Growth & productivity · UK and G7 · investment 2024

Britain invests the smallest share of GDP in the G7.

UK investment was 18.7% of GDP in 2024, compared with 21.8% for the other G7 economies’ median. It has been bottom or second-bottom since 1992; delivery also depends on skills, power and planning.

Priority: Raise productive investment and productivity through appraised, complementary reforms. What would change it →

Evidence last reviewed 3 October 2026

Overview

The short version

Three key measures

Who feels this most?

Weak productivity is not spread evenly. Output per hour is above the UK average only in London and South East; in 10 of the 12 nations and regions it is below, by up to 15%. Over time, output per hour is what allows pay to rise — see what happened to pay and productivity.

How does UK investment compare with its peers?

The UK has invested a smaller share of its income than the typical G7 economy every year since 1991

Gross fixed capital formation (business, government and dwellings) as a percentage of GDP, current prices: the UK and the median of the other six G7 economies, 1990–2024.

United Kingdom; United States, Germany, France, Italy, Japan, Canada · 1990 to 2024 (years in which all seven countries have data)

1996–2026 displayed window · observations only. Shading marks years outside the displayed record.

Investment, % of GDP0%10%20%20002010202018.7%21.8%
The gap opened in 1991 and has not closed since: in 2024 the UK invested 18.7% of GDP against a peer median of 21.8%, a difference of 3.1 percentage points of national income each year. A ranking alone says nothing about the quality of what is built, and a higher share is not automatically better — but persistently low investment means less capital per worker, which is one of the main explanations economists give for weak UK productivity growth since 2008.

United Kingdom; United States, Germany, France, Italy, Japan, Canada · 1990 to 2024 (years in which all seven countries have data) · Official estimates compiled by the World Bank from national accounts; recent years are revised

Sources, definitions and data — The UK has invested a smaller share of its income than the typical G7 economy every year since 1991
Geography:
United Kingdom; United States, Germany, France, Italy, Japan, Canada — Whole economy
Measure:
% of GDP
Period:
1990 to 2024 (years in which all seven countries have data)
Status:
Official estimates compiled by the World Bank from national accounts; recent years are revised
Calculation:
One international source and definition for every country. The grey line is the median of the six other G7 countries in each year — a UK Facts calculation; every country is listed in the data table.
Compare with:
Median of the other six G7 economies
Not included / breaks:
Investment is an input, not an outcome: this chart does not estimate how much growth the gap has cost. Japan’s high ratio partly reflects its economic structure. Intangible investment (software, R&D, brands) is only partly captured in GFCF.

Source: World Bank, World Development Indicators: Gross fixed capital formation (% of GDP), NE.GDI.FTOT.ZS (released WDI update, 13 July 2026). Chart GROW-01.

View the data as a table
YearUnited KingdomUnited StatesGermanyFranceItalyJapanCanadaMedian of other six
199024.021.324.423.422.936.721.723.1
199121.120.124.823.222.536.120.322.8
199219.719.825.021.921.934.619.421.9
199318.820.124.020.519.633.518.720.3
199419.320.424.020.119.332.319.420.3
199518.320.923.519.719.932.018.320.4
199618.921.322.919.519.733.118.820.5
199717.521.622.619.019.632.120.320.9
199818.022.322.719.320.030.420.621.4
199917.922.822.820.220.430.020.221.6
200018.223.122.920.921.229.719.622.1
200118.122.521.520.921.229.020.221.4
200218.121.519.920.321.827.620.020.9
200317.921.619.320.521.326.820.020.9
200417.822.118.820.821.426.420.921.1
200518.122.918.821.321.726.921.821.8
200618.423.019.521.921.927.122.922.4
200718.822.319.722.622.026.523.322.5
200818.421.220.022.921.626.423.522.2
200917.018.818.821.420.324.722.320.9
201016.618.319.221.520.223.623.520.9
201116.218.720.021.719.924.323.520.9
201216.319.520.021.718.524.824.520.8
201316.619.819.621.317.325.524.220.5
201417.220.419.821.016.826.424.420.7
201517.920.619.720.617.126.423.920.6
201618.620.720.020.917.326.122.820.8
201719.021.020.121.417.626.422.721.2
201818.721.320.821.918.026.722.721.6
201918.821.321.222.418.127.222.621.9
202018.221.621.322.418.227.123.222.0
202118.521.321.223.520.827.123.822.4
202219.021.321.623.521.827.823.122.4
202318.921.421.222.822.727.823.022.7
202418.721.320.522.121.527.822.921.8

Scroll the table sideways to see every column.

Investment over the long run

“Underinvests” here means one thing: the UK spends a smaller share of its national income on new buildings, machinery, networks, homes and software than comparable economies. It does not mean every project is underfunded, and a higher share is not automatically better — what matters is whether the investment becomes something productive in use.

The UK’s low share is not one bad year. It has been at or near the bottom of the G7 for three decades, and its own share has not been near the 1989 peak of 24.7% of GDP since. Business investment is the largest part. Public sector net investment roughly halved from 3.1% of GDP in 2009–10 to 1.5% in 2013–14; the OBR forecasts it between 2.5% and 2.8% a year to 2030–31.

Where does the UK sit among the G7 now?

In 2024 the UK invested the smallest share of GDP in the G7

Gross fixed capital formation as a percentage of GDP, 2024 (filled dot) and 2007 (open dot), G7 economies.

G7 economies · 2007 and 2024
20242007
  • Japan27.8%
  • Canada22.9%
  • France22.1%
  • Italy21.5%
  • United States21.3%
  • Germany20.5%
  • United Kingdom18.7%
Every G7 economy invested a different share in 2024 than before the financial crisis, but the order barely changed: Japan highest, the UK at or near the bottom. The UK’s position is not explained by one bad year — it holds across the cycle. The comparison is of shares of each country’s own GDP, so it is not affected by exchange rates.

G7 economies · 2007 and 2024 · Official estimates; latest year subject to revision

Sources, definitions and data — In 2024 the UK invested the smallest share of GDP in the G7
Geography:
G7 economies
Measure:
% of GDP
Period:
2007 and 2024
Status:
Official estimates; latest year subject to revision
Calculation:
As published by the World Bank (NE.GDI.FTOT.ZS).
Compare with:
2007, the last year before the financial crisis

Source: World Bank, World Development Indicators: Gross fixed capital formation (% of GDP), NE.GDI.FTOT.ZS (released WDI update, 13 July 2026). Chart GROW-03.

View the data as a table
Country20242007
Japan27.826.5
Canada22.923.3
France22.122.6
Italy21.522.0
United States21.322.3
Germany20.519.7
United Kingdom18.718.8

Has UK investment always been this low?

UK investment has not been near its 1989 peak since

UK gross fixed capital formation as a percentage of GDP, current prices, calendar-year average of four quarters, 1955–2025.

United Kingdom · 1955 to 2025 (complete years only)

1996–2026 displayed window · observations only. Shading marks years outside the displayed record.

Investment, % of GDP0%10%20%20002010202018.8%
UK investment averaged 21.3% of GDP in the 1970s and 20.6% in the 1980s, peaking at 24.7% in 1989. The 2010s averaged 17.8%, after investment fell sharply in the financial crisis and public investment was cut. The latest full year, 2025, was 18.8%. Business investment alone was 10.9% of GDP in 2026 Q2.

United Kingdom · 1955 to 2025 (complete years only) · Official statistics; revised back in time with each Blue Book

Sources, definitions and data — UK investment has not been near its 1989 peak since
Geography:
United Kingdom — Whole economy
Measure:
% of GDP
Period:
1955 to 2025 (complete years only)
Status:
Official statistics; revised back in time with each Blue Book
Calculation:
UK Facts calculation: quarterly current-price GFCF divided by current-price GDP from the same ONS release, averaged over the four quarters of each year.
Compare with:
Decade averages: 1970s 21.3%, 1980s 20.6%, 2010s 17.8%
Not included / breaks:
ONS’s ratio differs slightly from the World Bank figure used for the G7 comparison because of vintage and annualisation. Use this chart for the UK’s own history only.

Source: ONS, Quarterly national accounts: gross fixed capital formation and GDP at current prices, NPQS (GFCF) ÷ YBHA (GDP). Chart GROW-04.

View the data as a table
Year% of GDP
195514.4
195615.2
195716.0
195816.4
195916.1
196017.3
196118.3
196218.0
196318.2
196419.6
196519.6
196619.6
196720.1
196820.9
196920.5
197022.1
197122.1
197222.1
197323.0
197423.0
197520.7
197619.9
197719.5
197820.1
197921.0
198020.2
198118.9
198218.9
198318.9
198419.9
198520.2
198620.1
198721.4
198823.2
198924.7
199023.8
199121.4
199219.8
199319.0
199418.6
199518.4
199618.9
199717.6
199818.0
199918.0
200018.3
200118.2
200218.2
200317.9
200417.9
200518.2
200618.4
200718.9
200818.4
200917.0
201016.7
201116.3
201216.4
201316.8
201417.4
201518.2
201618.8
201719.2
201818.9
201919.0
202018.5
202118.8
202219.3
202319.0
202418.7
202518.8

Finance only works when projects can be delivered

More money does not by itself produce more output. A wind farm needs a grid connection, a factory needs power at a price it can pay, a housing estate needs permission and builders, and all of them need people to run them. When one of these binds, extra finance mostly raises prices or sits waiting. Each box below names what you can measure to see whether that step is the bottleneck.

GROW-02 · Which constraints bind together?

Money, a project, power, permission and people are needed at the same time

Equal-sized steps: a mechanism, not a model. The diagram does not say which constraint matters most, and the effects of easing each one overlap — they cannot be added up.

Mechanism diagram — arrows show how one step depends on another, not measured effects

  1. Finance

    Business, pension and public money willing to fund long-lived projects.

    Observable: business investment 10.9% of GDP (2026 Q2); 17 pension providers’ 5%-in-UK private-markets pledge by 2030.

    Capital markets and pension finance
  2. A viable project

    Finance only flows to projects that can be built and earn a return; projects only start if finance is available. Each depends on the other.

    Observable: planning decisions, final investment decisions, project pipelines.

    Why doesn’t Britain invest in Britain?
  • Power and grid

    A connection date and an affordable electricity price.

    Observable: 283 GW retained in NESO’s reformed connections pipeline (8 December 2025); industrial price 25.1p/kWh.

    Britain’s grid queue
  • Planning and infrastructure

    Permission to build, and the roads, water and connections a site needs.

    Observable: 208,600 net additional homes in England in 2024–25; decision times on major applications.

    Housing and planning
  • Workforce and skills

    People to build, run and maintain the asset.

    Observable: apprenticeship starts and achievements (England), vacancies in construction and engineering.

    Skills and apprenticeships
  • Management and adoption

    Firms able to use new equipment and technology well.

    Observable: business use of AI and other technologies (survey-based), R&D spending.

    Innovation: diffusion
  1. A completed productive asset

    A factory, wind farm, home, network or software system actually in use.

    Observable: completions, connections energised, capital stock per worker.

    Investment over the long run
  2. Output and pay

    More output per hour worked, which is what allows real pay to rise over time.

    Observable: output per hour worked; real pay.

    What happened to pay and productivity?

Who feels this most?

Where is output per hour lowest?

Output per hour is below the UK average in 10 of 12 nations and regions

Gross value added per hour worked, current prices, index UK = 100, ITL1 regions and nations, 2023 (filled dot) and 1998 (open dot).

UK nations and English regions (ITL1) · 1998 and 2023
20231998UK = 100
  • London129
  • South East108
  • Scotland99
  • North West95
  • East of England95
  • South West92
  • Yorkshire and the Humber88
  • Northern Ireland88
  • North East85
  • East Midlands85
  • West Midlands85
  • Wales85
London produces about 29% more per hour than the UK average and Wales about 15% less. Most of the UK sits below the average because London and the South East pull it up. Part of London’s lead reflects high-value industries such as finance concentrated there, and commuting from neighbouring regions. Weak investment, skills and transport links are the usual explanations offered for the rest of the gap; this chart does not test them.

UK nations and English regions (ITL1) · 1998 and 2023 · Official statistics; next release 5 November 2026

Sources, definitions and data — Output per hour is below the UK average in 10 of 12 nations and regions
Geography:
UK nations and English regions (ITL1) — Workplace-based output and hours
Measure:
Index, UK = 100
Period:
1998 and 2023
Status:
Official statistics; next release 5 November 2026
Calculation:
As published by ONS (Table 2).
Compare with:
UK = 100 in each year
Not included / breaks:
Relative position only: a region can grow while its index falls if the UK grows faster. Current prices, so price differences between regions are not removed.

Source: ONS, Annual regional labour productivity, PRODBYREG Table 2 (output per hour, current prices, UK = 100) (released 19 June 2025). Chart GROW-05.

View the data as a table
Area20231998
London128.5132.6
South East107.7110.8
Scotland98.991.9
North West94.892.4
East of England94.799.0
South West92.592.3
Yorkshire and the Humber87.988.3
Northern Ireland87.680.6
North East85.488.4
East Midlands85.388.6
West Midlands85.288.4
Wales84.987.0

The dot plot axis runs from 70 to 140 (index points, not a zero-based quantity) so the regional differences are legible.

Shareable visual summary

Visual summary

Image held

The image is not offered for download or sharing until the reasons below are resolved. The chart here is drawn from today’s records.

Britain invests the smallest share of GDP in the G7.

UK investment was 18.7% of GDP in 2024, compared with 21.8% for the other G7 economies’ median. It has been bottom or second-bottom since 1992; delivery also depends on skills, power and planning. Whole-economy investment as a share of GDP (World Bank), not a cash total or business investment alone.

Investment (GFCF), % of GDP, 2024 (same 0–30% scale)

  • United Kingdom18.7%
  • Median of the other six G7 economies21.8%

World Bank annual series for all seven economies; the ONS quarterly UK ratio is a different vintage and is not used for this comparison.

Industrial electricity price, 2025 H2 (pence per kWh, same scale)

  • UK25.1p/kWh
  • Germany16.7p/kWh
  • France10.6p/kWh

DESNZ international comparison; one consumption band and tax basis for all three countries.

Why the supplied image is held

  • Prints 18.9%; the current record is 19.0% for 2026 Q2 (Business and public investment (GFCF) as a share of GDP, current prices)
  • The image prints 18.9% investment for 2026 Q1; ONS published 19.0% for Q2 on 30 September 2026. The electricity prices also need their tax basis (including taxes, excluding VAT) stated.
Text and data version

Britain invests the smallest share of GDP in the G7. UK investment was 18.7% of GDP in 2024, compared with 21.8% for the other G7 economies’ median. It has been bottom or second-bottom since 1992; delivery also depends on skills, power and planning. Whole-economy investment as a share of GDP (World Bank), not a cash total or business investment alone.

Records behind this visual summary
MeasureValuePeriodGeographyTypeSource
UK gross fixed capital formation, % of GDP (World Bank)18.7%2024United Kingdomobserved countWorld Bank, World Development Indicators: Gross fixed capital formation
Median of the other six G7 economies, GFCF % of GDP (World Bank)Calculation: Median of the US, Germany, France, Italy, Japan and Canada21.8%2024G7 excluding the UKderived calculationWorld Bank, World Development Indicators: Gross fixed capital formation
Business and public investment (GFCF) as a share of GDP, current pricesCalculation: Gross Fixed Capital Formation (total, current prices) (£m, current prices) ÷ Nominal GDP (£m, current prices) × 10019.0%2026 Q2United Kingdomderived calculationUK Facts
Industrial electricity price, UK25.1p/kWh2025 H2United Kingdomobserved countDepartment for Energy Security and Net Zero
Industrial electricity price, France10.6p/kWh2025 H2Franceobserved countDepartment for Energy Security and Net Zero
Industrial electricity price, Germany16.7p/kWh2025 H2Germanyobserved countDepartment for Energy Security and Net Zero

All visual summaries, their source records and their publication state are listed on Shareable visuals.

More questions

Evidence → choices → outcomes

What could improve it?

More productive assets built and in use, and rising output per hour across the UK.

These options link to their national assessment, including funding, delivery constraints and remaining uncertainties.

  • Assessed option · provisional

    Turn investment promises into a deliverable pipeline

    Approved-versus-aspirational status, milestones and completed assets in the infrastructure pipeline.

    8/10 criteria scored

    Coverage of the appraisal, not an impact score.

    Delivery: Amber

    Whole-life costs incomplete

    Evidence and delivery constraints

    Macro modelling and delivery audits support the rationale; they do not evaluate the incremental publication or coordination change.

    Distinguish funded projects from aspirations; sequence resources; name owners and independent assurance; protect maintenance.

  • Assessed option · provisional

    City-region growth powers: access to jobs, productivity, earnings and inclusion in defined places

    7/10 criteria scored

    Coverage of the appraisal, not an impact score.

    Delivery: Red

    Whole-life costs incomplete

    Evidence and delivery constraints

    Regional productivity gaps establish need, not the causal benefit of an unspecified devolution package.

    Specify powers, stable budgets and accountability; integrate transport, housing and skills; assess local capacity.

  • Assessed option · provisional

    Skills in the building trades

    8/10 criteria scored

    Coverage of the appraisal, not an impact score.

    Delivery: Amber

    Whole-life costs incomplete

    Evidence and delivery constraints

    Historical apprenticeship returns support consideration, not the marginal return from this shortage-trades expansion.

    Identify trades and locations; secure paid placements, trainers, facilities and employer demand; measure completion and retention.

  • Assessed option · provisional

    Turn housing permissions into completed homes

    8/10 criteria scored

    Coverage of the appraisal, not an impact score.

    Delivery: Red

    Whole-life costs incomplete

    Evidence and delivery constraints

    Housing constraints and modelled supply responses support the case; no evaluated national effect for this exact site-unblocking package.

    Select sites; resolve land, planning, utilities, transport and viability; commission tenure mix and delivery agreements.

  • Assessed option · provisional

    Connect the power Britain needs

    8/10 criteria scored

    Coverage of the appraisal, not an impact score.

    Delivery: Red

    Whole-life costs incomplete

    Evidence and delivery constraints

    Engineering need and queue evidence exist; the marginal effects of queue reform and industrial bill relief are different questions.

    Separate queue management, network reinforcement and industrial levies; identify projects, kit, engineers and regulator decisions.

  • Assessed option · provisional

    Turn research into products and adoption

    7/10 criteria scored

    Coverage of the appraisal, not an impact score.

    Delivery: Amber

    Whole-life costs incomplete

    Evidence and delivery constraints

    The artifact offers weak support for its spinout/procurement package. Smart Grants evaluation is relevant to a different instrument and cannot validate the whole bundle.

    Separate spinout terms, procurement trials, grants and firm adoption; define market failure, beneficiaries and comparator.

  • Assessed option · provisional

    Cut EU trade friction with a scoped food-and-farm deal

    Conclude the SPS agreement.

    8/10 criteria scored

    Coverage of the appraisal, not an impact score.

    Delivery: Red

    Whole-life costs incomplete

    Evidence and delivery constraints

    Observed trade friction does not identify the effect of a future agreement; scope and baseline need updating.

    Define covered goods, alignment, oversight and border changes; secure agreement and business transition.

  • Assessed option · provisional

    Make childcare places work for working parents

    Test additional capacity, affordability and parental employment.

    8/10 criteria scored

    Coverage of the appraisal, not an impact score.

    Delivery: Amber

    Whole-life costs incomplete

    Evidence and delivery constraints

    IFS finds employment effects depend on the hours offered. This is indirect evidence for filling today’s local supply gaps. A September 2026 process evaluation exists; it is not a causal national impact estimate.

    Verify unmet demand, existing awards and provider viability; cost places, workforce, premises, operating subsidy and parental fees. Track access and sustained parental work. Proposed owners: councils, DfE and providers in England; separate devolved arrangements.

This domain in the UK SWOT →UK National Action Plan →

How we assessed these options

What would it take to improve this?

What would move the needle?

The outcome we want: More productive assets built and in use, and rising output per hour across the UK.

The main constraint: Funding commitments now exist, but the same construction workforce, grid connections and planning capacity are needed by housing, energy and transport at once — so the binding choice for HM Treasury, NISTA and departments is sequencing and delivery capacity, not another announcement.

Constraint type: workforce, infrastructure, coordination.

The options on the table

What is funded now, and the changes assessed against it — the current baseline and the alternatives, before the position today and the actions.

Provisional single-reviewer assessments from the 6 October 2026 review; not approved business cases, and not government policy.

  • Steady public investment through a published pipelineDelivery RAG: Amber

    Funded now
    Already government policy: the 10 Year Infrastructure Strategy (June 2025) commits at least £725bn over a decade and launched an online Infrastructure Pipeline in July 2025, updated at least every six months. UK Facts’ addition is to separate approved from aspirational projects on the page and to count completed, used assets rather than announcements.
    The change assessed
    Approved-versus-aspirational status, milestones and completed assets in the infrastructure pipeline.

    Range if completed: 15.0–21.0 out of 30 (equal weights; not yet assessed: expected incremental benefit (Bn), incremental affordability (Co))

  • City-region growth powersDelivery RAG: Red

    Funded now
    Not yet stated in the record.
    The change assessed
    Not yet defined.

    Range if completed: 8.0–17.0 out of 30 (equal weights; not yet assessed: increment beyond baseline (Ad), expected incremental benefit (Bn), incremental affordability (Co))

  • Transport access to jobsDelivery RAG: Amber

    Funded now
    Funded baseline: the Local Authority Bus Grant (£510.8m revenue in 2026–27 including a £30m uplift) and a £2 single-fare cap outside London for 2027 (£400m for England, announced 22 July 2026). Appraising one corridor for access to jobs, with a comparison, is a UK Facts proposal, not government policy.
    The change assessed
    Appraise one defined corridor/service intervention where journey reliability, hours or cost constrain access to jobs.

    Range if completed: 14.0–20.0 out of 30 (equal weights; not yet assessed: expected incremental benefit (Bn), incremental affordability (Co))

Assessed with another page as home

These options also bear on this topic. The full assessment sits on the home page named under each.

  • Skills in the building tradesDelivery RAG: Amber

    Home: Education.

    Funded now
    Baseline: a construction skills package of over £600m (March 2025), ten construction Technical Excellence Colleges, £287m for post-16 places including construction courses (July 2026), and free apprenticeship training for eligible under-25s from August 2026. Completion support targeted at shortage trades is a UK Facts proposal, not government policy.
    The change assessed
    Not yet defined.

    Range if completed: 15.0–21.0 out of 30 (equal weights; not yet assessed: expected incremental benefit (Bn), incremental affordability (Co))

  • Homes built, not just permittedDelivery RAG: Red

    Home: Housing.

    Funded now
    Not yet stated in the record.
    The change assessed
    Not yet defined.

    Range if completed: 14.0–20.0 out of 30 (equal weights; not yet assessed: expected incremental benefit (Bn), incremental affordability (Co))

  • Grid connections and industrial powerDelivery RAG: Red

    Home: Energy.

    Funded now
    Baseline: Ofgem approved the connections reform (Gate 2 firm queue) on 15 April 2025; NESO and the networks are issuing offers (Phase 1 deadline extended to 31 October 2026); Great British Grid was announced on 29 September 2026; industrial price relief (BICS) opens from April 2027. Enforcing the timetable and publishing time to connect as a regular measure is a UK Facts proposal, not government policy.
    The change assessed
    Not yet defined.

    Range if completed: 13.0–19.0 out of 30 (equal weights; not yet assessed: expected incremental benefit (Bn), incremental affordability (Co))

  • Turn research into products and adoptionDelivery RAG: Amber

    Home: Innovation.

    Funded now
    Not yet stated in the record.
    The change assessed
    Not yet defined.

    Range if completed: 11.0–20.0 out of 30 (equal weights; not yet assessed: increment beyond baseline (Ad), expected incremental benefit (Bn), incremental affordability (Co))

  • Cut EU trade friction with a scoped food-and-farm dealDelivery RAG: Red

    Home: Brexit.

    Funded now
    Agreed in principle in May 2025; at September 2026 the FSA reported negotiations “at an advanced stage” after the July 2026 summit was postponed, with implementation planning assuming summer 2027 and legislation expected through an anticipated European Partnership Bill. Not yet an operating agreement.
    The change assessed
    Conclude the SPS agreement.

    Range if completed: 11.0–17.0 out of 30 (equal weights; not yet assessed: expected incremental benefit (Bn), incremental affordability (Co))

  • Childcare places that parents can actually useDelivery RAG: Amber

    Home: Education.

    Funded now
    Funded baseline (England): 30 hours a week for 38 weeks for working parents of children from 9 months (since September 2025), the universal 15 hours for 3–4-year-olds, and 15 hours for disadvantaged 2-year-olds, with £9.5bn for early years in 2026–27; school-based nursery and capital grants add places. Commissioning extra places only where a local gap is shown is a UK Facts proposal, not government policy.
    The change assessed
    Commission specified additional places/hours in demonstrated local supply gaps beyond the funded baseline; adult-carer support remains a separate option.

    Range if completed: 16.0–22.0 out of 30 (equal weights; not yet assessed: expected incremental benefit (Bn), incremental affordability (Co))

  • Employer-linked shortage training beyond constructionDelivery RAG: Amber

    Home: Jobs & pay.

    Funded now
    Not yet stated in the record.
    The change assessed
    Appraise a defined adult or technical training cohort with employer placements in a verified non-construction shortage.

    Range if completed: 15.0–21.0 out of 30 (equal weights; not yet assessed: expected incremental benefit (Bn), incremental affordability (Co))

  • Existing-firm management and technology adoptionDelivery RAG: Amber

    Home: Innovation.

    Funded now
    Funded baseline: Help to Grow: Management (participants pay £750) continues; Made Smarter Adoption runs in all nine English regions (£16m in 2025–26); the Business Growth Service is the national brand. A comparison-based test of diagnostic and adoption support with a productivity outcome is a UK Facts proposal, not government policy.
    The change assessed
    Test targeted diagnostic advice and adoption support for existing firms, with a comparator and a defined productivity outcome.

    Range if completed: 15.0–21.0 out of 30 (equal weights; not yet assessed: expected incremental benefit (Bn), incremental affordability (Co))

Alternatives already on record: 42 options listed under the points in the position today (30 without an action record), and 3 earlier options under other options compared. They have not been scored in the review.

The position today

  • What we can build on (4)
  • What is holding us back (4)Total investment was 18.7% of GDP in 2024, the lowest in the G7 (the other six had a median of 21.8%); the UK was lowest in 23 of the 33 years since 1992. (2024 (G7 comparison since 1992) · United Kingdom and G7)
  • What could improve things (1)Using pipeline data to sequence projects against the workforce, grid and planning capacity they share could turn committed funding into completed assets sooner.
  • What could make it worse (3)

Which quadrant a point sits in is our analytical judgement, not a statistical category. Each point says whether it is a measured fact, our synthesis or a risk.

What we can build on Strengths

What is holding us back Weaknesses

What could improve things Opportunities

What could make it worse Threats

The actions worth examining

Our shortlist for this page. Research quality, policy status, cost and funding are judged separately; none of these is government policy unless its status says so.Our shortlist. None is government policy unless its status says so.

  1. Give productive investment a stable delivery pipeline — programme funding exists; project allocation unconfirmed
  2. Appraise one bus corridor where cost, hours or reliability stop people reaching jobs — not yet costed / funding not identified
  3. Turn permissions into homes people can live in — not yet costed / funding not identified

And 1 more in the full list.

  • Action 1A03Policy status: established

    Give productive investment a stable delivery pipeline

    Publish which pipeline projects are approved and funded, with milestones and maintenance, so firms can invest in skills and capacity ahead of delivery — then judge success by assets completed and used.

    Assessment (draft, 6 October review)

    Who decides:
    HM Treasury and NISTA, with spending departments, devolved governments and local delivery bodies (UK)
    Evidence:
    Modelled scenario. The OBR has modelled what extra public investment does to potential output in general; no study measures the effect of a published pipeline itself.
    Expected effect:
    Direction plausible; size not established.
    Cost and funding

    £725bn in total, “Over the next decade” from June 2025; Spending Review 2025 totals to 2029–30, then grown with forecast inflation (HM Treasury footnote 12). Exact fiscal years are not stated for the headline., cash (nominal) prices; 1 further cost line, some not yet costed

    Funding: Programme funding exists; project allocation unconfirmed

    Why it is shortlisted here: Investment is the page’s central weakness; the pipeline exists, so the test is approved projects completed and used.

    What it takes
    The problem

    UK investment has been low and erratic, so builders, suppliers and investors cannot plan the people and capacity that projects need.

    Who is affected, and where

    Users of transport, energy, water, digital and public-service infrastructure across the UK; construction firms and their workforce. Territory: UK. The Infrastructure Pipeline covers UK government projects plus regulated sectors and mayoral authorities; devolved governments run their own capital programmes, not assessed here.

    Policy status

    Already in place. Already government policy: the 10 Year Infrastructure Strategy (June 2025) commits at least £725bn over a decade and launched an online Infrastructure Pipeline in July 2025, updated at least every six months. UK Facts’ addition is to separate approved from aspirational projects on the page and to count completed, used assets rather than announcements.

    The evidence
    What the research found:
    A permanent rise in public investment of 1% of GDP raises potential output by about 0.4% after five years and 2.4% after 50 years, if projects are as productive as average public capital (OBR). The Resolution Foundation/LSE inquiry found UK firms invested about 20% less than US, French and German firms since 2005.
    Evaluated on:
    UK public capital stock (OBR model); United Kingdom, 5- and 50-year horizons
    Transfer to this case:
    The OBR result is for investment of average productivity; a specific project can do better or worse.
    Our recommendation (separate from the research):
    Report each pipeline project as approved, funded, in delivery or complete, with whole-life and maintenance costs; never present a growth multiplier as a substitute for project costing.
    Strongest counter-evidence:
    Higher capital spending can be wasted where projects are poorly appraised or managed; the NAO finds spending decisions have been short-term, and the Green Book warns of optimism bias. Borrowing to invest raises debt interest, and construction labour is already short.
    Effects on record
    • Potential output: Direction plausible; size not established. modelled, limited confidence; United Kingdom. The OBR’s +0.4% of potential output after five years (2.4% after 50) is for a permanent rise of 1% of GDP in investment of average productivity — not an estimate for a pipeline, and not cash for the Exchequer.
    Cost and funding

    Cost completeness: Published programme envelope; project costs still needed. Funding: Programme funding exists; project allocation unconfirmed.

    • 10 Year Infrastructure Strategy: government infrastructure funding (programme envelope) (capital; paid by central government, councils): £725bn in total, “Over the next decade” from June 2025; Spending Review 2025 totals to 2029–30, then grown with forecast inflation (HM Treasury footnote 12). Exact fiscal years are not stated for the headline., cash (nominal) prices. “At least £725bn”, an internal HM Treasury calculation. It includes housing and energy capital, so it overlaps the Social and Affordable Homes Programme (C-SAHP-ENVELOPE, A02) and Warm Homes funding (A18): never add it to them. Not an award to any project.
    • Project capital, maintenance, financing and workforce costs for pipeline projects (capital; paid by central government, councils, bill-payers, private investors): Not yet costed. Costs exist project by project (the Pipeline lists projects of £25m+ economic and £15m+ social). A national growth multiplier is not a substitute for project costing.
    • Ten-year infrastructure funding commitment (at least £725bn): £725bn — not committed (programme envelope, not a project award). Covers housing and energy capital too; the same money cannot be claimed again for A02 or A18. Project awards come through departmental business cases.
    Who pays:
    Central and local government capital budgets (taxpayers, and future taxpayers through borrowing); bill-payers for regulated water and energy projects; private investors for privately financed schemes.
    Financing proposed:
    Departmental capital settlements to 2029–30 from Spending Review 2025; beyond that, the Strategy’s commitment to grow capital with inflation. Additional projects need an explicit tax, reprioritisation or borrowing decision.
    Gap remaining:
    Unknown at project level: the £725bn is a ten-year cross-sector envelope, and project costs, maintenance and financing are published only project by project.
    What delivery needs
    Skills:
    Construction and engineering workforce, which the Strategy says is in significant deficit.
    Operational capacity:
    Appraisal and commercial capacity in departments and NISTA.
    Infrastructure:
    Grid connections, planning consents and supply chains for each project.
    Permissions:
    Development consent and local planning decisions.
    Law:
    Existing powers; the Planning and Infrastructure Act 2025 changes consenting.
    Public consent:
    Local acceptance of major projects; trade-offs with other spending.
    First step and stages

    First step: For each sector, publish which pipeline projects have approved, funded business cases and which are aspirations, with a milestone for each. (owner: NISTA with HM Treasury and departments)

    1. Classify pipeline projects by approval and funding status — NISTA (proposed stage, not an official timetable)
    2. Appraise and sequence before procurement — Departments, HM Treasury (proposed stage, not an official timetable)
    3. Report milestones, completion and use for each project — NISTA and delivery bodies (proposed stage, not an official timetable)

    Depends on: A01: consents that become starts; A45: shared construction workforce and grid capacity; Spending Review capital settlements

    Trade-offs
    Who gains and who loses:
    Benefits depend on where projects are built and who uses them; costs fall on taxpayers, bill-payers and communities near construction.
    What else the money or effort could do:
    Capital and construction workers used on one project are not available for others or for current services.
    Strongest counterargument:
    Stable plans can lock in poor projects; flexibility to cancel weak schemes also has value.
    Risks:
    Cost escalation, labour shortages, interest costs and counting announcements as delivery.
    How we would judge it
    Baseline:
    Gross fixed capital formation as a share of GDP (UK 18.7% in 2024, lowest in the G7).
    Leading indicator:
    Share of pipeline projects with a funded business case and published milestones.
    Outcome:
    Assets completed and in use; reliability; productivity, with an explicit attribution limit.
    Continue, adapt or stop:
    Continue where projects reach milestones near their published cost; review the pipeline when completions fall persistently behind plan.
    Earlier option on this page

    This card replaces the option “Higher and steadier public investment” (operating: The OBR’s latest forecast has public sector net investment at 2.6% of GDP in 2026–27, 2.5% by 2030–31.). Its evidence: The OBR estimates that a sustained rise in public investment of 1% of GDP raises potential output by about 0.4% after five years and 2.4% after 50 years, if the projects are as productive as the average. The IMF found that in advanced economies a rise of 1 percentage point of GDP raised output by about 0.4% in the same year and 1.5% after four years — but much less where investment was managed inefficiently, and not significantly at all when it was budget-neutral. Both are averages: individual projects range from poor to very high value for money. OBR, Discussion Paper No.5: Public investment and potential output (August 2024) · IMF, World Economic Outlook, October 2014, Chapter 3: Is it time for an infrastructure push? · OBR, Public finances databank: public sector net investment

    Sources

    Source published June 2025 (10 Year Strategy); August 2024 (OBR); December 2023 (Resolution Foundation/LSE); evidence reviewed 2026-10-04. Reconsider if: The next Infrastructure Pipeline update; A Spending Review resets capital budgets; An evaluation of pipeline effects on construction capacity.

    Also on: Economy — one shared record, so its cost is counted once.

  • Action 2A67Policy status: external proposal

    Appraise one bus corridor where cost, hours or reliability stop people reaching jobs

    A defined change to one corridor or service (hours, frequency, reliability or fares) where journeys to work are the constraint makes jobs reachable for people without a car, tested against a comparison corridor.

    Assessment (draft, 6 October review)

    Who decides:
    Local transport authorities and mayoral combined authorities (franchising or enhanced partnerships under the Bus Services Act 2025), with the Department for Transport (England)
    Evidence:
    Observational analysis. British studies associate better public transport access with higher employment, one using instrumental variables; the fare-cap evaluation measured patronage, not jobs; reviews of road and rail investment find mixed employment effects and possible displacement.
    Expected effect:
    Direction plausible; size not established.
    Cost and funding

    Not yet costed

    Funding: Not yet costed / funding not identified

    Why it is shortlisted here: The transport-access option (related to city-region growth, NG2): bus use and access to jobs matter most to people without a car, but no UK study measures the employment effect of a bus change; appraising one corridor against a comparison is the bounded step. City-region growth powers themselves (A57) are not yet a bounded option.

    What it takes
    The problem

    Bus use in England has not recovered to its pre-pandemic level and fares have risen faster than prices; areas with poorer public transport access to jobs have lower employment, but no UK study measures the employment effect of a bus change.

    Who is affected, and where

    Working-age residents without a car along one defined bus corridor in an English city region, where journey times or service hours limit access to employment centres. Territory: England. Buses are devolved in Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland; London runs its own franchised network. Not assessed outside England.

    Policy status

    Proposed by researchers or others, not government policy. Funded baseline: the Local Authority Bus Grant (£510.8m revenue in 2026–27 including a £30m uplift) and a £2 single-fare cap outside London for 2027 (£400m for England, announced 22 July 2026). Appraising one corridor for access to jobs, with a comparison, is a UK Facts proposal, not government policy.

    The evidence
    What the research found:
    Better public transport access raised the probability of being employed, most for people with low incomes, without cars and young people; the £2 cap raised patronage by about 5% with a preliminary benefit-cost ratio of 0.71–0.9, and work trips responded less than leisure trips.
    Evaluated on:
    Working-age people in Great Britain (individual-level models); bus passengers in England outside London (fare cap); Great Britain; England 2023
    Transfer to this case:
    No UK quasi-experimental study measures employment after a bus change; effects may be displacement between areas.
    Our recommendation (separate from the research):
    Choose one corridor with poor access to an employment centre, change the service, and compare employment and journeys with a similar corridor before deciding whether to scale.
    Strongest counter-evidence:
    Most evaluated transport schemes show no or mixed employment effects, and gains may come at the expense of nearby areas.
    Cost and funding

    Cost completeness: Not yet costed. Funding: Not yet costed / funding not identified.

      Who pays:
      Local transport authorities from the Local Authority Bus Grant; the Department for Transport.
      Financing proposed:
      From an authority’s bus grant if it chooses; otherwise not identified.
      Gap remaining:
      Unknown: no corridor has been selected or costed, and there is no employment-based benefit-cost ratio for bus changes.
      What delivery needs
      Skills:
      Transport appraisal and evaluation.
      Operational capacity:
      Operator vehicles and drivers.
      Infrastructure:
      Bus priority where reliability is the constraint.
      Permissions:
      Traffic orders for bus lanes.
      Law:
      None new.
      Public consent:
      Local support for priority measures.
      First step and stages

      First step: A mayoral combined authority selects a corridor using the Transport Connectivity Metric (employment component), defines the service change and a comparison corridor, and publishes the evaluation plan. (owner: Mayoral combined authority with DfT)

      1. Select corridor and comparison — Combined authority (proposed stage, not an official timetable)
      2. Change the service — Combined authority and operators (proposed stage, not an official timetable)
      3. Compare employment and journeys — Combined authority with DfT (proposed stage, not an official timetable)

      Depends on: Data on access to jobs (Transport Connectivity Metric; journey time statistics were discontinued in March 2025)

      Trade-offs
      Who gains and who loses:
      Aimed at people without a car, who are more likely to be on low incomes, young or disabled.
      What else the money or effort could do:
      Bus grant spent on one corridor is not available for network-wide fares or frequency.
      Strongest counterargument:
      Network-wide fare caps reach more people and need no corridor choice.
      Risks:
      Measuring patronage rather than employment; displacement of jobs between areas.
      How we would judge it
      Baseline:
      Year ending March 2025: 3.7bn bus journeys in England (90% of 2019–20); local bus fares up 7% against CPI inflation of 3%.
      Leading indicator:
      Journeys on the corridor; reliability.
      Outcome:
      Employment of corridor residents against the comparison corridor.
      Continue, adapt or stop:
      Scale only if employment rises relative to the comparison without evidence of displacement.
      Sources

      Source published 26 November 2025 (DfT bus statistics); 12 February 2025 (fare-cap evaluation); 2022 (Bastiaanssen et al.); evidence reviewed 2026-10-07. Reconsider if: Annual bus statistics, year ending March 2026; The devolution white paper and Budget roadmap.

    • Action 3A01Policy status: site-editorial action

      Turn permissions into homes people can live in

      Name the blocker, owner and infrastructure cost for each priority site, then fund and sequence the connections that let building start.

      The thread: issue, evidence, action

      1. Issue Weakness (Housing): England added 208,600 homes, against about 300,000 a year implied by the government’s 1.5 million ambition. Also: threat, opportunityHow acting here reaches it: Consents that turn into starts are the step between permissions and the homes the growth plan depends on; the housing page measures the shortfall in net additions.
      2. Evidence Net additional homes
      3. Action A01, this action

      Assessment (draft, 6 October review)

      • A new scope of this action (A01v2): Homes built, not just permitted

        Delivery RAG: RedGate: pending

        Range if completed: 14.0–20.0 out of 30 (equal weights; not yet assessed: expected incremental benefit (Bn), incremental affordability (Co))

        National plan: Growth and prosperity list

      Who decides:
      MHCLG and local planning authorities, with utilities, transport bodies and developers (England)
      Evidence:
      Modelled scenario. The underlying reforms have an official modelled estimate; this site-by-site package has not been evaluated.
      Expected effect:
      Direction plausible; size not established.
      Cost and funding

      Not yet costed

      Funding: Not yet costed / funding not identified

      Why it is shortlisted here: Homes and infrastructure need consents that turn into starts; permissions are an intermediate step, not delivery.

      What it takes
      The problem

      Permissions and plans do not become occupied homes when sites are held up by missing infrastructure, viability, finance or builders.

      Who is affected, and where

      Households who need a home in high-demand areas of England. Territory: England. Planning is devolved: Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland run separate systems and would need their own decisions; not assessed here.

      Policy status

      UK Facts proposal. Builds on reforms already in place: the National Planning Policy Framework published on 17 August 2026, which replaced the December 2024 version, and the Planning and Infrastructure Act 2025 (Royal Assent 18 December 2025). The site-by-site blocker list is a UK Facts proposal, not government policy.

      The evidence
      What the research found:
      The OBR judged that the revised planning framework would add about 170,000 net additional homes over 2025–26 to 2029–30. LSE’s qualitative research stresses certainty and meaningful participation; Centre for Cities proposes zoning instead but gives no estimate of its effect.
      Evaluated on:
      UK housing stock in the OBR forecast; qualitative research with planners and landowners; England, 2025–2030 forecast period
      Transfer to this case:
      The OBR estimate is for the reforms already enacted, not for any further package.
      Our recommendation (separate from the research):
      Publish the blocker, owner and cost for a small set of priority sites and count occupied homes, not permissions.
      Strongest counter-evidence:
      Centre for Cities argues incremental reform of a discretionary system cannot close the gap and proposes zoning; neither approach has a UK effect estimate.
      Effects on record
      • Net additional homes: Direction plausible; size not established. modelled, limited confidence; England. The OBR’s 170,000 extra homes by 2029–30 is its judgement of the 2024 planning reforms already in place, not of this site-by-site package, whose marginal effect has not been estimated.
      Cost and funding

      Cost completeness: Not yet costed. Funding: Not yet costed / funding not identified.

      • Planning staff, site infrastructure and financing for priority sites (capital; paid by central government, councils, developers): Not yet costed. No defensible national price found. Planning capacity (recurring), utilities and transport connections (capital) and financing must be costed separately for each site.
      Who pays:
      Central government and councils for planning capacity and enabling infrastructure; developers through fees and contributions; utilities and their bill-payers for connections.
      Financing proposed:
      Planning fees, developer contributions and named infrastructure allocations — each to be checked for legal use and timing.
      Gap remaining:
      Unknown until priority sites are costed.
      What delivery needs
      Skills:
      Planning officers and infrastructure specialists in councils.
      Operational capacity:
      Site-level data on blockers.
      Infrastructure:
      Water, power and transport connections.
      Permissions:
      Local plans and permissions.
      Law:
      Powers exist under current planning law.
      Public consent:
      Local consent for development; environmental trade-offs.
      First step and stages

      First step: Publish the actual blocker, owner and infrastructure cost for a small set of priority sites. (owner: MHCLG with local planning authorities)

      1. Select sites and diagnose blockers — MHCLG and councils (proposed stage, not an official timetable)
      2. Fund and sequence connections — Treasury, utilities, councils (proposed stage, not an official timetable)
      3. Build and occupy — Developers and housing associations (proposed stage, not an official timetable)

      Depends on: Construction workforce; Utility connection capacity

      Trade-offs
      Who gains and who loses:
      Gains for future residents and those who need affordable homes; costs for neighbouring residents (disruption, green space) and for whoever funds infrastructure.
      What else the money or effort could do:
      Infrastructure money and planning staff spent here are not available for other sites or services.
      Strongest counterargument:
      Faster permission alone may not make sites viable or speed building, which depends on demand, finance and builders.
      Risks:
      Local opposition, environmental harm, construction capacity limits and counting permissions as delivery.
      How we would judge it
      Baseline:
      Net additional dwellings, England (MHCLG Live Table 120).
      Leading indicator:
      Time from application to start on site at priority sites.
      Outcome:
      Net additional and occupied homes, affordable tenure and rents relative to income.
      Continue, adapt or stop:
      Continue where priority sites start faster than comparable sites; stop funding sites whose blocker is not infrastructure.
      Earlier option on this page

      This card replaces the option “Faster consent for infrastructure and homes” (legislated: Planning and Infrastructure Act 2025 received Royal Assent on 18 December 2025. The OBR’s homes estimate is for the earlier December 2024 framework changes, not this Act.). Its evidence: The OBR estimated in March 2025 that the December 2024 changes to the National Planning Policy Framework would raise housebuilding by about 170,000 homes over five years — a conditional, modelled effect, not an observed one. That estimate predates the Planning and Infrastructure Act 2025 and does not cover it: there is no comparable official estimate for the Act or for infrastructure consenting, and faster decisions do not by themselves start construction. OBR, Economic and fiscal outlook, March 2025 (planning reforms) · OBR, The supply-side impact of planning reforms (14 August 2025) · Planning and Infrastructure Act 2025 (c. 34)

      Sources

      Source published March 2025 (OBR); 2025 (LSE); February 2025 (Centre for Cities); evidence reviewed 2026-10-04. Reconsider if: The OBR publishes a new estimate of the planning reforms; Net additions move decisively away from the 2024–25 level; The government publishes site-level infrastructure data.

      Also on: Housing, Economy — one shared record, so its cost is counted once.

    • Action 4A45Policy status: site-editorial action

      Sequence reforms that depend on the same people and infrastructure

      Use one dependency map to identify the critical path and competing claims on the same workforce, grid and funding, and sequence prerequisites before the projects that depend on them.

      The thread: issue, evidence, action

      1. Issue Weakness: The government reports flat on-site labour productivity in construction and a significant construction workforce deficit. Also: threat, opportunity
      2. Evidence citb-construction-workers-needed; Net additional homes
      3. Action A45, this action

      Assessment (draft, 6 October review)

      Not assessed in the 6 October review; this action stays in the topic plan with its own evidence.

      Who decides:
      Cross-government delivery leadership (HM Treasury, NISTA, Cabinet Office) with local and devolved bodies (UK)
      Evidence:
      Untested proposal. Editorial synthesis supported by official statements of shared constraints; there is no estimate of what sequencing adds.
      Expected effect:
      Direction plausible; size not established.
      Cost and funding

      Not yet costed

      Funding: Not yet costed / funding not identified

      Why it is shortlisted here: Housing, energy and transport compete for the same workers and connections; sequencing is the missing step.

      What it takes
      The problem

      Housing, energy, transport and public-service programmes draw on the same construction workers, grid capacity and planning staff, so announcing them together does not mean they can be delivered together.

      Who is affected, and where

      Everyone affected by infrastructure, housing and energy programmes in the UK. Territory: UK. Delivery bodies differ across the four nations; a UK map needs devolved partners.

      Policy status

      UK Facts proposal. UK Facts synthesis. The 10 Year Infrastructure Strategy says pipeline data will inform skills demand and the sequencing of government projects; a published cross-domain dependency map is our proposal.

      The evidence
      What the research found:
      The 10 Year Strategy reports flat on-site labour productivity and a significant construction workforce deficit, and says pipeline data should support sequencing and skills planning. The NAO finds spending decisions short-term and reactive.
      Evaluated on:
      UK infrastructure and housing programmes; United Kingdom, 2025–2035
      Our recommendation (separate from the research):
      Publish a dependency map naming which constraint each package addresses, and inherit each action’s costs once rather than creating a package total.
      Strongest counter-evidence:
      Coordination adds overhead and can relabel unrelated policies as a package; synergies can be overstated.
      Cost and funding

      Cost completeness: Not yet costed. Funding: Not yet costed / funding not identified.

      • Cross-government coordination and shared-capacity planning (administration; paid by central government): Not yet costed. Component costs are inherited once through each action’s own cost IDs (A01, A03 and others); this line covers coordination only.
      Who pays:
      Central government (coordination staff); component costs stay with each action and are counted once.
      Financing proposed:
      None separate: aggregate only components that are funded on matched years; the package is partly funded while any dependency lacks cover.
      Gap remaining:
      Unknown: coordination capacity not costed; component gaps are shown on each action.
      What delivery needs
      Skills:
      Delivery and workforce planners.
      Operational capacity:
      Shared data on workforce, grid and planning capacity.
      Infrastructure:
      None beyond data.
      Permissions:
      None.
      Law:
      None.
      Public consent:
      Departments accepting a sequence that delays some projects.
      First step and stages

      First step: Identify the critical path and competing claims on the same workforce, grid capacity and funds for current growth packages. (owner: NISTA with HM Treasury)

      1. Build a dependency map from pipeline data — NISTA (proposed stage, not an official timetable)
      2. Sequence prerequisites before dependent projects — HM Treasury and departments (proposed stage, not an official timetable)
      3. Review when conditions change — NISTA (proposed stage, not an official timetable)

      Depends on: A01; A03; Grid connections reform; Construction skills supply

      Trade-offs
      Who gains and who loses:
      Projects delayed by sequencing lose; projects with ready prerequisites gain.
      What else the money or effort could do:
      Coordination time; some projects wait.
      Strongest counterargument:
      Markets and delivery bodies already adjust to constraints; central sequencing can be slow.
      Risks:
      False synergies, coordination overhead and relabelling.
      How we would judge it
      Baseline:
      Apprenticeship starts 353,500 in 2024/25, below 393,380 in 2018/19 (DfE).
      Leading indicator:
      Critical-path milestones met; bottlenecks resolved.
      Outcome:
      Domain outcomes (homes, connections, assets in use) with attribution limits.
      Continue, adapt or stop:
      Drop the map if it does not change any sequencing decision within two planning cycles.
      Sources

      Source published June 2025 (10 Year Strategy); October 2024 (NAO); evidence reviewed 2026-10-04. Reconsider if: Pipeline updates; New construction workforce data.

    How the options are assessed

    One shared record per option — the same one the national plan reads. Delivery RAG, gate and list membership are separate judgements.

    • Steady public investment through a published pipeline — Amber delivery RAG; gate pending
    • City-region growth powers — Red delivery RAG; gate pending
    • Transport access to jobs — Amber delivery RAG; gate pending

    Provisional single-reviewer assessments from the 6 October 2026 review; not approved business cases, and not government policy.

    • A03Delivery RAG: AmberGate: pending

      Steady public investment through a published pipeline

      Existing action A03, assessed at the same scope.

      Provisional single-reviewer assessment; not an approved business case.

      Who and where
      Users of transport, energy, water, digital and public-service infrastructure across the UK; construction firms and their workforce. (from the action record) Jurisdiction: UK.
      Result so far
      Range if completed: 15.0–21.0 out of 30 (equal weights; not yet assessed: expected incremental benefit (Bn), incremental affordability (Co))
      Funded now (baseline)
      Already government policy: the 10 Year Infrastructure Strategy (June 2025) commits at least £725bn over a decade and launched an online Infrastructure Pipeline in July 2025, updated at least every six months. UK Facts’ addition is to separate approved from aspirational projects on the page and to count completed, used assets rather than announcements. (from the action record)
      The change assessed (marginal)
      Approved-versus-aspirational status, milestones and completed assets in the infrastructure pipeline. (from the superseded 4 October selection table)
      What the evidence supports—and the next decision

      A pipeline makes intended investment visible; it does not make every listed project approved, affordable or deliverable.

      Codex — AI-assisted analytical follow-up · 8 October 2026. Proposed appraisal design; the attributed scores below are unchanged. No funding or delivery agreement is implied.

      Define the change
      Publish approval status, milestones, whole-life cost and delivery confidence for a defined portfolio, alongside the existing pipeline.
      Test whether it works
      Compare forecast and actual completion, service availability and cost at successive decision points. Record cancelled projects and changed scope rather than dropping them from the denominator.
      Establish the cost
      Appraise projects individually with maintenance, renewal, optimism bias and opportunity cost. Keep the small cost of better portfolio information separate from the assets themselves.
      Protect against harm
      Do not promise simultaneous delivery beyond shared construction, grid or specialist capacity.

      Read with the outcome evidence and sources in the full assessment. Monitoring proposals are not existing baseline measurements. A numerical benefit or cost score needs evidence for the defined increment, not just the scale of the problem.

      Full assessment of Steady public investment through a published pipeline: ten criteria, scenarios, delivery, costs and monitoring
      The ten criteria (0–3)

      Each criterion is scored 0 to 3 by the reviewer. “Not yet assessed” means unknown: it is never counted as zero.

      1. Scale and severity (Sc)3 of 3 — Severe harm across a broad population

        Reviewer’s reason: Provisional problem-importance judgement from linked site pages; not the scale of achievable benefit.

      2. Increment beyond baseline (Ad)2 of 3 — Specific material change to existing delivery

        Reviewer’s reason: Distinguish funded projects from aspirations; sequence resources; name owners and independent assurance; protect maintenance. A missing rating requires a defined marginal change.

      3. Confidence in the proposed action (Ev)1 of 3 — Indirect, mixed, modelled or weak causal support

        Reviewer’s reason: Macro modelling and delivery audits support the rationale; they do not evaluate the incremental publication or coordination change.

      4. Expected incremental benefit (Bn)Not yet assessed

        Reviewer’s reason: Unknown unless a reasonably defined target-population benefit can be judged; no bonus merely for spanning domains.

      5. Residual harms (Hm)2 of 3 — Manageable harm with specified safeguards

        Reviewer’s reason: Double-counting housing/grid benefits; shared workforce bottlenecks.

      6. Incremental affordability (Co)Not yet assessed

        Reviewer’s reason: Project lifetime costs, optimism bias, maintenance, financing and the coordination team. The headline strategy is an overlapping envelope.

      7. Delivery capacity (Ca)1 of 3 — Binding scarce resource

        Reviewer’s reason: Distinguish funded projects from aspirations; sequence resources; name owners and independent assurance; protect maintenance.

      8. Distribution (Fa)2 of 3 — Mixed or broadly neutral with safeguards

        Reviewer’s reason: Provisional distribution judgement for the stated target; verify who pays, who gains and excluded groups.

      9. Meaningful first outcome (Ti)2 of 3 — More than one and up to three years

        Reviewer’s reason: First meaningful outcome, not announcement: Milestones, outturn cost and service outcomes for selected projects.

      10. Readiness (Rd)2 of 3 — Named commissioning/allocation/coordination step

        Reviewer’s reason: Treasury, infrastructure bodies, departments and devolved governments; Project appraisal and sequencing

      Four weightings

      Normalised as 10 × weighted sum ÷ sum of weights, on a 0–30 scale. Where a criterion is not yet assessed, the range is the lowest and highest result if it were later scored 0 or 3 — not a score, a confidence interval or a rank.

      • Equal weights: Range if completed: 15.0–21.0 out of 30. Not yet assessed: expected incremental benefit (Bn), incremental affordability (Co). Funding gate: not passed.
      • Evidence doubled: Range if completed: 14.5–20.0 out of 30. Not yet assessed: expected incremental benefit (Bn), incremental affordability (Co). Funding gate: not passed.
      • Scale doubled: Range if completed: 16.4–21.8 out of 30. Not yet assessed: expected incremental benefit (Bn), incremental affordability (Co). Funding gate: not passed.
      • Cost ignored (the funding gate still applies): Range if completed: 16.7–20.0 out of 30. Not yet assessed: expected incremental benefit (Bn), incremental affordability (Co). Funding gate: not passed.

      Funding gate: Not passed — the cost is not yet assessed or no allocation is committed for this scope. Ignoring cost in a weighting never removes the gate.

      Delivery RAG and gate

      Delivery RAG shown: AmberReview’s claim: Amber. Best the recorded evidence allows: Amber.

      Review’s reason: Project lifetime costs, optimism bias, maintenance, financing and the coordination team. The headline strategy is an overlapping envelope.

      Why it is not Green yet

      • Scope (population, place and increment) not verified against the delivery baseline.
      • No verified owner with the powers in place.
      • Delivery capacity not verified.
      • Lifetime incremental costs not complete.
      • No credible funding (a committed allocation for the scope).
      • Safeguards not specified.
      • Monitoring lacks a metric, a data source or a baseline.

      Green needs verified scope, a verified owner with the powers, verified capacity, complete lifetime costs with credible funding, specified safeguards and monitoring with a metric, source and baseline. Amber means appraisal gaps remain; Red means a material delivery obstacle. Red does not mean unimportant.

      Gate: Pending — appraisal incomplete (review label: “Pending: incomplete appraisal”).

      Why: Scores incomplete; Funding gate not passed (cost unknown or no credible funding).

      The gate is separate from national list membership: being listed does not make an option eligible, and an eligible option need not be listed.

      Cost and funding

      Lifetime costing: Partial — some lines costed, no whole-life total. Review: “Full incremental costing not established in reviewed material”.

      • 10 Year Infrastructure Strategy: government infrastructure funding (programme envelope) (published programme envelope; C-10YIS-ENVELOPE)
      • Project capital, maintenance, financing and workforce costs for pipeline projects (not costed; C-A03-PROJECTS)

      Still to cost: Project lifetime costs, optimism bias, maintenance, financing and the coordination team. The headline strategy is an overlapping envelope.

      Funding status: programme route, not allocated.

      Owner, powers and capacity

      Proposed owner: Treasury, infrastructure bodies, departments and devolved governments (proposed, unverified).

      Powers: needs a decision or allocation. Capacity: binding constraint.

      Powers and capacity read from the review’s Rd and Ca anchors; no proposed owner has agreed to act (the review: “Proposed owners have not agreed to act”).

      England:
      HM Treasury and NISTA, with spending departments, devolved governments and local delivery bodies (action record)
      Scotland:
      HM Treasury and NISTA, with spending departments, devolved governments and local delivery bodies (action record)
      Wales:
      HM Treasury and NISTA, with spending departments, devolved governments and local delivery bodies (action record)
      Northern Ireland:
      HM Treasury and NISTA, with spending departments, devolved governments and local delivery bodies (action record)

      The Infrastructure Pipeline covers UK government projects plus regulated sectors and mayoral authorities; devolved governments run their own capital programmes, not assessed here.

      Dependencies, safeguards and risks

      Depends on: None recorded.

      Safeguards

      • protect maintenance (proposed, not yet specified)

      Risks and residual harms: Double-counting housing/grid benefits; shared workforce bottlenecks.

      Monitoring and measured results

      Metric: Milestones, outturn cost and service outcomes for selected projects.

      Data source: Not yet named. Baseline: Not yet established.

      Measures already on the domain page

      A page measure is not necessarily the review’s metric; linking the two is an editorial decision still to be made.

      Evidence for the outcome
      Review record

      Assessment version: working-review-2026-10-06 (A03@working-review-2026-10-06).

      Reviewer: Author of the review blueprint (single reviewer, not named in uk-facts-complete-plan.json). Reviewed: 6 October 2026.

      Scored in the working review of 6 October 2026 on the shared ten-criterion scale (one reviewer); not independently calibrated.

      First 90 days (review): Produce a signed scope and current-delivery baseline; Distinguish funded projects from aspirations; sequence resources; name owners and independent assurance; protect maintenance. Obtain incremental costs and an accountable decision before expansion.

      Decision route: Project appraisal and sequencing

      An earlier assessment exists on the 4 October 2026 selection table (nine H/M/L bands; superseded 7 October 2026). Its bands are kept, not converted into these scores.

      An editorial screening framework by one reviewer, not a formal appraisal or business case. Proposed owners have not agreed to act.

    • A57Delivery RAG: RedGate: pending

      City-region growth powers

      Proposed new action A57; sourced research home and appraisal design; scope and funding remain provisional.

      Provisional single-reviewer assessment; not an approved business case.

      Who and where
      Population not yet defined. Jurisdiction: not defined.
      Result so far
      Range if completed: 8.0–17.0 out of 30 (equal weights; not yet assessed: increment beyond baseline (Ad), expected incremental benefit (Bn), incremental affordability (Co))
      Funded now (baseline)
      Funded baseline not yet stated
      The change assessed (marginal)
      Marginal change not yet defined
      What the evidence supports—and the next decision

      Moving powers changes who decides; it does not itself identify an additional project or a growth effect.

      Codex — AI-assisted analytical follow-up · 8 October 2026. Proposed appraisal design; the attributed scores below are unchanged. No funding or delivery agreement is implied.

      Define the change
      Name the power, place and funded responsibility to be transferred beyond the current integrated settlement.
      Test whether it works
      Decision time, delivery and resident outcomes for that function against an explicit counterfactual. Separate local gains from activity displaced from other places.
      Establish the cost
      Transition, staff, data, accountability and the underlying service budget. A transfer between public bodies is not extra national spending.
      Protect against harm
      Publish local scrutiny, equalities and spillover arrangements before attributing a growth benefit.

      Read with the outcome evidence and sources in the full assessment. Monitoring proposals are not existing baseline measurements. A numerical benefit or cost score needs evidence for the defined increment, not just the scale of the problem.

      Full assessment of City-region growth powers: ten criteria, scenarios, delivery, costs and monitoring
      The ten criteria (0–3)

      Each criterion is scored 0 to 3 by the reviewer. “Not yet assessed” means unknown: it is never counted as zero.

      1. Scale and severity (Sc)2 of 3 — Serious harm to a defined group or widespread moderate harm

        Reviewer’s reason: Provisional problem-importance judgement from linked site pages; not the scale of achievable benefit.

      2. Increment beyond baseline (Ad)Not yet assessed

        Reviewer’s reason: Specify powers, stable budgets and accountability; integrate transport, housing and skills; assess local capacity. A missing rating requires a defined marginal change.

      3. Confidence in the proposed action (Ev)0 of 3 — No effect evaluation

        Reviewer’s reason: Regional productivity gaps establish need, not the causal benefit of an unspecified devolution package.

      4. Expected incremental benefit (Bn)Not yet assessed

        Reviewer’s reason: Unknown unless a reasonably defined target-population benefit can be judged; no bonus merely for spanning domains.

      5. Residual harms (Hm)1 of 3 — Material harm/unresolved mitigation

        Reviewer’s reason: Institutional change and capacity gaps; gains may relocate activity.

      6. Incremental affordability (Co)Not yet assessed

        Reviewer’s reason: Administrative transition, funded responsibilities, investment and evaluation; distinguish transfers from new resources.

      7. Delivery capacity (Ca)1 of 3 — Binding scarce resource

        Reviewer’s reason: Specify powers, stable budgets and accountability; integrate transport, housing and skills; assess local capacity.

      8. Distribution (Fa)2 of 3 — Mixed or broadly neutral with safeguards

        Reviewer’s reason: Provisional distribution judgement for the stated target; verify who pays, who gains and excluded groups.

      9. Meaningful first outcome (Ti)1 of 3 — More than three but less than ten years

        Reviewer’s reason: First meaningful outcome, not announcement: Access to jobs, productivity, earnings and inclusion in defined places.

      10. Readiness (Rd)1 of 3 — Legislation/external agreement or major enabling work

        Reviewer’s reason: Central government, mayors/local authorities; nation-specific arrangements; Specify powers and place-based appraisal

      Four weightings

      Normalised as 10 × weighted sum ÷ sum of weights, on a 0–30 scale. Where a criterion is not yet assessed, the range is the lowest and highest result if it were later scored 0 or 3 — not a score, a confidence interval or a rank.

      • Equal weights: Range if completed: 8.0–17.0 out of 30. Not yet assessed: increment beyond baseline (Ad), expected incremental benefit (Bn), incremental affordability (Co). Funding gate: not passed.
      • Evidence doubled: Range if completed: 7.3–15.5 out of 30. Not yet assessed: increment beyond baseline (Ad), expected incremental benefit (Bn), incremental affordability (Co). Funding gate: not passed.
      • Scale doubled: Range if completed: 9.1–17.3 out of 30. Not yet assessed: increment beyond baseline (Ad), expected incremental benefit (Bn), incremental affordability (Co). Funding gate: not passed.
      • Cost ignored (the funding gate still applies): Range if completed: 8.9–15.6 out of 30. Not yet assessed: increment beyond baseline (Ad), expected incremental benefit (Bn), incremental affordability (Co). Funding gate: not passed.

      Funding gate: Not passed — the cost is not yet assessed or no allocation is committed for this scope. Ignoring cost in a weighting never removes the gate.

      Delivery RAG and gate

      Delivery RAG shown: RedReview’s claim: Red. Best the recorded evidence allows: Red.

      Review’s reason: Institutional change and capacity gaps; gains may relocate activity.

      Why it is not Green yet

      • Delivery obstacle: Institutional change and capacity gaps; gains may relocate activity..
      • Scope (population, place and increment) not verified against the delivery baseline.
      • No verified owner with the powers in place.
      • Delivery capacity not verified.
      • Lifetime incremental costs not complete.
      • No credible funding (a committed allocation for the scope).
      • Safeguards not specified.
      • Monitoring lacks a metric, a data source or a baseline.

      Green needs verified scope, a verified owner with the powers, verified capacity, complete lifetime costs with credible funding, specified safeguards and monitoring with a metric, source and baseline. Amber means appraisal gaps remain; Red means a material delivery obstacle. Red does not mean unimportant.

      Gate: Pending — appraisal incomplete (review label: “Pending: incomplete appraisal”).

      Why: Scores incomplete; Funding gate not passed (cost unknown or no credible funding).

      The gate is separate from national list membership: being listed does not make an option eligible, and an eligible option need not be listed.

      Cost and funding

      Lifetime costing: Not established. Review: “Full incremental costing not established in reviewed material”.

      Still to cost: Administrative transition, funded responsibilities, investment and evaluation; distinguish transfers from new resources.

      Funding status: not established in review.

      Owner, powers and capacity

      Proposed owner: Central government, mayors/local authorities; nation-specific arrangements (proposed, unverified).

      Powers: needs legislation or external agreement. Capacity: binding constraint.

      Powers and capacity read from the review’s Rd and Ca anchors; no proposed owner has agreed to act (the review: “Proposed owners have not agreed to act”).

      England:
      not assessed
      Scotland:
      not assessed
      Wales:
      not assessed
      Northern Ireland:
      not assessed

      Not defined in the review.

      Dependencies, safeguards and risks

      Depends on: None recorded.

      Safeguards

      None specified yet.

      Risks and residual harms: Institutional change and capacity gaps; gains may relocate activity.

      Monitoring and measured results

      Metric: Access to jobs, productivity, earnings and inclusion in defined places.

      Data source: Not yet named. Baseline: Not yet established.

      Evidence for the outcome
      Review record

      Assessment version: working-review-2026-10-06 (A57@working-review-2026-10-06).

      Reviewer: Author of the review blueprint (single reviewer, not named in uk-facts-complete-plan.json). Reviewed: 6 October 2026.

      Scored in the working review of 6 October 2026 on the shared ten-criterion scale (one reviewer); not independently calibrated.

      First 90 days (review): Produce a signed scope and current-delivery baseline; Specify powers, stable budgets and accountability; integrate transport, housing and skills; assess local capacity. Obtain incremental costs and an accountable decision before expansion.

      Decision route: Specify powers and place-based appraisal

      An editorial screening framework by one reviewer, not a formal appraisal or business case. Proposed owners have not agreed to act.

    • A67Delivery RAG: AmberGate: pending

      Transport access to jobs

      Existing action A67, assessed at the same scope.

      Not stated in the review record; treated as a provisional single-reviewer assessment, not an approved business case.

      Who and where
      Working-age residents without a car along one defined bus corridor in an English city region, where journey times or service hours limit access to employment centres. (from the action record) Jurisdiction: England.
      Result so far
      Range if completed: 14.0–20.0 out of 30 (equal weights; not yet assessed: expected incremental benefit (Bn), incremental affordability (Co))
      Funded now (baseline)
      Funded baseline: the Local Authority Bus Grant (£510.8m revenue in 2026–27 including a £30m uplift) and a £2 single-fare cap outside London for 2027 (£400m for England, announced 22 July 2026). Appraising one corridor for access to jobs, with a comparison, is a UK Facts proposal, not government policy. (from the action record)
      The change assessed (marginal)
      Appraise one defined corridor/service intervention where journey reliability, hours or cost constrain access to jobs. (from the 6 October review)
      What the evidence supports—and the next decision

      More passenger journeys do not establish additional employment. The transport intervention must address a demonstrated access constraint.

      Codex — AI-assisted analytical follow-up · 8 October 2026. Proposed appraisal design; the attributed scores below are unchanged. No funding or delivery agreement is implied.

      Define the change
      Appraise a named corridor and change in hours, reliability, frequency or fares against existing services.
      Test whether it works
      Door-to-door access to suitable jobs, reliability, sustained employment and displacement; assess accessibility as well as average journey time.
      Establish the cost
      Vehicles, operating hours, maintenance, subsidy and infrastructure net of fares; include ongoing operation after capital funding ends.
      Protect against harm
      Protect disabled and rural users and assess effects on other routes. Do not label old discontinued journey-time statistics as current.

      Read with the outcome evidence and sources in the full assessment. Monitoring proposals are not existing baseline measurements. A numerical benefit or cost score needs evidence for the defined increment, not just the scale of the problem.

      Full assessment of Transport access to jobs: ten criteria, scenarios, delivery, costs and monitoring
      The ten criteria (0–3)

      Each criterion is scored 0 to 3 by the reviewer. “Not yet assessed” means unknown: it is never counted as zero.

      1. Scale and severity (Sc)2 of 3 — Serious harm to a defined group or widespread moderate harm

      2. Increment beyond baseline (Ad)2 of 3 — Specific material change to existing delivery

      3. Confidence in the proposed action (Ev)1 of 3 — Indirect, mixed, modelled or weak causal support

      4. Expected incremental benefit (Bn)Not yet assessed

      5. Residual harms (Hm)1 of 3 — Material harm/unresolved mitigation

      6. Incremental affordability (Co)Not yet assessed

      7. Delivery capacity (Ca)1 of 3 — Binding scarce resource

      8. Distribution (Fa)3 of 3 — Benefits concentrated on disadvantaged people with assessed burdens

      9. Meaningful first outcome (Ti)2 of 3 — More than one and up to three years

      10. Readiness (Rd)2 of 3 — Named commissioning/allocation/coordination step

      Four weightings

      Normalised as 10 × weighted sum ÷ sum of weights, on a 0–30 scale. Where a criterion is not yet assessed, the range is the lowest and highest result if it were later scored 0 or 3 — not a score, a confidence interval or a rank.

      • Equal weights: Range if completed: 14.0–20.0 out of 30. Not yet assessed: expected incremental benefit (Bn), incremental affordability (Co). Funding gate: not passed.
      • Evidence doubled: Range if completed: 13.6–19.1 out of 30. Not yet assessed: expected incremental benefit (Bn), incremental affordability (Co). Funding gate: not passed.
      • Scale doubled: Range if completed: 14.5–20.0 out of 30. Not yet assessed: expected incremental benefit (Bn), incremental affordability (Co). Funding gate: not passed.
      • Cost ignored (the funding gate still applies): Range if completed: 15.6–18.9 out of 30. Not yet assessed: expected incremental benefit (Bn), incremental affordability (Co). Funding gate: not passed.

      Funding gate: Not passed — the cost is not yet assessed or no allocation is committed for this scope. Ignoring cost in a weighting never removes the gate.

      Delivery RAG and gate

      Delivery RAG shown: AmberReview’s claim: Amber. Best the recorded evidence allows: Amber.

      Review’s reason: Name route/mode, baseline users, service hours and comparator; cost operation, capital, subsidy and maintenance. Assess accessibility and displacement, not gross local job counts. Proposed owners: transport authorities/operators and relevant national bodies.

      Why it is not Green yet

      • Scope (population, place and increment) not verified against the delivery baseline.
      • No verified owner with the powers in place.
      • Delivery capacity not verified.
      • Lifetime incremental costs not complete.
      • No credible funding (a committed allocation for the scope).
      • Safeguards not specified.
      • Monitoring lacks a metric, a data source or a baseline.

      Green needs verified scope, a verified owner with the powers, verified capacity, complete lifetime costs with credible funding, specified safeguards and monitoring with a metric, source and baseline. Amber means appraisal gaps remain; Red means a material delivery obstacle. Red does not mean unimportant.

      Gate: Pending — appraisal incomplete (review label: “Pending baseline verification, incremental costing and funding; not a rollout approval”).

      Why: Scores incomplete; Funding gate not passed (cost unknown or no credible funding).

      The gate is separate from national list membership: being listed does not make an option eligible, and an eligible option need not be listed.

      Cost and funding

      Lifetime costing: Not established. Review: “Not fully costed in this review”.

      Still to cost: Name route/mode, baseline users, service hours and comparator; cost operation, capital, subsidy and maintenance. Assess accessibility and displacement, not gross local job counts. Proposed owners: transport authorities/operators and relevant national bodies.

      Funding status: not identified.

      Owner, powers and capacity

      Proposed owner: transport authorities/operators and relevant national bodies (proposed, unverified).

      Powers: needs a decision or allocation. Capacity: binding constraint.

      Powers and capacity read from the review’s Rd and Ca anchors; no proposed owner has agreed to act (the review: “Proposed owners have not agreed to act”).

      England:
      Local transport authorities and mayoral combined authorities (franchising or enhanced partnerships under the Bus Services Act 2025), with the Department for Transport (action record)
      Scotland:
      not assessed
      Wales:
      not assessed
      Northern Ireland:
      not assessed

      Buses are devolved in Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland; London runs its own franchised network. Not assessed outside England.

      Dependencies, safeguards and risks

      Depends on: None recorded.

      Safeguards

      None specified yet.

      Monitoring and measured results

      Metric: Define and baseline the outcome described in delivery requirements before approval.

      Data source: Not yet named. Baseline: Not yet established.

      Measures already on the domain page

      A page measure is not necessarily the review’s metric; linking the two is an editorial decision still to be made.

      Evidence for the outcome

      Outcome: Define and baseline the outcome described in delivery requirements before approval.

      Transport evidence shows mixed employment effects and possible displacement. No selected corridor or mode has a costed case here.

      Sources: whatworksgrowth.org (P-GC-WWG-TRANSPORT-2015)

      Review record

      Assessment version: working-review-2026-10-06 (A67@working-review-2026-10-06).

      Reviewer: Author of the review blueprint (single reviewer, not named in uk-facts-complete-plan.json). Reviewed: 6 October 2026.

      Scored in the working review of 6 October 2026 on the shared ten-criterion scale (one reviewer); not independently calibrated.

      An editorial screening framework by one reviewer, not a formal appraisal or business case. Proposed owners have not agreed to act.

    Decision briefs

    • Publish what is ready to build — projects and housing sites — with each blocker’s owner and cost
    • Sequence one blocked class of projects: large new grid demand connections, against the workers and capacity they share

    The leading option set out as a decision someone could take: who decides, who benefits, the best evidence, cost and funding, and the main trade-off. The full research record is one click away.

    Decision briefExisting programmeReviewed 2026-10-04

    Publish what is ready to build — projects and housing sites — with each blocker’s owner and cost

    Decision required
    Whether NISTA and HM Treasury publish approved-versus-aspirational status and milestones for every pipeline project, and MHCLG the blocker, owner and infrastructure cost for a first set of priority housing sites.
    Who and where
    Infrastructure projects in the pipeline and priority housing sites. Applies in: UK.
    Accountable body
    HM Treasury and the National Infrastructure and Service Transformation Authority (NISTA); MHCLG for housing sites
    Intervention
    Publish what is approved and funded, what blocks priority sites and who owns each blocker.
    Best evidence, and where it applies
    No evaluation of a pipeline or blocker list exists; the OBR models +0.4% potential output after five years from 1% of GDP more public investment, if projects are as productive as average.Studied in: UK public investment (Modelled).
    Extra cost of this change
    Capital: Ten-year infrastructure funding — £725bn in total, “Over the next decade” from June 2025; Spending Review 2025 totals to 2029–30, then grown with forecast inflation (HM Treasury footnote 12). Exact fiscal years are not stated for the headline., cash (nominal) prices; Planning staff, site infrastructure and financing for priority sites — Not yet costed.Recurring: none identified in the brief.One-off or mixed: Project costs published one by one — Not yet costed.
    Funding
    Not funded yet: a possible funding route exists, but nothing is allocated to this change.Committed to this change: none.Possible source, not an award: Ten-year infrastructure funding commitment (at least £725bn) (£725bn).Unfunded: Publication and site-package costs are not established.
    Savings and wider benefits
    Not yet specified: no cashable saving or avoided cost has been costed for this change. Expected outcomes are listed one by one in the research appendix and are never added together or counted as money available.
    First 90-day step
    Status and milestones published at the next six-monthly pipeline update; first site blocker list published.The proposed first milestone; a 90-day date is not yet specified. Owner: NISTA with HM Treasury; MHCLG. Proposed by UK Facts, not an official deadline.
    Twelve-month milestone
    Not yet specified.Time to a first useful result: Status at the next pipeline update; delivery effects over two updates.
    Outcome, and when to scale or stop
    Measure: Share of projects with published status and milestones.Scale if: Projects reach milestones near published cost and priority sites start faster than comparable ones.Stop if: Publication changes neither sequencing nor delivery within two updates.
    Main trade-off
    Staff time and transparency costs now, with no measured return; stable plans can lock in weak projects.
    Source and review date
    Public investment and potential output (Discussion Paper No. 5) (August 2024). Reviewed 2026-10-04.

    An editorial proposal by UK Facts for discussion, not government policy. Records: A03, A01 · effects E-A03-OUTPUT, E-A01-HOMES · costs C-10YIS-ENVELOPE, C-A03-PROJECTS, C-A01-SITE-PACKAGE

    Research appendix: study design, effect sizes and limits, alternatives, full costing, international comparisons and how we would know

    1.The change, in plain words

    Publish what is ready to build — projects and housing sites — with each blocker’s owner and cost

    2.The decision requested

    Decision
    Add approved-versus-aspirational status and a milestone to each pipeline project, publish combined demand for builders, installers and connections, and publish a blocker list (owner and infrastructure cost) for a first set of priority housing sites.
    Accountable institution
    HM Treasury and the National Infrastructure and Service Transformation Authority (NISTA); MHCLG for housing sites
    Geography
    UK
    Powers
    Existing powers: the pipeline is government policy and published at least every six months.
    Delivery partners
    Spending departments; Local planning authorities; Ofgem, Ofwat and NESO; Skills England

    3.Who it is for, and what changes beyond today

    Target population
    Infrastructure projects in the pipeline and priority housing sites.
    Eligibility
    Projects in the published pipeline; housing sites with permission but not started.
    Scale
    Every pipeline project; a first set of priority housing sites chosen by MHCLG with councils.
    Baseline
    Total investment was 18.7% of GDP in 2024, the lowest in the G7; at least £725bn of infrastructure funding is committed over a decade.

    Source: World Bank, World Development Indicators: Gross fixed capital formation (% of GDP) (NE.GDI.FTOT.ZS); HM Treasury and NISTA, UK Infrastructure: A 10 Year Strategy (Paragraph 1.24)

    Change beyond existing law or funding
    The pipeline exists; the change adds status, milestones, combined workforce demand and a site blocker list, and counts completed assets.

    4.How it would work

    Do: Publish what is approved and funded, what blocks priority sites and who owns each blocker. Changing: Firms plan staff and capacity ahead of demand, and shared builders and connections are sequenced rather than double-booked.

    • Potential output from extra public investment

      Modelled, not observedEffect record E-A03-OUTPUT

      An OBR model of investment in general, not of a pipeline.

    • Net additional homes from planning reform

      Modelled, not observedEffect record E-A01-HOMES

      The OBR’s estimate for reforms already in place, not for a blocker list.

    Outcomes are kept separate and never added into one impact figure.

    5.Best evidence

    • Public investment and potential output (Discussion Paper No. 5)

      Author or institution:
      Office for Budget Responsibility (Discussion Paper No. 5)
      Published:
      August 2024
      Evaluation period:
      Modelled
      Design:
      Macroeconomic model
      Sample or population:
      UK public investment
      Effect and uncertainty:
      +0.4% potential output after five years from 1% of GDP more public investment
      Limits:
      Assumes average productivity of public capital; not a pipeline effect

      Where: Paragraph 4.7. Affiliation is provenance, not proof of quality.

    6.Alternatives, counter-evidence and who loses

    Closest feasible alternative
    Raising business investment through tax incentives or pension-fund reform, aimed at the larger private share.
    Strongest counter-evidence
    The NAO finds spending decisions short-term, and the Green Book warns of optimism bias: more capital can be wasted without better appraisal.

    Source: National Audit Office, Lessons learned: a planning and spending framework that enables long-term value for money (HC 234, Session 2024-25) (Summary)

    Distributional effects
    Depends on where projects are built and who uses them.
    Main downside
    No measured return; risk of locking in weak projects.

    The options compared, including current policy

    • The proposal

      Publish status, milestones, workforce demand and site blockers

      Who is reached
      Every pipeline project and priority sites
      Evidence
      Modelled and audit only
      Likely outcome and timing
      Sequencing within a year; delivery effects unmeasured
      Cost and funding
      Running costs not established
      Main trade-off
      Effort with no measured return
    • Current policy

      Current policy: the pipeline as published

      Who is reached
      Pipeline projects
      Evidence
      —
      Likely outcome and timing
      Unknown
      Cost and funding
      £725bn envelope
      Main trade-off
      Approved and aspirational projects mixed
    • Alternative

      Tax incentives for business investment

      Who is reached
      Private investors
      Evidence
      Not assessed here
      Likely outcome and timing
      Unknown
      Cost and funding
      Tax cost
      Main trade-off
      Revenue forgone

    7.What other countries or the devolved nations show

    No comparable evaluation found.

    Searched: Evaluations of national infrastructure pipelines or project-status publication (UK, Australia, New Zealand) linking publication to delivery outcomes. None found in this review.

    Next step: Track milestones met and time from permission to start before and after status publication.

    8.What delivery needs first

    • staff — Appraisal and commercial staff in departments and NISTA. (Scarce resource shared with other priorities; owner: HM Treasury and the Cabinet Office)
    • data — Project status from departments and connection data from network operators. (Requirement; owner: NISTA, NESO and Ofgem)

    9.What it would cost

    How the cost is built up: Analytical staff to publish status and the blocker list + site infrastructure where the blocker is infrastructure; project costs remain in each project’s business case.

    • Ten-year infrastructure funding

      UK

      £725bn in total, “Over the next decade” from June 2025; Spending Review 2025 totals to 2029–30, then grown with forecast inflation (HM Treasury footnote 12). Exact fiscal years are not stated for the headline., cash (nominal) prices (ledger C-10YIS-ENVELOPE)

      capital; price year not stated; Over the decade from June 2025; Current quoted cost

      The envelope the pipeline organises; it overlaps the homes and warm-homes envelopes.

    • Project costs published one by one

      Pipeline projects

      Not yet costed (ledger C-A03-PROJECTS)

      mixed; price year not stated; Project lifetimes; Not yet established

    • Planning staff, site infrastructure and financing for priority sites

      Priority housing sites

      Not yet costed (ledger C-A01-SITE-PACKAGE)

      capital; price year not stated; From the first list; Not yet established

    10.Who pays, and what is missing

    Programme envelope (a possible route, not an award)
    Ten-year infrastructure funding commitment (at least £725bn): £725bn
    Allocation committed to this change
    None
    Remaining gap
    Publication and site-package costs are not established.
    Proposed financing
    NISTA and departmental running costs for publication; site infrastructure from named capital allocations.
    Responsible payer
    central government, councils, developers, bill-payers
    Budget displaced
    Analytical time; capital used on priority sites is not available elsewhere.

    11.First milestone and time to a useful result

    Status and milestones published at the next six-monthly pipeline update; first site blocker list published. (Owner: NISTA with HM Treasury; MHCLG. Proposed by UK Facts, not an official deadline.)

    Time to first useful result: Status at the next pipeline update; delivery effects over two updates.

    What could delay it: Departments supply consistent status data. Councils can name blockers and owners.

    12.How we would know

    Baseline
    Milestones met and time from permission to start on priority sites before publication.
    Comparison
    Comparable projects and sites outside the first list.
    Leading indicator
    Share of projects with published status and milestones.
    Follow-up
    Completed, used assets; starts on priority sites.
    Continue if
    Projects reach milestones near published cost and priority sites start faster than comparable ones.
    Adapt if
    Status publication is incomplete or unused in sequencing.
    Stop if
    Publication changes neither sequencing nor delivery within two updates.
    Thresholds
    Not yet set: No business case sets them; agree with NISTA from the first two updates.

    What is not yet known, and how to find out

    • What would publication and the site package cost? (cost)Next step: Cost staff time from the first update and site infrastructure from the first list.Scope: Status publication; priority-site infrastructure · Data or quotes needed: NISTA staffing; site infrastructure quotes · Who can estimate it: NISTA with HM Treasury; MHCLG with councils
    • Does publication change delivery? (effect)Next step: Compare listed and unlisted projects and sites.Defensible route: further research

    Sources last checked 4 October 2026 · Owner: Evidence editor (James Harris) · Next check: the first trigger: NISTA annual report on the Government Major Projects Portfolio.

    Decision briefPublic-policy proposalReviewed 2026-10-04

    Sequence one blocked class of projects: large new grid demand connections, against the workers and capacity they share

    Decision required
    NISTA, DESNZ, Ofgem and NESO publish one dependency map for large new electricity demand connections — which projects need which network reinforcement, by when, and which construction trades — and agree a sequence that connects projects with planning consent, finance and a committed user first.
    Who and where
    Developers and users of projects needing large new demand connections in Great Britain. Applies in: Great Britain.
    Accountable body
    National Infrastructure and Service Transformation Authority (NISTA), with DESNZ and Ofgem
    Intervention
    Map the shared dependencies (network reinforcement, trades, planning) for large demand connections and connect ready projects in an agreed order.
    Best evidence, and where it applies
    DESNZ says the demand connections queue grew by 460% in the six months to June 2025, with waits of up to 15 years; CITB forecasts 41,200 extra construction workers a year are needed for 2026–2030.Studied in: Projects in the GB connections queue (Queue position before reform).
    Extra cost of this change
    Capital: none identified in the brief.Recurring: Cross-government coordination and shared-capacity planning — Not yet costed.
    Funding
    Not funded: no funding route identified yet.Committed to this change: none.Possible source, not an award: none identified.Unfunded: Coordination capacity not costed.
    Savings and wider benefits
    Not yet specified: no cashable saving or avoided cost has been costed for this change. Expected outcomes are listed one by one in the research appendix and are never added together or counted as money available.
    First 90-day step
    A published dependency map for large demand connections, with the sequencing criteriaThe proposed first milestone; a 90-day date is not yet specified. Owner: NISTA with DESNZ, Ofgem and NESO. Proposed by UK Facts, not an official deadline.
    Twelve-month milestone
    Not yet specified.Time to a first useful result: Changes in connection dates within one to two years; energisation later.
    Outcome, and when to scale or stop
    Measure: Ready projects receiving firm connection dates.Scale if: Ready projects connect sooner and the map changes at least some sequencing decisions.Stop if: The map changes no sequencing decision within two planning cycles (the action’s own evaluation rule).
    Main trade-off
    Sequencing brings some projects forward and pushes others back; projects without consent or finance lose their place.
    Source and review date
    Decision on the TMO4+ connections reform package (summary decision document) (15 April 2025); UK Infrastructure: A 10 Year Strategy (19 June 2025). Reviewed 2026-10-04.

    An editorial proposal by UK Facts for discussion, not government policy. Records: A45 · costs C-A45-COORDINATION

    Research appendix: study design, effect sizes and limits, alternatives, full costing, international comparisons and how we would know

    1.The change, in plain words

    Sequence one blocked class of projects: large new grid demand connections, against the workers and capacity they share

    2.The decision requested

    Decision
    Publish a dependency map for large demand connections (reinforcement needed, timing, trades and the other programmes competing for them), and use it to set connection order for demand projects in the reformed queue, with the criteria published.
    Accountable institution
    National Infrastructure and Service Transformation Authority (NISTA), with DESNZ and Ofgem
    Geography
    Great Britain
    Powers
    Ofgem’s regulatory powers over connection rules (the TMO4+ reform approved in April 2025 and the proposed demand reforms); NESO’s system-operator role; NISTA’s pipeline remit. Electricity networks in Northern Ireland are separate.
    Delivery partners
    NESO; Transmission and distribution network operators; MHCLG and local planning authorities; CITB and DfE (construction skills); Project developers

    3.Who it is for, and what changes beyond today

    Target population
    Developers and users of projects needing large new demand connections in Great Britain.
    Eligibility
    Transmission-connected and large distribution-connected demand projects in the reformed queue (data centres, AI Growth Zones, EV charging hubs, large employment sites).
    Scale
    The demand part of the reformed queue: 99 GW of transmission-connected demand in NESO’s December 2025 pipeline.
    Baseline
    Before reform the connections queue exceeded 700 GW, with offer dates extending into the 2040s. After Ofgem approved reform in April 2025, NESO’s reordered pipeline held 283 GW of generation and storage and 99 GW of transmission-connected demand. The demand queue grew by 460% in the six months to June 2025; waits of up to 15 years. CITB: 41,200 extra construction workers a year needed 2026–2030. The 10 Year Infrastructure Strategy reports flat on-site labour productivity and a significant workforce deficit but gives no figure.

    Source: National Energy System Operator, Unveiling the new project pipeline to deliver Clean Power 2030 (Announcement text); Ofgem, Decision on the TMO4+ connections reform package (summary decision document) (Paragraphs 1.2, 2.7); Department for Energy Security and Net Zero, Government to tackle speculative demand grid connection requests (consultation announcement) (Announcement text); CITB, Construction Workforce Outlook 2026–2030 (Headline findings); HM Treasury and NISTA, UK Infrastructure: A 10 Year Strategy (Paragraph 1.28)

    Change beyond existing law or funding
    Connections reform reorders the queue by readiness and strategic fit; the national brief publishes ready projects with their blockers. This brief adds the cross-programme step: one map showing which demand projects compete with housing, retrofit and transport for the same reinforcement work and trades, and an agreed order based on it.

    4.How it would work

    Do: Map the shared dependencies (network reinforcement, trades, planning) for large demand connections and connect ready projects in an agreed order Changing: so that scarce grid and construction capacity goes first to projects that can be used soon after connection

    • Shorter time from connection offer to energisation for ready demand projects

      Hypothesis to test

      No evaluation of sequencing exists; measured from connection data.

    • Fewer projects stalled by a dependency that another programme is using

      Hypothesis to test

      Synergies can be overstated; the map must show the trade-offs as well as the gains.

    Outcomes are kept separate and never added into one impact figure.

    5.Best evidence

    • Decision on the TMO4+ connections reform package (summary decision document)

      Author or institution:
      Ofgem (energy regulator)
      Published:
      15 April 2025
      Evaluation period:
      Queue position before reform
      Design:
      Regulatory decision document
      Sample or population:
      Projects in the GB connections queue
      Effect and uncertainty:
      Approves reform to reorder the queue by readiness and strategic alignment; offer dates for generation and demand were extending into the 2040s; demand projects are automatically deemed needed.
      Limits:
      A decision, not an evaluation; the separate demand reforms were still being consulted on in 2026.

      Where: Page 1; paragraphs 1.2, 1.11, 2.7. Affiliation is provenance, not proof of quality.

    • UK Infrastructure: A 10 Year Strategy

      Author or institution:
      HM Treasury
      Published:
      19 June 2025
      Evaluation period:
      Not an evaluation
      Design:
      Government strategy
      Sample or population:
      UK infrastructure
      Effect and uncertainty:
      On-site labour productivity has flatlined and there is a significant workforce deficit; pipeline data will inform construction skills needs, market capacity and the government’s approach to skills.
      Limits:
      States intent; gives no workforce-gap figure and no sequencing mechanism.

      Where: Paragraphs 1.28, 1.30, 1.59. Affiliation is provenance, not proof of quality.

    6.Alternatives, counter-evidence and who loses

    Closest feasible alternative
    Leave ordering to the reformed connections process project by project, without a cross-programme map.
    Strongest counter-evidence
    Coordination adds overhead and can relabel unrelated policies as a package; the NAO finds spending decisions short-term and reactive, so a map may not change decisions.

    Source: National Audit Office, Lessons learned: a planning and spending framework that enables long-term value for money (HC 234, Session 2024-25) (Summary)

    Distributional effects
    Projects ready to build gain; speculative projects lose their place; regions with spare network capacity may attract demand first.
    Main downside
    A published order can be challenged by developers who lose, slowing decisions.

    The options compared, including current policy

    • The proposal

      Dependency map and agreed order for large demand connections

      Who is reached
      Demand projects in the GB queue and the programmes competing with them
      Evidence
      Ofgem decision; DESNZ demand consultation; CITB workforce forecast
      Likely outcome and timing
      Connection dates in one to two years
      Cost and funding
      Coordination not costed; not funded
      Main trade-off
      Some projects move back
    • Current policy

      Current policy: reformed queue ordered project by project; demand reforms under consultation

      Who is reached
      All queued projects
      Evidence
      Ofgem TMO4+ decision; NESO pipeline
      Likely outcome and timing
      Ongoing
      Cost and funding
      Within regulator budgets
      Main trade-off
      Competing claims on shared trades not visible
    • Alternative

      Publish ready projects and blockers (national priority brief on this page)

      Who is reached
      Pipeline projects and housing sites
      Evidence
      Audit and expert recommendation
      Likely outcome and timing
      At each pipeline update
      Cost and funding
      Analytical time
      Main trade-off
      Lists blockers without resolving shared ones

    7.What other countries or the devolved nations show

    No comparable evaluation found.

    Searched: Evaluations of cross-programme infrastructure sequencing or dependency mapping (Infrastructure Australia’s priority list; the Netherlands’ MIRT programme; Ofgem and NESO connections reform documents) and of connection-queue reforms elsewhere.

    Next step: Record offer-to-energisation times for demand projects before and after the sequence is published, and compare projects inside and outside the mapped class.

    8.What delivery needs first

    • infrastructure — Network reinforcement capacity — the binding resource the sequence allocates. (Scarce resource shared with other priorities; owner: Network operators)
    • staff — Construction trades shared with housing, retrofit and transport programmes. (Scarce resource shared with other priorities; owner: Industry with CITB and DfE)
    • law — Ofgem rule changes for demand connections (consulted on in 2026). (Genuine veto: nothing proceeds without it; owner: Ofgem)
    • data — Project-level readiness (consent, finance, committed user) and reinforcement data shared across bodies. (Requirement; owner: NESO and network operators)

    9.What it would cost

    How the cost is built up: Coordination and analysis time only. Network reinforcement is funded through price controls and connection charges, and project costs stay with each project; none is added here.

    • Cross-government coordination and shared-capacity planning

      Large demand connections and the programmes sharing their dependencies

      Not yet costed (ledger C-A45-COORDINATION)

      recurring; price year not stated; Ongoing; Not yet established

    10.Who pays, and what is missing

    Programme envelope (a possible route, not an award)
    None identified
    Allocation committed to this change
    None
    Remaining gap
    Coordination capacity not costed.
    Proposed financing
    Existing NISTA, DESNZ and Ofgem budgets for coordination; reinforcement through network price controls paid by bill-payers.
    Responsible payer
    central government, bill-payers, private investors
    Budget displaced
    Analytical capacity in NISTA and DESNZ.

    11.First milestone and time to a useful result

    A published dependency map for large demand connections, with the sequencing criteria (Owner: NISTA with DESNZ, Ofgem and NESO. Proposed by UK Facts, not an official deadline.)

    Time to first useful result: Changes in connection dates within one to two years; energisation later.

    What could delay it: Demand-connection reforms are delayed Network operators cannot share project data Construction shortages worsen

    12.How we would know

    Baseline
    Demand projects in the queue, offer dates and energisation times at the date the map is published.
    Comparison
    Demand projects outside the mapped class, and the same class before publication.
    Leading indicator
    Ready projects receiving firm connection dates.
    Follow-up
    Energisation and first use of connected projects.
    Continue if
    Ready projects connect sooner and the map changes at least some sequencing decisions.
    Adapt if
    The map shows conflicts that no body has power to resolve: assign that decision explicitly.
    Stop if
    The map changes no sequencing decision within two planning cycles (the action’s own evaluation rule).
    Thresholds
    Not yet set: No business case sets a connection-time target for this class.

    What is not yet known, and how to find out

    • Coordination cost (cost)Next step: NISTA to estimate analyst time for the first map.Scope: One project class · Data or quotes needed: Analyst days; data-sharing costs · Who can estimate it: NISTA
    • Whether sequencing shortens connection times (effect)Next step: Compare offer-to-energisation times before and after publication.Defensible route: evaluation of existing delivery
    • How many construction workers the demand connections need (data)Next step: Ask NESO and network operators to publish trade requirements by year alongside CITB’s forecast.

    Sources last checked 4 October 2026 · Owner: Evidence editor (James Harris) · Next check: the first trigger: Grid connection reform milestones from Ofgem or NESO.

    What it would take

    The order things have to happen in, who pays, and the effects and appraisals on record.

    The order things have to happen in

    1. First, the prerequisite

      Classify pipeline projects by approval and funding status; map shared workforce and grid needs

      Owner: NISTA with HM Treasury

      No date: the timing depends on the steps before it.

    2. Then, the decision

      Sequence consents, connections and funding before dependent projects

      Owner: HM Treasury, MHCLG, DESNZ and departments

      No date: the timing depends on the steps before it.

    3. Then, delivery

      Build to published milestones; unblock priority housing sites

      Owner: Delivery bodies; councils; developers

      No date: the timing depends on the steps before it.

    4. Finally, the measured outcome

      Assets completed and used; investment share; homes added

      Owner: ONS; MHCLG; NISTA

      No date: the timing depends on the steps before it.

    5. First, the prerequisite

      Select one bus corridor and a comparison using the Transport Connectivity Metric

      Owner: A mayoral combined authority with DfT

      No date: the timing depends on the steps before it.

    Who pays, and what is still missing

    Cost, committed funding and the remaining gap for the same scope and years. A programme envelope is not an award to a project; a proposal is not committed money. No total is shown because these costs are on different bases or periods and cannot be added.

    Cost and funding ledger

    • 10 Year Infrastructure Strategy: government infrastructure funding (programme envelope)

      A03 · capital · published programme envelope

      Amount
      £725bn in total, “Over the next decade” from June 2025; Spending Review 2025 totals to 2029–30, then grown with forecast inflation (HM Treasury footnote 12). Exact fiscal years are not stated for the headline., cash (nominal) prices
      Who pays
      central government, councils
      Committed
      None identified
      Proposed, not committed
      £725bn (Ten-year infrastructure funding commitment (at least £725bn))
      Gap
      Not established
    • Project capital, maintenance, financing and workforce costs for pipeline projects

      A03 · capital · not costed

      Amount
      Not yet costed
      Who pays
      central government, councils, bill-payers, private investors
      Committed
      None identified
      Proposed, not committed
      —
      Gap
      Not established
    • Planning staff, site infrastructure and financing for priority sites

      A01 · capital · not costed

      Amount
      Not yet costed
      Who pays
      central government, councils, developers
      Committed
      None identified
      Proposed, not committed
      —
      Gap
      Not established
    • Cross-government coordination and shared-capacity planning

      A45 · administration · not costed

      Amount
      Not yet costed
      Who pays
      central government
      Committed
      None identified
      Proposed, not committed
      —
      Gap
      Not established

    “Not yet costed” means no defensible cost has been found — not that the action is free. Lifetime benefits, benefit-cost ratios and forecast savings are never shown here as money available to spend.

    Effects on record, with evidence ratings (2 records)

    What the evidence says each action changes

    Effects on record — these measure different outcomes, so they are not drawn on one scale
    ActionOutcome and areaEffectCompared withEvidence
    Turn permissions into homes people can live inNet additional homes HousingDirection plausible; size not established—modelled; limited confidence; EnglandThe OBR’s 170,000 extra homes by 2029–30 is its judgement of the 2024 planning reforms already in place, not of this site-by-site package, whose marginal effect has not been estimated.
    Give productive investment a stable delivery pipelinePotential output Living standards and growthDirection plausible; size not established—modelled; limited confidence; United KingdomThe OBR’s +0.4% of potential output after five years (2.4% after 50) is for a permanent rise of 1% of GDP in investment of average productivity — not an estimate for a pipeline, and not cash for the Exchequer.

    How we would know

    Total investment (gross fixed capital formation); Business investment; Net additional homes; and 1 more.

    The outcome measures to watch. A baseline is where we start, not a target; where there is no official target we say so.

    Measured results

    What each option would be judged on, and the latest value of the measures already on this page. A measure moving is not proof that an option caused it.

    Where the ideas come from

    Research, counter-evidence and methods (24 sources; 3 claims held back)
    • Ending Stagnation: A New Economic Strategy for Britain — Resolution Foundation / LSE Centre for Economic Performance, 2023-12-04.Final report of the Economy 2030 Inquiry: synthesis of about 70 reports with policy proposals; United Kingdom, with international comparisons. Relevant passages checked, 2026-10-04. Limits: A strategy, not an evaluation: no estimate of what any single reform would deliver; its £8,300 household figure is a comparison with peer countries, not a policy effect. Data to 2023.
    • UK Infrastructure: A 10 Year Strategy — HM Treasury and NISTA, 2025-06-19.Government strategy; United Kingdom. Relevant passages checked, 2026-10-04. Limits: The £725bn is a ten-year envelope across sectors, not a project award, and overlaps with sector programmes such as the Social and Affordable Homes Programme.
    • Public finances databank (September 2026); outturn consistent with ONS/HM Treasury Public sector finances, 22 September 2026 — Office for Budget Responsibility, September 2026.Official statistics (outturn and forecast); United Kingdom. Relevant passages checked, 2026-10-04.
    • Global Offshore Wind Report 2026 — Global Wind Energy Council, 2026-06.Industry statistics report; Global. Relevant passages checked (Full report is gated; the ranking was read on the report page. Industry data, not official statistics.), 2026-10-04. Limits: Supports the ranking (the UK second to China), not a UK capacity figure. The UK’s official capacity series (DUKES 5.7) is de-rated and not comparable with nameplate rankings.
    • Digest of UK Energy Statistics (DUKES) 2026: Chapter 5 — Electricity — Department for Energy Security and Net Zero, 2026-07.Accredited official statistics; United Kingdom. Relevant passages checked, 2026-10-04. Limits: Stored as electricity-generation-*-twh and carbon-intensity-electricity-supplied-gco2-kwh in data/economy.
    • World Development Indicators: Gross fixed capital formation (% of GDP) — World Bank, WDI update, 13 July 2026.International statistics; G7. Relevant passages checked, 2026-10-04.
    • Annual regional labour productivity (PRODBYREG) — Office for National Statistics, 2025-06-19.Official statistics; UK nations and English regions (ITL1). Relevant passages checked, 2026-10-04. Limits: Relative position only (UK = 100 each year); current prices, so regional price differences are not removed. Stored as productivity-per-hour-index-* in data/economy.
    • Annual bus statistics: year ending March 2025 — Department for Transport, 2025-11-26.Accredited official statistics; England. Relevant passages checked, 2026-10-07.
    • Journey time statistics: user engagement exercise, summary of responses — Department for Transport, 2025-03-27.Statistics notice; England. Relevant passages checked, 2026-10-07.
    • Public investment and potential output (Discussion Paper No. 5) — Office for Budget Responsibility, 2024-08.Modelling paper; United Kingdom. Relevant passages checked, 2026-10-04. Limits: A generic modelled scenario; it says nothing about any particular pipeline or project, and output is not cash for the Exchequer.
    • Lessons learned: a planning and spending framework that enables long-term value for money (HC 234, Session 2024-25) — National Audit Office, 2024-10-27.Audit synthesis of NAO value-for-money work (HC 234, 2024–25); UK central government. Relevant passages checked, 2026-10-04. Limits: Written before the 2025 Spending Review; a published plan is an input to accountability, not a service improvement.
    • National Framework for Water Resources 2025: water for growth, nature and a resilient future — Environment Agency, 2025-06-17.Official planning framework (modelled scenarios); England. Relevant passages checked, 2026-10-04. Limits: Modelled scenarios of population, climate and environmental needs; “up to” is the top of a range. England only.
    • Dry weather and drought in England: 18 to 24 September 2026 — Environment Agency, 2026-10-02.Official weekly situation report; England. Relevant passages checked, 2026-10-04. Limits: A point-in-time status that changes week to week; replace with the latest report before reuse.
    • Progress in adapting to climate change – 2025 report to Parliament — Climate Change Committee, 2025-04-30.Statutory progress report (Climate Change Act 2008); United Kingdom. Full text checked, 2026-10-04. Limits: An independent statutory assessment of adaptation readiness and delivery, scored against indicators. It does not cost future climate damage; the 2050 heat figure is a projection.
    • The Green Book (2026) — HM Treasury, 2026-02-05.Official appraisal guidance. Relevant passages checked, 2026-10-04. Limits: Guidance; a positive benefit-cost ratio identifies no funding source.
    • Economic and fiscal outlook, March 2025 — Office for Budget Responsibility, 2025-03-26.Official forecast; United Kingdom. Relevant passages checked, 2026-10-04. Limits: A modelled judgement about the 2024 planning reforms, not about any further package, and not an observed effect.
    • Planning with purpose: reforming the planning system to meet modern needs — London School of Economics (LSE article on research by Liz Williams, Meg Hennessy and Olexiy Pedosenko), 2025-03-25.Media article on a qualitative report (expert workshops, a jury of 27 people aged 25–45 working in urban development, a roundtable of 18 landowners); England. Relevant passages checked, 2026-10-04. Limits: Qualitative; supports arguments about participation and certainty, not any quantified supply effect.
    • Planning and Infrastructure Act 2025 (c. 34) — legislation.gov.uk, 2025-12-18 (Royal Assent).Legislation; England (mainly). Relevant passages checked, 2026-10-04.
    • A zoning system for England — Centre for Cities, 2025-02.Policy briefing with international comparison; England. Relevant passages checked, 2026-10-04. Limits: No estimate of what zoning itself would deliver; its 4.3 million “missing homes” figure is a comparison with Western Europe, not an effect.
    • Does better job accessibility help people gain employment? The role of public transport in Great Britain — Urban Studies 59(2):301–322 (Bastiaanssen J, Johnson D, Lucas K), 2022.Individual-level employment models with instrumental variables for reverse causation.; Great Britain. Relevant passages checked, 2026-10-07. Limits: The abstract gives no effect size; observational data.
    • Evaluation of the first 10 months of the £2 bus fare cap — Department for Transport (Frontier Economics and SYSTRA), 2025-02-12.Difference-in-differences against London (Table 5, section 5.2.3).; England outside London (London as control). Relevant passages checked, 2026-10-07. Limits: The treated group includes non-participating areas and concessionary tickets; the report calls the estimate indicative.
    • Evidence review: transport — What Works Centre for Local Economic Growth, 2015-07.Systematic evidence review; UK and OECD. Relevant passages checked, 2026-10-07. Limits: Road and rail evaluations; no bus evaluations named in the summary.
    • Business investment in the UK: January to March 2026, revised results — Office for National Statistics, date not stated.Official statistics; United Kingdom. Relevant passages checked, 2026-10-04.
    • Housing supply: net additional dwellings, England — MHCLG, 20 November 2025.Official statistics; England. Relevant passages checked, 2026-10-04.

    Counter-evidence and criticism

    • Give productive investment a stable delivery pipeline: Higher capital spending can be wasted where projects are poorly appraised or managed; the NAO finds spending decisions have been short-term, and the Green Book warns of optimism bias. Borrowing to invest raises debt interest, and construction labour is already short. (National Audit Office; HM Treasury)
    • Turn permissions into homes people can live in: Centre for Cities argues incremental reform of a discretionary system cannot close the gap and proposes zoning; neither approach has a UK effect estimate. (Centre for Cities)
    • Sequence reforms that depend on the same people and infrastructure: Coordination adds overhead and can relabel unrelated policies as a package; synergies can be overstated. (National Audit Office)
    • Appraise one bus corridor where cost, hours or reliability stop people reaching jobs: Most evaluated transport schemes show no or mixed employment effects, and gains may come at the expense of nearby areas. (What Works Centre for Local Economic Growth)

    Claims held back

    • England has not completed a major reservoir since 1992 (retired live /swot water item) — Not found in the sources read; the January 2026 white paper describes its nine planned reservoirs as the first major ones in about 30 years, which is not the same claim. Needed: An Environment Agency or Defra statement with the date and name of the last major reservoir completed.
    • Rule of law and intellectual-property protection as a national strength (retired live /swot item) — No domain finding on this site measures it; the live item cited no source. Needed: An official or international index with a published method, attached to a domain page.
    • A national growth effect from the pipeline or from sequencing — No study estimates either; the OBR’s potential-output result is for generic public investment of average productivity. Needed: Evaluation of completed pipeline projects, or an OBR judgement on specific programmes.

    “Full text checked” means we read the report itself; “relevant passages” means the sections behind each figure; “summary or abstract only” means we could not read the full study, so no number from it is published here without another source.

    Other options compared — not on the shortlist (3)

    Other options compared

    Options from earlier work on this page that are not on the shortlist. They remain valid choices; their evidence is shown as before.

    • capacityStatus: operating

      Grid connections and cheaper industrial power

      Aims to:
      Viable projects connected sooner, and electricity costs for industry closer to European peers.
      How:
      NESO’s connections reform reorders the queue by readiness rather than date of application; separately, government proposes to cut levies on electricity for eligible manufacturers.
      Who decides:
      NESO and Ofgem (connections); DESNZ and DBT (levies and industrial schemes); network companies (building the connections).
      Main constraint:
      Physical network build takes years; levy relief moves costs onto other bill-payers or taxpayers rather than removing them.
      Evidence:
      Not evaluated — a mechanism to test, not an evidenced fix
      See the trade-offs and evidence
      What the evidence shows
      The reformed queue retained 283 GW (8 December 2025) from a pre-reform register of over 700 GW; there is not yet evidence on whether connection dates have actually shortened. DBT says policy costs make up about 27% of a very large UK industrial user’s bill, against much less in France and Germany.
      Policy status
      Connections reform live from June 2025. The British Industrial Competitiveness Scheme — exempting eligible manufacturers from Renewables Obligation, Feed-in Tariff and Capacity Market costs — was consulted on between November 2025 and September 2026.
      Resources
      Network investment approved by Ofgem; supply chains for cables and transformers; public money or other bill-payers to fund any levy cut.
      Consent and decisions needed
      Ofgem price controls; who pays for relief is a political decision.
      Time
      Queue reform is immediate; new transmission lines take most of a decade.
      Cost and yield
      Network investment is recovered through bills; no official costing of levy relief is cited here.
      Trade-offs and who pays
      Cheaper power for industry may mean higher bills for households or other businesses; prioritising some projects delays others.
      How we would know it worked
      Leading indicator: Time from connection offer to energisation. Outcome: Industrial investment and output in energy-intensive sectors. It would not be working if: Queue shrinks on paper but connection dates do not move.
    • structuralStatus: announced

      Pension savings into UK productive assets

      Aims to:
      More long-term finance available for UK infrastructure and growing companies.
      How:
      Larger, consolidated defined-contribution schemes can hold more illiquid assets; 17 providers have pledged 10% of default funds to private markets by 2030, at least 5% in the UK.
      Who decides:
      Pension trustees and providers (decisions); HM Treasury and DWP (Pension Schemes legislation); The Pensions Regulator.
      Main constraint:
      Trustees’ legal duty to members’ returns; fees and liquidity of private assets; the same project-pipeline constraints as public investment.
      Evidence:
      Limited evidence — plausible mechanism, little direct evaluation
      See the trade-offs and evidence
      What the evidence shows
      The pledge is voluntary and conditional on there being suitable investments; there is no evaluation yet of whether it adds investment rather than re-labelling existing holdings. It changes who finances projects, not whether viable projects exist.
      Policy status
      Mansion House Accord, May 2025; voluntary.
      Resources
      Scale in pension schemes; a pipeline of investable UK projects; specialist investment staff.
      Consent and decisions needed
      Voluntary; any mandation would be contested by the industry.
      Time
      Target date 2030.
      Cost and yield
      No direct public cost; risk falls on savers if returns disappoint.
      Trade-offs and who pays
      Savers bear the investment risk; home bias reduces diversification.
      How we would know it worked
      Leading indicator: Share of DC default funds in UK private markets (industry reporting). Outcome: Additional UK business and infrastructure investment. It would not be working if: Allocations rise but total UK investment does not.
    • preventionStatus: operating

      Skills for building and running new assets

      Aims to:
      Enough trained engineers, electricians, builders and technicians that investment becomes output rather than wage inflation and delay.
      How:
      Apprenticeships and technical training add skilled workers in the trades that every investment programme competes for.
      Who decides:
      DfE and Skills England; employers; the Home Office (overseas recruitment).
      Main constraint:
      Training takes one to four years; employers hesitate to train for cyclical demand.
      Evidence:
      Moderate evidence — evaluated, with limits on scope or transfer
      See the trade-offs and evidence
      What the evidence shows
      DfE estimates that each £1 it spent on level 2 or level 3 apprenticeships started in 2021–22 produces about £9 of economic benefit, and £7 at levels 4–5. These are backward-looking averages for all apprentices, not the return on an extra place in a shortage trade, and evidence that training removes the specific bottlenecks investment projects face is thinner.
      Policy status
      The apprenticeship levy is being reformed into a Growth and Skills Levy, announced in September 2024, with shorter and foundation apprenticeships.
      Resources
      Training places, assessors and employer time.
      Consent and decisions needed
      Levy design and immigration rules are contested.
      Time
      Several years before newly trained workers add capacity.
      Cost and yield
      Levy and DfE budgets; no official costing per extra completed asset.
      Trade-offs and who pays
      Funding higher-level apprenticeships leaves less for entry level, and vice versa.
      How we would know it worked
      Leading indicator: Apprenticeship achievements in construction and engineering (England). Outcome: Vacancy rates and project delays attributed to skills shortages. It would not be working if: Starts rise but achievements and vacancies do not change.
    The options side by side
    OptionResourcesTimeEvidenceOutcome to watch
    Grid connections and cheaper industrial powerNetwork investment approved by Ofgem; supply chains for cables and transformers; public money or other bill-payers to fund any levy cut.Queue reform is immediate; new transmission lines take most of a decade.not evaluatedIndustrial investment and output in energy-intensive sectors.
    Pension savings into UK productive assetsScale in pension schemes; a pipeline of investable UK projects; specialist investment staff.Target date 2030.limitedAdditional UK business and infrastructure investment.
    Skills for building and running new assetsTraining places, assessors and employer time.Several years before newly trained workers add capacity.moderateVacancy rates and project delays attributed to skills shortages.

    Plan reviewed 2026-10-07. How we judge evidence.

    How this connects

    Sources and methods (8)

    Method notes

    • Investment means gross fixed capital formation: spending on buildings, machinery, transport equipment, dwellings, software and other intellectual property by businesses, government and households. It is gross of depreciation.
    • The G7 comparison uses World Bank WDI data for every country so definitions and vintages match; ONS’s own UK ratio is used only for the UK’s history.
    • Investment is an input. No chart on this page estimates the growth lost to low investment, and the options’ estimated effects overlap and must not be summed.