The problem
Permissions and plans do not become occupied homes when sites are held up by missing infrastructure, viability, finance or builders.
Who is affected, and where
Households who need a home in high-demand areas of England. Territory: England. Planning is devolved: Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland run separate systems and would need their own decisions; not assessed here.
Policy status
UK Facts proposal. Builds on reforms already in place: the National Planning Policy Framework published on 17 August 2026, which replaced the December 2024 version, and the Planning and Infrastructure Act 2025 (Royal Assent 18 December 2025). The site-by-site blocker list is a UK Facts proposal, not government policy.
The evidence
- What the research found:
- The OBR judged that the revised planning framework would add about 170,000 net additional homes over 2025–26 to 2029–30. LSE’s qualitative research stresses certainty and meaningful participation; Centre for Cities proposes zoning instead but gives no estimate of its effect.
- Evaluated on:
- UK housing stock in the OBR forecast; qualitative research with planners and landowners; England, 2025–2030 forecast period
- Transfer to this case:
- The OBR estimate is for the reforms already enacted, not for any further package.
- Our recommendation (separate from the research):
- Publish the blocker, owner and cost for a small set of priority sites and count occupied homes, not permissions.
- Strongest counter-evidence:
- Centre for Cities argues incremental reform of a discretionary system cannot close the gap and proposes zoning; neither approach has a UK effect estimate.
Effects on record
- Net additional homes: Direction plausible; size not established. modelled, limited confidence; England. The OBR’s 170,000 extra homes by 2029–30 is its judgement of the 2024 planning reforms already in place, not of this site-by-site package, whose marginal effect has not been estimated.
Cost and funding
Cost completeness: Not yet costed. Funding: Not yet costed / funding not identified.
- Planning staff, site infrastructure and financing for priority sites (capital; paid by central government, councils, developers): Not yet costed. No defensible national price found. Planning capacity (recurring), utilities and transport connections (capital) and financing must be costed separately for each site.
- Who pays:
- Central government and councils for planning capacity and enabling infrastructure; developers through fees and contributions; utilities and their bill-payers for connections.
- Financing proposed:
- Planning fees, developer contributions and named infrastructure allocations — each to be checked for legal use and timing.
- Gap remaining:
- Unknown until priority sites are costed.
What delivery needs
- Skills:
- Planning officers and infrastructure specialists in councils.
- Operational capacity:
- Site-level data on blockers.
- Infrastructure:
- Water, power and transport connections.
- Permissions:
- Local plans and permissions.
- Law:
- Powers exist under current planning law.
- Public consent:
- Local consent for development; environmental trade-offs.
First step and stages
First step: Publish the actual blocker, owner and infrastructure cost for a small set of priority sites. (owner: MHCLG with local planning authorities)
- Select sites and diagnose blockers — MHCLG and councils (proposed stage, not an official timetable)
- Fund and sequence connections — Treasury, utilities, councils (proposed stage, not an official timetable)
- Build and occupy — Developers and housing associations (proposed stage, not an official timetable)
Depends on: Construction workforce; Utility connection capacity
Trade-offs
- Who gains and who loses:
- Gains for future residents and those who need affordable homes; costs for neighbouring residents (disruption, green space) and for whoever funds infrastructure.
- What else the money or effort could do:
- Infrastructure money and planning staff spent here are not available for other sites or services.
- Strongest counterargument:
- Faster permission alone may not make sites viable or speed building, which depends on demand, finance and builders.
- Risks:
- Local opposition, environmental harm, construction capacity limits and counting permissions as delivery.
How we would judge it
- Baseline:
- Net additional dwellings, England (MHCLG Live Table 120).
- Leading indicator:
- Time from application to start on site at priority sites.
- Outcome:
- Net additional and occupied homes, affordable tenure and rents relative to income.
- Continue, adapt or stop:
- Continue where priority sites start faster than comparable sites; stop funding sites whose blocker is not infrastructure.
Earlier option on this page
This card replaces the option “Planning reform so homes and infrastructure get built” (legislated: In force: National Planning Policy Framework revised December 2024 (the change the OBR estimate covers); Planning and Infrastructure Act 2025, Royal Assent 18 December 2025 (no OBR estimate attached here).). Its evidence: The OBR estimated in March 2025 that the December 2024 changes to the National Planning Policy Framework would add about 170,000 homes and make the economy about 0.2% larger by 2029–30, possibly over 0.4% by 2034–35. It is a conditional, modelled estimate, not an observed result: it depends on councils applying the framework and the homes being built, and it predates the Planning and Infrastructure Act 2025, which it does not cover. MHCLG, OBR concludes planning reforms will bring housebuilding to its highest level in 40 years (26 March 2025) · OBR, The supply-side impact of planning reforms (14 August 2025)
Sources
Source published March 2025 (OBR); 2025 (LSE); February 2025 (Centre for Cities); evidence reviewed 2026-10-04. Reconsider if: The OBR publishes a new estimate of the planning reforms; Net additions move decisively away from the 2024–25 level; The government publishes site-level infrastructure data.
Also on: Housing, Growth — one shared record, so its cost is counted once.
