Housing · England · 2025

A typical home in England costs 7.6 times annual pay.

Buying is out of reach for many. High rents and too few suitable, affordable homes leave families with limited choices — and some without a settled home.

Priority: Increase access to affordable, secure, suitable homes; compare supply, social housing and prevention. What would change it →

Evidence last reviewed 8 October 2026

Overview

The short version

Three key measures

01 · Buying

Three hurdles: the price, the deposit and the mortgage

A lower house-price ratio does not necessarily mean an affordable monthly payment. Start with the price, then follow the money needed to buy.

How many years of pay does a typical home cost?

A home costs 7.6 times annual earnings, against 3.5 in 1997

England · median house price ÷ median full-time annual earnings. The early earnings basis differs in 1997–98.

England · 1997 to 2025 (prices: year to September; earnings: April)

1996–2026 displayed window · observations only. Shading marks years outside the displayed record.

House price / annual earnings2×4×6×8×10×axis does not start at 02000201020207.6×1997: 3.5×2021 peak 9.1×
Prices rose much faster than pay before 2007. The ratio peaked at 9.1× in 2021 and has since fallen to 7.6×. That does not measure the deposit or monthly mortgage payment.
Sources, definitions and data — A home costs 7.6 times annual earnings, against 3.5 in 1997
Geography:
England — Residential property sales; full-time employees, workplace-based
Measure:
Multiple of annual earnings (ratio)
Period:
1997 to 2025 (prices: year to September; earnings: April)
Status:
Official statistics; the latest year may be revised when new earnings data arrive
Calculation:
As published by ONS (Table 1c). Values shown to two decimal places in the table; one decimal in text.
Compare with:
2000 baseline (4.2); 1997, the first year (3.5); the 2021 peak (9.1)
Not included / breaks:
Earnings for 1997–98 are annualised weekly figures. The ratio is an individual full-time earnings comparison: it is not the years a household must save, and not a mortgage test — mortgage rates and deposits are not in it.

Source: ONS, Housing affordability in England and Wales: 2025, dataset Table 1c (released 26 March 2026). Chart HOUSE-01.

View the data as a table
YearRatio
19973.54
19983.67
19993.96
20004.19
20014.50
20025.12
20035.93
20046.60
20056.79
20066.95
20077.15
20086.97
20096.40
20106.85
20116.80
20126.77
20136.76
20147.09
20157.54
20167.72
20177.91
20188.04
20197.88
20207.86
20219.06
20228.56
20238.45
20247.84
20257.63

How much did first-time buyers borrow against income?

First-time buyers borrow 3.6 times income, compared with 2.4 in 1996

UK · loan-to-income ratio for completed first-time buyer mortgages. Two sources; not one continuous series.

United Kingdom · Archive: 1996–2010; ONS/FCA: 2006–2025

1996–2026 displayed window · observations only. Shading marks years outside the displayed record.

Loan / borrower income2.0×2.5×3.0×3.5×4.0×axis does not start at 02000201020203.1×3.6×

Archive source: Table 517 (XLS). Survey changes in 2003 and 2005; sources overlap in 2006–10.

The archive records 2.42× in 1996; the current ONS series records 3.62× in 2025. Their methods differ. Unlike the house-price chart, this compares the loan with the borrower’s income, which may include joint applicants.
Sources, definitions and data — First-time buyers borrow 3.6 times income, compared with 2.4 in 1996
Geography:
United Kingdom — First-time buyer mortgage sales, as defined by each source
Measure:
Mortgage advance ÷ borrower income
Period:
Archive: 1996–2010; ONS/FCA: 2006–2025
Status:
Current series: official statistics in development; archive: historical mortgage survey
Calculation:
Published annual loan-to-income ratios. Archived Table 517 is plotted separately with its overlapping years; no percentage change is calculated between sources.
Not included / breaks:
Archive: sample enlarged in 2003; collection moved to the Regulated Mortgage Survey during 2005. Since 1988 its ratios are averaged case by case. Current data use FCA PSD001; first-time buyer definitions may include previous owners who are not selling another property. These figures describe successful borrowers, not the lending limit or households unable to buy.

Source: ONS, First-time buyer mortgage sales by local authority: UK, 2b, United Kingdom. Chart HOUSE-FTB.

View the data as a table
YearArchived Table 517ONS/FCA Table 2b
19962.42—
19972.43—
19982.41—
19992.44—
20002.46—
20012.52—
20022.679—
20032.96—
20043.36—
20053.39—
20063.23.25
20073.353.39
20083.2473.28
20093.0173.11
20103.0733.23
2011—3.21
2012—3.27
2013—3.34
2014—3.43
2015—3.44
2016—3.56
2017—3.62
2018—3.66
2019—3.67
2020—3.71
2021—3.75
2022—3.79
2023—3.47
2024—3.47
2025—3.62

The next hurdle: cash up front

A much bigger purchase — and a bigger cash hurdle

UK first-time buyers · nominal pounds. The archive gives means; the current release gives medians. The different measures provide context, not a precise growth rate.

1996

£48,693

Mean purchase price

Mean mortgage
£43,867
Mean loan-to-value
90.11%

Deposit illustration

£4,816

Using this price and 9.89% cash; not the observed average deposit.

2025

£240,000

Median purchase price

Median mortgage
£195,720
Median loan-to-value
85.62%

Deposit illustration

£34,512

Using this price and 14.38% cash; not the observed average deposit.

Deposits were not fixed at 10%. The median first-time buyer LTV was 90% in 2007. Some products went further: Northern Rock’s Together combined a mortgage with an unsecured loan, allowing total borrowing up to 125% of the property value.

Sources, definitions and deposit assumptions

Successful UK mortgage buyers only, not all homes or people unable to buy. Archive: Table 513 (price and advance) and Table 517 (case-level LTV). Current: ONS/FCA tables 2a, 3b and 3c. Means and medians are not interchangeable. The cash illustration applies each period’s published LTV to its price, assumes valuation equals price, and excludes fees and taxes. Separate medians must not be subtracted to claim a median deposit.

High-LTV products were not the typical loan and do not, on their own, explain the financial crisis. Northern Rock also depended on wholesale funding that dried up.

Commons Library: Northern Rock

Separate savings illustration: Under the same two-earner saving rule, a 10% deposit takes 21 months in 1997 and 46 in 2025: 25 extra months (+116%). A fictional family and an illustrative calculation using ONS data.

The saving model, assumptions and illustrated story →

What does the size of your deposit change?

Smaller deposits can mean higher mortgage rates

UK · quoted two-year fixed rates, 1996–Sept 2026. LTV is the share of the property price borrowed.

United Kingdom · January 1996 to Sept 2026

1996–2026 displayed window · observations only. Shading marks years outside the displayed record.

Quoted annual rate (%)0.0%5.0%10.0%20002010202075% LTV 5.1%90% LTV 5.4%95% LTV 5.7%
Compare the lines at the same date: a larger deposit often buys a lower rate as well as a smaller loan. These are product quotes, not total mortgage costs; fees, term and eligibility also matter.
Sources, definitions and data — Smaller deposits can mean higher mortgage rates
Geography:
United Kingdom
Measure:
Annual interest rate (%)
Period:
January 1996 to Sept 2026
Status:
Bank of England statistics
Calculation:
Monthly published quoted rates. Missing observations remain gaps. No interpolation, fees or APRC adjustment.
Not included / breaks:
These are quoted product rates, not rates actually paid by all borrowers or personalised offers. The product mix can change. The 90% LTV record starts in May 2008; the 95% record has gaps, including periods with limited product availability. Blank cells do not mean zero interest.

Source: Bank of England, quoted household interest rates, IUMBV34 (75%), IUMB482 (90%), IUM2WTL (95%). Chart HOUSE-LTV.

View the data as a table
Month75% LTV (%)90% LTV (%)95% LTV (%)
Jan 19966.7Not available6.7
Feb 19966.65Not available6.65
Mar 19966.49Not available6.49
Apr 19966.62Not available6.62
May 19967.01Not available7.01
Jun 19967.06Not available7.06
Jul 19967.12Not available7.12
Aug 19967.09Not available7.09
Sept 19967.06Not available7.06
Oct 19966.96Not available6.96
Nov 19966.94Not available6.94
Dec 19967.24Not available7.27
Jan 19977.29Not available7.35
Feb 19977.35Not available7.41
Mar 19977.11Not available7.18
Apr 19977.24Not available7.3
May 19977.15Not available7.2
Jun 19977.14Not available7.19
Jul 19977.2Not available7.23
Aug 19977.17Not available7.19
Sept 19977.06Not available7.09
Oct 19977.07Not available7.1
Nov 19977.04Not available7.06
Dec 19977.13Not available7.33
Jan 19987.13Not available7.33
Feb 19987.08Not available7.32
Mar 19987.02Not available7.26
Apr 19987.14Not available7.28
May 19987.12Not available7.35
Jun 19986.94Not available7.24
Jul 19987.08Not available7.35
Aug 19987.33Not available7.55
Sept 19987.27Not available7.49
Oct 19986.91Not available7.01
Nov 19986.66Not available6.82
Dec 19986.42Not available6.54
Jan 19995.9Not available5.97
Feb 19995.78Not available5.88
Mar 19995.64Not available5.95
Apr 19995.71Not available5.89
May 19995.72Not available5.96
Jun 19995.89Not available6
Jul 19996Not available6.17
Aug 19996.19Not available6.36
Sept 19996.22Not available6.45
Oct 19996.5Not available6.79
Nov 19996.6Not available6.77
Dec 19996.52Not available6.84
Jan 20006.78Not available6.9
Feb 20006.79Not available6.97
Mar 20006.45Not available6.68
Apr 20006.31Not available6.64
May 20006.39Not available6.52
Jun 20006.46Not available6.65
Jul 20006.37Not available6.59
Aug 20006.35Not available6.58
Sept 20006.31Not available6.6
Oct 20006.05Not available6.45
Nov 20006.06Not available6.29
Dec 20006.03Not available6.22
Jan 20015.78Not available6
Feb 20015.7Not available5.85
Mar 20015.68Not available5.82
Apr 20015.63Not available5.76
May 20015.65Not available5.71
Jun 20015.72Not available5.82
Jul 20015.92Not available6.16
Aug 20015.58Not available6
Sept 20015.39Not available5.59
Oct 20015.06Not available5.53
Nov 20014.84Not available5.31
Dec 20014.98Not available5.21
Jan 20025.06Not available5.34
Feb 20025.14Not available5.47
Mar 20025.22Not available5.47
Apr 20025.35Not available5.62
May 20025.43Not available5.67
Jun 20025.41Not available5.65
Jul 20025.3Not available5.55
Aug 20024.59Not available4.92
Sept 20024.5Not available4.72
Oct 20024.43Not available4.69
Nov 20024.45Not available4.68
Dec 20024.62Not available4.86
Jan 20034.5Not available4.69
Feb 20034.14Not available4.36
Mar 20034.06Not available4.2
Apr 20034.06Not available4.31
May 20033.91Not available4.18
Jun 20033.85Not available4.04
Jul 20033.87Not available4.08
Aug 20034.32Not available4.63
Sept 20034.56Not available4.86
Oct 20034.98Not available5.21
Nov 20035.1Not available5.34
Dec 20035.05Not available5.32
Jan 20044.95Not available5.19
Feb 20044.89Not available5.12
Mar 20044.9Not available5.17
Apr 20045.11Not available5.37
May 20045.18Not available5.33
Jun 20045.52Not available5.76
Jul 20045.53Not available5.69
Aug 20045.47Not available5.66
Sept 20045.33Not available5.63
Oct 20045.29Not available5.6
Nov 20045.06Not available5.42
Dec 20045.07Not available5.31
Jan 20054.99Not available5.3
Feb 20055.07Not available5.31
Mar 20055.2Not available5.48
Apr 20055.16Not available5.43
May 20054.91Not available5.27
Jun 20054.77Not available5.01
Jul 20054.59Not available4.76
Aug 20054.56Not available4.75
Sept 20054.52Not available4.74
Oct 20054.54Not available4.78
Nov 20054.74Not available4.98
Dec 20054.74Not available5.04
Jan 20064.62Not available4.96
Feb 20064.71Not available5.01
Mar 20064.72Not available5.04
Apr 20064.77Not available5.03
May 20065Not available5.23
Jun 20065Not available5.31
Jul 20065.01Not available5.39
Aug 20065.1Not available5.42
Sept 20065.1Not available5.44
Oct 20064.99Not available5.39
Nov 20065.2Not available5.51
Dec 20065.15Not available5.44
Jan 20075.32Not available5.68
Feb 20075.46Not available5.82
Mar 20075.55Not available5.88
Apr 20075.62Not available5.86
May 20075.7Not available6.05
Jun 20075.98Not available6.26
Jul 20076.07Not available6.33
Aug 20076.11Not available6.54
Sept 20076.05Not available6.32
Oct 20076.11Not available6.44
Nov 20076.09Not available6.47
Dec 20076.06Not available6.54
Jan 20085.97Not available6.41
Feb 20085.74Not available6.52
Mar 20085.8Not available6.59
Apr 20086.06Not available6.91
May 20086.266.44Not available
Jun 20086.66.67Not available
Jul 20086.356.94Not available
Aug 20086.086.8Not available
Sept 20085.966.56Not available
Oct 20085.836.41Not available
Nov 20085.16.58Not available
Dec 20084.776.69Not available
Jan 20094.356.13Not available
Feb 20094.355.97Not available
Mar 20093.98Not availableNot available
Apr 20094.02Not availableNot available
May 20093.98Not availableNot available
Jun 20094.456.47Not available
Jul 20094.426.47Not available
Aug 20094.436.44Not available
Sept 20094.476.42Not available
Oct 20094.326.55Not available
Nov 20094.16.62Not available
Dec 20094.056.64Not available
Jan 20103.976.61Not available
Feb 20103.886.62Not available
Mar 20103.926.61Not available
Apr 20103.826.65Not available
May 20103.786.63Not available
Jun 20103.676.6Not available
Jul 20103.776.52Not available
Aug 20103.746.35Not available
Sept 20103.86.27Not available
Oct 20103.686.14Not available
Nov 20103.536.16Not available
Dec 20103.56.15Not available
Jan 20113.76.18Not available
Feb 20113.75.92Not available
Mar 20113.685.91Not available
Apr 20113.665.98Not available
May 20113.515.93Not available
Jun 20113.365.77Not available
Jul 20113.145.75Not available
Aug 201135.5Not available
Sept 20112.925.27Not available
Oct 20113.045.31Not available
Nov 20113.145.37Not available
Dec 20113.225.45Not available
Jan 20123.275.53Not available
Feb 20123.375.6Not available
Mar 20123.445.76Not available
Apr 20123.665.79Not available
May 20123.686.07Not available
Jun 20123.745.7Not available
Jul 20123.675.83Not available
Aug 20123.695.93Not available
Sept 20123.675.85Not available
Oct 20123.495.64Not available
Nov 20123.435.64Not available
Dec 20123.355.39Not available
Jan 20133.114.86Not available
Feb 20132.924.73Not available
Mar 20132.94.67Not available
Apr 20132.874.67Not available
May 20132.694.61Not available
Jun 20132.634.59Not available
Jul 20132.624.58Not available
Aug 20132.584.52Not available
Sept 20132.544.56Not available
Oct 20132.484.425.1
Nov 20132.444.415.04
Dec 20132.44.365.08
Jan 20142.374.345.05
Feb 20142.384.395.05
Mar 20142.374.385.06
Apr 20142.544.485.14
May 20142.564.495.2
Jun 20142.64.55.32
Jul 20142.544.475.33
Aug 20142.544.345.28
Sept 20142.464.235.28
Oct 20142.213.985.2
Nov 20142.173.845.27
Dec 20142.083.895.27
Jan 20152.013.714.74
Feb 20151.963.774.67
Mar 20151.993.744.72
Apr 20151.953.534.58
May 20151.93.534.57
Jun 20151.833.344.39
Jul 20151.873.264.32
Aug 20151.953.154.36
Sept 20151.913.034.22
Oct 20151.872.894.22
Nov 20151.922.884.13
Dec 20151.92.874.06
Jan 20161.932.853.95
Feb 20161.952.883.99
Mar 20161.92.873.92
Apr 20161.842.713.92
May 20161.912.753.93
Jun 20161.752.643.88
Jul 20161.722.573.85
Aug 20161.692.553.88
Sept 20161.592.423.84
Oct 20161.522.423.73
Nov 20161.432.493.66
Dec 20161.452.533.62
Jan 20171.452.53.62
Feb 20171.422.453.8
Mar 20171.372.483.99
Apr 20171.352.434.04
May 20171.492.54.19
Jun 20171.482.54.2
Jul 20171.412.374.07
Aug 20171.432.334.02
Sept 20171.42.314.01
Oct 20171.552.364.02
Nov 20171.612.363.97
Dec 20171.572.213.89
Jan 20181.542.173.82
Feb 20181.492.213.82
Mar 20181.532.23.77
Apr 20181.722.363.9
May 20181.742.343.95
Jun 20181.742.373.95
Jul 20181.752.33.78
Aug 20181.752.283.61
Sept 20181.712.123.38
Oct 20181.82.273.33
Nov 20181.752.283.23
Dec 20181.732.243.18
Jan 20191.722.233.04
Feb 20191.72.172.99
Mar 20191.72.172.97
Apr 20191.662.152.92
May 20191.652.192.93
Jun 20191.642.182.95
Jul 20191.612.152.96
Aug 20191.592.12.96
Sept 20191.552.092.99
Oct 20191.472.072.99
Nov 20191.412.082.99
Dec 20191.422.073
Jan 20201.412.053.02
Feb 20201.41.973.02
Mar 20201.41.943.02
Apr 20201.381.893.07
May 20201.421.963.17
Jun 20201.412.192.72
Jul 20201.452.52.58
Aug 20201.62.783.78
Sept 20201.753.293.95
Oct 20201.943.524.13
Nov 20201.923.724.2
Dec 20201.863.754.2
Jan 20211.753.634.16
Feb 20211.613.494.1
Mar 20211.563.384.16
Apr 20211.493.384.01
May 20211.473.313.88
Jun 20211.393.093.74
Jul 20211.292.793.53
Aug 20211.232.483.43
Sept 20211.22.163.22
Oct 20211.292.042.98
Nov 20211.532.022.91
Dec 20211.571.952.77
Jan 20221.641.952.73
Feb 20221.782.032.72
Mar 20222.142.382.8
Apr 20222.352.582.95
May 20222.632.853.2
Jun 20222.873.153.48
Jul 20223.483.693.96
Aug 20223.63.934.14
Sept 20224.174.484.67
Oct 20225.996.26.42
Nov 20225.986.286.59
Dec 20225.4366.3
Jan 20235.145.666.02
Feb 20234.795.355.86
Mar 20234.745.235.77
Apr 20234.65.075.65
May 20234.725.085.67
Jun 20235.495.756.28
Jul 20236.226.496.88
Aug 20236.186.576.93
Sept 20235.916.376.75
Oct 20235.66.066.6
Nov 20235.285.816.38
Dec 20235.035.696.18
Jan 20244.715.445.87
Feb 20244.765.265.73
Mar 20244.965.395.83
Apr 20244.985.475.87
May 20245.195.666.04
Jun 20245.165.656.07
Jul 20244.995.615.97
Aug 20244.85.545.9
Sept 20244.585.45.76
Oct 20244.45.35.61
Nov 20244.535.415.69
Dec 20244.65.375.7
Jan 20254.635.355.69
Feb 20254.655.265.64
Mar 20254.545.095.44
Apr 20254.424.965.29
May 20254.184.825.1
Jun 20254.284.85.1
Jul 20254.214.625.05
Aug 20254.14.555
Sept 20254.194.585.03
Oct 20254.24.575
Nov 20254.064.494.91
Dec 20253.974.424.83
Jan 20263.934.364.8
Feb 20263.974.344.82
Mar 20264.454.795.23
Apr 20265.145.465.8
May 20264.915.315.63
Jun 20264.85.185.54
Jul 20264.795.075.48
Aug 20264.925.165.52
Sept 20265.135.375.7

Scroll the table sideways to see every column.

02 · Availability

More buying power needs more suitable homes

Credit can help someone compete for a home. It cannot by itself create one. Supply, location and tenure determine the choices available.

How many homes are being added?

+58.0%2000–01–2024–25 · provisionalEngland · net additional dwellings per year
0150K300K19962026
132,000 → 208,600 (provisional)2000–01–2024–25

Net additions include conversions and changes of use, less demolitions. Latest year provisional. This is not the number currently for sale.

Sources, definitions and data

Live Table 118, England total, 2000–01 onwards. Includes Census adjustments; the component collection begins in 2006–07. Earlier figures are less reliable. Financial years are plotted at their starting year.

MHCLG · Live Table 118 (ODS)
YearNet homesStatus
2000–01132,000Published estimate
2001–02146,704Published estimate
2002–03159,875Published estimate
2003–04170,969Published estimate
2004–05185,553Published estimate
2005–06202,653Published estimate
2006–07214,936Published estimate
2007–08223,534Published estimate
2008–09182,767Published estimate
2009–10144,870Published estimate
2010–11137,394Published estimate
2011–12140,785Published estimate
2012–13130,611Published estimate
2013–14142,494Published estimate
2014–15176,582Published estimate
2015–16195,534Published estimate
2016–17223,234Published estimate
2017–18228,170Published estimate
2018–19247,766Published estimate
2019–20248,591Published estimate
2020–21217,754Published estimate
2021–22234,462Published estimate
2022–23234,292Published estimate
2023–24221,409Published estimate
2024–25208,600Provisional
From permission to a finished home →

The sharpest consequence: no settled home

177,530 children were in council-arranged temporary accommodation in March 2026. The household trend below counts their families, not additional people.

+185.3%Mar 1998–Mar 2026England · households
075K150K19962026
47,520 → 135,580Mar 1998–Mar 2026
Latest quarter provisional. This does not count all homelessness, such as rough sleeping or sofa-surfing.
Sources and data

Households placed in temporary accommodation by councils under homelessness duties, at the end of each quarter. It does not count people sleeping rough, sofa-surfing, or not known to a council. The Homelessness Reduction Act 2017 (in force April 2018) changed the duties under which people are placed.

Source dataset →
PeriodhouseholdsStatus
Mar 199847,520Outturn
Jun 199849,390Outturn
Sep 199852,510Outturn
Dec 199853,790Outturn
Mar 199956,580Outturn
Jun 199958,430Outturn
Sep 199961,450Outturn
Dec 199962,180Outturn
Mar 200065,170Outturn
Jun 200067,520Outturn
Sep 200071,860Outturn
Dec 200073,080Outturn
Mar 200175,200Outturn
Jun 200175,920Outturn
Sep 200177,800Outturn
Dec 200177,510Outturn
Mar 200280,200Outturn
Jun 200281,660Outturn
Sep 200285,010Outturn
Dec 200285,140Outturn
Mar 200389,040Outturn
Jun 200391,870Outturn
Sep 200394,440Outturn
Dec 200394,610Outturn
Mar 200497,680Outturn
Jun 200499,530Outturn
Sep 2004101,300Outturn
Dec 2004101,030Outturn
Mar 2005101,070Outturn
Jun 2005100,970Outturn
Sep 2005101,020Outturn
Dec 200598,730Outturn
Mar 200696,370Outturn
Jun 200693,910Outturn
Sep 200693,090Outturn
Dec 200689,510Outturn
Mar 200787,120Outturn
Jun 200784,900Outturn
Sep 200782,750Outturn
Dec 200779,500Outturn
Mar 200877,510Outturn
Jun 200874,690Outturn
Sep 200872,130Outturn
Dec 200867,480Outturn
Mar 200964,000Outturn
Jun 200960,230Outturn
Sep 200956,920Outturn
Dec 200953,370Outturn
Mar 201051,310Outturn
Jun 201050,400Outturn
Sep 201049,680Outturn
Dec 201048,010Outturn
Mar 201148,240Outturn
Jun 201148,330Outturn
Sep 201149,100Outturn
Dec 201148,920Outturn
Mar 201250,430Outturn
Jun 201251,630Outturn
Sep 201252,960Outturn
Dec 201253,140Outturn
Mar 201355,320Outturn
Jun 201355,840Outturn
Sep 201357,410Outturn
Dec 201356,940Outturn
Mar 201458,410Outturn
Jun 201459,570Outturn
Sep 201460,900Outturn
Dec 201461,930Outturn
Mar 201564,710Outturn
Jun 201566,980Outturn
Sep 201568,560Outturn
Dec 201569,140Outturn
Mar 201671,670Outturn
Jun 201673,050Outturn
Sep 201674,750Outturn
Dec 201675,740Outturn
Mar 201777,220Outturn
Jun 201778,540Outturn
Sep 201779,830Outturn
Dec 201779,720Outturn
Mar 201880,720Outturn
Jun 201882,390Outturn
Sep 201883,430Outturn
Dec 201883,540Outturn
Mar 201985,040Outturn
Jun 201986,240Outturn
Sep 201987,390Outturn
Dec 201988,310Outturn
Mar 202092,190Outturn
Jun 202098,260Outturn
Sep 202094,610Outturn
Dec 202095,100Outturn
Mar 202195,290Outturn
Jun 202195,850Outturn
Sep 202195,560Outturn
Dec 202196,280Outturn
Mar 202295,000Outturn
Jun 202295,690Outturn
Sep 202298,840Outturn
Dec 2022100,510Outturn
Mar 2023104,540Outturn
Jun 2023105,840Outturn
Sep 2023108,920Outturn
Dec 2023112,610Outturn
Mar 2024117,350Outturn
Jun 2024123,030Outturn
Sep 2024125,970Outturn
Dec 2024127,820Outturn
Mar 2025130,890Outturn
Jun 2025132,340Outturn
Sep 2025134,700Outturn
Dec 2025134,140Outturn
Mar 2026135,580Outturn

03 · Private renting

When buying is out of reach, rent still has to be paid

Rent is an ongoing household cost. The size of the rented sector shows how many people rely on it; it does not tell us whether a suitable home is available locally.

How much income goes on rent?

-3.1percentage points2015-16–2023-24England · %
No observationsshown0255019962026
39.4% → 36.3%2015-16–2023-24
Mean rent ÷ median gross renter-household income. Comparable data start in 2015–16; no earlier history is invented.
Sources and data

Mean private rent (all tenancies, new and existing) as a share of the median GROSS monthly income of private-renting households (Family Resources Survey). Not take-home pay, and not an individual worker. ONS treats 30% or less as affordable. Regional estimates rest on survey samples and can move a lot year to year. ONS warns these estimates are not directly comparable with earlier editions of the release (method changed in 2024).

Source dataset →
Period%Status
2015-1639.4Outturn
2016-1739.2Outturn
2017-1839Outturn
2018-1937Outturn
2019-2035.4Outturn
2020-2138Outturn
2021-2235.7Outturn
2022-2333.1Outturn
2023-2436.3Outturn

How many households rely on private renting?

+8.8percentage points1996–2024-25England · %
012.52519962026
10.1% → 18.9%1996–2024-25
Share of households renting privately. This is the occupied sector, not a measure of advertised vacancies.
Sources and data

English Housing Survey and its predecessors. Before 2008 figures come from the Labour Force Survey and earlier household surveys; years with no survey are left blank, not filled. Source changes: 1980–1991 DoE estimates; 1992–2008 Labour Force Survey; 2008-09 onward English Housing Survey.

Source dataset →
Period%Status
199610.1Outturn
199710.5Outturn
199810.3Outturn
19999.9Outturn
200010Outturn
200110.1Outturn
200210.3Outturn
200310.8Outturn
200411Outturn
200511.7Outturn
200612.2Outturn
200712.7Outturn
200813.9Outturn
2008-0914.2Outturn
2009-1015.6Outturn
2010-1116.5Outturn
2011-1217.4Outturn
2012-1318Outturn
2013-1419.4Outturn
2014-1519Outturn
2015-1619.9Outturn
2016-1720.3Outturn
2017-1819.5Outturn
2018-1919.3Outturn
2019-2018.7Outturn
2020-2118.5Outturn
2021-2219.1Outturn
2022-2318.8Outturn
2023-2418.8Outturn
2024-2518.9Outturn

The 2024 dwelling survey estimated 11% of private rented homes were vacant. Empty does not necessarily mean available or suitable to let.

Vacancy definition and source →

Place changes both choices

The same regions, two measures: purchase price ÷ individual annual pay; rent ÷ gross household income. The rent chart is not a comparison with monthly mortgage payments.

Buying affordability

Buying: price / pay

English regions · 2025 versus 2007

English regions · 2007 and 2025
20252007England 7.6×
  • London10.6×
  • South East9.6×
  • East of England9.0×
  • South West8.3×
  • East Midlands7.0×
  • West Midlands6.8×
  • Yorkshire and The Humber6.0×
  • North West5.9×
  • North East5.0×
London: 10.6× annual pay; North East: 5.0×. Local differences can be larger still.
Sources, definitions and data — Buying: price / pay
Geography:
English regions
Measure:
Multiple of annual earnings (ratio)
Period:
2007 and 2025
Status:
Official statistics
Calculation:
As published by ONS (Table 1c).
Compare with:
England, 7.6

Source: ONS, Housing affordability in England and Wales: 2025, dataset Table 1c (released 26 March 2026). Chart HOUSE-04.

View the data as a table
Region20252007
London10.617.94
South East9.588.40
East of England9.027.77
South West8.338.29
East Midlands7.026.43
West Midlands6.806.48
Yorkshire and The Humber6.036.04
North West5.925.83
North East5.005.79

Rental affordability

Renting: rent / income

English regions · 2023–24 versus 2015–16

English regions and Wales · 2015–16 and 2023–24
2023–242015–16
  • London41.6%
  • South East29.6%
  • East of England28.9%
  • South West31.4%
  • East Midlands24.4%
  • West Midlands29.2%
  • Yorkshire and The Humber27.4%
  • North West28.1%
  • North East19.8%
London: 41.6% of gross renter-household income; England overall: 36.3%. These averages do not describe every household.
Sources, definitions and data — Renting: rent / income
Geography:
English regions and Wales — Private-renting households
Measure:
Per cent of gross household income
Period:
2015–16 and 2023–24
Status:
Official statistics in development
Calculation:
As published by ONS (Table 3).
Compare with:
England, 36.3%
Not included / breaks:
Gross income — before tax — of the renting household, not take-home pay. Rents are averages for all private tenancies, not new lets, so they lag asking rents.

Source: ONS, Private rental affordability, England, Wales and Northern Ireland: 2024, dataset Table 3. Chart HOUSE-02.

View the data as a table
Area2023–242015–16
London41.6%52.0%
England36.3%39.4%
South West31.4%32.1%
South East29.6%33.2%
West Midlands29.2%27.2%
East of England28.9%33.1%
North West28.1%30.2%
Yorkshire and The Humber27.4%26.3%
Wales25.9%31.5%
East Midlands24.4%25.0%
North East19.8%28.0%
Compare Hampshire’s 13 council areas →

04 · Social housing

Lower rents need homes people can actually access

Social rent offers a different route to a settled home. Increasing that supply matters alongside helping buyers.

Council rents: lower costs, limited access

Councils and housing associations both provide social housing. “Council” describes the landlord; Social Rent and Affordable Rent describe how the rent is set. Access depends on eligibility, allocation and homes becoming available.

Council rent: source and definition

Pages 11 and 14; England general-needs Social Rent, excluding service charges. 2024 derived from £107.88 less published £8.13 change. Stock revisions were not applied to earlier rents. These stock-wide net rents differ from the new-letting geometric means below; they are not a matched-home comparison.

Regulator of Social Housing · 2024–25 stock and rents

Council Social Rent · England

£107.88 / week

Average general-needs net rent
31 March 2025 · service charges extra

£99.75 in 2024 → £107.88

Social-rent additions remain below the 1990s

-71.1%1996–97–2024–25England · homes per financial year
025K50K19962026
42,465 → 12,2671996–97–2024–25

12,267 added in 2024–25. These are gross additions: sales and demolitions also affect the stock.

Sources, definitions and data

Live Table 1000, revised 25 June 2026. Social Rent excludes Affordable Rent and shared ownership. Some London grant reporting cannot separate social rent from London Affordable Rent; see source notes. Financial years are plotted at their starting year.

MHCLG · Live Table 1000
YearHomes
1996–9742,465
1997–9835,780
1998–9933,579
1999–0028,794
2000–0127,087
2001–0226,810
2002–0323,955
2003–0422,661
2004–0521,674
2005–0623,633
2006–0724,683
2007–0829,643
2008–0931,122
2009–1033,491
2010–1139,562
2011–1237,677
2012–1317,580
2013–1410,924
2014–159,331
2015–166,803
2016–175,827
2017–187,049
2018–196,363
2019–206,766
2020–216,051
2021–227,661
2022–239,458
2023–2410,325
2024–2512,267

Two rent labels, different costs

England · average weekly rent for new social-sector lettings, 2024–25

Social Rent£113 / week

Affordable Rent£160 / week

“Affordable Rent” is a policy category, not a promise that every household can afford it. These rents describe new lettings, not every existing tenancy.

Sources, definitions and data

MHCLG CORE lettings statistics, geometric means across new lets (general needs and supported housing), section 7.2. Differences also reflect where homes are and their size; this is not a matched-property comparison.

Social housing lettings · rents
TenureAverage weekly rent
Social Rent£113
Affordable Rent£160

Delivery and safety · England; Housing Benefit changes also concern Scotland and Wales

Support must come with the home

Supported housing is more than a bed. Residents may need help to live independently; weak oversight can leave them paying for support they do not receive.

  1. Assess the resident’s needs
  2. Check accommodation and support
  3. Protect residents when standards fail
What this means, sources and limits

The June 2026 government response sets out licensing and support standards. These are implementation proposals, not evidence that poor provision has already been eliminated. Councils need inspection capacity and safe alternatives when provision closes.

Process illustration; no effect sizes implied. MHCLG and DWP: Supported Housing regulation: government response · 2026-06-19 · Introduction; licensing; exemptions; next steps.

05 · Age and condition

The homes we already have need care too

New supply is only part of the task. Older buildings, damp and unsafe homes need sustained repairs and investment.

Older homes remain most common in private renting

England · homes built before 1919 · 2016–17 → 2024

Private rented

35%2016–1732%2024

32 in every 100 homes in 2024.
3 percentage points lower than 2016–17.

Owner occupied

21%2016–1720%2024

20 in every 100 homes in 2024.
1 percentage point lower than 2016–17.

Social rented

7%2016–176%2024

6 in every 100 homes in 2024.
1 percentage point lower than 2016–17.

Age alone does not mean poor condition. These snapshots show the changing mix of homes in each tenure, not the same homes followed over time.

Sources, definitions and data

Rounded survey shares; differences are descriptive, not tests of statistical significance. The earlier ONS release labels the period financial year ending 2017; its England analysis reports 35% private, 21% owner occupied and 7% social rented. The latest EHS dwelling survey is 2024 (32%, 20%, 6%). No annual path between snapshots is inferred. Each square is one percentage point of the 2024 stock.

ONS · UK private rented sector, England, Figure 38 and accompanying textEnglish Housing Survey · Figure 1.8, Annex Table 1.6

Homes need to be safe as well as affordable

One period, one scale: 2006–2024. Conditions improved overall, but damp has risen again in recent years.

Non-decent homes

34.9% → 15.4%

2006 → 2024 · -19.5 percentage points

4 million homes in 2024

Homes with damp

9.8% → 5.5%

2006 → 2024 · -4.3 percentage points

1.4 million homes in 2024

Share of dwellings (%)01020304020062010201520202024

Teal solid: non-decent · rust dashed: damp. Hollow dots: modelled 2020–21 estimates. Categories overlap; do not add the totals.

Evidence, sources and data — including the longer damp record

The current non-decent definition starts in 2006, so both chart comparisons start there. The full damp record below begins in 1996, with gaps before 2003. We retain it without using a different headline baseline. Energy-efficiency assessment methods also changed over the record. Survey estimates of dwellings. Categories overlap and must not be added. The charts use published percentages; headline dwelling counts are rounded. Pandemic estimates for 2020–21 were modelled, with a different survey basis.

English Housing Survey · Annex 1.4 and 1.9
England · percentage of dwellings
YearNon-decent (%)Damp (%)Basis
1996Not comparable12.8Survey
2001Not comparable9.6Survey
2003Not comparable10.6Survey
2004Not comparable10.4Survey
2005Not comparable10.1Survey
200634.99.8Survey
200734.78.6Survey
200833.17.8Survey
200930.18.1Survey
201026.56.5Survey
201123.64.6Survey
201221.84.3Survey
201320.64.3Survey
201419.84.3Survey
201519.44.4Survey
201619.94.2Survey
201718.83.7Survey
201817.83.3Survey
2019173.4Survey
2020154Modelled
202114.33.8Modelled
202214.74.1Survey
2023155.2Survey
202415.45.5Survey
Housing weaknesses in the UK SWOT →

Building safety also matters: unsafe-cladding remediation and other housing weaknesses →

06 · What would move the needle?

More homes people can afford, with safer routes into ownership

Build supply, keep rents affordable and widen access to credit responsibly. Each option shows its evidence and what still needs to be assessed.

All six priorities are in the UK National Action PlanTwo have existing assessments. The other four retain their delivery, proposal or announcement status.
  1. Turn permissions into completed homes

    Existing assessed action

    Connect sites to infrastructure, secure builders and finance, and measure completed homes rather than permissions.

    Delivery, safeguards and evidence

    Match homes to local need; test infrastructure costs, build-out rates and environmental constraints.

    Track: Net additional homes and time from permission to completion.

    Primary sourceExisting assessment

    Housing issues in the UK SWOT →

    In the National Action Plan
  2. Build more homes at social rents

    Programme delivery priority · additional appraisal needed

    Use the social and affordable homes programme to expand lower-rent supply where need is greatest.

    Delivery, safeguards and evidence

    Report Social Rent separately from Affordable Rent; count sales and demolitions as well as additions. Funding, land and provider capacity constrain delivery.

    Track: Net social-rent stock, rent burdens and access for households in need.

    Primary source

    Housing issues in the UK SWOT →

    In the National Action Plan
  3. Test the new first-time buyer scheme

    Government announcement · details pending

    Your First Home proposes a 20% government equity loan and an expected 2.5% deposit for eligible new-build purchases in England.

    Delivery, safeguards and evidence

    Budget details must settle cost, eligibility and timing. Assess additional homes, price effects, resale terms and taxpayer risk; an equity loan is debt, not a grant.

    The NAO found that the earlier Help to Buy scheme supported ownership and supply, but also helped some who could already buy and exposed buyers and taxpayers to market risk. That is evidence to test the new scheme against, not a forecast of its effects. NAO evaluation.

    Track: Additional first-time buyers and homes, total borrower cost and public exposure.

    Primary source

    Housing issues in the UK SWOT →

    In the National Action Plan
  4. Widen access without weakening affordability checks

    Policy option · not yet appraised

    Assess rent-payment history and sustainable income more effectively so creditworthy applicants can qualify.

    Delivery, safeguards and evidence

    Keep verified affordability, rate-stress checks, responsible-lending rules and system-wide limits on high loan-to-income lending. Test arrears and negative-equity risks. Later-life lending also needs suitable advice, balanced promotions and clear explanations of rolled-up interest and alternatives.

    Track: Access alongside arrears, repossessions, advice complaints and the distribution of high-risk loans.

    Primary sourceFCA: later-life lending safeguards

    Housing issues in the UK SWOT →

    In the National Action Plan
  5. Give families a settled home sooner

    Existing assessed action

    Combine suitable social housing with early tenancy support and homelessness prevention.

    Delivery, safeguards and evidence

    Check suitability, local services and whether buying or leasing homes adds capacity rather than displacing other households.

    Track: Households and children in temporary accommodation; sustained settled tenancies.

    Primary sourceExisting assessment

    Housing issues in the UK SWOT →

    In the National Action Plan
  6. Repair unsafe, damp and inefficient homes

    Delivery priority · additional appraisal needed

    Join maintenance and energy improvements to enforcement of housing and building-safety standards.

    Delivery, safeguards and evidence

    Prioritise serious hazards and remediation; assess costs and avoid repairs budgets being crowded out by new construction.

    Track: Damp, non-decent homes and completion of unsafe-cladding remediation.

    Primary source

    Housing issues in the UK SWOT →

    In the National Action Plan

Reviewed 8 October 2026. The first-time buyer scheme is an announcement, not an open application service. The established national shortlists and their named reviews remain separately identified.

How we assessed these options

What would it take to improve this?

What would move the needle?

The outcome we want: More suitable, occupied homes in England that people can afford relative to their income.

The main constraint: Permissions and grant only become homes when sites have infrastructure, builders and finance — and the social-rent programme’s first allocations (25 August 2026) went to providers for supply in general, not to named schemes for households in temporary accommodation.

Constraint type: infrastructure, workforce, money, permissions.

The options on the table

What is funded now, and the changes assessed against it — the current baseline and the alternatives, before the position today and the actions.

Provisional single-reviewer assessments from the 6 October 2026 review; not approved business cases, and not government policy.

  • Homes built, not just permittedDelivery RAG: Red

    Funded now
    Not yet stated in the record.
    The change assessed
    Not yet defined.

    Range if completed: 14.0–20.0 out of 30 (equal weights; not yet assessed: expected incremental benefit (Bn), incremental affordability (Co))

  • Settled homes for families in temporary accommodationDelivery RAG: Amber

    Funded now
    The Social and Affordable Homes Programme 2026–2036 (£39bn envelope) made its first allocations on 25 August 2026 (£9.58bn to 33 strategic partners outside London; more than £16bn outside London and around £5bn in London still to allocate), under the Burnham government; its aim is supply, especially social rent, with temporary accommodation a stated use only for limited acquisitions. The dedicated temporary-accommodation capital route is the separate Local Authority Housing Fund, not assessed here. Linking awards to temporary-accommodation outcomes is a UK Facts proposal.
    The change assessed
    A buy/build/lease comparison against temporary accommodation, and awards tied to lettings.

    Range if completed: 19.0–22.0 out of 30 (equal weights; not yet assessed: incremental affordability (Co))

  • Prevent avoidable loss of rented homesDelivery RAG: Amber

    Funded now
    Funded baseline: the 56-day prevention duty (extended to section 8 notices from 1 May 2026), the Homelessness, Rough Sleeping and Domestic Abuse Grant (£885.0m in 2026–27), the Housing Loss Prevention Advice Service and a £16m Legal Support Grant (October 2026 to March 2029). Testing a defined early-advice offer against comparison areas is a UK Facts proposal, not government policy.
    The change assessed
    Test early rent-arrears/legal advice and targeted assistance for a defined at-risk cohort before homelessness occurs.

    Range if completed: 16.0–22.0 out of 30 (equal weights; not yet assessed: expected incremental benefit (Bn), incremental affordability (Co))

  • Protect flood-defence maintenance and appraise schemes by riskDelivery RAG: Amber

    Funded now
    The Starmer government committed £7.9bn over ten years and £4.2bn for 2026–27 to 2028–29 (16 June 2025) and consulted on a simpler way to bid for flood-defence funding. Allocating against the 2024 risk assessment, protecting maintenance and publishing homes better protected against that map each year are a UK Facts proposal; whether the Burnham government has kept the settlement unchanged is not confirmed here.
    The change assessed
    Separate maintenance of existing protection from long-lead new defences and assess each against local exposure.

    Range if completed: 15.0–21.0 out of 30 (equal weights; not yet assessed: expected incremental benefit (Bn), incremental affordability (Co))

Alternatives already on record: 34 options listed under the points in the position today (24 without an action record), and 2 earlier options under other options compared. They have not been scored in the review.

The position today

  • What we can build on (2)
  • What is holding us back (11)Supported housing is more than a bed. Residents may need help to live independently; weak oversight can leave them paying for support they do not receive. The June 2026 government response sets out licensing and support standards. These are implementation proposals, not evidence that poor provision has already been eliminated. Councils need inspection capacity and safe alternatives when provision closes. (2026-06-19 · England; Housing Benefit changes also concern Scotland and Wales)
  • What could improve things (2)Pairing deliverable sites with the new social-rent programme could turn grant into lettings for households in temporary accommodation.
  • What could make it worse (3)

Which quadrant a point sits in is our analytical judgement, not a statistical category. Each point says whether it is a measured fact, our synthesis or a risk.

What we can build on Strengths

  • A ten-year, £39bn Social and Affordable Homes Programme aims for around 300,000 homes with at least 60% for social rent; the first £9.58bn went to 33 strategic partners outside London on 25 August 2026, with more than £16bn outside London and around £5bn in London still to allocate.

    Measured factConfidence: High· 2026–27 to 2035–36· England

    Source: MHCLG / Homes England / GLA, Social and Affordable Homes Programme 2026 to 2036 (collection; MHCLG policy statement; Homes England prospectus) (Collection introduction; policy statement “Introduction”); Ministry of Housing, Communities and Local Government, The Social and Affordable Homes Programme and the reinvigoration of council housebuilding (Sections “Investment to strategic partners” and “Investment through continuous market engagement”)

    Options assessed against this point: Settled homes for families in temporary accommodation (Amber delivery RAG)

    What government has committed to

    Funding: A £39bn Social and Affordable Homes Programme for 2026–2036 aims to deliver around 300,000 social and affordable homes, with a target that at least 60% are for Social Rent. On 25 August 2026 the Burnham government made the first allocations — £9.58bn to 33 Strategic Partners for 73,600 homes — and said the remaining funding outside London (more than £16bn) will prioritise Social Rent and council housebuilding.

    Who and when:
    Starmer government (to July 2026), 7 November 2025.
    Since 20 July 2026:
    Kept by the Burnham government. Acted on and re-stated: first allocations announced by the Prime Minister and Angela Rayner on 25 August 2026; the 28 September 2026 Social Housing Bill notice repeats the £39bn commitment. Burnham's separate pledge to "build more council homes" (speech, 20 July 2026) has no numerical target; the 25 August notice speaks of "the largest expansion of council housing in decades" without a number. Source: Prime Minister’s Office and MHCLG, Historic council housebuilding comeback to help families into secure homes (Body and Notes to editors: £9.58bn to 33 Strategic Partners, 73,600 homes; "More than £16 billion remains to be allocated outside London"; "builds on the government's commitment to deliver 1.5 million homes this Parliament"; £46m Capacity to Build).
    Source:
    MHCLG, Social and Affordable Homes Programme 2026-2036: MHCLG policy statement (Ministerial foreword ("around 300,000 affordable homes ... around 180,000 for Social Rent"); "target to deliver at least 60% ... as Social Rent"; section G (LAHF 4))

    Checked 4 October 2026. A commitment is not delivery.

    Options (4)
  • The planning reforms are in force: the National Planning Policy Framework was revised in December 2024 and replaced by a new version on 17 August 2026, and the Planning and Infrastructure Act 2025 became law on 18 December 2025. Their effect on the number of homes built has not yet been observed.

    Measured factConfidence: High· December 2024 to August 2026· England

    Source: legislation.gov.uk, Planning and Infrastructure Act 2025 (c. 34) (Introductory text); MHCLG, National Planning Policy Framework (Introduction (this version replaces the Framework revised in December 2024))

    Options assessed against this point: Homes built, not just permitted (Red delivery RAG)

    What government has committed to

    Policy: The planning reforms are being taken further. A new National Planning Policy Framework was published on 17 August 2026 (updated 29 September 2026), replacing the December 2024 version; it keeps the standard method for housing need and adds a default "yes" for homes near well-connected stations. Mayors are to get call-in powers over large schemes (proposals announced 23 August 2026). The Planning and Infrastructure Act 2025 remains in law.

    Who and when:
    Burnham government (from 20 July 2026), 17 August 2026.
    Since 20 July 2026:
    Made by the current government. New NPPF published under Burnham on 17 August 2026; mayoral call-in proposals 23 August 2026. The OBR (March 2026, para 2.38) says the reforms' effect on net additions "has yet to meaningfully materialise in outturn" and it will reassess in the Autumn EFO — so the OBR’s 170,000 figure (the modelled estimate under “What could improve things”) is the March 2025 judgement, not an observed result.
    Source:
    MHCLG, National Planning Policy Framework (Introduction: "This version replaces the previous National Planning Policy Framework ... revised ... December 2024")

    Checked 4 October 2026. A commitment is not delivery.

    Options (4)
    • ShortlistedPublish the blocker, owner and infrastructure cost for priority sites

      Shows which step stops permitted sites becoming homes, so the planning reforms translate into starts.

      Who: MHCLG with local planning authorities · Evidence: Untested proposal · Status: Site-editorial action

      Source: Office for Budget Responsibility, Economic and fiscal outlook, March 2025 (Paragraphs 1.10 and 3.37)

    • Use mayoral call-in and up-front permission for large schemes

      Moves strategic decisions on 150+ home schemes to mayors and allows permission before an application, aiming to shorten time to start.

      Who: MHCLG; mayors · Evidence: Untested proposal · Status: Announced proposal

      Source: Prime Minister's Office / MHCLG, Mayors given powers to green light developments (Body: call-in thresholds (150+ homes, 15,000 sq m, 30m+); proposals "to be published next week"; mayoral say over Homes England funding)

    • Test whether the reforms are adding homes, against the OBR's judgement

      Compares net additions and permissions with the OBR's 170,000 assumption so policy can be adjusted if the effect does not appear.

      Who: OBR (Autumn EFO); MHCLG statistics · Evidence: Observational analysis · Status: Established

      Source: Office for Budget Responsibility, Economic and fiscal outlook – March 2026 (Paragraph 2.38: net additions fall to 220,000 in 2026-27, rise to just over 305,000 by 2030-31; reforms' impact "has yet to meaningfully materialise in outturn"; cumulative UK net additions 2025-26 to 2029-30 of 1.3 million)

    • Move towards a rules-based zoning system

      Replaces case-by-case permission with zoned rights, which proponents argue raises supply where demand is highest.

      Who: MHCLG; Parliament · Evidence: Untested proposal · Status: External proposal

      Source: Centre for Cities, A zoning system for England (Whole report (proposal))

What is holding us back Weaknesses

  • Supported housing is more than a bed. Residents may need help to live independently; weak oversight can leave them paying for support they do not receive. The June 2026 government response sets out licensing and support standards. These are implementation proposals, not evidence that poor provision has already been eliminated. Councils need inspection capacity and safe alternatives when provision closes.

    Risk, not a certaintyConfidence: Moderate· 2026-06-19· England; Housing Benefit changes also concern Scotland and Wales

    Source: MHCLG and DWP, Supported Housing regulation: government response (Introduction; licensing; exemptions; next steps)

  • The FCA found misleading promotions and unsuitable advice in later-life mortgage sales, including inadequate consideration of alternatives and incentives that could favour sales. Its intervention led reviewed firms to change their processes. Rolling up interest can substantially increase lifetime-mortgage debt; suitability and clear total-cost explanations remain important.

    Measured factConfidence: High· FCA review, September 2023· United Kingdom

    Source: Financial Conduct Authority, Action needed to ensure good outcomes for later life mortgage borrowers (Summary of findings: financial promotions and suitability of advice)

  • Shared ownership combines a purchased share with rent on the remainder. The NAO identifies affordability and information challenges; access should be assessed using the total ongoing cost, not just the initial deposit.

    Measured factConfidence: High· March 2026 review· England

    Source: National Audit Office, Investigation into shared ownership (Scope: affordability and information challenges)

  • Mean private rent was 36.3% of median gross renter-household income, and 41.6% in London. This is a ratio of averages, not every household’s rent burden; the England share has not risen steadily.

    Measured factConfidence: High· 2023-24· England

    Source: ONS, Private rental affordability, England, Wales and Northern Ireland: 2024 (Table 3)

  • Social-rent additions fell from 42,465 in 1996–97 to 12,267 in 2024–25. This is gross supply, including acquisitions, not net of sales and demolitions; Affordable Rent is a separate category.

    Measured factConfidence: High· 1996–97 to 2024–25· England

    Source: MHCLG, Live tables on affordable housing supply (Live Table 1000: Social Rent row, revised June 2026)

  • Of 4,724 monitored residential buildings at least 11 metres high with unsafe cladding, 2,153 had not started remediation. This monitored portfolio is not a count of every unsafe home; coverage changes over time.

    Measured factConfidence: High· August 2026· England

    Source: MHCLG, MHCLG (Overview: remediation progress)

  • 4 million dwellings (15%) did not meet the Decent Homes Standard; 1.4 million (5%) had damp. Existing-home condition needs attention alongside supply and affordability. The categories overlap.

    Measured factConfidence: High· 2024· England

    Source: MHCLG, English Housing Survey 2024–25: housing quality and energy efficiency (Key findings: non-decent dwellings and damp)

  • A typical home costs 7.6 times full-time annual earnings, against 3.5 in 1997 (the early earnings basis differs in 1997–98).

    Measured factConfidence: High· 2025 (1997 reference)· England

    Source: Office for National Statistics, Housing affordability in England and Wales: 2025 (Table 1c)

    What government has committed to

    No commitment found. There is no official target for the house-price-to-earnings ratio. The related commitment is supply: 1.5 million homes in England this Parliament, re-stated under Burnham (see housing-w3), alongside ministers' stated aim to help more people into home ownership.

    Searched: gov.uk search "affordability", "house prices", "home ownership" from 2026-07-20; MHCLG news 17 and 25 Aug 2026; Burnham tracker (no affordability pledge).

    Checked 4 October 2026. A commitment is not delivery.

    Options (3)
    • Turn permissions into completed homes where the ratio is highest

      More completions in high-ratio areas add to supply where prices are furthest from earnings.

      Who: MHCLG; local planning authorities · Evidence: Modelled scenario · Status: Site-editorial action

      Source: Office for Budget Responsibility, Economic and fiscal outlook, March 2025 (Paragraphs 1.10 and 3.37)

    • Grow the construction workforce

      More skilled workers let higher demand become more homes rather than higher build costs.

      Who: DfE / Skills England; CITB; employers · Evidence: Observational analysis · Status: Established

      Source: CITB, Construction Workforce Outlook 2026–2030 (Headline annual recruitment requirement)

    • Address housing costs directly as the driver of the generational divide

      Treats housing cost as the main lever on cohesion and living standards rather than income alone.

      Who: MHCLG; HM Treasury · Evidence: Untested proposal · Status: External proposal · Works through Inequality: Treats housing cost as the main lever on cohesion and living standards rather than income alone.

  • 135,580 households, including 177,530 children, were in temporary accommodation.

    Measured factConfidence: High· March 2026· England

    Source: MHCLG, Statutory homelessness: England time series (Table TA1)

    Options assessed against this point: Settled homes for families in temporary accommodation (Amber delivery RAG)

    What government has committed to

    Policy: The National Plan to End Homelessness (December 2025) set a target to eliminate the use of B&Bs for families, except very short emergency use, by the end of this Parliament, with £950m for round 4 of the Local Authority Housing Fund to grow good-quality temporary accommodation. There is no target for the number of households in temporary accommodation. Under Burnham the government has announced Social Housing Bill amendments (28 September 2026) to let councils refer homeless households to housing associations, "helping to reduce reliance on temporary accommodation", and a duty to collaborate on prevention.

    Who and when:
    Starmer government (to July 2026), 11 December 2025.
    Since 20 July 2026:
    Kept by the Burnham government. Acted on: Social Housing Bill amendments (28 Sep 2026); temporary accommodation notification duty in force 1 Sep 2026 (Children's Wellbeing and Schools Act 2026); 25 Aug 2026 SAHP allocations framed around families in temporary accommodation. The B&B target itself has not been re-stated since 20 July (it was restated in the June 2026 government response to the HCLG Committee). Burnham's rough-sleeping drive (£442m Rough Sleeping Programme, "route off the streets" by Christmas 2026) changes the separate rough-sleeping target from "halve long-term rough sleeping" to "end long-term rough sleeping at the earliest opportunity". Source: MHCLG, Social Housing Bill to strengthen homelessness prevention and protect social housing stock (Body: referral powers to private registered providers; disposals notification (eight weeks); Duty to Collaborate; "previously committed £39 billion").
    Source:
    MHCLG (cross-government), A National Plan to End Homelessness (Summary, "Immediate action on temporary accommodation": target to eliminate B&B use for families by end of Parliament; £950m LAHF round 4; halve long-term rough sleeping; £3.5bn over three years (section 7))

    Checked 4 October 2026. A commitment is not delivery.

    Options (5)
  • England added 208,600 homes, against about 300,000 a year implied by the government’s 1.5 million ambition.

    Measured factConfidence: High· 2024–25· England

    Source: MHCLG, Housing supply: net additional dwellings, England (Live Table 120); Centre for Cities, A zoning system for England (PDF pp.2–3)

    Options assessed against this point: Homes built, not just permitted (Red delivery RAG)

    What government has committed to

    Target: The government is committed to building 1.5 million homes in England this Parliament, a Plan for Change milestone set in December 2024. The Burnham government re-stated it on 5 and 25 August 2026.

    Who and when:
    Starmer government (to July 2026), 5 December 2024.
    Since 20 July 2026:
    Kept by the Burnham government. Re-stated in written answer HL2483 (5 Aug 2026); MHCLG news 17 Aug 2026 ("quarter-way mark towards its stretching target of 1.5 million homes") and 25 Aug 2026. The OBR March 2026 forecast is 1.3 million UK net additions over 2025-26 to 2029-30 — below the ambition (OBR does not frame it as a test of the target). Source: Prime Minister’s Office and MHCLG, Historic council housebuilding comeback to help families into secure homes (Paragraph beginning “The package builds on the government’s commitment to deliver 1.5 million homes this Parliament”).
    Source:
    Prime Minister’s Office and Cabinet Office, Plan for Change: Milestones for mission-led government (Milestones for change this Parliament (pp.12–13): 1.5 million homes)

    Checked 4 October 2026. A commitment is not delivery.

    Options (4)
    • ShortlistedTurn permissions into homes people can live in

      Targets the stall between permission and start so net additions rise towards 300,000 a year.

      Who: MHCLG with local planning authorities · Evidence: Untested proposal · Status: Site-editorial action

      Source: Office for Budget Responsibility, Economic and fiscal outlook, March 2025 (Paragraphs 1.10 and 3.37)

    • Fund Social Rent through the programme as a counter-cyclical source of completions

      Grant-funded homes continue when market sales slow, supporting total additions.

      Who: MHCLG; Homes England · Evidence: Observational analysis · Status: Funded programme

      Source: Prime Minister’s Office and MHCLG, Historic council housebuilding comeback to help families into secure homes (Body and Notes to editors: £9.58bn to 33 Strategic Partners, 73,600 homes; "More than £16 billion remains to be allocated outside London"; "builds on the government's commitment to deliver 1.5 million homes this Parliament"; £46m Capacity to Build)

    • Expand the construction workforce

      Removes a capacity limit on how fast completions can rise.

      Who: DfE / Skills England; CITB · Evidence: Observational analysis · Status: Established

      Source: CITB, Construction Workforce Outlook 2026–2030 (Headline annual recruitment requirement)

    • Publish an annual check of progress against the 1.5 million milestone, alongside the OBR forecast

      Makes the gap between ambition and forecast visible each year, so delivery shortfalls are corrected early.

      Who: MHCLG; OBR · Evidence: Observational analysis · Status: Site-editorial action

      Source: Office for Budget Responsibility, Economic and fiscal outlook – March 2026 (Paragraph 2.38: net additions fall to 220,000 in 2026-27, rise to just over 305,000 by 2030-31; reforms' impact "has yet to meaningfully materialise in outturn"; cumulative UK net additions 2025-26 to 2029-30 of 1.3 million)

  • Prevention works for just over half of households: of 35,130 prevention duties that ended in January–March 2026, 54.7% ended with a home secured for six months or more and 25% became homeless. The end of a private tenancy was the most common reason among the 39,200 households owed a duty (36.0%).

    Measured factConfidence: High· January to March 2026· England

    Source: Ministry of Housing, Communities and Local Government, Statutory homelessness in England: January to March 2026 (Main findings; sections 4 and 5)

    Options assessed against this point: Prevent avoidable loss of rented homes (Amber delivery RAG)

    What government has committed to

    Legislation: The 56-day prevention duty now covers section 8 notices (Renters’ Rights Act 2025, in force 1 May 2026, when section 21 was abolished for private assured tenancies), with new-burdens money in the Homelessness, Rough Sleeping and Domestic Abuse Grant (£885.0m in 2026–27).

    Who and when:
    Starmer government (to July 2026), 1 May 2026.
    Since 20 July 2026:
    Kept by the Burnham government. Built on under Burnham: a £16m Legal Support Grant for eviction and debt advice (30 September 2026) and a duty to collaborate on prevention added to the Social Housing Bill (28 September 2026). The national prevention target and grant allocations were not restated. Source: Ministry of Justice, £16m legal lifeline for families facing eviction and hardship (Opening paragraphs).
    Source:
    legislation.gov.uk, Housing Act 1996, section 175 (homelessness and threatened homelessness) (Section 175(4)–(5) as amended (SI 2026/421 reg 3(a)))

    Checked 7 October 2026. A commitment is not delivery.

    Options (3)

What could improve things Opportunities

What could make it worse Threats

The actions worth examining

Our shortlist for this page. Research quality, policy status, cost and funding are judged separately; none of these is government policy unless its status says so.Our shortlist. None is government policy unless its status says so.

  1. Turn permissions into homes people can live in — not yet costed / funding not identified
  2. Use social-housing funding to reduce temporary accommodation — programme funding exists; project allocation unconfirmed
  3. Allocate flood-defence money by the new risk map, keep existing defences in condition, and report homes better protected every year — programme funding exists; project allocation unconfirmed

And 1 more in the full list.

  • Action 1A01Policy status: site-editorial action

    Turn permissions into homes people can live in

    Name the blocker, owner and infrastructure cost for each priority site, then fund and sequence the connections that let building start.

    Assessment (draft, 6 October review)

    • A new scope of this action (A01v2): Homes built, not just permitted

      Delivery RAG: RedGate: pending

      Range if completed: 14.0–20.0 out of 30 (equal weights; not yet assessed: expected incremental benefit (Bn), incremental affordability (Co))

      National plan: Growth and prosperity list

    Who decides:
    MHCLG and local planning authorities, with utilities, transport bodies and developers (England)
    Evidence:
    Modelled scenario. The underlying reforms have an official modelled estimate; this site-by-site package has not been evaluated.
    Expected effect:
    Direction plausible; size not established.
    Cost and funding

    Not yet costed

    Funding: Not yet costed / funding not identified

    Why it is shortlisted here: Permissions are not homes: this targets the step where the pipeline stalls.

    What it takes
    The problem

    Permissions and plans do not become occupied homes when sites are held up by missing infrastructure, viability, finance or builders.

    Who is affected, and where

    Households who need a home in high-demand areas of England. Territory: England. Planning is devolved: Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland run separate systems and would need their own decisions; not assessed here.

    Policy status

    UK Facts proposal. Builds on reforms already in place: the National Planning Policy Framework published on 17 August 2026, which replaced the December 2024 version, and the Planning and Infrastructure Act 2025 (Royal Assent 18 December 2025). The site-by-site blocker list is a UK Facts proposal, not government policy.

    The evidence
    What the research found:
    The OBR judged that the revised planning framework would add about 170,000 net additional homes over 2025–26 to 2029–30. LSE’s qualitative research stresses certainty and meaningful participation; Centre for Cities proposes zoning instead but gives no estimate of its effect.
    Evaluated on:
    UK housing stock in the OBR forecast; qualitative research with planners and landowners; England, 2025–2030 forecast period
    Transfer to this case:
    The OBR estimate is for the reforms already enacted, not for any further package.
    Our recommendation (separate from the research):
    Publish the blocker, owner and cost for a small set of priority sites and count occupied homes, not permissions.
    Strongest counter-evidence:
    Centre for Cities argues incremental reform of a discretionary system cannot close the gap and proposes zoning; neither approach has a UK effect estimate.
    Effects on record
    • Net additional homes: Direction plausible; size not established. modelled, limited confidence; England. The OBR’s 170,000 extra homes by 2029–30 is its judgement of the 2024 planning reforms already in place, not of this site-by-site package, whose marginal effect has not been estimated.
    Cost and funding

    Cost completeness: Not yet costed. Funding: Not yet costed / funding not identified.

    • Planning staff, site infrastructure and financing for priority sites (capital; paid by central government, councils, developers): Not yet costed. No defensible national price found. Planning capacity (recurring), utilities and transport connections (capital) and financing must be costed separately for each site.
    Who pays:
    Central government and councils for planning capacity and enabling infrastructure; developers through fees and contributions; utilities and their bill-payers for connections.
    Financing proposed:
    Planning fees, developer contributions and named infrastructure allocations — each to be checked for legal use and timing.
    Gap remaining:
    Unknown until priority sites are costed.
    What delivery needs
    Skills:
    Planning officers and infrastructure specialists in councils.
    Operational capacity:
    Site-level data on blockers.
    Infrastructure:
    Water, power and transport connections.
    Permissions:
    Local plans and permissions.
    Law:
    Powers exist under current planning law.
    Public consent:
    Local consent for development; environmental trade-offs.
    First step and stages

    First step: Publish the actual blocker, owner and infrastructure cost for a small set of priority sites. (owner: MHCLG with local planning authorities)

    1. Select sites and diagnose blockers — MHCLG and councils (proposed stage, not an official timetable)
    2. Fund and sequence connections — Treasury, utilities, councils (proposed stage, not an official timetable)
    3. Build and occupy — Developers and housing associations (proposed stage, not an official timetable)

    Depends on: Construction workforce; Utility connection capacity

    Trade-offs
    Who gains and who loses:
    Gains for future residents and those who need affordable homes; costs for neighbouring residents (disruption, green space) and for whoever funds infrastructure.
    What else the money or effort could do:
    Infrastructure money and planning staff spent here are not available for other sites or services.
    Strongest counterargument:
    Faster permission alone may not make sites viable or speed building, which depends on demand, finance and builders.
    Risks:
    Local opposition, environmental harm, construction capacity limits and counting permissions as delivery.
    How we would judge it
    Baseline:
    Net additional dwellings, England (MHCLG Live Table 120).
    Leading indicator:
    Time from application to start on site at priority sites.
    Outcome:
    Net additional and occupied homes, affordable tenure and rents relative to income.
    Continue, adapt or stop:
    Continue where priority sites start faster than comparable sites; stop funding sites whose blocker is not infrastructure.
    Earlier option on this page

    This card replaces the option “Faster, more predictable planning decisions” (legislated: Revised National Planning Policy Framework (December 2024, the change the OBR estimate covers); Planning and Infrastructure Act 2025 received Royal Assent on 18 December 2025 (not covered by that estimate).). Its evidence: The OBR estimated in March 2025 that the December 2024 changes to the National Planning Policy Framework would add about 170,000 homes over five years — a conditional, modelled effect, not an observed one, made before the Planning and Infrastructure Act 2025 and not covering it. A high approval rate does not show planning is no constraint, because it excludes applications never made and says nothing about delays after approval. OBR, Economic and fiscal outlook, March 2025 (housing and planning reforms) · OBR, The supply-side impact of planning reforms (14 August 2025)

    Sources

    Source published March 2025 (OBR); 2025 (LSE); February 2025 (Centre for Cities); evidence reviewed 2026-10-04. Reconsider if: The OBR publishes a new estimate of the planning reforms; Net additions move decisively away from the 2024–25 level; The government publishes site-level infrastructure data.

    Also on: Economy, Growth — one shared record, so its cost is counted once.

  • Action 2A02Policy status: funded programme

    Use social-housing funding to reduce temporary accommodation

    Steer named awards from the social and affordable homes programme to additional social-rent homes that councils can let to households in temporary accommodation.

    Assessment (draft, 6 October review)

    Who decides:
    Homes England and the GLA (awards), with councils and housing associations (England)
    Evidence:
    Observational analysis. An audit of the previous programme shows grant delivers homes but below plan; whether new lettings reduce temporary accommodation locally has not been evaluated.
    Expected effect:
    Direction plausible; size not established.
    Cost and funding

    £39bn in total, 2026–27 to 2035–36, price basis not stated by the source; 1 further cost line, some not yet costed

    Funding: Programme funding exists; project allocation unconfirmed

    Why it is shortlisted here: Temporary accommodation is the sharpest housing harm on this page, and a funded programme already exists to act on it.

    What it takes
    The problem

    Record numbers of households are in temporary accommodation while a new social-housing programme is being allocated: the first allocations (25 August 2026) fund supply in general, not homes for households in temporary accommodation.

    Who is affected, and where

    Homeless households in temporary accommodation, and households on social-housing waiting lists, in England. Territory: England. Housing is devolved; Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland have separate programmes, not assessed here.

    Policy status

    A funded programme already exists. The Social and Affordable Homes Programme 2026–2036 (£39bn envelope) made its first allocations on 25 August 2026 (£9.58bn to 33 strategic partners outside London; more than £16bn outside London and around £5bn in London still to allocate), under the Burnham government; its aim is supply, especially social rent, with temporary accommodation a stated use only for limited acquisitions. The dedicated temporary-accommodation capital route is the separate Local Authority Housing Fund, not assessed here. Linking awards to temporary-accommodation outcomes is a UK Facts proposal.

    The evidence
    What the research found:
    The NAO found the department’s central forecast was 157,000 homes under the 2021 programme, against a published target of “up to 180,000 should economic conditions allow”.
    Evaluated on:
    The 2021 Affordable Homes Programme; England
    Our recommendation (separate from the research):
    Track each award against social-rent lettings and households leaving temporary accommodation, not grant announced.
    Strongest counter-evidence:
    Rising build costs cut the last programme’s output; grant per home and the share at social rent trade off against the number of homes.
    Effects on record
    • Households leaving temporary accommodation: Direction plausible; size not established. plausible spillover, limited confidence; England. Whether new social-rent homes are additional locally and reach households in temporary accommodation has not been evaluated.
    • Income after housing costs of households moving into a social-rent home: Direction plausible; size not established. plausible spillover, limited confidence; England. No source we checked estimates how much poverty after housing costs falls when households move into new social-rent homes; rent levels, benefit offsets and who is housed all change the answer.
    • Stability of home and school for children leaving temporary accommodation: Direction plausible; size not established. plausible spillover, limited confidence; England. Our sources count the children affected but none evaluates the effect of rehousing on attendance, attainment or health, so this is a link to test, not a finding.
    Cost and funding

    Cost completeness: Published programme envelope; project costs still needed. Funding: Programme funding exists; project allocation unconfirmed.

    • Social and Affordable Homes Programme 2026–2036 (programme envelope) (capital; paid by central government): £39bn in total, 2026–27 to 2035–36, price basis not stated by the source. A ten-year envelope allocated by bidding — not an award to any project. MHCLG states no price basis. Homes England’s share includes £1.2bn of bridge funding announced in March 2025.
    • Grant, borrowing, rent, maintenance and infrastructure for a named scheme (capital; paid by central government, councils, households): Not yet costed. Must come from a scheme’s award and business case; dividing the envelope by a guessed number of homes is not a cost.
    • Social and Affordable Homes Programme envelope: £39bn, 2026–27 to 2035–36 — not committed (programme envelope, not a project award). Not an award to a scheme. A selected scheme counts as funded only once its award, co-financing and conditions are checked.
    Who pays:
    Central government grant; housing associations and councils through borrowing repaid from rents; tenants through rents.
    Financing proposed:
    Programme grant plus landlord borrowing.
    Gap remaining:
    Unknown for any selected scheme until its award, co-financing and running costs are checked.
    What delivery needs
    Skills:
    Development and housing-management staff.
    Operational capacity:
    Housing associations’ balance sheets, also needed for repairs and safety work.
    Infrastructure:
    Sites with connections.
    Permissions:
    Planning permission for each scheme.
    Law:
    No new law needed.
    Public consent:
    Local consent for schemes.
    First step and stages

    First step: Link a named allocation to a tenure mix, timetable and the households it will serve. (owner: Homes England, GLA and councils)

    1. Award and planning checks — Homes England / GLA, Bidding opened February 2026; first strategic-partner allocations 25 August 2026
    2. Build or acquire, then let — Housing associations and councils (proposed stage, not an official timetable)
    3. Measure lettings to households in temporary accommodation — Councils; MHCLG statistics (proposed stage, not an official timetable)

    Depends on: A01: deliverable sites; Construction capacity

    Trade-offs
    Who gains and who loses:
    Gains for households who get a social tenancy; the subsidy per home is highest for social rent; other uses of the same capital lose out.
    What else the money or effort could do:
    The same grant could buy more homes at higher rents, or fund repairs to existing stock.
    Strongest counterargument:
    Acquiring existing homes can add little to total supply and compete with first-time buyers.
    Risks:
    Cost inflation, contractor capacity and grant dependence; homes that are not additional locally.
    How we would judge it
    Baseline:
    Households in temporary accommodation (MHCLG Table TA1).
    Leading indicator:
    Social-rent starts and lettings from programme awards.
    Outcome:
    Households leaving temporary accommodation into settled homes; cost per sustained tenancy.
    Continue, adapt or stop:
    Expand where lettings reach households in temporary accommodation; review schemes whose completions fall short as costs rise.
    Earlier option on this page

    This card replaces the option “Grant for social and affordable homes” (funded: Social and Affordable Homes Programme 2026–2036: up to £39bn over ten years.). Its evidence: The previous programme delivered homes but fewer than planned: the National Audit Office found in 2022 that the 2021 programme was expected to complete about 157,000 homes against a target of up to 180,000, as build costs rose. The new programme aims for about 300,000 homes over ten years, at least 60% for social rent. National Audit Office, The Affordable Homes Programme since 2015 (September 2022) · MHCLG, Social and Affordable Homes Programme 2026 to 2036

    Sources

    Source published November 2025 (programme documents); September 2022 (NAO); August 2026 (first allocations); evidence reviewed 2026-10-04. Reconsider if: Programme allocations are published; Temporary accommodation numbers change direction; A new NAO report on the programme.

    Also on: Hampshire — one shared record, so its cost is counted once.

  • Action 3A54Policy status: funded programme

    Allocate flood-defence money by the new risk map, keep existing defences in condition, and report homes better protected every year

    Allocating the 2026–29 programme against the 2024 national flood risk assessment, funding maintenance of existing defences first and publishing homes better protected each year makes money follow risk and shows shortfalls early, while there is still time to change course.

    Assessment (draft, 6 October review)

    Who decides:
    Defra and the Environment Agency, with HM Treasury; lead local flood authorities for surface water (England)
    Evidence:
    Expert or audit recommendation. A National Audit Office audit documents why the last programme protected fewer homes than planned and recommends better data and maintenance; no evaluation shows that risk-based allocation or annual reporting raises the number of homes protected.
    Expected effect:
    Direction plausible; size not established.
    Cost and funding

    £4.2bn in total, 2026–27 to 2028–29, price basis not stated by the source

    Funding: Programme funding exists; project allocation unconfirmed

    Why it is shortlisted here: Flood risk is the climate threat to homes with an official map and a funded programme; the decision is how that money follows the risk.

    What it takes
    The problem

    About 6.3 million properties in England are in areas at risk of flooding, around 8 million by mid-century; the last capital programme expected to better protect 40% fewer properties than first planned, and existing defences were not maintained to the level that gives best value.

    Who is affected, and where

    Households and businesses in areas of England at risk of flooding from rivers, the sea and surface water, especially those at high risk. Territory: England. Flood risk management is devolved: Natural Resources Wales, the Scottish Environment Protection Agency and councils, and the Department for Infrastructure (Rivers) in Northern Ireland run their own programmes; not reviewed here.

    Policy status

    A funded programme already exists. The Starmer government committed £7.9bn over ten years and £4.2bn for 2026–27 to 2028–29 (16 June 2025) and consulted on a simpler way to bid for flood-defence funding. Allocating against the 2024 risk assessment, protecting maintenance and publishing homes better protected against that map each year are a UK Facts proposal; whether the Burnham government has kept the settlement unchanged is not confirmed here.

    The evidence
    What the research found:
    In 2020 government committed £5.2bn to better protect 336,000 properties by 2027; the Environment Agency later reduced its forecast to 200,000, a 40% reduction, and the NAO found it was not maintaining defences to the level that optimises value.
    Evaluated on:
    Environment Agency capital and maintenance programmes in England, 2021–2027; England
    Transfer to this case:
    The audit covers the previous programme; the new settlement and funding rules may already address some of its findings.
    Our recommendation (separate from the research):
    Allocate the 2026–29 money against the 2024 risk assessment, protect maintenance of existing defences, and publish homes better protected and defences at required condition each year.
    Strongest counter-evidence:
    Defences are only part of adaptation: the Climate Change Committee finds no adaptation outcome with good delivery, and most homes at risk are exposed to surface water, which large defences protect less well. Allocating strictly by risk can also move money away from cheaper schemes that protect many homes.
    Cost and funding

    Cost completeness: Published programme envelope; project costs still needed. Funding: Programme funding exists; project allocation unconfirmed.

    • Flood and coastal erosion risk management programme 2026–27 to 2028–29 (programme envelope) (capital; paid by central government): £4.2bn in total, 2026–27 to 2028–29, price basis not stated by the source. Three years of the £7.9bn ten-year commitment. It covers capital and resource (building and maintaining defences); the announcement states no price basis. Not an award to any scheme.
    • Flood programme 2026–27 to 2028–29 (Spending Review 2025): £4.2bn, 2026–27 to 2028–29 — not committed (programme envelope, not a project award). A Starmer-government settlement; not confirmed as unchanged under the Burnham government in this review.
    Who pays:
    Central government (Defra’s flood and coastal erosion programme), with partnership contributions from councils, businesses and other beneficiaries.
    Financing proposed:
    Within the £4.2bn 2026–29 programme; reporting and allocation rules need staff time, not new capital.
    Gap remaining:
    Unknown: the maintenance shortfall and the cost of protecting homes newly mapped at high risk have not been estimated here.
    What delivery needs
    Skills:
    Flood risk engineers and asset inspectors.
    Operational capacity:
    Environment Agency and lead local flood authority teams; contractors.
    Infrastructure:
    Defences, pumping stations and drainage.
    Permissions:
    Planning and environmental consents for new schemes.
    Law:
    No new law: allocation rules and reporting are Defra and Environment Agency decisions.
    Public consent:
    Communities whose schemes are reprioritised.
    First step and stages

    First step: Defra and the Environment Agency publish how the 2026–29 programme is allocated against the 2024 risk assessment, the maintenance budget against the condition target, and a baseline of homes better protected. (owner: Defra and the Environment Agency)

    1. Publish allocation against the risk map and the maintenance baseline — Defra and the Environment Agency (proposed stage, not an official timetable)
    2. Build and maintain defences; fund property-level resilience where schemes are not viable — Environment Agency; lead local flood authorities (proposed stage, not an official timetable)
    3. Report homes better protected and defences at required condition each year — Environment Agency (proposed stage, not an official timetable)

    Depends on: The outcome of the 2025 consultation on flood-defence funding rules; Construction capacity shared with housing and infrastructure

    Trade-offs
    Who gains and who loses:
    Gains for households at high risk, including in deprived coastal and river communities; areas whose schemes are reprioritised lose, and surface-water risk in towns is harder to defend.
    What else the money or effort could do:
    Money and engineers spent on defences are not available for other capital projects; maintenance competes with new schemes inside a fixed budget.
    Strongest counterargument:
    Funding rules alone do not create capacity: the last programme fell short as costs rose and partnership contributions lagged, whatever the allocation method.
    Risks:
    Counting homes “better protected” rather than homes that do not flood; cost inflation; schemes delayed by consents.
    How we would judge it
    Baseline:
    Properties in areas at risk of flooding, England (about 6.3 million; Environment Agency 2024 assessment); properties better protected by the last programme (200,000 forecast by 2027 against 336,000 planned).
    Leading indicator:
    Share of the programme allocated to areas at high risk; defences at required condition.
    Outcome:
    Homes better protected each year and properties in areas at high risk, at the next national assessment.
    Continue, adapt or stop:
    Continue where homes better protected track the plan; publish and explain any shortfall before the next allocation.
    Sources

    Source published 15 November 2023 (NAO); 17 December 2024 (risk assessment); 16 June 2025 (funding); evidence reviewed 2026-10-04. Reconsider if: The government response to the flood-funding consultation; The next Environment Agency national risk assessment update; A Burnham-government Budget or Spending Review changing the flood settlement.

  • Action 4A74Policy status: external proposal

    Offer early arrears and legal advice to renters before a notice becomes homelessness

    Early legal and money advice, landlord negotiation and targeted help with arrears for renters served notice or in arrears keeps tenancies going or secures another home before households need temporary accommodation.

    Assessment (draft, 6 October review)

    Who decides:
    Councils (Housing Act 1996 Part 7 prevention duty), with MHCLG and the Ministry of Justice (legal aid and the Housing Loss Prevention Advice Service) (England)
    Evidence:
    Experimental or quasi-experimental evaluation. An English quasi-experimental evaluation found fewer homelessness acceptances where councils acted within 56 days; US randomised and natural-experiment studies found legal counsel and emergency rent help reduced evictions and shelter entry; transfer to England is uncertain.
    Expected effect:
    Direction plausible; size not established.
    Cost and funding

    Not yet costed

    Funding: Not yet costed / funding not identified

    Why it is shortlisted here: The tenancy-loss prevention option (related to settled homes for families, NE3): the end of a private tenancy is the commonest route to a prevention duty and just over half of duties end with a secure home; early advice, tested against comparison councils, is the bounded change. It builds on the renters option card, which stays.

    Builds on the option Support and security for private renters compared below.

    What it takes
    The problem

    Councils prevent homelessness for just over half of households owed a prevention duty, and the end of a private tenancy is the most common reason for being threatened with homelessness, while temporary accommodation is at a record level.

    Who is affected, and where

    Private and social renters in England threatened with homelessness through a notice or rent arrears, in defined council areas, before a prevention duty would otherwise fail. Territory: England. Wales created the prevention duty model (Housing (Wales) Act 2014 s.66); Scotland has new prevention duties (Housing (Scotland) Act 2025 Part 5); Northern Ireland’s Housing Executive delivers homelessness services. Not assessed.

    Policy status

    Proposed by researchers or others, not government policy. Funded baseline: the 56-day prevention duty (extended to section 8 notices from 1 May 2026), the Homelessness, Rough Sleeping and Domestic Abuse Grant (£885.0m in 2026–27), the Housing Loss Prevention Advice Service and a £16m Legal Support Grant (October 2026 to March 2029). Testing a defined early-advice offer against comparison areas is a UK Facts proposal, not government policy.

    The evidence
    What the research found:
    Trailblazer areas acting within 56 days had about 13% fewer homelessness acceptances (2.76 against 3.16 per 1,000 households); prevention and temporary accommodation effects were not significant. In New York, assigned counsel cut judgments against tenants from about 52% to 32%.
    Evaluated on:
    30 English Trailblazer areas (100 councils), 2016–2018; tenants in New York Housing Court; Chicago callers seeking rent help; England; United States
    Transfer to this case:
    The US studies are from different legal systems; the English evaluation predates the Homelessness Reduction Act and was not randomised.
    Our recommendation (separate from the research):
    Offer early legal and money advice with landlord negotiation to renters served notice or in arrears in defined council areas, and compare the share of prevention duties ending with a secure home with similar councils.
    Strongest counter-evidence:
    The English evaluation found no significant effect on prevention or temporary accommodation, only on acceptances; advice cannot help where rents exceed what households can pay.
    Cost and funding

    Cost completeness: Not yet costed. Funding: Not yet costed / funding not identified.

      Who pays:
      Councils from the homelessness grant; the Ministry of Justice for legal advice.
      Financing proposed:
      From councils’ homelessness grant and the Legal Support Grant if chosen; not identified.
      Gap remaining:
      Unknown: there is no English cost per prevention-duty outcome and no published cost of an arrears and legal-advice package.
      What delivery needs
      Skills:
      Housing and debt advisers; housing lawyers.
      Operational capacity:
      Advice provider capacity in legal-aid deserts.
      Infrastructure:
      Referral routes from courts and landlords.
      Permissions:
      Data sharing on notices and arrears.
      Law:
      None new.
      Public consent:
      Landlord participation in negotiation.
      First step and stages

      First step: MHCLG and five councils agree a defined early-advice offer for renters served notice or in arrears, with comparison councils, and report the share of prevention duties ending with a secure home. (owner: MHCLG with councils and the Ministry of Justice)

      1. Agree the offer and comparison councils — MHCLG and councils (proposed stage, not an official timetable)
      2. Deliver early advice and arrears help — Councils and advice providers (proposed stage, not an official timetable)
      3. Compare prevention outcomes — MHCLG (evaluation) (proposed stage, not an official timetable)

      Depends on: Reason coding after the section 21 to section 8 change (first full quarter due 29 October 2026); Advice provider capacity

      Trade-offs
      Who gains and who loses:
      Aimed at renters on low incomes facing eviction, including families who would otherwise enter temporary accommodation.
      What else the money or effort could do:
      Advice spending competes with temporary accommodation costs and new supply.
      Strongest counterargument:
      Without more affordable homes, prevention mainly delays homelessness.
      Risks:
      Helping households who would have kept their homes anyway; measuring advice given rather than homes kept.
      How we would judge it
      Baseline:
      January–March 2026: 54.7% of 35,130 prevention duties ended with accommodation secured for six months or more; 25% became homeless.
      Leading indicator:
      Households advised before notice expiry.
      Outcome:
      Share of prevention duties ending with a secure home against comparison councils; entries to temporary accommodation.
      Continue, adapt or stop:
      Continue where secure outcomes rise relative to comparison councils.
      Sources

      Source published 13 August 2026 (MHCLG); 25 March 2019 (Trailblazers evaluation); evidence reviewed 2026-10-07. Reconsider if: Statutory homelessness, April–June 2026 (29 October 2026); The 2025–26 annual release (26 November 2026).

    How the options are assessed

    One shared record per option — the same one the national plan reads. Delivery RAG, gate and list membership are separate judgements.

    • Homes built, not just permitted — Red delivery RAG; gate pending
    • Settled homes for families in temporary accommodation — Amber delivery RAG; gate pending
    • Prevent avoidable loss of rented homes — Amber delivery RAG; gate pending
    • Protect flood-defence maintenance and appraise schemes by risk — Amber delivery RAG; gate pending

    Provisional single-reviewer assessments from the 6 October 2026 review; not approved business cases, and not government policy.

    • A01v2Delivery RAG: RedGate: pending

      Homes built, not just permitted

      A new scope of action A01 (A01v2); A01 itself is unchanged and nothing is inherited from it.

      Provisional single-reviewer assessment; not an approved business case.

      Who and where
      Population not yet defined. Jurisdiction: not defined.
      Result so far
      Range if completed: 14.0–20.0 out of 30 (equal weights; not yet assessed: expected incremental benefit (Bn), incremental affordability (Co))
      Funded now (baseline)
      Funded baseline not yet stated
      The change assessed (marginal)
      Marginal change not yet defined
      What the evidence supports—and the next decision

      Permissions are not completions. Infrastructure, finance, build-out and tenure determine whether an additional permission becomes a useful home.

      Codex — AI-assisted analytical follow-up · 8 October 2026. Proposed appraisal design; the attributed scores below are unchanged. No funding or delivery agreement is implied.

      Define the change
      Choose named stalled sites, identify the binding constraint and compare infrastructure support, acquisition, contractual build-out and no additional intervention.
      Test whether it works
      Additional occupied homes by tenure and date, relative to the site’s funded baseline; track displacement from neighbouring sites and affordability of the completed homes.
      Establish the cost
      Land, enabling works, finance, construction, subsidy, maintenance and the public share of risk. Keep grant, loans and guarantees distinct.
      Protect against harm
      Retain building safety, environmental mitigation and affordability obligations; do not book the whole national housing ambition as the effect of this option.

      Read with the outcome evidence and sources in the full assessment. Monitoring proposals are not existing baseline measurements. A numerical benefit or cost score needs evidence for the defined increment, not just the scale of the problem.

      Full assessment of Homes built, not just permitted: ten criteria, scenarios, delivery, costs and monitoring
      The ten criteria (0–3)

      Each criterion is scored 0 to 3 by the reviewer. “Not yet assessed” means unknown: it is never counted as zero.

      1. Scale and severity (Sc)3 of 3 — Severe harm across a broad population

        Reviewer’s reason: Provisional problem-importance judgement from linked site pages; not the scale of achievable benefit.

      2. Increment beyond baseline (Ad)2 of 3 — Specific material change to existing delivery

        Reviewer’s reason: Select sites; resolve land, planning, utilities, transport and viability; commission tenure mix and delivery agreements. A missing rating requires a defined marginal change.

      3. Confidence in the proposed action (Ev)1 of 3 — Indirect, mixed, modelled or weak causal support

        Reviewer’s reason: Housing constraints and modelled supply responses support the case; no evaluated national effect for this exact site-unblocking package.

      4. Expected incremental benefit (Bn)Not yet assessed

        Reviewer’s reason: Unknown unless a reasonably defined target-population benefit can be judged; no bonus merely for spanning domains.

      5. Residual harms (Hm)1 of 3 — Material harm/unresolved mitigation

        Reviewer’s reason: Binding construction/infrastructure constraints; environmental and displacement harms.

      6. Incremental affordability (Co)Not yet assessed

        Reviewer’s reason: Site-level land, infrastructure, finance, construction, affordable-housing subsidy and maintenance.

      7. Delivery capacity (Ca)1 of 3 — Binding scarce resource

        Reviewer’s reason: Select sites; resolve land, planning, utilities, transport and viability; commission tenure mix and delivery agreements.

      8. Distribution (Fa)2 of 3 — Mixed or broadly neutral with safeguards

        Reviewer’s reason: Provisional distribution judgement for the stated target; verify who pays, who gains and excluded groups.

      9. Meaningful first outcome (Ti)2 of 3 — More than one and up to three years

        Reviewer’s reason: First meaningful outcome, not announcement: Net additional completed and occupied homes, affordability and displacement.

      10. Readiness (Rd)2 of 3 — Named commissioning/allocation/coordination step

        Reviewer’s reason: Planning authorities, housing bodies, developers and utilities; devolved responsibility; Site-specific investment appraisal

      Four weightings

      Normalised as 10 × weighted sum ÷ sum of weights, on a 0–30 scale. Where a criterion is not yet assessed, the range is the lowest and highest result if it were later scored 0 or 3 — not a score, a confidence interval or a rank.

      • Equal weights: Range if completed: 14.0–20.0 out of 30. Not yet assessed: expected incremental benefit (Bn), incremental affordability (Co). Funding gate: not passed.
      • Evidence doubled: Range if completed: 13.6–19.1 out of 30. Not yet assessed: expected incremental benefit (Bn), incremental affordability (Co). Funding gate: not passed.
      • Scale doubled: Range if completed: 15.5–20.9 out of 30. Not yet assessed: expected incremental benefit (Bn), incremental affordability (Co). Funding gate: not passed.
      • Cost ignored (the funding gate still applies): Range if completed: 15.6–18.9 out of 30. Not yet assessed: expected incremental benefit (Bn), incremental affordability (Co). Funding gate: not passed.

      Funding gate: Not passed — the cost is not yet assessed or no allocation is committed for this scope. Ignoring cost in a weighting never removes the gate.

      Delivery RAG and gate

      Delivery RAG shown: RedReview’s claim: Red. Best the recorded evidence allows: Red.

      Review’s reason: Binding construction/infrastructure constraints; environmental and displacement harms.

      Why it is not Green yet

      • Delivery obstacle: Binding construction/infrastructure constraints; environmental and displacement harms..
      • Scope (population, place and increment) not verified against the delivery baseline.
      • No verified owner with the powers in place.
      • Delivery capacity not verified.
      • Lifetime incremental costs not complete.
      • No credible funding (a committed allocation for the scope).
      • Safeguards not specified.
      • Monitoring lacks a metric, a data source or a baseline.

      Green needs verified scope, a verified owner with the powers, verified capacity, complete lifetime costs with credible funding, specified safeguards and monitoring with a metric, source and baseline. Amber means appraisal gaps remain; Red means a material delivery obstacle. Red does not mean unimportant.

      Gate: Pending — appraisal incomplete (review label: “Pending: incomplete appraisal”).

      Why: Scores incomplete; Funding gate not passed (cost unknown or no credible funding).

      The gate is separate from national list membership: being listed does not make an option eligible, and an eligible option need not be listed.

      Cost and funding

      Lifetime costing: Not established. Review: “Full incremental costing not established in reviewed material”.

      Still to cost: Site-level land, infrastructure, finance, construction, affordable-housing subsidy and maintenance.

      Funding status: not established in review.

      Owner, powers and capacity

      Proposed owner: Planning authorities, housing bodies, developers and utilities; devolved responsibility (proposed, unverified).

      Powers: needs a decision or allocation. Capacity: binding constraint.

      Powers and capacity read from the review’s Rd and Ca anchors; no proposed owner has agreed to act (the review: “Proposed owners have not agreed to act”).

      England:
      not assessed
      Scotland:
      not assessed
      Wales:
      not assessed
      Northern Ireland:
      not assessed

      Not defined in the review.

      Dependencies, safeguards and risks

      Depends on: None recorded.

      Safeguards

      None specified yet.

      Risks and residual harms: Binding construction/infrastructure constraints; environmental and displacement harms.

      Monitoring and measured results

      Metric: Net additional completed and occupied homes, affordability and displacement.

      Data source: Not yet named. Baseline: Not yet established.

      Measures already on the domain page

      A page measure is not necessarily the review’s metric; linking the two is an editorial decision still to be made.

      Evidence for the outcome
      Review record

      Assessment version: working-review-2026-10-06 (A01v2@working-review-2026-10-06).

      Reviewer: Author of the review blueprint (single reviewer, not named in uk-facts-complete-plan.json). Reviewed: 6 October 2026.

      Scored in the working review of 6 October 2026 on the shared ten-criterion scale (one reviewer); not independently calibrated.

      First 90 days (review): Produce a signed scope and current-delivery baseline; Select sites; resolve land, planning, utilities, transport and viability; commission tenure mix and delivery agreements. Obtain incremental costs and an accountable decision before expansion.

      Decision route: Site-specific investment appraisal

      An editorial screening framework by one reviewer, not a formal appraisal or business case. Proposed owners have not agreed to act.

    • A02Delivery RAG: AmberGate: pending

      Settled homes for families in temporary accommodation

      Existing action A02, assessed at the same scope.

      Provisional single-reviewer assessment; not an approved business case.

      Who and where
      Homeless households in temporary accommodation, and households on social-housing waiting lists, in England. (from the action record) Jurisdiction: England.
      Result so far
      Range if completed: 19.0–22.0 out of 30 (equal weights; not yet assessed: incremental affordability (Co))
      Funded now (baseline)
      The Social and Affordable Homes Programme 2026–2036 (£39bn envelope) made its first allocations on 25 August 2026 (£9.58bn to 33 strategic partners outside London; more than £16bn outside London and around £5bn in London still to allocate), under the Burnham government; its aim is supply, especially social rent, with temporary accommodation a stated use only for limited acquisitions. The dedicated temporary-accommodation capital route is the separate Local Authority Housing Fund, not assessed here. Linking awards to temporary-accommodation outcomes is a UK Facts proposal. (from the action record)
      The change assessed (marginal)
      A buy/build/lease comparison against temporary accommodation, and awards tied to lettings. (from the superseded 4 October selection table)
      What the evidence supports—and the next decision

      Temporary accommodation counts establish need, not which purchase, build or lease option provides best value. Supported housing may require continuing support.

      Codex — AI-assisted analytical follow-up · 8 October 2026. Proposed appraisal design; the attributed scores below are unchanged. No funding or delivery agreement is implied.

      Define the change
      Compare named buy, build and lease options for a defined council cohort with the actual temporary-accommodation alternative.
      Test whether it works
      Settled suitable tenancies sustained at 6 and 12 months, school continuity, repeat homelessness and resident experience.
      Establish the cost
      Acquisition or building, financing, repairs, rent, maintenance and support minus actual avoidable temporary-accommodation costs. Distinguish cash savings from costs shifted to another agency.
      Protect against harm
      Check suitability, location and support; avoid displacing other homeless households or closing poor provision without safe alternatives.

      Read with the outcome evidence and sources in the full assessment. Monitoring proposals are not existing baseline measurements. A numerical benefit or cost score needs evidence for the defined increment, not just the scale of the problem.

      Full assessment of Settled homes for families in temporary accommodation: ten criteria, scenarios, delivery, costs and monitoring
      The ten criteria (0–3)

      Each criterion is scored 0 to 3 by the reviewer. “Not yet assessed” means unknown: it is never counted as zero.

      1. Scale and severity (Sc)3 of 3 — Severe harm across a broad population

        Reviewer’s reason: Provisional problem-importance judgement from linked site pages; not the scale of achievable benefit.

      2. Increment beyond baseline (Ad)2 of 3 — Specific material change to existing delivery

        Reviewer’s reason: Define families and locations; compare acquisition, lease and new build; inspect standards; secure lettings and tenancy support. A missing rating requires a defined marginal change.

      3. Confidence in the proposed action (Ev)1 of 3 — Indirect, mixed, modelled or weak causal support

        Reviewer’s reason: US subsidy evidence supports housing stability but does not establish UK acquisition/build effects or local value for money.

      4. Expected incremental benefit (Bn)3 of 3 — Large for the target population; no multi-domain bonus

        Reviewer’s reason: Unknown unless a reasonably defined target-population benefit can be judged; no bonus merely for spanning domains.

        Reason and score disagree — under review

      5. Residual harms (Hm)2 of 3 — Manageable harm with specified safeguards

        Reviewer’s reason: Competition with other buyers; displacement; unsuitable location/condition.

      6. Incremental affordability (Co)Not yet assessed

        Reviewer’s reason: Capital, finance, refurbishment, rent, maintenance, support and actual avoided temporary-accommodation costs.

      7. Delivery capacity (Ca)1 of 3 — Binding scarce resource

        Reviewer’s reason: Define families and locations; compare acquisition, lease and new build; inspect standards; secure lettings and tenancy support.

      8. Distribution (Fa)3 of 3 — Benefits concentrated on disadvantaged people with assessed burdens

        Reviewer’s reason: Provisional distribution judgement for the stated target; verify who pays, who gains and excluded groups.

      9. Meaningful first outcome (Ti)2 of 3 — More than one and up to three years

        Reviewer’s reason: First meaningful outcome, not announcement: Sustained settled housing, repeat homelessness and household wellbeing.

      10. Readiness (Rd)2 of 3 — Named commissioning/allocation/coordination step

        Reviewer’s reason: Councils and housing providers; relevant national housing bodies; Local buy/build/lease comparison

      Four weightings

      Normalised as 10 × weighted sum ÷ sum of weights, on a 0–30 scale. Where a criterion is not yet assessed, the range is the lowest and highest result if it were later scored 0 or 3 — not a score, a confidence interval or a rank.

      • Equal weights: Range if completed: 19.0–22.0 out of 30. Not yet assessed: incremental affordability (Co). Funding gate: not passed.
      • Evidence doubled: Range if completed: 18.2–20.9 out of 30. Not yet assessed: incremental affordability (Co). Funding gate: not passed.
      • Scale doubled: Range if completed: 20.0–22.7 out of 30. Not yet assessed: incremental affordability (Co). Funding gate: not passed.
      • Cost ignored (the funding gate still applies): Range if completed: 21.1–21.1 out of 30. Not yet assessed: incremental affordability (Co). The missing criteria carry no weight here, so the ends meet; the record is still incomplete. Funding gate: not passed.

      Funding gate: Not passed — the cost is not yet assessed or no allocation is committed for this scope. Ignoring cost in a weighting never removes the gate.

      Delivery RAG and gate

      Delivery RAG shown: AmberReview’s claim: Amber. Best the recorded evidence allows: Amber.

      Review’s reason: Capital, finance, refurbishment, rent, maintenance, support and actual avoided temporary-accommodation costs.

      Why it is not Green yet

      • Scope (population, place and increment) not verified against the delivery baseline.
      • No verified owner with the powers in place.
      • Delivery capacity not verified.
      • Lifetime incremental costs not complete.
      • No credible funding (a committed allocation for the scope).
      • Safeguards not specified.
      • Monitoring lacks a metric, a data source or a baseline.

      Green needs verified scope, a verified owner with the powers, verified capacity, complete lifetime costs with credible funding, specified safeguards and monitoring with a metric, source and baseline. Amber means appraisal gaps remain; Red means a material delivery obstacle. Red does not mean unimportant.

      Gate: Pending — appraisal incomplete (review label: “Pending: incomplete appraisal”).

      Why: Scores incomplete; Funding gate not passed (cost unknown or no credible funding).

      The gate is separate from national list membership: being listed does not make an option eligible, and an eligible option need not be listed.

      Cost and funding

      Lifetime costing: Partial — some lines costed, no whole-life total. Review: “Full incremental costing not established in reviewed material”.

      • Social and Affordable Homes Programme 2026–2036 (programme envelope) (published programme envelope; C-SAHP-ENVELOPE)
      • Grant, borrowing, rent, maintenance and infrastructure for a named scheme (not costed; C-A02-SCHEME)

      Still to cost: Capital, finance, refurbishment, rent, maintenance, support and actual avoided temporary-accommodation costs.

      Funding status: programme route, not allocated.

      Owner, powers and capacity

      Proposed owner: Councils and housing providers; relevant national housing bodies (proposed, unverified).

      Powers: needs a decision or allocation. Capacity: binding constraint.

      Powers and capacity read from the review’s Rd and Ca anchors; no proposed owner has agreed to act (the review: “Proposed owners have not agreed to act”).

      England:
      Homes England and the GLA (awards), with councils and housing associations (action record)
      Scotland:
      not assessed
      Wales:
      not assessed
      Northern Ireland:
      not assessed

      Housing is devolved; Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland have separate programmes, not assessed here.

      Dependencies, safeguards and risks

      Depends on: None recorded.

      Safeguards

      None specified yet.

      Risks and residual harms: Competition with other buyers; displacement; unsuitable location/condition.

      Monitoring and measured results

      Metric: Sustained settled housing, repeat homelessness and household wellbeing.

      Data source: Not yet named. Baseline: Not yet established.

      Measures already on the domain page

      A page measure is not necessarily the review’s metric; linking the two is an editorial decision still to be made.

      Evidence for the outcome

      Outcome: Sustained settled housing, repeat homelessness and household wellbeing.

      US subsidy evidence supports housing stability but does not establish UK acquisition/build effects or local value for money.

      Effect records for this action

      • Households leaving temporary accommodation: size not established (plausible spillover, limited confidence; England)
      • Income after housing costs of households moving into a social-rent home: size not established (plausible spillover, limited confidence; England)
      • Stability of home and school for children leaving temporary accommodation: size not established (plausible spillover, limited confidence; England)
      Review record

      Assessment version: working-review-2026-10-06 (A02@working-review-2026-10-06).

      Reviewer: Author of the review blueprint (single reviewer, not named in uk-facts-complete-plan.json). Reviewed: 6 October 2026.

      Scored in the working review of 6 October 2026 on the shared ten-criterion scale (one reviewer); not independently calibrated.

      First 90 days (review): Produce a signed scope and current-delivery baseline; Define families and locations; compare acquisition, lease and new build; inspect standards; secure lettings and tenancy support. Obtain incremental costs and an accountable decision before expansion.

      Decision route: Local buy/build/lease comparison

      An earlier assessment exists on the 4 October 2026 selection table (nine H/M/L bands; superseded 7 October 2026). Its bands are kept, not converted into these scores.

      An editorial screening framework by one reviewer, not a formal appraisal or business case. Proposed owners have not agreed to act.

    • A74Delivery RAG: AmberGate: pending

      Prevent avoidable loss of rented homes

      Existing action A74, assessed at the same scope.

      Not stated in the review record; treated as a provisional single-reviewer assessment, not an approved business case.

      Who and where
      Private and social renters in England threatened with homelessness through a notice or rent arrears, in defined council areas, before a prevention duty would otherwise fail. (from the action record) Jurisdiction: England.
      Result so far
      Range if completed: 16.0–22.0 out of 30 (equal weights; not yet assessed: expected incremental benefit (Bn), incremental affordability (Co))
      Funded now (baseline)
      Funded baseline: the 56-day prevention duty (extended to section 8 notices from 1 May 2026), the Homelessness, Rough Sleeping and Domestic Abuse Grant (£885.0m in 2026–27), the Housing Loss Prevention Advice Service and a £16m Legal Support Grant (October 2026 to March 2029). Testing a defined early-advice offer against comparison areas is a UK Facts proposal, not government policy. (from the action record)
      The change assessed (marginal)
      Test early rent-arrears/legal advice and targeted assistance for a defined at-risk cohort before homelessness occurs. (from the 6 October review)
      What the evidence supports—and the next decision

      Prevention-duty outcomes describe households served; they do not measure how many tenancies a new advice service would additionally save.

      Codex — AI-assisted analytical follow-up · 8 October 2026. Proposed appraisal design; the attributed scores below are unchanged. No funding or delivery agreement is implied.

      Define the change
      Test early legal and money advice for a specified arrears or eviction-risk cohort beyond the existing prevention duty and funded advice.
      Test whether it works
      Suitable tenancies sustained, repeat homelessness, court outcomes and temporary accommodation at 6 and 12 months, compared with similar households.
      Establish the cost
      Advice, staff, targeted assistance and follow-up minus verified avoidable accommodation costs; grants and transfers need separate accounting.
      Protect against harm
      Do not sustain unsafe tenancies or exclude complex households to improve the success rate.

      Read with the outcome evidence and sources in the full assessment. Monitoring proposals are not existing baseline measurements. A numerical benefit or cost score needs evidence for the defined increment, not just the scale of the problem.

      Full assessment of Prevent avoidable loss of rented homes: ten criteria, scenarios, delivery, costs and monitoring
      The ten criteria (0–3)

      Each criterion is scored 0 to 3 by the reviewer. “Not yet assessed” means unknown: it is never counted as zero.

      1. Scale and severity (Sc)3 of 3 — Severe harm across a broad population

      2. Increment beyond baseline (Ad)2 of 3 — Specific material change to existing delivery

      3. Confidence in the proposed action (Ev)1 of 3 — Indirect, mixed, modelled or weak causal support

      4. Expected incremental benefit (Bn)Not yet assessed

      5. Residual harms (Hm)1 of 3 — Material harm/unresolved mitigation

      6. Incremental affordability (Co)Not yet assessed

      7. Delivery capacity (Ca)2 of 3 — Stretched but plausibly obtainable

      8. Distribution (Fa)3 of 3 — Benefits concentrated on disadvantaged people with assessed burdens

      9. Meaningful first outcome (Ti)2 of 3 — More than one and up to three years

      10. Readiness (Rd)2 of 3 — Named commissioning/allocation/coordination step

      Four weightings

      Normalised as 10 × weighted sum ÷ sum of weights, on a 0–30 scale. Where a criterion is not yet assessed, the range is the lowest and highest result if it were later scored 0 or 3 — not a score, a confidence interval or a rank.

      • Equal weights: Range if completed: 16.0–22.0 out of 30. Not yet assessed: expected incremental benefit (Bn), incremental affordability (Co). Funding gate: not passed.
      • Evidence doubled: Range if completed: 15.5–20.9 out of 30. Not yet assessed: expected incremental benefit (Bn), incremental affordability (Co). Funding gate: not passed.
      • Scale doubled: Range if completed: 17.3–22.7 out of 30. Not yet assessed: expected incremental benefit (Bn), incremental affordability (Co). Funding gate: not passed.
      • Cost ignored (the funding gate still applies): Range if completed: 17.8–21.1 out of 30. Not yet assessed: expected incremental benefit (Bn), incremental affordability (Co). Funding gate: not passed.

      Funding gate: Not passed — the cost is not yet assessed or no allocation is committed for this scope. Ignoring cost in a weighting never removes the gate.

      Delivery RAG and gate

      Delivery RAG shown: AmberReview’s claim: Amber. Best the recorded evidence allows: Amber.

      Review’s reason: Define arrears/risk trigger, legal advice and assistance design; cost staff, grants and sustained tenancies. Assess additional prevention against existing duties. Proposed owners: councils, housing/advice providers and landlords.

      Why it is not Green yet

      • Scope (population, place and increment) not verified against the delivery baseline.
      • No verified owner with the powers in place.
      • Delivery capacity not verified.
      • Lifetime incremental costs not complete.
      • No credible funding (a committed allocation for the scope).
      • Safeguards not specified.
      • Monitoring lacks a metric, a data source or a baseline.

      Green needs verified scope, a verified owner with the powers, verified capacity, complete lifetime costs with credible funding, specified safeguards and monitoring with a metric, source and baseline. Amber means appraisal gaps remain; Red means a material delivery obstacle. Red does not mean unimportant.

      Gate: Pending — appraisal incomplete (review label: “Pending baseline verification, incremental costing and funding; not a rollout approval”).

      Why: Scores incomplete; Funding gate not passed (cost unknown or no credible funding).

      The gate is separate from national list membership: being listed does not make an option eligible, and an eligible option need not be listed.

      Cost and funding

      Lifetime costing: Not established. Review: “Not fully costed in this review”.

      Still to cost: Define arrears/risk trigger, legal advice and assistance design; cost staff, grants and sustained tenancies. Assess additional prevention against existing duties. Proposed owners: councils, housing/advice providers and landlords.

      Funding status: not identified.

      Owner, powers and capacity

      Proposed owner: councils, housing/advice providers and landlords (proposed, unverified).

      Powers: needs a decision or allocation. Capacity: unverified.

      Powers and capacity read from the review’s Rd and Ca anchors; no proposed owner has agreed to act (the review: “Proposed owners have not agreed to act”).

      England:
      Councils (Housing Act 1996 Part 7 prevention duty), with MHCLG and the Ministry of Justice (legal aid and the Housing Loss Prevention Advice Service) (action record)
      Scotland:
      not assessed
      Wales:
      not assessed
      Northern Ireland:
      not assessed

      Wales created the prevention duty model (Housing (Wales) Act 2014 s.66); Scotland has new prevention duties (Housing (Scotland) Act 2025 Part 5); Northern Ireland’s Housing Executive delivers homelessness services. Not assessed.

      Dependencies, safeguards and risks

      Depends on: None recorded.

      Safeguards

      None specified yet.

      Monitoring and measured results

      Metric: Define and baseline the outcome described in delivery requirements before approval.

      Data source: Not yet named. Baseline: Not yet established.

      Measures already on the domain page

      A page measure is not necessarily the review’s metric; linking the two is an editorial decision still to be made.

      Evidence for the outcome

      Outcome: Define and baseline the outcome described in delivery requirements before approval.

      UK prevention evaluations and tenancy-sustainment reviews offer relevant but limited transfer evidence. Do not import Housing First effects into general renter advice.

      Sources: gov.uk (not yet in the source register)

      Review record

      Assessment version: working-review-2026-10-06 (A74@working-review-2026-10-06).

      Reviewer: Author of the review blueprint (single reviewer, not named in uk-facts-complete-plan.json). Reviewed: 6 October 2026.

      Scored in the working review of 6 October 2026 on the shared ten-criterion scale (one reviewer); not independently calibrated.

      An editorial screening framework by one reviewer, not a formal appraisal or business case. Proposed owners have not agreed to act.

    • A54Delivery RAG: AmberGate: pending

      Protect flood-defence maintenance and appraise schemes by risk

      Existing action A54, assessed at the same scope.

      Provisional single-reviewer desk assessment, 6 October 2026.

      Who and where
      Households and businesses in areas of England at risk of flooding from rivers, the sea and surface water, especially those at high risk. (from the action record) Jurisdiction: England.
      Result so far
      Range if completed: 15.0–21.0 out of 30 (equal weights; not yet assessed: expected incremental benefit (Bn), incremental affordability (Co))
      Funded now (baseline)
      The Starmer government committed £7.9bn over ten years and £4.2bn for 2026–27 to 2028–29 (16 June 2025) and consulted on a simpler way to bid for flood-defence funding. Allocating against the 2024 risk assessment, protecting maintenance and publishing homes better protected against that map each year are a UK Facts proposal; whether the Burnham government has kept the settlement unchanged is not confirmed here. (from the action record)
      The change assessed (marginal)
      Separate maintenance of existing protection from long-lead new defences and assess each against local exposure. (from the 6 October review)
      What the evidence supports—and the next decision

      Flood protection is a risk-management decision. A year without a flood is not evidence of effectiveness, and one historic funding gap is not today’s national bill.

      Codex — AI-assisted analytical follow-up · 8 October 2026. Proposed appraisal design; the attributed scores below are unchanged. No funding or delivery agreement is implied.

      Define the change
      Separate maintenance of existing assets from a named new scheme; define exposure, failure probability and the do-minimum option.
      Test whether it works
      Asset condition and modelled expected damage under alternative climate and failure scenarios, with observed performance when events occur.
      Establish the cost
      Whole-life capital, maintenance, renewal, land and residual risk; test uncertainty in damage avoided and property exposure.
      Protect against harm
      Assess downstream effects, vulnerable communities, nature and residual-risk communication.

      Read with the outcome evidence and sources in the full assessment. Monitoring proposals are not existing baseline measurements. A numerical benefit or cost score needs evidence for the defined increment, not just the scale of the problem.

      Full assessment of Protect flood-defence maintenance and appraise schemes by risk: ten criteria, scenarios, delivery, costs and monitoring
      The ten criteria (0–3)

      Each criterion is scored 0 to 3 by the reviewer. “Not yet assessed” means unknown: it is never counted as zero.

      1. Scale and severity (Sc)3 of 3 — Severe harm across a broad population

        Reviewer’s reason: Problem scale judged from the linked domain evidence; not a population estimate of those helped.

      2. Increment beyond baseline (Ad)2 of 3 — Specific material change to existing delivery

        Reviewer’s reason: Separate maintenance of existing protection from long-lead new defences and assess each against local exposure. This is a provisional marginal-change judgement, to confirm against commissioned delivery.

      3. Confidence in the proposed action (Ev)1 of 3 — Indirect, mixed, modelled or weak causal support

        Reviewer’s reason: Risk maps and audits justify attention; they are not experimental proof of a uniform policy effect.

      4. Expected incremental benefit (Bn)Not yet assessed

        Reviewer’s reason: Unknown: no sufficiently supported magnitude for this exact change.

      5. Residual harms (Hm)2 of 3 — Manageable harm with specified safeguards

        Reviewer’s reason: Residual risk, false assurance and displacement of water or spending to other places.

      6. Incremental affordability (Co)Not yet assessed

        Reviewer’s reason: Unknown: the proposed increment has not been costed and matched to an approved affordable allocation in this review. Existing programme envelopes are not that allocation.

      7. Delivery capacity (Ca)1 of 3 — Binding scarce resource

        Reviewer’s reason: Use engineering and risk appraisal; low trial evidence is not grounds to leave essential protection unmanaged.

      8. Distribution (Fa)2 of 3 — Mixed or broadly neutral with safeguards

        Reviewer’s reason: Distribution assessed against the target group and the burdens described here: Residual risk, false assurance and displacement of water or spending to other places.

      9. Meaningful first outcome (Ti)2 of 3 — More than one and up to three years

        Reviewer’s reason: Timing judgement concerns the first meaningful outcome in: Asset condition; modelled protection standard; observed flood harm when events occur. It does not imply all long-term benefits arrive then.

      10. Readiness (Rd)2 of 3 — Named commissioning/allocation/coordination step

        Reviewer’s reason: List safety/maintenance gaps, cost them and appraise new schemes using expected damage and distribution. Owner: Defra, Environment Agency and local partners in England.

      Four weightings

      Normalised as 10 × weighted sum ÷ sum of weights, on a 0–30 scale. Where a criterion is not yet assessed, the range is the lowest and highest result if it were later scored 0 or 3 — not a score, a confidence interval or a rank.

      • Equal weights: Range if completed: 15.0–21.0 out of 30. Not yet assessed: expected incremental benefit (Bn), incremental affordability (Co). Funding gate: not passed.
      • Evidence doubled: Range if completed: 14.5–20.0 out of 30. Not yet assessed: expected incremental benefit (Bn), incremental affordability (Co). Funding gate: not passed.
      • Scale doubled: Range if completed: 16.4–21.8 out of 30. Not yet assessed: expected incremental benefit (Bn), incremental affordability (Co). Funding gate: not passed.
      • Cost ignored (the funding gate still applies): Range if completed: 16.7–20.0 out of 30. Not yet assessed: expected incremental benefit (Bn), incremental affordability (Co). Funding gate: not passed.

      Funding gate: Not passed — the cost is not yet assessed or no allocation is committed for this scope. Ignoring cost in a weighting never removes the gate.

      Delivery RAG and gate

      Delivery RAG shown: AmberReview’s claim: Amber. Best the recorded evidence allows: Amber.

      Review’s reason: Incremental lifetime costs and funding not established. Use engineering and risk appraisal; low trial evidence is not grounds to leave essential protection unmanaged.

      Why it is not Green yet

      • Scope (population, place and increment) not verified against the delivery baseline.
      • No verified owner with the powers in place.
      • Delivery capacity not verified.
      • Lifetime incremental costs not complete.
      • No credible funding (a committed allocation for the scope).
      • Safeguards not specified.
      • Monitoring lacks a metric, a data source or a baseline.

      Green needs verified scope, a verified owner with the powers, verified capacity, complete lifetime costs with credible funding, specified safeguards and monitoring with a metric, source and baseline. Amber means appraisal gaps remain; Red means a material delivery obstacle. Red does not mean unimportant.

      Gate: Pending — appraisal incomplete (review label: “Pending cost, funding, scope and capacity appraisal”).

      Why: Scores incomplete; Funding gate not passed (cost unknown or no credible funding).

      The gate is separate from national list membership: being listed does not make an option eligible, and an eligible option need not be listed.

      Cost and funding

      Lifetime costing: Partial — some lines costed, no whole-life total.

      • Flood and coastal erosion risk management programme 2026–27 to 2028–29 (programme envelope) (published programme envelope; C-FLOOD-2629)

      Still to cost: Incremental lifetime costs and funding not established. Use engineering and risk appraisal; low trial evidence is not grounds to leave essential protection unmanaged.

      Funding status: programme route, not allocated.

      Owner, powers and capacity

      Proposed owner: Defra, Environment Agency and local partners in England. (proposed, unverified).

      Powers: needs a decision or allocation. Capacity: binding constraint.

      Powers and capacity read from the review’s Rd and Ca anchors; no proposed owner has agreed to act (the review: “Proposed owners have not agreed to act”).

      England:
      Defra and the Environment Agency, with HM Treasury; lead local flood authorities for surface water (action record)
      Scotland:
      not assessed
      Wales:
      not assessed
      Northern Ireland:
      not assessed

      Flood risk management is devolved: Natural Resources Wales, the Scottish Environment Protection Agency and councils, and the Department for Infrastructure (Rivers) in Northern Ireland run their own programmes; not reviewed here.

      Dependencies, safeguards and risks

      Depends on: Use engineering and risk appraisal; low trial evidence is not grounds to leave essential protection unmanaged.

      Safeguards

      • low trial evidence is not grounds to leave essential protection unmanaged (proposed, not yet specified)
      • Separate maintenance of existing protection from long-lead new defences and assess each against local exposure (proposed, not yet specified)

      Risks and residual harms: Residual risk, false assurance and displacement of water or spending to other places.

      Monitoring and measured results

      Metric: Asset condition; modelled protection standard; observed flood harm when events occur.

      Data source: Not yet named. Baseline: Not yet established.

      Measures already on the domain page

      A page measure is not necessarily the review’s metric; linking the two is an editorial decision still to be made.

      Evidence for the outcome
      Review record

      Assessment version: working-review-2026-10-06 (A54@working-review-2026-10-06).

      Reviewer: Author of the review blueprint (single reviewer, not named in uk-facts-complete-plan.json). Reviewed: 6 October 2026.

      Carried from the earlier domain review (C record): must be calibrated jointly with the G/W/E/NG/NW/NE records before any combined comparison.

      Decision route: List safety/maintenance gaps, cost them and appraise new schemes using expected damage and distribution.

      An earlier assessment exists on the 4 October 2026 selection table (nine H/M/L bands; superseded 7 October 2026). Its bands are kept, not converted into these scores.

      An editorial screening framework by one reviewer, not a formal appraisal or business case. Proposed owners have not agreed to act.

    Decision brief

    • Buy or build social-rent homes? Make the choice against the cost of temporary accommodation

    The leading option set out as a decision someone could take: who decides, who benefits, the best evidence, cost and funding, and the main trade-off. The full research record is one click away.

    Decision briefExisting programmeReviewed 2026-10-04

    Buy or build social-rent homes? Make the choice against the cost of temporary accommodation

    Decision required
    Whether a council, with Homes England or the GLA, compares buying, building and leasing homes for a named group in temporary accommodation over a declared horizon, and ties its first programme award to lettings to those households.
    Who and where
    Households in temporary accommodation, starting with families with children. Applies in: England.
    Accountable body
    The local housing authority, with Homes England or the GLA (awards)
    Intervention
    Supply settled social-rent homes, by whichever route is quicker and cheaper over the horizon, and let them to households in temporary accommodation.
    Best evidence, and where it applies
    A US randomised trial of 2,282 homeless families found a long-term affordable tenancy more than halved homelessness — but cost about 9% more than usual care. No UK evaluation tests this link.Studied in: 2,282 families in emergency shelter in 12 communities (Enrolment 2010–2012; 20- and 37-month follow-up).How closely the comparison transfers to this decision: 12 US communities — partial; Five Canadian cities — low.
    Extra cost of this change
    Capital: Social and Affordable Homes Programme — £39bn in total, 2026–27 to 2035–36, price basis not stated by the source.Recurring: none identified in the brief.One-off or mixed: Purchase or build, repairs, financing, management, maintenance, voids and support for a named scheme — Not yet costed; Whole-life comparison and evaluation — not yet established.
    Funding
    Not funded yet: a possible funding route exists, but nothing is allocated to this change.Committed to this change: none.Possible source, not an award: Social and Affordable Homes Programme envelope (£39bn).Unfunded: Unknown until a named scheme is costed; the £39bn is a programme envelope, not an award to this package.
    Savings and wider benefits
    Not yet specified: no cashable saving or avoided cost has been costed for this change. Expected outcomes are listed one by one in the research appendix and are never added together or counted as money available.
    First 90-day step
    First whole-life comparison published for a named authority; first award linked to temporary-accommodation lettings.The proposed first milestone; a 90-day date is not yet specified. Owner: Council with Homes England or the GLA. Proposed by UK Facts, not an official deadline.
    Twelve-month milestone
    Not yet specified.Time to a first useful result: Acquisition lettings within months of an award; new-build lettings in years.
    Outcome, and when to scale or stop
    Measure: Lettings from awards to households in temporary accommodation.Scale if: Lettings reach households in temporary accommodation and whole-life costs track the comparison.Stop if: Homes are not let to the target group.
    Main trade-off
    Acquisitions can compete with other buyers and renters; new build takes years and scarce builders.

    An editorial proposal by UK Facts for discussion, not government policy. Records: A02 · effects E-A02-TA, E-A02-CHILDREN-TA · costs C-SAHP-ENVELOPE, C-A02-SCHEME

    Research appendix: study design, effect sizes and limits, alternatives, full costing, international comparisons and how we would know

    1.The change, in plain words

    Buy or build social-rent homes? Make the choice against the cost of temporary accommodation

    2.The decision requested

    Decision
    For one authority and a named household group, publish a whole-life comparison of acquisition and repair, new construction and long leases against the current temporary-accommodation pathway over a declared horizon; choose the route by time-to-home, whole-life cost and resident outcomes; tie the first programme award to lettings to those households.
    Accountable institution
    The local housing authority, with Homes England or the GLA (awards)
    Geography
    England
    Powers
    Existing powers: council housing and homelessness duties; programme grant conditions; no new law.
    Delivery partners
    Homes England and the GLA; Housing associations; MHCLG; Estate agents and developers (acquisitions and sites)

    3.Who it is for, and what changes beyond today

    Target population
    Households in temporary accommodation, starting with families with children.
    Eligibility
    Households owed the main homelessness duty and in temporary accommodation in the authority, under its allocation scheme.
    Scale
    Set from the authority’s temporary-accommodation numbers, available properties and sites, and a costed business case — not a national number.
    Baseline
    135,580 households, including 177,530 children, were in temporary accommodation in England (March 2026). Councils’ gross spending on it was £2.82bn in 2024–25 (£1.39bn net of income, mostly housing benefit).

    Source: MHCLG, Statutory homelessness: England time series (Table TA1); Ministry of Housing, Communities and Local Government, Local authority revenue expenditure and financing England: 2024 to 2025 individual local authority data – outturn (RO4 housing services) (ENGLAND row, temporary accommodation lines)

    Change beyond existing law or funding
    The £39bn programme funds supply and is allocated by bidding; it does not require awards to house households in temporary accommodation or compare routes against its cost. The change adds both.

    4.How it would work

    Do: Supply settled social-rent homes, by whichever route is quicker and cheaper over the horizon, and let them to households in temporary accommodation. Changing: Each letting ends a temporary placement and its recurring cost.

    • Households leaving temporary accommodation into settled homes

      Hypothesis to testEffect record E-A02-TA

      The mechanism is direct, but whether new homes are additional locally and reach these households is unevaluated in the UK.

    • Stability of home and school for children

      Hypothesis to testEffect record E-A02-CHILDREN-TA

      The US trial found fewer school moves; untested here.

    • Total public cost of housing the group

      Hypothesis to test

      The US subsidy cost more than usual care; whether buying or building here costs less than temporary accommodation is what the comparison tests.

    Outcomes are kept separate and never added into one impact figure.

    5.Best evidence

    • Family Options Study: 3-Year Impacts of Housing and Services Interventions for Homeless Families (summary report)

      Author or institution:
      US Department of Housing and Urban Development (Abt Associates)
      Published:
      October 2016
      Evaluation period:
      Enrolment 2010–2012; 20- and 37-month follow-up
      Design:
      Randomised controlled trial of four approaches
      Sample or population:
      2,282 families in emergency shelter in 12 communities
      Effect and uncertainty:
      Long-term subsidy more than halved homelessness or doubling-up in the past six months; shelter stays in months 21–32 down by more than three quarters; cost about 9% more than usual care
      Limits:
      US rent subsidies, not bought or built homes; work fell at 20 months

      Where: Summary pp.3–5, 9. Affiliation is provenance, not proof of quality.

    • The Affordable Homes Programme since 2015

      Author or institution:
      National Audit Office
      Published:
      September 2022
      Evaluation period:
      2021 Affordable Homes Programme
      Design:
      Audit
      Sample or population:
      England’s affordable homes programme
      Effect and uncertainty:
      Central forecast 157,000 homes against “up to 180,000”
      Limits:
      Delivery of supply, not who is housed

      Where: Summary, paragraph 14. Affiliation is provenance, not proof of quality.

    6.Alternatives, counter-evidence and who loses

    Closest feasible alternative
    Long leases of private homes for temporary accommodation, or Local Authority Housing Fund acquisitions: faster for some households but adding less to total supply.
    Strongest counter-evidence
    The last programme delivered below plan as build costs rose, and acquiring existing homes can move households around rather than add homes.

    Source: National Audit Office, The Affordable Homes Programme since 2015 (Summary, paragraph 14)

    Distributional effects
    Gains for homeless households, many with children; other renters and first-time buyers may lose out where homes are acquired; other uses of the same grant lose.
    Main downside
    It may cost more, not less, than temporary accommodation over a short horizon, as the US trial found.

    The options compared, including current policy

    • The proposal

      Buy, build or lease — chosen against temporary-accommodation cost

      Who is reached
      Named households in temporary accommodation
      Evidence
      US RCT for the tenancy mechanism; no UK evaluation
      Likely outcome and timing
      Months (buy/lease) to years (build)
      Cost and funding
      Programme envelope; scheme not costed
      Main trade-off
      Competes with other buyers or for builders
    • Current policy

      Current policy: supply grant by bidding

      Who is reached
      Future social-rent tenants generally
      Evidence
      NAO: delivery below plan
      Likely outcome and timing
      Homes over the decade; who is housed not tracked
      Cost and funding
      £39bn envelope
      Main trade-off
      No link to temporary accommodation
    • Alternative

      Long leases of private homes

      Who is reached
      Households in temporary accommodation
      Evidence
      Not evaluated here
      Likely outcome and timing
      Fast
      Cost and funding
      Revenue cost
      Main trade-off
      Adds no supply

    7.What other countries or the devolved nations show

    Country lesson · 12 US communities, Enrolment 2010–2012; 3-year results 2016

    Long-term housing subsidies for homeless families in the United States

    Evidence: Experimental or quasi-experimental evaluationPartial match: some conditions differ

    What was changed
    Priority access to a long-term rent subsidy (usually a Housing Choice Voucher) for families leaving emergency shelter, compared with rapid re-housing, transitional housing and usual care.
    Study design and population
    Randomised controlled trial. 2,282 families with children who had spent at least seven days in emergency shelter.
    Measured outcome there
    Families offered a long-term subsidy were less than half as likely to be homeless or doubled up in the previous six months, 15 points more likely to live in their own place, and three quarters less likely to stay in shelter in months 21–32; child separations, school moves, distress, domestic violence and food insecurity also fell. Short-term rapid re-housing did no better than usual care.
    Cost status
    Measured in the trial: the subsidy group cost about 9% more than usual care over 37 months (about $3,800 per family on about $41,000), not less.
    What failed or remains uncertain
    The subsidy did not pay for itself; work among family heads fell at 20 months; the intervention is a rent subsidy in the private market, not a newly built or bought social home.
    Why the UK differs
    England already has housing benefit; the scarce input is a home at a rent the household can sustain, so the transferable finding is that a settled, affordable tenancy — rather than short-term help — ends homelessness for families. Whether buying, building or leasing supplies that home most cheaply is not tested.
    First change required here
    For one authority’s families in temporary accommodation, compare whole-life cost and time-to-home for acquisition, new build and long leases against the current temporary-accommodation pathway, and track nights in temporary accommodation as the outcome.

    Not a UK forecast: the effect above was measured in that place and population. Source: US Department of Housing and Urban Development, Office of Policy Development and Research, Family Options Study: 3-Year Impacts of Housing and Services Interventions for Homeless Families (summary report) (Summary pp.3–5, 9). Reviewed 2026-10-04.

    Country lesson · Five Canadian cities, 2009–2013

    Housing First for homeless adults with mental illness in Canada (context only)

    Evidence: Experimental or quasi-experimental evaluationWeak match: context only, not a model to copy

    What was changed
    Housing First: rent-supplemented homes chosen by the participant, with Assertive Community Treatment (high needs) or Intensive Case Management (moderate needs).
    Study design and population
    Pragmatic randomised controlled field trial. 2,148 homeless adults with serious mental illness.
    Measured outcome there
    62% of Housing First participants were housed all of the time in the last six months against 31% under usual care; 73% of time stably housed over two years against 32%. Symptoms improved similarly in both groups.
    Cost status
    Every $10 spent produced average service savings of $9.60 (high needs) and $3.42 (moderate needs) — offsets, not a net saving except for the highest-cost 10%.
    What failed or remains uncertain
    About 13% did not achieve stable housing in the first year; savings fall to other services, not the housing budget.
    Why the UK differs
    A different population: it is not evidence for families in temporary accommodation or for general housebuilding, and is shown here only to mark that limit.
    First change required here
    None for this brief: use it only for single homeless adults with high support needs.

    Not a UK forecast: the effect above was measured in that place and population. Source: Mental Health Commission of Canada, National At Home/Chez Soi Final Report (Executive summary pp.5–7; Chapter 4). Reviewed 2026-10-04.

    8.What delivery needs first

    • infrastructure — Available properties to buy, or sites with connections for new build. (Scarce resource shared with other priorities; owner: Councils with Homes England)
    • staff — Builders and acquisition and housing-management staff. (Scarce resource shared with other priorities; owner: Housing associations and councils)
    • dependency — Sites and connections sequenced through NP5 for new build. (Requirement; owner: MHCLG and NISTA)

    9.What it would cost

    How the cost is built up: For each route: purchase or build + repairs + financing + management + maintenance + voids + recurring support, less rent, over the declared horizon — set against the current temporary-accommodation pathway for the same households. Capital and recurring costs shown separately.

    • Social and Affordable Homes Programme

      England

      £39bn in total, 2026–27 to 2035–36, price basis not stated by the source (ledger C-SAHP-ENVELOPE)

      capital; price year not stated; 2026–27 to 2035–36; Current quoted cost

      A possible route, not a confirmed budget for this package.

    • Purchase or build, repairs, financing, management, maintenance, voids and support for a named scheme

      One authority’s scheme

      Not yet costed (ledger C-A02-SCHEME)

      mixed; price year not stated; Declared horizon; Not yet established

    • Whole-life comparison and evaluation

      One authority

      Not yet established per comparison

      one-off revenue; price year not stated; Before the first award; Not yet established

    10.Who pays, and what is missing

    Programme envelope (a possible route, not an award)
    Social and Affordable Homes Programme envelope: £39bn, 2026–27 to 2035–36
    Allocation committed to this change
    None
    Remaining gap
    Unknown until a named scheme is costed; the £39bn is a programme envelope, not an award to this package.
    Proposed financing
    Programme grant plus landlord borrowing repaid from rents; the authority’s temporary-accommodation budget is the comparison, not a source of cash.
    Responsible payer
    central government, councils, households
    Budget displaced
    Other homes or repairs the same grant could fund.

    11.First milestone and time to a useful result

    First whole-life comparison published for a named authority; first award linked to temporary-accommodation lettings. (Owner: Council with Homes England or the GLA. Proposed by UK Facts, not an official deadline.)

    Time to first useful result: Acquisition lettings within months of an award; new-build lettings in years.

    What could delay it: Suitable homes are available at a price within grant rates. Build costs do not rise faster than grant.

    12.How we would know

    Baseline
    Households in temporary accommodation in the authority, nights in temporary accommodation, and current spending on the pathway.
    Comparison
    The best feasible alternative route, and similar households not yet housed through the programme.
    Leading indicator
    Lettings from awards to households in temporary accommodation.
    Follow-up
    Tenancy sustainment and total public cost over the declared horizon.
    Continue if
    Lettings reach households in temporary accommodation and whole-life costs track the comparison.
    Adapt if
    Acquisitions do not add supply locally, or costs rise faster than plan; switch route.
    Stop if
    Homes are not let to the target group.
    Thresholds
    Not yet set: From the authority’s business case once the horizon, baseline and prices are known.

    What is not yet known, and how to find out

    • Which route is cheapest over the horizon for a named authority? (cost)Next step: Commission the whole-life comparison.Scope: Acquisition, new build and lease against the current pathway for one household group · Data or quotes needed: Property prices, build quotes, rents, management and repair costs, temporary-accommodation unit costs · Who can estimate it: The council with Homes England
    • Are acquired homes additional locally? (effect)Next step: Track who previously occupied acquired homes and local rents.Defensible route: evaluation of existing delivery

    Sources last checked 4 October 2026 · Owner: Evidence editor (James Harris) · Next check: MHCLG statutory homelessness in England: April to June 2026 (temporary accommodation) (29 October 2026, provisional) or the first trigger: Social and Affordable Homes Programme prospectus, bidding round or allocations.

    More decision briefs on other pages

    What it would take

    The order things have to happen in, who pays, and the effects and appraisals on record.

    The order things have to happen in

    1. First, the prerequisite

      Publish the blocker, owner and infrastructure cost for priority sites

      Owner: MHCLG with local planning authorities

      No date: the timing depends on the steps before it.

    2. Then, the decision

      Award programme grant to named social-rent schemes

      Owner: Homes England and the GLA

      Bidding opened February 2026; first strategic-partner allocations 25 August 2026, most of the programme still to allocate — source

    3. Then, delivery

      Build or acquire, then let to households in temporary accommodation

      Owner: Housing associations and councils

      No date: the timing depends on the steps before it.

    4. Finally, the measured outcome

      Fewer households in temporary accommodation; more net additional homes

      Owner: MHCLG statistics

      No date: the timing depends on the steps before it.

    5. Then, delivery

      Early legal and money advice for renters served notice or in arrears, in named councils with comparisons

      Owner: Councils with MHCLG and the Ministry of Justice

      No date: the timing depends on the steps before it.

    Who pays, and what is still missing

    Cost, committed funding and the remaining gap for the same scope and years. A programme envelope is not an award to a project; a proposal is not committed money. No total is shown because these costs are on different bases or periods and cannot be added.

    Cost and funding ledger

    • Social and Affordable Homes Programme 2026–2036 (programme envelope)

      A02 · capital · published programme envelope

      Amount
      £39bn in total, 2026–27 to 2035–36, price basis not stated by the source
      Who pays
      central government
      Committed
      None identified
      Proposed, not committed
      £39bn (Social and Affordable Homes Programme envelope)
      Gap
      Not established
    • Grant, borrowing, rent, maintenance and infrastructure for a named scheme

      A02 · capital · not costed

      Amount
      Not yet costed
      Who pays
      central government, councils, households
      Committed
      None identified
      Proposed, not committed
      —
      Gap
      Not established
    • Planning staff, site infrastructure and financing for priority sites

      A01 · capital · not costed

      Amount
      Not yet costed
      Who pays
      central government, councils, developers
      Committed
      None identified
      Proposed, not committed
      —
      Gap
      Not established
    • Flood and coastal erosion risk management programme 2026–27 to 2028–29 (programme envelope)

      A54 · capital · published programme envelope

      Amount
      £4.2bn in total, 2026–27 to 2028–29, price basis not stated by the source
      Who pays
      central government
      Committed
      None identified
      Proposed, not committed
      £4.2bn (Flood programme 2026–27 to 2028–29 (Spending Review 2025))
      Gap
      Not established

    “Not yet costed” means no defensible cost has been found — not that the action is free. Lifetime benefits, benefit-cost ratios and forecast savings are never shown here as money available to spend.

    Effects on record, with evidence ratings (4 records)

    What the evidence says each action changes

    Effects on record — these measure different outcomes, so they are not drawn on one scale
    ActionOutcome and areaEffectCompared withEvidence
    Turn permissions into homes people can live inNet additional homes HousingDirection plausible; size not established—modelled; limited confidence; EnglandThe OBR’s 170,000 extra homes by 2029–30 is its judgement of the 2024 planning reforms already in place, not of this site-by-site package, whose marginal effect has not been estimated.
    Use social-housing funding to reduce temporary accommodationHouseholds leaving temporary accommodation HousingDirection plausible; size not established—plausible spillover; limited confidence; EnglandWhether new social-rent homes are additional locally and reach households in temporary accommodation has not been evaluated.
    Use social-housing funding to reduce temporary accommodationIncome after housing costs of households moving into a social-rent home Poverty and inequalityDirection plausible; size not established—plausible spillover; limited confidence; EnglandNo source we checked estimates how much poverty after housing costs falls when households move into new social-rent homes; rent levels, benefit offsets and who is housed all change the answer.
    Use social-housing funding to reduce temporary accommodationStability of home and school for children leaving temporary accommodation Education and childrenDirection plausible; size not established—plausible spillover; limited confidence; EnglandOur sources count the children affected but none evaluates the effect of rehousing on attendance, attainment or health, so this is a link to test, not a finding.

    How we would know

    Properties in areas at risk of flooding from rivers, the sea or surface water; Households in temporary accommodation; Net additional homes; and 2 more.

    The outcome measures to watch. A baseline is where we start, not a target; where there is no official target we say so.

    • Properties in areas at risk of flooding from rivers, the sea or surface water

      properties · England

      Baseline
      Not published
      Latest
      about 6.3 million
      2024 national assessment

      Target: none — no official target for properties at risk; the flood programme counts properties better protected.

      Source: Environment Agency, National assessment of flood and coastal erosion risk in England 2024 (Executive summary, printed p.3). Next release: next national assessment update (no date published) (check the release calendar).

    • Households in temporary accommodation

      households · England

      Baseline
      Not published
      Latest
      135,580
      March 2026

      Target: none — there is no official target for temporary accommodation.

      Source: MHCLG, Statutory homelessness: England time series (Table TA1). Next release: quarterly (check the release calendar).

    • Net additional homes

      homes a year · England

      Baseline
      248,591
      2019–20
      Latest
      208,600
      2024–25

      Official target: 1.5 million homes this Parliament (about 300,000 a year): a Plan for Change milestone set by the Starmer government and restated by the Burnham government on 25 August 2026.

      Source: MHCLG, Housing supply: net additional dwellings, England (Live Table 120). Next release: annual; last released 20 November 2025 (check the release calendar).

    • House price to earnings ratio

      times annual earnings · England

      Baseline
      4.2×
      2000
      Latest
      7.6×
      2025

      Target: none — affordability has no official target.

      Source: Office for National Statistics, Housing affordability in England and Wales: 2025 (Table 1c). Next release: annual (March) (check the release calendar).

    • Prevention duties ending with accommodation secured for six months or more

      % of prevention duties ended · England

      Baseline
      Not published
      Latest
      54.7% (19,230 of 35,130)
      January–March 2026

      Target: none — no target for this measure; the national prevention target uses a different metric (44.3% prevented or relieved).

      Source: Ministry of Housing, Communities and Local Government, Statutory homelessness in England: January to March 2026 (Sections 4 and 5). Next release: April–June 2026 due 29 October 2026 (provisional) (check the release calendar).

    Measured results

    What each option would be judged on, and the latest value of the measures already on this page. A measure moving is not proof that an option caused it.

    Where the ideas come from

    Research, counter-evidence and methods (30 sources; 1 claim held back)

    Counter-evidence and criticism

    • Use social-housing funding to reduce temporary accommodation: Rising build costs cut the last programme’s output; grant per home and the share at social rent trade off against the number of homes. (National Audit Office)
    • Turn permissions into homes people can live in: Centre for Cities argues incremental reform of a discretionary system cannot close the gap and proposes zoning; neither approach has a UK effect estimate. (Centre for Cities)
    • Allocate flood-defence money by the new risk map, keep existing defences in condition, and report homes better protected every year: Defences are only part of adaptation: the Climate Change Committee finds no adaptation outcome with good delivery, and most homes at risk are exposed to surface water, which large defences protect less well. Allocating strictly by risk can also move money away from cheaper schemes that protect many homes. (Climate Change Committee)
    • Offer early arrears and legal advice to renters before a notice becomes homelessness: The English evaluation found no significant effect on prevention or temporary accommodation, only on acceptances; advice cannot help where rents exceed what households can pay. (MHCLG (ICF and Bryson Purdon Social Research))

    Claims held back

    • Infrastructure, skilled labour and finance stop permissions turning into homes (brief threat, cited to S02 and S41) — Neither S02 nor S41 makes this point. Needed: Re-sourced to the NAO’s programme risks (paragraph 15); a source on build-out of private permissions is still needed.

    “Full text checked” means we read the report itself; “relevant passages” means the sections behind each figure; “summary or abstract only” means we could not read the full study, so no number from it is published here without another source.

    Other options compared — not on the shortlist (2)

    Other options compared

    Options from earlier work on this page that are not on the shortlist. They remain valid choices; their evidence is shown as before.

    • capacityStatus: operating

      Construction workforce and skills

      Aims to:
      Enough skilled workers to build more homes without simply pushing up costs.
      How:
      Training, apprenticeships and recruitment increase the number of bricklayers, electricians, plumbers and site managers, so that higher demand turns into more homes rather than higher wages and delays.
      Who decides:
      DfE and Skills England (training); CITB; employers; the Home Office (overseas recruitment).
      Main constraint:
      Training takes one to four years; housebuilding demand is cyclical, so employers hesitate to train.
      Evidence:
      Limited evidence — plausible mechanism, little direct evaluation
      See the trade-offs and evidence
      What the evidence shows
      CITB estimates the industry needs about 41,200 extra workers a year over 2026–2030. Evidence on which training routes reliably raise output is thin; this is a plausible constraint rather than an evaluated fix.
      Resources
      Training places, assessors and employer time; an ageing workforce to replace.
      Consent and decisions needed
      Immigration rules for construction trades are politically contested.
      Time
      Several years before newly trained workers add capacity.
      Cost and yield
      No reliable estimate of the cost per extra home built.
      Trade-offs and who pays
      Overseas recruitment is faster but contested; training is slower and depends on steady demand.
      How we would know it worked
      Leading indicator: Construction apprenticeship starts and completions. Outcome: Completions rise without a matching rise in build costs. It would not be working if: Vacancies stay high and build costs rise faster than completions.
    • immediate reliefStatus: legislated

      Support and security for private renters

      Aims to:
      Fewer renters pushed into arrears or homelessness while supply catches up.
      How:
      Local Housing Allowance (housing support in Universal Credit) set to cover the cheapest third of local rents, and new security of tenure, reduce sudden moves and evictions.
      Who decides:
      DWP and HM Treasury (Local Housing Allowance); MHCLG (tenancy law); councils (enforcement).
      Main constraint:
      Support does not add homes; higher allowances can be partly absorbed by higher rents where supply is tight.
      Evidence:
      Limited evidence — plausible mechanism, little direct evaluation
      See the trade-offs and evidence
      What the evidence shows
      Ending no-fault evictions began on 1 May 2026 under the Renters’ Rights Act 2025, so its effect is not yet measurable. Local Housing Allowance has been frozen for 2026–27; the link between allowance levels and homelessness is plausible but not robustly evaluated in the UK.
      Policy status
      Renters’ Rights Act 2025 in force from 1 May 2026; Local Housing Allowance frozen in 2026–27.
      Resources
      Benefit spending for higher allowances; council enforcement officers.
      Consent and decisions needed
      Higher benefit spending competes with other priorities; landlords’ response to new regulation is uncertain.
      Time
      Allowance changes act within a year; tenancy reforms take longer to show.
      Cost and yield
      Depends on the allowance level; no current official costing of restoring the 30th-percentile link is cited here.
      Trade-offs and who pays
      Relieves hardship now but does not tackle supply; some landlords may leave the market.
      How we would know it worked
      Leading indicator: Share of local rents covered by the allowance. Outcome: Homelessness from the end of a private tenancy, and households in temporary accommodation. It would not be working if: Evictions and temporary accommodation keep rising despite the changes.
    The options side by side
    OptionResourcesTimeEvidenceOutcome to watch
    Construction workforce and skillsTraining places, assessors and employer time; an ageing workforce to replace.Several years before newly trained workers add capacity.limitedCompletions rise without a matching rise in build costs.
    Support and security for private rentersBenefit spending for higher allowances; council enforcement officers.Allowance changes act within a year; tenancy reforms take longer to show.limitedHomelessness from the end of a private tenancy, and households in temporary accommodation.

    Plan reviewed 2026-10-07. How we judge evidence.

    Go deeper

    Shareable visual summary

    Visual summary

    Image current

    Every figure printed in the image matches today’s record, and its primary sources have been checked.

    Homes still cost nearly eight years of full-time pay.

    In England a median home cost 7.6× median gross full-time annual earnings in 2025, against 9.1× at the 2021 peak and 4.2× in 2000. A price-to-earnings ratio, not a deposit or mortgage measure. Three separate observations, not a continuous line.

    House price to earnings ratio, England (same 0–10 scale)

    • 2000 (baseline)4.2×
    • 2021 (peak)9.1×
    • 20257.6×

    A ratio of price to pay — not a mortgage payment or deposit measure. Local ratios vary far more widely.

    England, median price ÷ median full-time earnings. Source: ONS, House price to workplace-based earnings ratio.
    Download image (PNG, 1024 by 1536 pixels)

    Homes still cost nearly eight years of full-time pay.

    Housing infographic: a typical home in England cost 7.6 times full-time annual pay in 2025, against 3.5 in 1997 and 9.1 in 2021.
    Text and data version

    Homes still cost nearly eight years of full-time pay. In England a median home cost 7.6× median gross full-time annual earnings in 2025, against 9.1× at the 2021 peak and 4.2× in 2000. A price-to-earnings ratio, not a deposit or mortgage measure. Three separate observations, not a continuous line.

    Records behind this visual summary
    MeasureValuePeriodGeographyTypeSource
    House price to workplace-based earnings ratio, England, 19973.5×1997Englandobserved countOffice for National Statistics, Housing affordability in England and Wales
    House price to workplace-based earnings ratio, England, 20004.2×2000Englandobserved countOffice for National Statistics, Housing affordability in England and Wales
    House price to workplace-based earnings ratio, England, 20219.1×2021Englandobserved countOffice for National Statistics, Housing affordability in England and Wales
    House price to workplace-based earnings ratio, England, 20257.6×2025Englandobserved countOffice for National Statistics, Housing affordability in England and Wales

    Image description: Housing infographic: a typical home in England cost 7.6 times full-time annual pay in 2025, against 3.5 in 1997 and 9.1 in 2021.

    Social card

    A landscape card for sharing this finding. Post it with the page link — an uploaded image does not link back by itself.

    An English home cost 7.6 times median gross full-time annual earnings in 2025. The ratio improved from its peak, but buying still presents a high barrier. Explore prices, rents and supply.
    Download image (PNG, 1536 by 1024 pixels)

    Homes still cost nearly eight years of full-time pay.

    Housing social card. England’s median home cost 7.6 times gross full-time annual earnings in 2025. The earlier selected observations are 3.5 in 1997 and 9.1 in 2021.

    All visual summaries, their source records and their publication state are listed on Shareable visuals.

    How this connects

    Sources and methods (5)

    Method notes

    • England only unless stated: housing policy is devolved, and the nations measure housing differently.
    • Affordability ratios use workplace-based earnings of full-time employees; ONS also publishes residence-based ratios, which differ where many people commute.
    • Net additional dwellings is the most complete measure of new homes; building-control completions count new builds only and are a different series.