with poorer public transport access to jobs have lower employment, but no UK study measures the employment effect of a bus change.
Who is affected, and where
Working-age residents without a car along one defined bus corridor in an English city region, where journey times or service hours limit access to employment centres. Territory: England. Buses are devolved in Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland; London runs its own franchised network. Not assessed outside England.
Policy status
Proposed by researchers or others, not government policy. Funded baseline: the Local Authority Bus Grant (£510.8m revenue in 2026–27 including a £30m uplift) and a £2 single-fare cap outside London for 2027 (£400m for England, announced 22 July 2026). Appraising one corridor for access to jobs, with a comparison, is a UK Facts proposal, not government policy.
The evidence
- What the research found:
- Better public transport access raised the probability of being employed, most for people with low incomes, without cars and young people; the £2 cap raised patronage by about 5% with a preliminary benefit-cost ratio of 0.71–0.9, and work trips responded less than leisure trips.
- Evaluated on:
- Working-age people in Great Britain (individual-level models); bus passengers in England outside London (fare cap); Great Britain; England 2023
- Transfer to this case:
- No UK quasi-experimental study measures employment after a bus change; effects may be displacement between areas.
- Our recommendation (separate from the research):
- Choose one corridor with poor access to an employment centre, change the service, and compare employment and journeys with a similar corridor before deciding whether to scale.
- Strongest counter-evidence:
- Most evaluated transport schemes show no or mixed employment effects, and gains may come at the expense of nearby areas.
Cost and funding
Cost completeness: Not yet costed. Funding: Not yet costed / funding not identified.
- Who pays:
- Local transport authorities from the Local Authority Bus Grant; the Department for Transport.
- Financing proposed:
- From an authority’s bus grant if it chooses; otherwise not identified.
- Gap remaining:
- Unknown: no corridor has been selected or costed, and there is no employment-based benefit-cost ratio for bus changes.
What delivery needs
- Skills:
- Transport appraisal and evaluation.
- Operational capacity:
- Operator vehicles and drivers.
- Infrastructure:
- Bus priority where reliability is the constraint.
- Permissions:
- Traffic orders for bus lanes.
- Law:
- None new.
- Public consent:
- Local support for priority measures.
First step and stages
First step: A mayoral combined authority selects a corridor using the Transport Connectivity Metric (employment component), defines the service change and a comparison corridor, and publishes the evaluation plan. (owner: Mayoral combined authority with DfT)
- Select corridor and comparison — Combined authority (proposed stage, not an official timetable)
- Change the service — Combined authority and operators (proposed stage, not an official timetable)
- Compare employment and journeys — Combined authority with DfT (proposed stage, not an official timetable)
Depends on: Data on access to jobs (Transport Connectivity Metric; journey time statistics were discontinued in March 2025)
Trade-offs
- Who gains and who loses:
- Aimed at people without a car, who are more likely to be on low incomes, young or disabled.
- What else the money or effort could do:
- Bus grant spent on one corridor is not available for network-wide fares or frequency.
- Strongest counterargument:
- Network-wide fare caps reach more people and need no corridor choice.
- Risks:
- Measuring patronage rather than employment; displacement of jobs between areas.
How we would judge it
- Baseline:
- Year ending March 2025: 3.7bn bus journeys in England (90% of 2019–20); local bus fares up 7% against CPI inflation of 3%.
- Leading indicator:
- Journeys on the corridor; reliability.
- Outcome:
- Employment of corridor residents against the comparison corridor.
- Continue, adapt or stop:
- Scale only if employment rises relative to the comparison without evidence of displacement.
Sources
- Urban Studies 59(2):301–322, Does better job accessibility help people gain employment? The role of public transport in Great Britain, Abstract (2022; relevant passages checked)
- Department for Transport (Frontier Economics and SYSTRA), Evaluation of the first 10 months of the £2 bus fare cap, Executive summary p.5; section 5.3.1 (2025-02-12; relevant passages checked)
- What Works Centre for Local Economic Growth, Evidence review: transport, Summary of findings (2015-07; relevant passages checked)
- What Works Centre for Local Economic Growth, Evidence review: transport, Summary of findings (no or mixed employment effects; displacement unresolved) (2015-07; relevant passages checked)
Source published 26 November 2025 (DfT bus statistics); 12 February 2025 (fare-cap evaluation); 2022 (Bastiaanssen et al.); evidence reviewed 2026-10-07. Reconsider if: Annual bus statistics, year ending March 2026; The devolution white paper and Budget roadmap.
Action 3A01Policy status: site-editorial action
Turn permissions into homes people can live in
Name the blocker, owner and infrastructure cost for each priority site, then fund and sequence the connections that let building start.
The thread: issue, evidence, action
- Issue Weakness (Housing): England added 208,600 homes, against about 300,000 a year implied by the government’s 1.5 million ambition. Also: threat, opportunityHow acting here reaches it: Consents that turn into starts are the step between permissions and the homes the growth plan depends on; the housing page measures the shortfall in net additions.
- Evidence Net additional homes
- Action A01, this action
Assessment (draft, 6 October review)
A new scope of this action (A01v2): Homes built, not just permitted
Delivery RAG: RedGate: pending
Range if completed: 14.0–20.0 out of 30 (equal weights; not yet assessed: expected incremental benefit (Bn), incremental affordability (Co))
National plan: Growth and prosperity list
- Who decides:
- MHCLG and local planning authorities, with utilities, transport bodies and developers (England)
- Evidence:
- Modelled scenario. The underlying reforms have an official modelled estimate; this site-by-site package has not been evaluated.
- Expected effect:
- Direction plausible; size not established.
- Cost and funding
Not yet costed
Funding: Not yet costed / funding not identified
Why it is shortlisted here: Homes and infrastructure need consents that turn into starts; permissions are an intermediate step, not delivery.
What it takes
The problem
Permissions and plans do not become occupied homes when sites are held up by missing infrastructure, viability, finance or builders.
Who is affected, and where
Households who need a home in high-demand areas of England. Territory: England. Planning is devolved: Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland run separate systems and would need their own decisions; not assessed here.
Policy status
UK Facts proposal. Builds on reforms already in place: the National Planning Policy Framework published on 17 August 2026, which replaced the December 2024 version, and the Planning and Infrastructure Act 2025 (Royal Assent 18 December 2025). The site-by-site blocker list is a UK Facts proposal, not government policy.
The evidence
- What the research found:
- The OBR judged that the revised planning framework would add about 170,000 net additional homes over 2025–26 to 2029–30. LSE’s qualitative research stresses certainty and meaningful participation; Centre for Cities proposes zoning instead but gives no estimate of its effect.
- Evaluated on:
- UK housing stock in the OBR forecast; qualitative research with planners and landowners; England, 2025–2030 forecast period
- Transfer to this case:
- The OBR estimate is for the reforms already enacted, not for any further package.
- Our recommendation (separate from the research):
- Publish the blocker, owner and cost for a small set of priority sites and count occupied homes, not permissions.
- Strongest counter-evidence:
- Centre for Cities argues incremental reform of a discretionary system cannot close the gap and proposes zoning; neither approach has a UK effect estimate.
Effects on record
- Net additional homes: Direction plausible; size not established. modelled, limited confidence; England. The OBR’s 170,000 extra homes by 2029–30 is its judgement of the 2024 planning reforms already in place, not of this site-by-site package, whose marginal effect has not been estimated.
Cost and funding
Cost completeness: Not yet costed. Funding: Not yet costed / funding not identified.
- Planning staff, site infrastructure and financing for priority sites (capital; paid by central government, councils, developers): Not yet costed. No defensible national price found. Planning capacity (recurring), utilities and transport connections (capital) and financing must be costed separately for each site.
- Who pays:
- Central government and councils for planning capacity and enabling infrastructure; developers through fees and contributions; utilities and their bill-payers for connections.
- Financing proposed:
- Planning fees, developer contributions and named infrastructure allocations — each to be checked for legal use and timing.
- Gap remaining:
- Unknown until priority sites are costed.
What delivery needs
- Skills:
- Planning officers and infrastructure specialists in councils.
- Operational capacity:
- Site-level data on blockers.
- Infrastructure:
- Water, power and transport connections.
- Permissions:
- Local plans and permissions.
- Law:
- Powers exist under current planning law.
- Public consent:
- Local consent for development; environmental trade-offs.
First step and stages
First step: Publish the actual blocker, owner and infrastructure cost for a small set of priority sites. (owner: MHCLG with local planning authorities)
- Select sites and diagnose blockers — MHCLG and councils (proposed stage, not an official timetable)
- Fund and sequence connections — Treasury, utilities, councils (proposed stage, not an official timetable)
- Build and occupy — Developers and housing associations (proposed stage, not an official timetable)
Depends on: Construction workforce; Utility connection capacity
Trade-offs
- Who gains and who loses:
- Gains for future residents and those who need affordable homes; costs for neighbouring residents (disruption, green space) and for whoever funds infrastructure.
- What else the money or effort could do:
- Infrastructure money and planning staff spent here are not available for other sites or services.
- Strongest counterargument:
- Faster permission alone may not make sites viable or speed building, which depends on demand, finance and builders.
- Risks:
- Local opposition, environmental harm, construction capacity limits and counting permissions as delivery.
How we would judge it
- Baseline:
- Net additional dwellings, England (MHCLG Live Table 120).
- Leading indicator:
- Time from application to start on site at priority sites.
- Outcome:
- Net additional and occupied homes, affordable tenure and rents relative to income.
- Continue, adapt or stop:
- Continue where priority sites start faster than comparable sites; stop funding sites whose blocker is not infrastructure.
Earlier option on this page
This card replaces the option “Faster consent for infrastructure and homes” (legislated: Planning and Infrastructure Act 2025 received Royal Assent on 18 December 2025. The OBR’s homes estimate is for the earlier December 2024 framework changes, not this Act.). Its evidence: The OBR estimated in March 2025 that the December 2024 changes to the National Planning Policy Framework would raise housebuilding by about 170,000 homes over five years — a conditional, modelled effect, not an observed one. That estimate predates the Planning and Infrastructure Act 2025 and does not cover it: there is no comparable official estimate for the Act or for infrastructure consenting, and faster decisions do not by themselves start construction. OBR, Economic and fiscal outlook, March 2025 (planning reforms) · OBR, The supply-side impact of planning reforms (14 August 2025) · Planning and Infrastructure Act 2025 (c. 34)
Sources
- Office for Budget Responsibility, Economic and fiscal outlook, March 2025, Paragraphs 1.10 and 3.37 (2025-03-26; relevant passages checked)
- London School of Economics, Planning with purpose: reforming the planning system to meet modern needs (2025-03-25; relevant passages checked)
- legislation.gov.uk, Planning and Infrastructure Act 2025 (c. 34) (2025-12-18 (Royal Assent); relevant passages checked)
- Centre for Cities, A zoning system for England, PDF pp.1–3 (2025-02; relevant passages checked)
Source published March 2025 (OBR); 2025 (LSE); February 2025 (Centre for Cities); evidence reviewed 2026-10-04. Reconsider if: The OBR publishes a new estimate of the planning reforms; Net additions move decisively away from the 2024–25 level; The government publishes site-level infrastructure data.
Also on: Housing, Economy — one shared record, so its cost is counted once.
Action 4A45Policy status: site-editorial action
Sequence reforms that depend on the same people and infrastructure
Use one dependency map to identify the critical path and competing claims on the same workforce, grid and funding, and sequence prerequisites before the projects that depend on them.
The thread: issue, evidence, action
- Issue Weakness: The government reports flat on-site labour productivity in construction and a significant construction workforce deficit. Also: threat, opportunity
- Evidence citb-construction-workers-needed; Net additional homes
- Action A45, this action
Assessment (draft, 6 October review)
Not assessed in the 6 October review; this action stays in the topic plan with its own evidence.
- Who decides:
- Cross-government delivery leadership (HM Treasury, NISTA, Cabinet Office) with local and devolved bodies (UK)
- Evidence:
- Untested proposal. Editorial synthesis supported by official statements of shared constraints; there is no estimate of what sequencing adds.
- Expected effect:
- Direction plausible; size not established.
- Cost and funding
Not yet costed
Funding: Not yet costed / funding not identified
Why it is shortlisted here: Housing, energy and transport compete for the same workers and connections; sequencing is the missing step.
What it takes
The problem
Housing, energy, transport and public-service programmes draw on the same construction workers, grid capacity and planning staff, so announcing them together does not mean they can be delivered together.
Who is affected, and where
Everyone affected by infrastructure, housing and energy programmes in the UK. Territory: UK. Delivery bodies differ across the four nations; a UK map needs devolved partners.
Policy status
UK Facts proposal. UK Facts synthesis. The 10 Year Infrastructure Strategy says pipeline data will inform skills demand and the sequencing of government projects; a published cross-domain dependency map is our proposal.
The evidence
- What the research found:
- The 10 Year Strategy reports flat on-site labour productivity and a significant construction workforce deficit, and says pipeline data should support sequencing and skills planning. The NAO finds spending decisions short-term and reactive.
- Evaluated on:
- UK infrastructure and housing programmes; United Kingdom, 2025–2035
- Our recommendation (separate from the research):
- Publish a dependency map naming which constraint each package addresses, and inherit each action’s costs once rather than creating a package total.
- Strongest counter-evidence:
- Coordination adds overhead and can relabel unrelated policies as a package; synergies can be overstated.
Cost and funding
Cost completeness: Not yet costed. Funding: Not yet costed / funding not identified.
- Cross-government coordination and shared-capacity planning (administration; paid by central government): Not yet costed. Component costs are inherited once through each action’s own cost IDs (A01, A03 and others); this line covers coordination only.
- Who pays:
- Central government (coordination staff); component costs stay with each action and are counted once.
- Financing proposed:
- None separate: aggregate only components that are funded on matched years; the package is partly funded while any dependency lacks cover.
- Gap remaining:
- Unknown: coordination capacity not costed; component gaps are shown on each action.
What delivery needs
- Skills:
- Delivery and workforce planners.
- Operational capacity:
- Shared data on workforce, grid and planning capacity.
- Infrastructure:
- None beyond data.
- Permissions:
- None.
- Law:
- None.
- Public consent:
- Departments accepting a sequence that delays some projects.
First step and stages
First step: Identify the critical path and competing claims on the same workforce, grid capacity and funds for current growth packages. (owner: NISTA with HM Treasury)
- Build a dependency map from pipeline data — NISTA (proposed stage, not an official timetable)
- Sequence prerequisites before dependent projects — HM Treasury and departments (proposed stage, not an official timetable)
- Review when conditions change — NISTA (proposed stage, not an official timetable)
Depends on: A01; A03; Grid connections reform; Construction skills supply
Trade-offs
- Who gains and who loses:
- Projects delayed by sequencing lose; projects with ready prerequisites gain.
- What else the money or effort could do:
- Coordination time; some projects wait.
- Strongest counterargument:
- Markets and delivery bodies already adjust to constraints; central sequencing can be slow.
- Risks:
- False synergies, coordination overhead and relabelling.
How we would judge it
- Baseline:
- Apprenticeship starts 353,500 in 2024/25, below 393,380 in 2018/19 (DfE).
- Leading indicator:
- Critical-path milestones met; bottlenecks resolved.
- Outcome:
- Domain outcomes (homes, connections, assets in use) with attribution limits.
- Continue, adapt or stop:
- Drop the map if it does not change any sequencing decision within two planning cycles.
Sources
- HM Treasury and NISTA, UK Infrastructure: A 10 Year Strategy, Paragraph 1.28; Annex paragraph 3 (2025-06-19; relevant passages checked)
- National Audit Office, Lessons learned: a planning and spending framework that enables long-term value for money (HC 234, Session 2024-25), Summary (2024-10-27; relevant passages checked)
- Resolution Foundation / LSE Centre for Economic Performance, Ending Stagnation: A New Economic Strategy for Britain, PDF p.30 (2023-12-04; relevant passages checked)
- National Audit Office, Lessons learned: a planning and spending framework that enables long-term value for money (HC 234, Session 2024-25), Summary paragraph 11 (2024-10-27; relevant passages checked)
Source published June 2025 (10 Year Strategy); October 2024 (NAO); evidence reviewed 2026-10-04. Reconsider if: Pipeline updates; New construction workforce data.
How the options are assessed
One shared record per option — the same one the national plan reads. Delivery RAG, gate and list membership are separate judgements.
Provisional single-reviewer assessments from the 6 October 2026 review; not approved business cases, and not government policy.
A03Delivery RAG: AmberGate: pending
Steady public investment through a published pipeline
Existing action A03, assessed at the same scope.
Provisional single-reviewer assessment; not an approved business case.
- Who and where
- Users of transport, energy, water, digital and public-service infrastructure across the UK; construction firms and their workforce. (from the action record) Jurisdiction: UK.
- Result so far
- Range if completed: 15.0–21.0 out of 30 (equal weights; not yet assessed: expected incremental benefit (Bn), incremental affordability (Co))
- Funded now (baseline)
- Already government policy: the 10 Year Infrastructure Strategy (June 2025) commits at least £725bn over a decade and launched an online Infrastructure Pipeline in July 2025, updated at least every six months. UK Facts’ addition is to separate approved from aspirational projects on the page and to count completed, used assets rather than announcements. (from the action record)
- The change assessed (marginal)
- Approved-versus-aspirational status, milestones and completed assets in the infrastructure pipeline. (from the superseded 4 October selection table)
- Domain home: Growth & productivity
- In the national plan: Growth and prosperity list
- Previous version: NP5: Publish what is ready to build — projects and housing sites — with each blocker’s owner and cost (4 October 2026 slate, superseded 7 October 2026).
What the evidence supports—and the next decision
A pipeline makes intended investment visible; it does not make every listed project approved, affordable or deliverable.
Codex — AI-assisted analytical follow-up · 8 October 2026. Proposed appraisal design; the attributed scores below are unchanged. No funding or delivery agreement is implied.
- Define the change
- Publish approval status, milestones, whole-life cost and delivery confidence for a defined portfolio, alongside the existing pipeline.
- Test whether it works
- Compare forecast and actual completion, service availability and cost at successive decision points. Record cancelled projects and changed scope rather than dropping them from the denominator.
- Establish the cost
- Appraise projects individually with maintenance, renewal, optimism bias and opportunity cost. Keep the small cost of better portfolio information separate from the assets themselves.
- Protect against harm
- Do not promise simultaneous delivery beyond shared construction, grid or specialist capacity.
Read with the outcome evidence and sources in the full assessment. Monitoring proposals are not existing baseline measurements. A numerical benefit or cost score needs evidence for the defined increment, not just the scale of the problem.
Full assessment of Steady public investment through a published pipeline: ten criteria, scenarios, delivery, costs and monitoring
The ten criteria (0–3)
Each criterion is scored 0 to 3 by the reviewer. “Not yet assessed” means unknown: it is never counted as zero.
Scale and severity (Sc)3 of 3 — Severe harm across a broad population
Reviewer’s reason: Provisional problem-importance judgement from linked site pages; not the scale of achievable benefit.
Increment beyond baseline (Ad)2 of 3 — Specific material change to existing delivery
Reviewer’s reason: Distinguish funded projects from aspirations; sequence resources; name owners and independent assurance; protect maintenance. A missing rating requires a defined marginal change.
Confidence in the proposed action (Ev)1 of 3 — Indirect, mixed, modelled or weak causal support
Reviewer’s reason: Macro modelling and delivery audits support the rationale; they do not evaluate the incremental publication or coordination change.
Expected incremental benefit (Bn)Not yet assessed
Reviewer’s reason: Unknown unless a reasonably defined target-population benefit can be judged; no bonus merely for spanning domains.
Residual harms (Hm)2 of 3 — Manageable harm with specified safeguards
Reviewer’s reason: Double-counting housing/grid benefits; shared workforce bottlenecks.
Incremental affordability (Co)Not yet assessed
Reviewer’s reason: Project lifetime costs, optimism bias, maintenance, financing and the coordination team. The headline strategy is an overlapping envelope.
Delivery capacity (Ca)1 of 3 — Binding scarce resource
Reviewer’s reason: Distinguish funded projects from aspirations; sequence resources; name owners and independent assurance; protect maintenance.
Distribution (Fa)2 of 3 — Mixed or broadly neutral with safeguards
Reviewer’s reason: Provisional distribution judgement for the stated target; verify who pays, who gains and excluded groups.
Meaningful first outcome (Ti)2 of 3 — More than one and up to three years
Reviewer’s reason: First meaningful outcome, not announcement: Milestones, outturn cost and service outcomes for selected projects.
Readiness (Rd)2 of 3 — Named commissioning/allocation/coordination step
Reviewer’s reason: Treasury, infrastructure bodies, departments and devolved governments; Project appraisal and sequencing
Four weightings
Normalised as 10 × weighted sum ÷ sum of weights, on a 0–30 scale. Where a criterion is not yet assessed, the range is the lowest and highest result if it were later scored 0 or 3 — not a score, a confidence interval or a rank.
- Equal weights: Range if completed: 15.0–21.0 out of 30. Not yet assessed: expected incremental benefit (Bn), incremental affordability (Co). Funding gate: not passed.
- Evidence doubled: Range if completed: 14.5–20.0 out of 30. Not yet assessed: expected incremental benefit (Bn), incremental affordability (Co). Funding gate: not passed.
- Scale doubled: Range if completed: 16.4–21.8 out of 30. Not yet assessed: expected incremental benefit (Bn), incremental affordability (Co). Funding gate: not passed.
- Cost ignored (the funding gate still applies): Range if completed: 16.7–20.0 out of 30. Not yet assessed: expected incremental benefit (Bn), incremental affordability (Co). Funding gate: not passed.
Funding gate: Not passed — the cost is not yet assessed or no allocation is committed for this scope. Ignoring cost in a weighting never removes the gate.
Delivery RAG and gate
Delivery RAG shown: AmberReview’s claim: Amber. Best the recorded evidence allows: Amber.
Review’s reason: Project lifetime costs, optimism bias, maintenance, financing and the coordination team. The headline strategy is an overlapping envelope.
Why it is not Green yet
- Scope (population, place and increment) not verified against the delivery baseline.
- No verified owner with the powers in place.
- Delivery capacity not verified.
- Lifetime incremental costs not complete.
- No credible funding (a committed allocation for the scope).
- Safeguards not specified.
- Monitoring lacks a metric, a data source or a baseline.
Green needs verified scope, a verified owner with the powers, verified capacity, complete lifetime costs with credible funding, specified safeguards and monitoring with a metric, source and baseline. Amber means appraisal gaps remain; Red means a material delivery obstacle. Red does not mean unimportant.
Gate: Pending — appraisal incomplete (review label: “Pending: incomplete appraisal”).
Why: Scores incomplete; Funding gate not passed (cost unknown or no credible funding).
The gate is separate from national list membership: being listed does not make an option eligible, and an eligible option need not be listed.
Cost and funding
Lifetime costing: Partial — some lines costed, no whole-life total. Review: “Full incremental costing not established in reviewed material”.
- 10 Year Infrastructure Strategy: government infrastructure funding (programme envelope) (published programme envelope; C-10YIS-ENVELOPE)
- Project capital, maintenance, financing and workforce costs for pipeline projects (not costed; C-A03-PROJECTS)
Still to cost: Project lifetime costs, optimism bias, maintenance, financing and the coordination team. The headline strategy is an overlapping envelope.
Funding status: programme route, not allocated.
Owner, powers and capacity
Proposed owner: Treasury, infrastructure bodies, departments and devolved governments (proposed, unverified).
Powers: needs a decision or allocation. Capacity: binding constraint.
Powers and capacity read from the review’s Rd and Ca anchors; no proposed owner has agreed to act (the review: “Proposed owners have not agreed to act”).
- England:
- HM Treasury and NISTA, with spending departments, devolved governments and local delivery bodies (action record)
- Scotland:
- HM Treasury and NISTA, with spending departments, devolved governments and local delivery bodies (action record)
- Wales:
- HM Treasury and NISTA, with spending departments, devolved governments and local delivery bodies (action record)
- Northern Ireland:
- HM Treasury and NISTA, with spending departments, devolved governments and local delivery bodies (action record)
The Infrastructure Pipeline covers UK government projects plus regulated sectors and mayoral authorities; devolved governments run their own capital programmes, not assessed here.
Dependencies, safeguards and risks
Depends on: None recorded.
Safeguards
- protect maintenance (proposed, not yet specified)
Risks and residual harms: Double-counting housing/grid benefits; shared workforce bottlenecks.
Monitoring and measured results
Metric: Milestones, outturn cost and service outcomes for selected projects.
Data source: Not yet named. Baseline: Not yet established.
Measures already on the domain page
- Total investment (gross fixed capital formation): latest 18.7% (2024); baseline 18.2% (2000) (United Kingdom).
- Business investment: latest 10.9% (2026 Q2); baseline not published (United Kingdom).
A page measure is not necessarily the review’s metric; linking the two is an editorial decision still to be made.
Evidence for the outcome
Outcome: Milestones, outturn cost and service outcomes for selected projects.
Macro modelling and delivery audits support the rationale; they do not evaluate the incremental publication or coordination change.
Effect records for this action
- Potential output: size not established (modelled, limited confidence; United Kingdom)
SWOT points it addresses
- Total investment was 18.7% of GDP in 2024, the lowest in the G7 (the other six had a median of 21.8%); the UK was lowest in 23 of the 33 years since 1992.
- A ten-year infrastructure plan is in place: at least £725bn of government funding over the decade and an online pipeline of projects with their funding status, updated at least every six months.
- Public net investment is forecast at 2.5–2.8% of GDP to 2030–31, well above its post-2010 low of 1.5% in 2013–14.
- Using pipeline data to sequence projects against the workforce, grid and planning capacity they share could turn committed funding into completed assets sooner.
Review record
Assessment version: working-review-2026-10-06 (A03@working-review-2026-10-06).
Reviewer: Author of the review blueprint (single reviewer, not named in uk-facts-complete-plan.json). Reviewed: 6 October 2026.
Scored in the working review of 6 October 2026 on the shared ten-criterion scale (one reviewer); not independently calibrated.
First 90 days (review): Produce a signed scope and current-delivery baseline; Distinguish funded projects from aspirations; sequence resources; name owners and independent assurance; protect maintenance. Obtain incremental costs and an accountable decision before expansion.
Decision route: Project appraisal and sequencing
An earlier assessment exists on the 4 October 2026 selection table (nine H/M/L bands; superseded 7 October 2026). Its bands are kept, not converted into these scores.
An editorial screening framework by one reviewer, not a formal appraisal or business case. Proposed owners have not agreed to act.
A57Delivery RAG: RedGate: pending
City-region growth powers
Proposed new action A57; sourced research home and appraisal design; scope and funding remain provisional.
Provisional single-reviewer assessment; not an approved business case.
- Who and where
- Population not yet defined. Jurisdiction: not defined.
- Result so far
- Range if completed: 8.0–17.0 out of 30 (equal weights; not yet assessed: increment beyond baseline (Ad), expected incremental benefit (Bn), incremental affordability (Co))
- Funded now (baseline)
- Funded baseline not yet stated
- The change assessed (marginal)
- Marginal change not yet defined
- Domain home: Growth & productivity
- In the national plan: Growth and prosperity list
What the evidence supports—and the next decision
Moving powers changes who decides; it does not itself identify an additional project or a growth effect.
Codex — AI-assisted analytical follow-up · 8 October 2026. Proposed appraisal design; the attributed scores below are unchanged. No funding or delivery agreement is implied.
- Define the change
- Name the power, place and funded responsibility to be transferred beyond the current integrated settlement.
- Test whether it works
- Decision time, delivery and resident outcomes for that function against an explicit counterfactual. Separate local gains from activity displaced from other places.
- Establish the cost
- Transition, staff, data, accountability and the underlying service budget. A transfer between public bodies is not extra national spending.
- Protect against harm
- Publish local scrutiny, equalities and spillover arrangements before attributing a growth benefit.
Read with the outcome evidence and sources in the full assessment. Monitoring proposals are not existing baseline measurements. A numerical benefit or cost score needs evidence for the defined increment, not just the scale of the problem.
Full assessment of City-region growth powers: ten criteria, scenarios, delivery, costs and monitoring
The ten criteria (0–3)
Each criterion is scored 0 to 3 by the reviewer. “Not yet assessed” means unknown: it is never counted as zero.
Scale and severity (Sc)2 of 3 — Serious harm to a defined group or widespread moderate harm
Reviewer’s reason: Provisional problem-importance judgement from linked site pages; not the scale of achievable benefit.
Increment beyond baseline (Ad)Not yet assessed
Reviewer’s reason: Specify powers, stable budgets and accountability; integrate transport, housing and skills; assess local capacity. A missing rating requires a defined marginal change.
Confidence in the proposed action (Ev)0 of 3 — No effect evaluation
Reviewer’s reason: Regional productivity gaps establish need, not the causal benefit of an unspecified devolution package.
Expected incremental benefit (Bn)Not yet assessed
Reviewer’s reason: Unknown unless a reasonably defined target-population benefit can be judged; no bonus merely for spanning domains.
Residual harms (Hm)1 of 3 — Material harm/unresolved mitigation
Reviewer’s reason: Institutional change and capacity gaps; gains may relocate activity.
Incremental affordability (Co)Not yet assessed
Reviewer’s reason: Administrative transition, funded responsibilities, investment and evaluation; distinguish transfers from new resources.
Delivery capacity (Ca)1 of 3 — Binding scarce resource
Reviewer’s reason: Specify powers, stable budgets and accountability; integrate transport, housing and skills; assess local capacity.
Distribution (Fa)2 of 3 — Mixed or broadly neutral with safeguards
Reviewer’s reason: Provisional distribution judgement for the stated target; verify who pays, who gains and excluded groups.
Meaningful first outcome (Ti)1 of 3 — More than three but less than ten years
Reviewer’s reason: First meaningful outcome, not announcement: Access to jobs, productivity, earnings and inclusion in defined places.
Readiness (Rd)1 of 3 — Legislation/external agreement or major enabling work
Reviewer’s reason: Central government, mayors/local authorities; nation-specific arrangements; Specify powers and place-based appraisal
Four weightings
Normalised as 10 × weighted sum ÷ sum of weights, on a 0–30 scale. Where a criterion is not yet assessed, the range is the lowest and highest result if it were later scored 0 or 3 — not a score, a confidence interval or a rank.
- Equal weights: Range if completed: 8.0–17.0 out of 30. Not yet assessed: increment beyond baseline (Ad), expected incremental benefit (Bn), incremental affordability (Co). Funding gate: not passed.
- Evidence doubled: Range if completed: 7.3–15.5 out of 30. Not yet assessed: increment beyond baseline (Ad), expected incremental benefit (Bn), incremental affordability (Co). Funding gate: not passed.
- Scale doubled: Range if completed: 9.1–17.3 out of 30. Not yet assessed: increment beyond baseline (Ad), expected incremental benefit (Bn), incremental affordability (Co). Funding gate: not passed.
- Cost ignored (the funding gate still applies): Range if completed: 8.9–15.6 out of 30. Not yet assessed: increment beyond baseline (Ad), expected incremental benefit (Bn), incremental affordability (Co). Funding gate: not passed.
Funding gate: Not passed — the cost is not yet assessed or no allocation is committed for this scope. Ignoring cost in a weighting never removes the gate.
Delivery RAG and gate
Delivery RAG shown: RedReview’s claim: Red. Best the recorded evidence allows: Red.
Review’s reason: Institutional change and capacity gaps; gains may relocate activity.
Why it is not Green yet
- Delivery obstacle: Institutional change and capacity gaps; gains may relocate activity..
- Scope (population, place and increment) not verified against the delivery baseline.
- No verified owner with the powers in place.
- Delivery capacity not verified.
- Lifetime incremental costs not complete.
- No credible funding (a committed allocation for the scope).
- Safeguards not specified.
- Monitoring lacks a metric, a data source or a baseline.
Green needs verified scope, a verified owner with the powers, verified capacity, complete lifetime costs with credible funding, specified safeguards and monitoring with a metric, source and baseline. Amber means appraisal gaps remain; Red means a material delivery obstacle. Red does not mean unimportant.
Gate: Pending — appraisal incomplete (review label: “Pending: incomplete appraisal”).
Why: Scores incomplete; Funding gate not passed (cost unknown or no credible funding).
The gate is separate from national list membership: being listed does not make an option eligible, and an eligible option need not be listed.
Cost and funding
Lifetime costing: Not established. Review: “Full incremental costing not established in reviewed material”.
Still to cost: Administrative transition, funded responsibilities, investment and evaluation; distinguish transfers from new resources.
Funding status: not established in review.
Owner, powers and capacity
Proposed owner: Central government, mayors/local authorities; nation-specific arrangements (proposed, unverified).
Powers: needs legislation or external agreement. Capacity: binding constraint.
Powers and capacity read from the review’s Rd and Ca anchors; no proposed owner has agreed to act (the review: “Proposed owners have not agreed to act”).
- England:
- not assessed
- Scotland:
- not assessed
- Wales:
- not assessed
- Northern Ireland:
- not assessed
Not defined in the review.
Dependencies, safeguards and risks
Depends on: None recorded.
Safeguards
None specified yet.
Risks and residual harms: Institutional change and capacity gaps; gains may relocate activity.
Monitoring and measured results
Metric: Access to jobs, productivity, earnings and inclusion in defined places.
Data source: Not yet named. Baseline: Not yet established.
Evidence for the outcome
Outcome: Access to jobs, productivity, earnings and inclusion in defined places.
Regional productivity gaps establish need, not the causal benefit of an unspecified devolution package.
SWOT points it addresses
- Output per hour was below the UK average in 10 of 12 nations and regions in 2023: London produced about 29% more per hour than the UK average and Wales about 15% less.
- Bus use in England was still below its pre-pandemic level in the year to March 2025 — 3.7 billion journeys, 90% of 2019–20 — and local bus fares rose 7% in the year against 3% for consumer prices. There is no current official measure of travel times to jobs: the journey time statistics stopped in 2025, with 2019 the last year.
Review record
Assessment version: working-review-2026-10-06 (A57@working-review-2026-10-06).
Reviewer: Author of the review blueprint (single reviewer, not named in uk-facts-complete-plan.json). Reviewed: 6 October 2026.
Scored in the working review of 6 October 2026 on the shared ten-criterion scale (one reviewer); not independently calibrated.
First 90 days (review): Produce a signed scope and current-delivery baseline; Specify powers, stable budgets and accountability; integrate transport, housing and skills; assess local capacity. Obtain incremental costs and an accountable decision before expansion.
Decision route: Specify powers and place-based appraisal
An editorial screening framework by one reviewer, not a formal appraisal or business case. Proposed owners have not agreed to act.
A67Delivery RAG: AmberGate: pending
Transport access to jobs
Existing action A67, assessed at the same scope.
Not stated in the review record; treated as a provisional single-reviewer assessment, not an approved business case.
- Who and where
- Working-age residents without a car along one defined bus corridor in an English city region, where journey times or service hours limit access to employment centres. (from the action record) Jurisdiction: England.
- Result so far
- Range if completed: 14.0–20.0 out of 30 (equal weights; not yet assessed: expected incremental benefit (Bn), incremental affordability (Co))
- Funded now (baseline)
- Funded baseline: the Local Authority Bus Grant (£510.8m revenue in 2026–27 including a £30m uplift) and a £2 single-fare cap outside London for 2027 (£400m for England, announced 22 July 2026). Appraising one corridor for access to jobs, with a comparison, is a UK Facts proposal, not government policy. (from the action record)
- The change assessed (marginal)
- Appraise one defined corridor/service intervention where journey reliability, hours or cost constrain access to jobs. (from the 6 October review)
- Domain home: Growth & productivity
- In the national plan: Related option, assessed separately
What the evidence supports—and the next decision
More passenger journeys do not establish additional employment. The transport intervention must address a demonstrated access constraint.
Codex — AI-assisted analytical follow-up · 8 October 2026. Proposed appraisal design; the attributed scores below are unchanged. No funding or delivery agreement is implied.
- Define the change
- Appraise a named corridor and change in hours, reliability, frequency or fares against existing services.
- Test whether it works
- Door-to-door access to suitable jobs, reliability, sustained employment and displacement; assess accessibility as well as average journey time.
- Establish the cost
- Vehicles, operating hours, maintenance, subsidy and infrastructure net of fares; include ongoing operation after capital funding ends.
- Protect against harm
- Protect disabled and rural users and assess effects on other routes. Do not label old discontinued journey-time statistics as current.
Read with the outcome evidence and sources in the full assessment. Monitoring proposals are not existing baseline measurements. A numerical benefit or cost score needs evidence for the defined increment, not just the scale of the problem.
Full assessment of Transport access to jobs: ten criteria, scenarios, delivery, costs and monitoring
The ten criteria (0–3)
Each criterion is scored 0 to 3 by the reviewer. “Not yet assessed” means unknown: it is never counted as zero.
Scale and severity (Sc)2 of 3 — Serious harm to a defined group or widespread moderate harm
Increment beyond baseline (Ad)2 of 3 — Specific material change to existing delivery
Confidence in the proposed action (Ev)1 of 3 — Indirect, mixed, modelled or weak causal support
Expected incremental benefit (Bn)Not yet assessed
Residual harms (Hm)1 of 3 — Material harm/unresolved mitigation
Incremental affordability (Co)Not yet assessed
Delivery capacity (Ca)1 of 3 — Binding scarce resource
Distribution (Fa)3 of 3 — Benefits concentrated on disadvantaged people with assessed burdens
Meaningful first outcome (Ti)2 of 3 — More than one and up to three years
Readiness (Rd)2 of 3 — Named commissioning/allocation/coordination step
Four weightings
Normalised as 10 × weighted sum ÷ sum of weights, on a 0–30 scale. Where a criterion is not yet assessed, the range is the lowest and highest result if it were later scored 0 or 3 — not a score, a confidence interval or a rank.
- Equal weights: Range if completed: 14.0–20.0 out of 30. Not yet assessed: expected incremental benefit (Bn), incremental affordability (Co). Funding gate: not passed.
- Evidence doubled: Range if completed: 13.6–19.1 out of 30. Not yet assessed: expected incremental benefit (Bn), incremental affordability (Co). Funding gate: not passed.
- Scale doubled: Range if completed: 14.5–20.0 out of 30. Not yet assessed: expected incremental benefit (Bn), incremental affordability (Co). Funding gate: not passed.
- Cost ignored (the funding gate still applies): Range if completed: 15.6–18.9 out of 30. Not yet assessed: expected incremental benefit (Bn), incremental affordability (Co). Funding gate: not passed.
Funding gate: Not passed — the cost is not yet assessed or no allocation is committed for this scope. Ignoring cost in a weighting never removes the gate.
Delivery RAG and gate
Delivery RAG shown: AmberReview’s claim: Amber. Best the recorded evidence allows: Amber.
Review’s reason: Name route/mode, baseline users, service hours and comparator; cost operation, capital, subsidy and maintenance. Assess accessibility and displacement, not gross local job counts. Proposed owners: transport authorities/operators and relevant national bodies.
Why it is not Green yet
- Scope (population, place and increment) not verified against the delivery baseline.
- No verified owner with the powers in place.
- Delivery capacity not verified.
- Lifetime incremental costs not complete.
- No credible funding (a committed allocation for the scope).
- Safeguards not specified.
- Monitoring lacks a metric, a data source or a baseline.
Green needs verified scope, a verified owner with the powers, verified capacity, complete lifetime costs with credible funding, specified safeguards and monitoring with a metric, source and baseline. Amber means appraisal gaps remain; Red means a material delivery obstacle. Red does not mean unimportant.
Gate: Pending — appraisal incomplete (review label: “Pending baseline verification, incremental costing and funding; not a rollout approval”).
Why: Scores incomplete; Funding gate not passed (cost unknown or no credible funding).
The gate is separate from national list membership: being listed does not make an option eligible, and an eligible option need not be listed.
Cost and funding
Lifetime costing: Not established. Review: “Not fully costed in this review”.
Still to cost: Name route/mode, baseline users, service hours and comparator; cost operation, capital, subsidy and maintenance. Assess accessibility and displacement, not gross local job counts. Proposed owners: transport authorities/operators and relevant national bodies.
Funding status: not identified.
Owner, powers and capacity
Proposed owner: transport authorities/operators and relevant national bodies (proposed, unverified).
Powers: needs a decision or allocation. Capacity: binding constraint.
Powers and capacity read from the review’s Rd and Ca anchors; no proposed owner has agreed to act (the review: “Proposed owners have not agreed to act”).
- England:
- Local transport authorities and mayoral combined authorities (franchising or enhanced partnerships under the Bus Services Act 2025), with the Department for Transport (action record)
- Scotland:
- not assessed
- Wales:
- not assessed
- Northern Ireland:
- not assessed
Buses are devolved in Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland; London runs its own franchised network. Not assessed outside England.
Dependencies, safeguards and risks
Depends on: None recorded.
Safeguards
None specified yet.
Monitoring and measured results
Metric: Define and baseline the outcome described in delivery requirements before approval.
Data source: Not yet named. Baseline: Not yet established.
Measures already on the domain page
- Local bus passenger journeys: latest 3.7 billion (90% of 2019–20) (Year ending March 2025); baseline not published (England).
A page measure is not necessarily the review’s metric; linking the two is an editorial decision still to be made.
Evidence for the outcome
Outcome: Define and baseline the outcome described in delivery requirements before approval.
Transport evidence shows mixed employment effects and possible displacement. No selected corridor or mode has a costed case here.
Sources: whatworksgrowth.org (P-GC-WWG-TRANSPORT-2015)
Review record
Assessment version: working-review-2026-10-06 (A67@working-review-2026-10-06).
Reviewer: Author of the review blueprint (single reviewer, not named in uk-facts-complete-plan.json). Reviewed: 6 October 2026.
Scored in the working review of 6 October 2026 on the shared ten-criterion scale (one reviewer); not independently calibrated.
An editorial screening framework by one reviewer, not a formal appraisal or business case. Proposed owners have not agreed to act.
Decision briefs
The leading option set out as a decision someone could take: who decides, who benefits, the best evidence, cost and funding, and the main trade-off. The full research record is one click away.
Decision briefExisting programmeReviewed 2026-10-04
Publish what is ready to build — projects and housing sites — with each blocker’s owner and cost
The thread: issue, evidence, action
- Issue Weakness: Total investment was 18.7% of GDP in 2024, the lowest in the G7 (the other six had a median of 21.8%); the UK was lowest in 23 of the 33 years since 1992. Also: opportunity, strength, strength
- Evidence Total investment (gross fixed capital formation); Business investment
- Action Give productive investment a stable delivery pipeline
- Decision required
- Whether NISTA and HM Treasury publish approved-versus-aspirational status and milestones for every pipeline project, and MHCLG the blocker, owner and infrastructure cost for a first set of priority housing sites.
- Who and where
- Infrastructure projects in the pipeline and priority housing sites. Applies in: UK.
- Accountable body
- HM Treasury and the National Infrastructure and Service Transformation Authority (NISTA); MHCLG for housing sites
- Intervention
- Publish what is approved and funded, what blocks priority sites and who owns each blocker.
- Best evidence, and where it applies
- No evaluation of a pipeline or blocker list exists; the OBR models +0.4% potential output after five years from 1% of GDP more public investment, if projects are as productive as average.Studied in: UK public investment (Modelled).
- Extra cost of this change
- Capital: Ten-year infrastructure funding — £725bn in total, “Over the next decade” from June 2025; Spending Review 2025 totals to 2029–30, then grown with forecast inflation (HM Treasury footnote 12). Exact fiscal years are not stated for the headline., cash (nominal) prices; Planning staff, site infrastructure and financing for priority sites — Not yet costed.Recurring: none identified in the brief.One-off or mixed: Project costs published one by one — Not yet costed.
- Funding
- Not funded yet: a possible funding route exists, but nothing is allocated to this change.Committed to this change: none.Possible source, not an award: Ten-year infrastructure funding commitment (at least £725bn) (£725bn).Unfunded: Publication and site-package costs are not established.
- Savings and wider benefits
- Not yet specified: no cashable saving or avoided cost has been costed for this change. Expected outcomes are listed one by one in the research appendix and are never added together or counted as money available.
- First 90-day step
- Status and milestones published at the next six-monthly pipeline update; first site blocker list published.The proposed first milestone; a 90-day date is not yet specified. Owner: NISTA with HM Treasury; MHCLG. Proposed by UK Facts, not an official deadline.
- Twelve-month milestone
- Not yet specified.Time to a first useful result: Status at the next pipeline update; delivery effects over two updates.
- Outcome, and when to scale or stop
- Measure: Share of projects with published status and milestones.Scale if: Projects reach milestones near published cost and priority sites start faster than comparable ones.Stop if: Publication changes neither sequencing nor delivery within two updates.
- Main trade-off
- Staff time and transparency costs now, with no measured return; stable plans can lock in weak projects.
- Source and review date
- Public investment and potential output (Discussion Paper No. 5) (August 2024). Reviewed 2026-10-04.
An editorial proposal by UK Facts for discussion, not government policy. Records: A03, A01 · effects E-A03-OUTPUT, E-A01-HOMES · costs C-10YIS-ENVELOPE, C-A03-PROJECTS, C-A01-SITE-PACKAGE
Research appendix: study design, effect sizes and limits, alternatives, full costing, international comparisons and how we would know
1.The change, in plain words
Publish what is ready to build — projects and housing sites — with each blocker’s owner and cost
2.The decision requested
- Decision
- Add approved-versus-aspirational status and a milestone to each pipeline project, publish combined demand for builders, installers and connections, and publish a blocker list (owner and infrastructure cost) for a first set of priority housing sites.
- Accountable institution
- HM Treasury and the National Infrastructure and Service Transformation Authority (NISTA); MHCLG for housing sites
- Geography
- UK
- Powers
- Existing powers: the pipeline is government policy and published at least every six months.
- Delivery partners
- Spending departments; Local planning authorities; Ofgem, Ofwat and NESO; Skills England
3.Who it is for, and what changes beyond today
- Target population
- Infrastructure projects in the pipeline and priority housing sites.
- Eligibility
- Projects in the published pipeline; housing sites with permission but not started.
- Scale
- Every pipeline project; a first set of priority housing sites chosen by MHCLG with councils.
- Baseline
- Total investment was 18.7% of GDP in 2024, the lowest in the G7; at least £725bn of infrastructure funding is committed over a decade.
Source: World Bank, World Development Indicators: Gross fixed capital formation (% of GDP) (NE.GDI.FTOT.ZS); HM Treasury and NISTA, UK Infrastructure: A 10 Year Strategy (Paragraph 1.24)
- Change beyond existing law or funding
- The pipeline exists; the change adds status, milestones, combined workforce demand and a site blocker list, and counts completed assets.
4.How it would work
Do: Publish what is approved and funded, what blocks priority sites and who owns each blocker. Changing: Firms plan staff and capacity ahead of demand, and shared builders and connections are sequenced rather than double-booked.
Potential output from extra public investment
Modelled, not observedEffect record E-A03-OUTPUT
An OBR model of investment in general, not of a pipeline.
Net additional homes from planning reform
Modelled, not observedEffect record E-A01-HOMES
The OBR’s estimate for reforms already in place, not for a blocker list.
Outcomes are kept separate and never added into one impact figure.
5.Best evidence
Public investment and potential output (Discussion Paper No. 5)
- Author or institution:
- Office for Budget Responsibility (Discussion Paper No. 5)
- Published:
- August 2024
- Evaluation period:
- Modelled
- Design:
- Macroeconomic model
- Sample or population:
- UK public investment
- Effect and uncertainty:
- +0.4% potential output after five years from 1% of GDP more public investment
- Limits:
- Assumes average productivity of public capital; not a pipeline effect
Where: Paragraph 4.7. Affiliation is provenance, not proof of quality.
6.Alternatives, counter-evidence and who loses
- Closest feasible alternative
- Raising business investment through tax incentives or pension-fund reform, aimed at the larger private share.
- Strongest counter-evidence
- The NAO finds spending decisions short-term, and the Green Book warns of optimism bias: more capital can be wasted without better appraisal.
Source: National Audit Office, Lessons learned: a planning and spending framework that enables long-term value for money (HC 234, Session 2024-25) (Summary)
- Distributional effects
- Depends on where projects are built and who uses them.
- Main downside
- No measured return; risk of locking in weak projects.
| Option | Who is reached | Evidence | Likely outcome and timing | Cost and funding | Main trade-off |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| The proposalPublish status, milestones, workforce demand and site blockers | Every pipeline project and priority sites | Modelled and audit only | Sequencing within a year; delivery effects unmeasured | Running costs not established | Effort with no measured return |
| Current policyCurrent policy: the pipeline as published | Pipeline projects | — | Unknown | £725bn envelope | Approved and aspirational projects mixed |
| AlternativeTax incentives for business investment | Private investors | Not assessed here | Unknown | Tax cost | Revenue forgone |
The options compared, including current policy
The proposal
Publish status, milestones, workforce demand and site blockers
- Who is reached
- Every pipeline project and priority sites
- Evidence
- Modelled and audit only
- Likely outcome and timing
- Sequencing within a year; delivery effects unmeasured
- Cost and funding
- Running costs not established
- Main trade-off
- Effort with no measured return
Current policy
Current policy: the pipeline as published
- Who is reached
- Pipeline projects
- Evidence
- —
- Likely outcome and timing
- Unknown
- Cost and funding
- £725bn envelope
- Main trade-off
- Approved and aspirational projects mixed
Alternative
Tax incentives for business investment
- Who is reached
- Private investors
- Evidence
- Not assessed here
- Likely outcome and timing
- Unknown
- Cost and funding
- Tax cost
- Main trade-off
- Revenue forgone
7.What other countries or the devolved nations show
No comparable evaluation found.
Searched: Evaluations of national infrastructure pipelines or project-status publication (UK, Australia, New Zealand) linking publication to delivery outcomes. None found in this review.
Next step: Track milestones met and time from permission to start before and after status publication.
8.What delivery needs first
- staff — Appraisal and commercial staff in departments and NISTA. (Scarce resource shared with other priorities; owner: HM Treasury and the Cabinet Office)
- data — Project status from departments and connection data from network operators. (Requirement; owner: NISTA, NESO and Ofgem)
9.What it would cost
How the cost is built up: Analytical staff to publish status and the blocker list + site infrastructure where the blocker is infrastructure; project costs remain in each project’s business case.
| Component | Unit and quantity | Unit cost or amount | Type, price year, period | Status |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Ten-year infrastructure fundingUK | programme; quantity to be set from need and capacity | £725bn in total, “Over the next decade” from June 2025; Spending Review 2025 totals to 2029–30, then grown with forecast inflation (HM Treasury footnote 12). Exact fiscal years are not stated for the headline., cash (nominal) prices (ledger C-10YIS-ENVELOPE) | capital; price year not stated; Over the decade from June 2025 | Current quoted costThe envelope the pipeline organises; it overlaps the homes and warm-homes envelopes. |
| Project costs published one by onePipeline projects | per project; quantity to be set from need and capacity | Not yet costed (ledger C-A03-PROJECTS) | mixed; price year not stated; Project lifetimes | Not yet established |
| Planning staff, site infrastructure and financing for priority sitesPriority housing sites | per site; quantity to be set from need and capacity | Not yet costed (ledger C-A01-SITE-PACKAGE) | capital; price year not stated; From the first list | Not yet established |
Ten-year infrastructure funding
UK
£725bn in total, “Over the next decade” from June 2025; Spending Review 2025 totals to 2029–30, then grown with forecast inflation (HM Treasury footnote 12). Exact fiscal years are not stated for the headline., cash (nominal) prices (ledger C-10YIS-ENVELOPE)
capital; price year not stated; Over the decade from June 2025; Current quoted cost
The envelope the pipeline organises; it overlaps the homes and warm-homes envelopes.
Project costs published one by one
Pipeline projects
Not yet costed (ledger C-A03-PROJECTS)
mixed; price year not stated; Project lifetimes; Not yet established
Planning staff, site infrastructure and financing for priority sites
Priority housing sites
Not yet costed (ledger C-A01-SITE-PACKAGE)
capital; price year not stated; From the first list; Not yet established
10.Who pays, and what is missing
- Programme envelope (a possible route, not an award)
- Ten-year infrastructure funding commitment (at least £725bn): £725bn
- Allocation committed to this change
- None
- Remaining gap
- Publication and site-package costs are not established.
- Proposed financing
- NISTA and departmental running costs for publication; site infrastructure from named capital allocations.
- Responsible payer
- central government, councils, developers, bill-payers
- Budget displaced
- Analytical time; capital used on priority sites is not available elsewhere.
11.First milestone and time to a useful result
Status and milestones published at the next six-monthly pipeline update; first site blocker list published. (Owner: NISTA with HM Treasury; MHCLG. Proposed by UK Facts, not an official deadline.)
Time to first useful result: Status at the next pipeline update; delivery effects over two updates.
What could delay it: Departments supply consistent status data. Councils can name blockers and owners.
12.How we would know
- Baseline
- Milestones met and time from permission to start on priority sites before publication.
- Comparison
- Comparable projects and sites outside the first list.
- Leading indicator
- Share of projects with published status and milestones.
- Follow-up
- Completed, used assets; starts on priority sites.
- Continue if
- Projects reach milestones near published cost and priority sites start faster than comparable ones.
- Adapt if
- Status publication is incomplete or unused in sequencing.
- Stop if
- Publication changes neither sequencing nor delivery within two updates.
- Thresholds
- Not yet set: No business case sets them; agree with NISTA from the first two updates.
What is not yet known, and how to find out
- What would publication and the site package cost? (cost)Next step: Cost staff time from the first update and site infrastructure from the first list.Scope: Status publication; priority-site infrastructure · Data or quotes needed: NISTA staffing; site infrastructure quotes · Who can estimate it: NISTA with HM Treasury; MHCLG with councils
- Does publication change delivery? (effect)Next step: Compare listed and unlisted projects and sites.Defensible route: further research
Sources last checked 4 October 2026 · Owner: Evidence editor (James Harris) · Next check: the first trigger: NISTA annual report on the Government Major Projects Portfolio.
Decision briefPublic-policy proposalReviewed 2026-10-04
Sequence one blocked class of projects: large new grid demand connections, against the workers and capacity they share
The thread: issue, evidence, action
- Issue Weakness: The government reports flat on-site labour productivity in construction and a significant construction workforce deficit. Also: threat, opportunity
- Evidence citb-construction-workers-needed; Net additional homes
- Action Sequence reforms that depend on the same people and infrastructure
- Decision required
- NISTA, DESNZ, Ofgem and NESO publish one dependency map for large new electricity demand connections — which projects need which network reinforcement, by when, and which construction trades — and agree a sequence that connects projects with planning consent, finance and a committed user first.
- Who and where
- Developers and users of projects needing large new demand connections in Great Britain. Applies in: Great Britain.
- Accountable body
- National Infrastructure and Service Transformation Authority (NISTA), with DESNZ and Ofgem
- Intervention
- Map the shared dependencies (network reinforcement, trades, planning) for large demand connections and connect ready projects in an agreed order.
- Best evidence, and where it applies
- DESNZ says the demand connections queue grew by 460% in the six months to June 2025, with waits of up to 15 years; CITB forecasts 41,200 extra construction workers a year are needed for 2026–2030.Studied in: Projects in the GB connections queue (Queue position before reform).
- Extra cost of this change
- Capital: none identified in the brief.Recurring: Cross-government coordination and shared-capacity planning — Not yet costed.
- Funding
- Not funded: no funding route identified yet.Committed to this change: none.Possible source, not an award: none identified.Unfunded: Coordination capacity not costed.
- Savings and wider benefits
- Not yet specified: no cashable saving or avoided cost has been costed for this change. Expected outcomes are listed one by one in the research appendix and are never added together or counted as money available.
- First 90-day step
- A published dependency map for large demand connections, with the sequencing criteriaThe proposed first milestone; a 90-day date is not yet specified. Owner: NISTA with DESNZ, Ofgem and NESO. Proposed by UK Facts, not an official deadline.
- Twelve-month milestone
- Not yet specified.Time to a first useful result: Changes in connection dates within one to two years; energisation later.
- Outcome, and when to scale or stop
- Measure: Ready projects receiving firm connection dates.Scale if: Ready projects connect sooner and the map changes at least some sequencing decisions.Stop if: The map changes no sequencing decision within two planning cycles (the action’s own evaluation rule).
- Main trade-off
- Sequencing brings some projects forward and pushes others back; projects without consent or finance lose their place.
- Source and review date
- Decision on the TMO4+ connections reform package (summary decision document) (15 April 2025); UK Infrastructure: A 10 Year Strategy (19 June 2025). Reviewed 2026-10-04.
An editorial proposal by UK Facts for discussion, not government policy. Records: A45 · costs C-A45-COORDINATION
Research appendix: study design, effect sizes and limits, alternatives, full costing, international comparisons and how we would know
1.The change, in plain words
Sequence one blocked class of projects: large new grid demand connections, against the workers and capacity they share
2.The decision requested
- Decision
- Publish a dependency map for large demand connections (reinforcement needed, timing, trades and the other programmes competing for them), and use it to set connection order for demand projects in the reformed queue, with the criteria published.
- Accountable institution
- National Infrastructure and Service Transformation Authority (NISTA), with DESNZ and Ofgem
- Geography
- Great Britain
- Powers
- Ofgem’s regulatory powers over connection rules (the TMO4+ reform approved in April 2025 and the proposed demand reforms); NESO’s system-operator role; NISTA’s pipeline remit. Electricity networks in Northern Ireland are separate.
- Delivery partners
- NESO; Transmission and distribution network operators; MHCLG and local planning authorities; CITB and DfE (construction skills); Project developers
3.Who it is for, and what changes beyond today
- Target population
- Developers and users of projects needing large new demand connections in Great Britain.
- Eligibility
- Transmission-connected and large distribution-connected demand projects in the reformed queue (data centres, AI Growth Zones, EV charging hubs, large employment sites).
- Scale
- The demand part of the reformed queue: 99 GW of transmission-connected demand in NESO’s December 2025 pipeline.
- Baseline
- Before reform the connections queue exceeded 700 GW, with offer dates extending into the 2040s. After Ofgem approved reform in April 2025, NESO’s reordered pipeline held 283 GW of generation and storage and 99 GW of transmission-connected demand. The demand queue grew by 460% in the six months to June 2025; waits of up to 15 years. CITB: 41,200 extra construction workers a year needed 2026–2030. The 10 Year Infrastructure Strategy reports flat on-site labour productivity and a significant workforce deficit but gives no figure.
Source: National Energy System Operator, Unveiling the new project pipeline to deliver Clean Power 2030 (Announcement text); Ofgem, Decision on the TMO4+ connections reform package (summary decision document) (Paragraphs 1.2, 2.7); Department for Energy Security and Net Zero, Government to tackle speculative demand grid connection requests (consultation announcement) (Announcement text); CITB, Construction Workforce Outlook 2026–2030 (Headline findings); HM Treasury and NISTA, UK Infrastructure: A 10 Year Strategy (Paragraph 1.28)
- Change beyond existing law or funding
- Connections reform reorders the queue by readiness and strategic fit; the national brief publishes ready projects with their blockers. This brief adds the cross-programme step: one map showing which demand projects compete with housing, retrofit and transport for the same reinforcement work and trades, and an agreed order based on it.
4.How it would work
Do: Map the shared dependencies (network reinforcement, trades, planning) for large demand connections and connect ready projects in an agreed order Changing: so that scarce grid and construction capacity goes first to projects that can be used soon after connection
Shorter time from connection offer to energisation for ready demand projects
Hypothesis to test
No evaluation of sequencing exists; measured from connection data.
Fewer projects stalled by a dependency that another programme is using
Hypothesis to test
Synergies can be overstated; the map must show the trade-offs as well as the gains.
Outcomes are kept separate and never added into one impact figure.
5.Best evidence
Decision on the TMO4+ connections reform package (summary decision document)
- Author or institution:
- Ofgem (energy regulator)
- Published:
- 15 April 2025
- Evaluation period:
- Queue position before reform
- Design:
- Regulatory decision document
- Sample or population:
- Projects in the GB connections queue
- Effect and uncertainty:
- Approves reform to reorder the queue by readiness and strategic alignment; offer dates for generation and demand were extending into the 2040s; demand projects are automatically deemed needed.
- Limits:
- A decision, not an evaluation; the separate demand reforms were still being consulted on in 2026.
Where: Page 1; paragraphs 1.2, 1.11, 2.7. Affiliation is provenance, not proof of quality.
UK Infrastructure: A 10 Year Strategy
- Author or institution:
- HM Treasury
- Published:
- 19 June 2025
- Evaluation period:
- Not an evaluation
- Design:
- Government strategy
- Sample or population:
- UK infrastructure
- Effect and uncertainty:
- On-site labour productivity has flatlined and there is a significant workforce deficit; pipeline data will inform construction skills needs, market capacity and the government’s approach to skills.
- Limits:
- States intent; gives no workforce-gap figure and no sequencing mechanism.
Where: Paragraphs 1.28, 1.30, 1.59. Affiliation is provenance, not proof of quality.
6.Alternatives, counter-evidence and who loses
- Closest feasible alternative
- Leave ordering to the reformed connections process project by project, without a cross-programme map.
- Strongest counter-evidence
- Coordination adds overhead and can relabel unrelated policies as a package; the NAO finds spending decisions short-term and reactive, so a map may not change decisions.
Source: National Audit Office, Lessons learned: a planning and spending framework that enables long-term value for money (HC 234, Session 2024-25) (Summary)
- Distributional effects
- Projects ready to build gain; speculative projects lose their place; regions with spare network capacity may attract demand first.
- Main downside
- A published order can be challenged by developers who lose, slowing decisions.
| Option | Who is reached | Evidence | Likely outcome and timing | Cost and funding | Main trade-off |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| The proposalDependency map and agreed order for large demand connections | Demand projects in the GB queue and the programmes competing with them | Ofgem decision; DESNZ demand consultation; CITB workforce forecast | Connection dates in one to two years | Coordination not costed; not funded | Some projects move back |
| Current policyCurrent policy: reformed queue ordered project by project; demand reforms under consultation | All queued projects | Ofgem TMO4+ decision; NESO pipeline | Ongoing | Within regulator budgets | Competing claims on shared trades not visible |
| AlternativePublish ready projects and blockers (national priority brief on this page) | Pipeline projects and housing sites | Audit and expert recommendation | At each pipeline update | Analytical time | Lists blockers without resolving shared ones |
The options compared, including current policy
The proposal
Dependency map and agreed order for large demand connections
- Who is reached
- Demand projects in the GB queue and the programmes competing with them
- Evidence
- Ofgem decision; DESNZ demand consultation; CITB workforce forecast
- Likely outcome and timing
- Connection dates in one to two years
- Cost and funding
- Coordination not costed; not funded
- Main trade-off
- Some projects move back
Current policy
Current policy: reformed queue ordered project by project; demand reforms under consultation
- Who is reached
- All queued projects
- Evidence
- Ofgem TMO4+ decision; NESO pipeline
- Likely outcome and timing
- Ongoing
- Cost and funding
- Within regulator budgets
- Main trade-off
- Competing claims on shared trades not visible
Alternative
Publish ready projects and blockers (national priority brief on this page)
- Who is reached
- Pipeline projects and housing sites
- Evidence
- Audit and expert recommendation
- Likely outcome and timing
- At each pipeline update
- Cost and funding
- Analytical time
- Main trade-off
- Lists blockers without resolving shared ones
7.What other countries or the devolved nations show
No comparable evaluation found.
Searched: Evaluations of cross-programme infrastructure sequencing or dependency mapping (Infrastructure Australia’s priority list; the Netherlands’ MIRT programme; Ofgem and NESO connections reform documents) and of connection-queue reforms elsewhere.
Next step: Record offer-to-energisation times for demand projects before and after the sequence is published, and compare projects inside and outside the mapped class.
8.What delivery needs first
- infrastructure — Network reinforcement capacity — the binding resource the sequence allocates. (Scarce resource shared with other priorities; owner: Network operators)
- staff — Construction trades shared with housing, retrofit and transport programmes. (Scarce resource shared with other priorities; owner: Industry with CITB and DfE)
- law — Ofgem rule changes for demand connections (consulted on in 2026). (Genuine veto: nothing proceeds without it; owner: Ofgem)
- data — Project-level readiness (consent, finance, committed user) and reinforcement data shared across bodies. (Requirement; owner: NESO and network operators)
9.What it would cost
How the cost is built up: Coordination and analysis time only. Network reinforcement is funded through price controls and connection charges, and project costs stay with each project; none is added here.
| Component | Unit and quantity | Unit cost or amount | Type, price year, period | Status |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Cross-government coordination and shared-capacity planningLarge demand connections and the programmes sharing their dependencies | staff time; quantity to be set from need and capacity | Not yet costed (ledger C-A45-COORDINATION) | recurring; price year not stated; Ongoing | Not yet established |
Cross-government coordination and shared-capacity planning
Large demand connections and the programmes sharing their dependencies
Not yet costed (ledger C-A45-COORDINATION)
recurring; price year not stated; Ongoing; Not yet established
10.Who pays, and what is missing
- Programme envelope (a possible route, not an award)
- None identified
- Allocation committed to this change
- None
- Remaining gap
- Coordination capacity not costed.
- Proposed financing
- Existing NISTA, DESNZ and Ofgem budgets for coordination; reinforcement through network price controls paid by bill-payers.
- Responsible payer
- central government, bill-payers, private investors
- Budget displaced
- Analytical capacity in NISTA and DESNZ.
11.First milestone and time to a useful result
A published dependency map for large demand connections, with the sequencing criteria (Owner: NISTA with DESNZ, Ofgem and NESO. Proposed by UK Facts, not an official deadline.)
Time to first useful result: Changes in connection dates within one to two years; energisation later.
What could delay it: Demand-connection reforms are delayed Network operators cannot share project data Construction shortages worsen
12.How we would know
- Baseline
- Demand projects in the queue, offer dates and energisation times at the date the map is published.
- Comparison
- Demand projects outside the mapped class, and the same class before publication.
- Leading indicator
- Ready projects receiving firm connection dates.
- Follow-up
- Energisation and first use of connected projects.
- Continue if
- Ready projects connect sooner and the map changes at least some sequencing decisions.
- Adapt if
- The map shows conflicts that no body has power to resolve: assign that decision explicitly.
- Stop if
- The map changes no sequencing decision within two planning cycles (the action’s own evaluation rule).
- Thresholds
- Not yet set: No business case sets a connection-time target for this class.
What is not yet known, and how to find out
- Coordination cost (cost)Next step: NISTA to estimate analyst time for the first map.Scope: One project class · Data or quotes needed: Analyst days; data-sharing costs · Who can estimate it: NISTA
- Whether sequencing shortens connection times (effect)Next step: Compare offer-to-energisation times before and after publication.Defensible route: evaluation of existing delivery
- How many construction workers the demand connections need (data)Next step: Ask NESO and network operators to publish trade requirements by year alongside CITB’s forecast.
Sources last checked 4 October 2026 · Owner: Evidence editor (James Harris) · Next check: the first trigger: Grid connection reform milestones from Ofgem or NESO.
What it would take
The order things have to happen in
First, the prerequisite
Classify pipeline projects by approval and funding status; map shared workforce and grid needs
Owner: NISTA with HM Treasury
No date: the timing depends on the steps before it.
Then, the decision
Sequence consents, connections and funding before dependent projects
Owner: HM Treasury, MHCLG, DESNZ and departments
No date: the timing depends on the steps before it.
Then, delivery
Build to published milestones; unblock priority housing sites
Owner: Delivery bodies; councils; developers
No date: the timing depends on the steps before it.
Finally, the measured outcome
Assets completed and used; investment share; homes added
Owner: ONS; MHCLG; NISTA
No date: the timing depends on the steps before it.
First, the prerequisite
Select one bus corridor and a comparison using the Transport Connectivity Metric
Owner: A mayoral combined authority with DfT
No date: the timing depends on the steps before it.
Who pays, and what is still missing
Cost, committed funding and the remaining gap for the same scope and years. A programme envelope is not an award to a project; a proposal is not committed money. No total is shown because these costs are on different bases or periods and cannot be added.
Cost and funding ledger
10 Year Infrastructure Strategy: government infrastructure funding (programme envelope)
A03 · capital · published programme envelope
- Amount
- £725bn in total, “Over the next decade” from June 2025; Spending Review 2025 totals to 2029–30, then grown with forecast inflation (HM Treasury footnote 12). Exact fiscal years are not stated for the headline., cash (nominal) prices
- Who pays
- central government, councils
- Committed
- None identified
- Proposed, not committed
- £725bn (Ten-year infrastructure funding commitment (at least £725bn))
- Gap
- Not established
Project capital, maintenance, financing and workforce costs for pipeline projects
A03 · capital · not costed
- Amount
- Not yet costed
- Who pays
- central government, councils, bill-payers, private investors
- Committed
- None identified
- Proposed, not committed
- —
- Gap
- Not established
Planning staff, site infrastructure and financing for priority sites
A01 · capital · not costed
- Amount
- Not yet costed
- Who pays
- central government, councils, developers
- Committed
- None identified
- Proposed, not committed
- —
- Gap
- Not established
Cross-government coordination and shared-capacity planning
A45 · administration · not costed
- Amount
- Not yet costed
- Who pays
- central government
- Committed
- None identified
- Proposed, not committed
- —
- Gap
- Not established
“Not yet costed” means no defensible cost has been found — not that the action is free. Lifetime benefits, benefit-cost ratios and forecast savings are never shown here as money available to spend.
Effects on record, with evidence ratings (2 records)
What the evidence says each action changes
| Action | Outcome and area | Effect | Compared with | Evidence |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Turn permissions into homes people can live in | Net additional homes Housing | Direction plausible; size not established | — | modelled; limited confidence; EnglandThe OBR’s 170,000 extra homes by 2029–30 is its judgement of the 2024 planning reforms already in place, not of this site-by-site package, whose marginal effect has not been estimated. |
| Give productive investment a stable delivery pipeline | Potential output Living standards and growth | Direction plausible; size not established | — | modelled; limited confidence; United KingdomThe OBR’s +0.4% of potential output after five years (2.4% after 50) is for a permanent rise of 1% of GDP in investment of average productivity — not an estimate for a pipeline, and not cash for the Exchequer. |
How we would know
The outcome measures to watch. A baseline is where we start, not a target; where there is no official target we say so.
Total investment (gross fixed capital formation)
% of GDP · United Kingdom
- Baseline
- 18.2%
- 2000
- Latest
- 18.7%
- 2024
Target: none — no official target for total investment.
Source: World Bank, World Development Indicators: Gross fixed capital formation (% of GDP) (NE.GDI.FTOT.ZS). Next release: annual World Development Indicators update (data for 2025) (check the release calendar).
Business investment
% of GDP (nominal) · United Kingdom
- Baseline
- Not published
- Latest
- 10.9%
- 2026 Q2
Target: none — no official target.
Source: Office for National Statistics, Business investment in the UK: January to March 2026, revised results (Business investment, current prices, as a share of GDP). Next release: quarterly (check the release calendar).
Net additional homes
homes a year · England
- Baseline
- 248,591
- 2019–20
- Latest
- 208,600
- 2024–25
Official target: 1.5 million homes this Parliament (about 300,000 a year): a Plan for Change milestone set by the Starmer government and restated by the Burnham government on 25 August 2026.
Source: MHCLG, Housing supply: net additional dwellings, England (Live Table 120). Next release: annual (November) (check the release calendar).
Local bus passenger journeys
journeys a year · England
- Baseline
- Not published
- Latest
- 3.7 billion (90% of 2019–20)
- Year ending March 2025
Target: none — no official target.
Source: Department for Transport, Annual bus statistics: year ending March 2025 (Table BUS01; main points). Next release: annual (year ending March 2026 edition not yet announced) (check the release calendar).
Measured results
What each option would be judged on, and the latest value of the measures already on this page. A measure moving is not proof that an option caused it.
Steady public investment through a published pipeline
Judged on: Milestones, outturn cost and service outcomes for selected projects.
Data source: not yet named; baseline: not yet established.
- Total investment (gross fixed capital formation)Latest: 18.7% (2024). Baseline: 18.2% (2000). United Kingdom.
- Business investmentLatest: 10.9% (2026 Q2). Baseline: not published. United Kingdom.
National plan: Growth and prosperity list
Judged on: Access to jobs, productivity, earnings and inclusion in defined places.
Data source: not yet named; baseline: not yet established.
No measure on this page yet.
National plan: Growth and prosperity list
Judged on: Define and baseline the outcome described in delivery requirements before approval.
Data source: not yet named; baseline: not yet established.
- Local bus passenger journeysLatest: 3.7 billion (90% of 2019–20) (Year ending March 2025). Baseline: not published. England.
National plan: Related option, assessed separately
Where the ideas come from
Research, counter-evidence and methods (24 sources; 3 claims held back)
- Ending Stagnation: A New Economic Strategy for Britain — Resolution Foundation / LSE Centre for Economic Performance, 2023-12-04.Final report of the Economy 2030 Inquiry: synthesis of about 70 reports with policy proposals; United Kingdom, with international comparisons. Relevant passages checked, 2026-10-04. Limits: A strategy, not an evaluation: no estimate of what any single reform would deliver; its £8,300 household figure is a comparison with peer countries, not a policy effect. Data to 2023.
- UK Infrastructure: A 10 Year Strategy — HM Treasury and NISTA, 2025-06-19.Government strategy; United Kingdom. Relevant passages checked, 2026-10-04. Limits: The £725bn is a ten-year envelope across sectors, not a project award, and overlaps with sector programmes such as the Social and Affordable Homes Programme.
- Public finances databank (September 2026); outturn consistent with ONS/HM Treasury Public sector finances, 22 September 2026 — Office for Budget Responsibility, September 2026.Official statistics (outturn and forecast); United Kingdom. Relevant passages checked, 2026-10-04.
- Global Offshore Wind Report 2026 — Global Wind Energy Council, 2026-06.Industry statistics report; Global. Relevant passages checked (Full report is gated; the ranking was read on the report page. Industry data, not official statistics.), 2026-10-04. Limits: Supports the ranking (the UK second to China), not a UK capacity figure. The UK’s official capacity series (DUKES 5.7) is de-rated and not comparable with nameplate rankings.
- Digest of UK Energy Statistics (DUKES) 2026: Chapter 5 — Electricity — Department for Energy Security and Net Zero, 2026-07.Accredited official statistics; United Kingdom. Relevant passages checked, 2026-10-04. Limits: Stored as electricity-generation-*-twh and carbon-intensity-electricity-supplied-gco2-kwh in data/economy.
- World Development Indicators: Gross fixed capital formation (% of GDP) — World Bank, WDI update, 13 July 2026.International statistics; G7. Relevant passages checked, 2026-10-04.
- Annual regional labour productivity (PRODBYREG) — Office for National Statistics, 2025-06-19.Official statistics; UK nations and English regions (ITL1). Relevant passages checked, 2026-10-04. Limits: Relative position only (UK = 100 each year); current prices, so regional price differences are not removed. Stored as productivity-per-hour-index-* in data/economy.
- Annual bus statistics: year ending March 2025 — Department for Transport, 2025-11-26.Accredited official statistics; England. Relevant passages checked, 2026-10-07.
- Journey time statistics: user engagement exercise, summary of responses — Department for Transport, 2025-03-27.Statistics notice; England. Relevant passages checked, 2026-10-07.
- Public investment and potential output (Discussion Paper No. 5) — Office for Budget Responsibility, 2024-08.Modelling paper; United Kingdom. Relevant passages checked, 2026-10-04. Limits: A generic modelled scenario; it says nothing about any particular pipeline or project, and output is not cash for the Exchequer.
- Lessons learned: a planning and spending framework that enables long-term value for money (HC 234, Session 2024-25) — National Audit Office, 2024-10-27.Audit synthesis of NAO value-for-money work (HC 234, 2024–25); UK central government. Relevant passages checked, 2026-10-04. Limits: Written before the 2025 Spending Review; a published plan is an input to accountability, not a service improvement.
- National Framework for Water Resources 2025: water for growth, nature and a resilient future — Environment Agency, 2025-06-17.Official planning framework (modelled scenarios); England. Relevant passages checked, 2026-10-04. Limits: Modelled scenarios of population, climate and environmental needs; “up to” is the top of a range. England only.
- Dry weather and drought in England: 18 to 24 September 2026 — Environment Agency, 2026-10-02.Official weekly situation report; England. Relevant passages checked, 2026-10-04. Limits: A point-in-time status that changes week to week; replace with the latest report before reuse.
- Progress in adapting to climate change – 2025 report to Parliament — Climate Change Committee, 2025-04-30.Statutory progress report (Climate Change Act 2008); United Kingdom. Full text checked, 2026-10-04. Limits: An independent statutory assessment of adaptation readiness and delivery, scored against indicators. It does not cost future climate damage; the 2050 heat figure is a projection.
- The Green Book (2026) — HM Treasury, 2026-02-05.Official appraisal guidance. Relevant passages checked, 2026-10-04. Limits: Guidance; a positive benefit-cost ratio identifies no funding source.
- Economic and fiscal outlook, March 2025 — Office for Budget Responsibility, 2025-03-26.Official forecast; United Kingdom. Relevant passages checked, 2026-10-04. Limits: A modelled judgement about the 2024 planning reforms, not about any further package, and not an observed effect.
- Planning with purpose: reforming the planning system to meet modern needs — London School of Economics (LSE article on research by Liz Williams, Meg Hennessy and Olexiy Pedosenko), 2025-03-25.Media article on a qualitative report (expert workshops, a jury of 27 people aged 25–45 working in urban development, a roundtable of 18 landowners); England. Relevant passages checked, 2026-10-04. Limits: Qualitative; supports arguments about participation and certainty, not any quantified supply effect.
- Planning and Infrastructure Act 2025 (c. 34) — legislation.gov.uk, 2025-12-18 (Royal Assent).Legislation; England (mainly). Relevant passages checked, 2026-10-04.
- A zoning system for England — Centre for Cities, 2025-02.Policy briefing with international comparison; England. Relevant passages checked, 2026-10-04. Limits: No estimate of what zoning itself would deliver; its 4.3 million “missing homes” figure is a comparison with Western Europe, not an effect.
- Does better job accessibility help people gain employment? The role of public transport in Great Britain — Urban Studies 59(2):301–322 (Bastiaanssen J, Johnson D, Lucas K), 2022.Individual-level employment models with instrumental variables for reverse causation.; Great Britain. Relevant passages checked, 2026-10-07. Limits: The abstract gives no effect size; observational data.
- Evaluation of the first 10 months of the £2 bus fare cap — Department for Transport (Frontier Economics and SYSTRA), 2025-02-12.Difference-in-differences against London (Table 5, section 5.2.3).; England outside London (London as control). Relevant passages checked, 2026-10-07. Limits: The treated group includes non-participating areas and concessionary tickets; the report calls the estimate indicative.
- Evidence review: transport — What Works Centre for Local Economic Growth, 2015-07.Systematic evidence review; UK and OECD. Relevant passages checked, 2026-10-07. Limits: Road and rail evaluations; no bus evaluations named in the summary.
- Business investment in the UK: January to March 2026, revised results — Office for National Statistics, date not stated.Official statistics; United Kingdom. Relevant passages checked, 2026-10-04.
- Housing supply: net additional dwellings, England — MHCLG, 20 November 2025.Official statistics; England. Relevant passages checked, 2026-10-04.
Counter-evidence and criticism
- Give productive investment a stable delivery pipeline: Higher capital spending can be wasted where projects are poorly appraised or managed; the NAO finds spending decisions have been short-term, and the Green Book warns of optimism bias. Borrowing to invest raises debt interest, and construction labour is already short. (National Audit Office; HM Treasury)
- Turn permissions into homes people can live in: Centre for Cities argues incremental reform of a discretionary system cannot close the gap and proposes zoning; neither approach has a UK effect estimate. (Centre for Cities)
- Sequence reforms that depend on the same people and infrastructure: Coordination adds overhead and can relabel unrelated policies as a package; synergies can be overstated. (National Audit Office)
- Appraise one bus corridor where cost, hours or reliability stop people reaching jobs: Most evaluated transport schemes show no or mixed employment effects, and gains may come at the expense of nearby areas. (What Works Centre for Local Economic Growth)
Claims held back
- England has not completed a major reservoir since 1992 (retired live /swot water item) — Not found in the sources read; the January 2026 white paper describes its nine planned reservoirs as the first major ones in about 30 years, which is not the same claim. Needed: An Environment Agency or Defra statement with the date and name of the last major reservoir completed.
- Rule of law and intellectual-property protection as a national strength (retired live /swot item) — No domain finding on this site measures it; the live item cited no source. Needed: An official or international index with a published method, attached to a domain page.
- A national growth effect from the pipeline or from sequencing — No study estimates either; the OBR’s potential-output result is for generic public investment of average productivity. Needed: Evaluation of completed pipeline projects, or an OBR judgement on specific programmes.
“Full text checked” means we read the report itself; “relevant passages” means the sections behind each figure; “summary or abstract only” means we could not read the full study, so no number from it is published here without another source.
Other options compared — not on the shortlist (3)
Other options compared
Options from earlier work on this page that are not on the shortlist. They remain valid choices; their evidence is shown as before.
- capacityStatus: operating
Grid connections and cheaper industrial power
- Aims to:
- Viable projects connected sooner, and electricity costs for industry closer to European peers.
- How:
- NESO’s connections reform reorders the queue by readiness rather than date of application; separately, government proposes to cut levies on electricity for eligible manufacturers.
- Who decides:
- NESO and Ofgem (connections); DESNZ and DBT (levies and industrial schemes); network companies (building the connections).
- Main constraint:
- Physical network build takes years; levy relief moves costs onto other bill-payers or taxpayers rather than removing them.
- Evidence:
- Not evaluated — a mechanism to test, not an evidenced fix
See the trade-offs and evidence
- What the evidence shows
- The reformed queue retained 283 GW (8 December 2025) from a pre-reform register of over 700 GW; there is not yet evidence on whether connection dates have actually shortened. DBT says policy costs make up about 27% of a very large UK industrial user’s bill, against much less in France and Germany.
- Policy status
- Connections reform live from June 2025. The British Industrial Competitiveness Scheme — exempting eligible manufacturers from Renewables Obligation, Feed-in Tariff and Capacity Market costs — was consulted on between November 2025 and September 2026.
- Resources
- Network investment approved by Ofgem; supply chains for cables and transformers; public money or other bill-payers to fund any levy cut.
- Consent and decisions needed
- Ofgem price controls; who pays for relief is a political decision.
- Time
- Queue reform is immediate; new transmission lines take most of a decade.
- Cost and yield
- Network investment is recovered through bills; no official costing of levy relief is cited here.
- Trade-offs and who pays
- Cheaper power for industry may mean higher bills for households or other businesses; prioritising some projects delays others.
- How we would know it worked
- Leading indicator: Time from connection offer to energisation. Outcome: Industrial investment and output in energy-intensive sectors. It would not be working if: Queue shrinks on paper but connection dates do not move.
- structuralStatus: announced
Pension savings into UK productive assets
- Aims to:
- More long-term finance available for UK infrastructure and growing companies.
- How:
- Larger, consolidated defined-contribution schemes can hold more illiquid assets; 17 providers have pledged 10% of default funds to private markets by 2030, at least 5% in the UK.
- Who decides:
- Pension trustees and providers (decisions); HM Treasury and DWP (Pension Schemes legislation); The Pensions Regulator.
- Main constraint:
- Trustees’ legal duty to members’ returns; fees and liquidity of private assets; the same project-pipeline constraints as public investment.
- Evidence:
- Limited evidence — plausible mechanism, little direct evaluation
See the trade-offs and evidence
- What the evidence shows
- The pledge is voluntary and conditional on there being suitable investments; there is no evaluation yet of whether it adds investment rather than re-labelling existing holdings. It changes who finances projects, not whether viable projects exist.
- Policy status
- Mansion House Accord, May 2025; voluntary.
- Resources
- Scale in pension schemes; a pipeline of investable UK projects; specialist investment staff.
- Consent and decisions needed
- Voluntary; any mandation would be contested by the industry.
- Time
- Target date 2030.
- Cost and yield
- No direct public cost; risk falls on savers if returns disappoint.
- Trade-offs and who pays
- Savers bear the investment risk; home bias reduces diversification.
- How we would know it worked
- Leading indicator: Share of DC default funds in UK private markets (industry reporting). Outcome: Additional UK business and infrastructure investment. It would not be working if: Allocations rise but total UK investment does not.
- preventionStatus: operating
Skills for building and running new assets
- Aims to:
- Enough trained engineers, electricians, builders and technicians that investment becomes output rather than wage inflation and delay.
- How:
- Apprenticeships and technical training add skilled workers in the trades that every investment programme competes for.
- Who decides:
- DfE and Skills England; employers; the Home Office (overseas recruitment).
- Main constraint:
- Training takes one to four years; employers hesitate to train for cyclical demand.
- Evidence:
- Moderate evidence — evaluated, with limits on scope or transfer
See the trade-offs and evidence
- What the evidence shows
- DfE estimates that each £1 it spent on level 2 or level 3 apprenticeships started in 2021–22 produces about £9 of economic benefit, and £7 at levels 4–5. These are backward-looking averages for all apprentices, not the return on an extra place in a shortage trade, and evidence that training removes the specific bottlenecks investment projects face is thinner.
- Policy status
- The apprenticeship levy is being reformed into a Growth and Skills Levy, announced in September 2024, with shorter and foundation apprenticeships.
- Resources
- Training places, assessors and employer time.
- Consent and decisions needed
- Levy design and immigration rules are contested.
- Time
- Several years before newly trained workers add capacity.
- Cost and yield
- Levy and DfE budgets; no official costing per extra completed asset.
- Trade-offs and who pays
- Funding higher-level apprenticeships leaves less for entry level, and vice versa.
- How we would know it worked
- Leading indicator: Apprenticeship achievements in construction and engineering (England). Outcome: Vacancy rates and project delays attributed to skills shortages. It would not be working if: Starts rise but achievements and vacancies do not change.
| Option | Resources | Time | Evidence | Outcome to watch |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Grid connections and cheaper industrial power | Network investment approved by Ofgem; supply chains for cables and transformers; public money or other bill-payers to fund any levy cut. | Queue reform is immediate; new transmission lines take most of a decade. | not evaluated | Industrial investment and output in energy-intensive sectors. |
| Pension savings into UK productive assets | Scale in pension schemes; a pipeline of investable UK projects; specialist investment staff. | Target date 2030. | limited | Additional UK business and infrastructure investment. |
| Skills for building and running new assets | Training places, assessors and employer time. | Several years before newly trained workers add capacity. | moderate | Vacancy rates and project delays attributed to skills shortages. |
Plan reviewed 2026-10-07. How we judge evidence.
How this connects
- What happened to pay and productivity?
Output per hour is the outcome this page’s inputs are meant to raise; pay follows it over time.
Investment is one explanation for slow productivity growth among several.
- Is the UK turning research into growth?
R&D is a form of investment; the UK spends near the OECD norm, so the question is what happens after the research.
- How long is the grid queue?
Grid connections gate new generation, data centres and factories alike.
- Where does housebuilding stall?
Homes and infrastructure compete for the same planning and construction capacity.
Net additions and building-control completions are different series.
Sources and methods (8)
- World Bank, World Development Indicators: Gross fixed capital formation (% of GDP), NE.GDI.FTOT.ZS (released WDI update, 13 July 2026) — investment as a share of GDP, G7 comparison
- ONS, Quarterly national accounts: gross fixed capital formation and GDP at current prices, NPQS (GFCF) ÷ YBHA (GDP) — UK investment share since 1955
- ONS, Business investment in the UK: January to March 2026, revised results — business investment share and ONS’s own G7 comparison
- DESNZ, International non-domestic energy prices, QEP Table 5.4.2 (Medium band, incl. taxes excl. VAT) — industrial electricity prices
- MHCLG, Housing supply: net additional dwellings, England, Live Table 120 (released 20 November 2025) — net additional dwellings
- ONS, Annual regional labour productivity, PRODBYREG Table 2 (output per hour, current prices, UK = 100) (released 19 June 2025) — output per hour by region and nation
- NESO, Connections reform: retained and prioritised pipeline (released 8 December 2025) — grid connections pipeline after reform
- OBR, Public finances databank: public sector net investment — public sector net investment, outturn and forecast
Method notes
- Investment means gross fixed capital formation: spending on buildings, machinery, transport equipment, dwellings, software and other intellectual property by businesses, government and households. It is gross of depreciation.
- The G7 comparison uses World Bank WDI data for every country so definitions and vintages match; ONS’s own UK ratio is used only for the UK’s history.
- Investment is an input. No chart on this page estimates the growth lost to low investment, and the options’ estimated effects overlap and must not be summed.