Britain today · Growing the UK economy

Growing the UK Economy

How effectively Britain turns capital, energy, infrastructure, skills and institutions into rising productivity and living standards — the headline picture, how the pieces connect, and what the data itself shows is constrained. Every figure below traces to an official source; nothing on this page is UK Stat Pack's own forecast or policy recommendation.

Three headline facts

Investment

18.9%

Whole-economy investment (GFCF) as a share of GDP, 2026 Q1 — the lowest of the G7

Current prices, seasonally adjusted. ONS publishes the G7 ranking alongside this measure, using OECD data for the other six countries; those comparators are provisional and subject to revision. ONS, Business investment, Jan–Mar 2026.

Industrial electricity

25.1p/kWh

UK Medium-band price, 2025 H2, vs 10.6p France and 16.7p Germany, same band and period

See Powering Britain for the full international comparison.

Pensions — two separate quantities

£1.07tn funded DB assets

£1.4tn unfunded PAYG liability

Never add or subtract these — one is invested money, the other is a pay-as-you-go promise with no fund behind it.

Total investment (GFCF) as a share of GDP

UK investment averaged 21.3% of GDP across the 1970s and 20.8% across the 1980s, peaking at 24.4% in 1989. It has not been near that since: the 2010s averaged 17.7%, the weakest decade in the series, and the 2020s so far average 18.8%. This is the longest-running weakness in the UK economy, and the thread most of the pages below connect back to.

View data table
Total investment (GFCF) as a share of GDPUnited Kingdom. Source: UK Stat Pack (calculated), Derived from Quarterly National Accounts (QNA). 2026 Q1.
YearTotal investment (GFCF) as a share of GDP
195514.715381509890998
195615.41899441340782
195715.981012658227847
195816.070820565202588
195916.529579247073713
196017.80128109638016
196118.16114821656956
196217.704962243797194
196318.70149069853394
196419.419668059162245
196519.77395162142178
196619.574721780604136
196719.75145923554886
196821.492889001094
196921.174916465925868
197022.429084015977253
197122.39907305768996
197221.813452248234857
197323.305343153351785
197422.362683522022643
197519.847847199741015
197619.501622181629816
197719.991461708132725
197820.02781072348779
197921.30132976499122
198019.863867740468542
198118.652548750379573
198219.15605595689676
198319.352956717009377
198419.96515395431296
198519.810933004521168
198620.90840937879689
198722.29153542399705
198823.200616243801452
198924.361901068866526
199023.361418034459636
199120.769055694642592
199219.19541344713502
199318.875373938924575
199418.489935632338852
199518.56930500606033
199618.108738130334924
199718.28048740271732
199818.110026166816397
199917.65258076051973
200018.32820244490716
200117.52264714608013
200219.073786458881752
200317.455059734266253
200417.618449675468227
200518.191660341979553
200618.42321057959672
200719.484340992455873
200818.024426858983546
200916.60493192910352
201016.81134804539414
201116.40155246697447
201216.49918403934999
201316.748371942650152
201417.442945992657727
201518.007984784640357
201618.472160757575164
201719.316350895357495
201818.66391046961311
201918.403382112453137
202018.81782022732246
202118.636405481469794
202219.034453455893026
202318.735026145400298
202418.624509702865016
202518.961325275773376
202618.916491799834485

United Kingdom · Source: UK Stat Pack (calculated), Derived from Quarterly National Accounts (QNA) · as of 2026 Q1

How the pieces connect

Our reading — a framework, not a finding

This is UK Stat Pack's own way of organising the pages on this site — a conceptual map, not a quantified model. No arrow here carries a measured effect size; it is a way of asking questions, not a claim about how the economy actually works.

Enabling inputs — all required, none sufficient alone

Energy cost and availability · planning and consenting speed · grid and infrastructure capacity · skills and supply chain · capital availability.

The chain this site tracks

Business investment → productive capacity per worker → productivity → real wages, profits and competitiveness → the tax base and household savings → pension assets → reinvestment.

Where this is too simple: GDP does not automatically become living standards, and the productivity-to-income link is more weakly measured than commonly assumed (see the international comparators' own decomposition work, cited on the relevant pages). Government expenditure is not the same as government investment. Capital allocation is not automatically optimal in either direction.

What the data itself shows is constrained

Built from this site's own already-sourced series — not a ranked opinion about which constraint matters most, just what the underlying data actually shows is binding, stalled or structurally smaller than it used to be.

Grid connections are the binding constraint on new supply

NESO's own reform confirms two separate figures that must not be merged: a 283 GW generation/storage pipeline, and separately ~100 GW of new transmission-connected demand (data centres, electrolysers, industrial loads) identified alongside it. NESO's own words: this reform "isn't a silver bullet" — queue admission is not the same as an actual connection.

See the full data →

Housebuilding remains well below the government’s own target

England completed 142,040 net additional dwellings in 2025 — short of the 300,000-a-year target, and lower than each of the previous three years, even as the planning approval rate for decided applications sits above 85%. Approvals are not completions.

See the full data →

Major residential planning volume has structurally fallen since the financial crisis

Major residential planning decisions ran at roughly 1,700 a quarter in 2000; by early 2026 that was down to around 1,000 a quarter — a lower-volume planning system, not just a slower one.

See the full data →

Unfunded public-service pensions are the second-largest government liability — and are excluded from the headline debt figures

The second-largest UK government liability after gilts. Excluded from Public Sector Net Debt (PSND) and Public Sector Net Financial Liabilities (PSNFL) under ESA10 accounting rules (treated as a contingent, not a concrete, liability) — only appears on the broadest measure, Public Sector Net Worth (PSNW). A reader tracking only PSND or PSNFL will not see this £1.4tn liability at all.

See the full data →

Business R&D growth is slower once inflation is stripped out

UK business R&D spending has grown steadily in current-price terms, but the real-terms (constant-price) series shows slower, less consistent growth — a reminder that a current-price headline alone can overstate genuine innovation-spending growth.

See the full data →
How this whole module is sourced, and what "evidence class" means
  • A — Observed official statistic and B — Official/admin statistic with methodological limitations account for the large majority of figures across this module — official measurements and statutory-body estimates, never a think tank or campaign group where an official series exists.
  • C — Derived by UK Stat Pack from official data figures always name their exact formula and inputs — UK Stat Pack's own calculation, never presented as an official statistic.
  • D/E — Forecast or scenario (see forecastSource) figures are always labelled as a projection or model output, with who made the forecast stated.

Every section uses the same evidence-classification scheme, above. Where a figure is genuinely disputed by credible parties, or where a publisher acknowledges a defect in its own source, that is shown inline next to the number — never hidden behind a "read more". Every figure across these pages traces to a named official release.

See every canonical series, its source and its freshness →

Start with a topic