10–15 Year Trends
Every major UK metric tracked from 2010 to 2024 — economy, housing, NHS, employment, inequality, immigration, crime, and public finances. All charts drawn from official ONS, OBR, NHS England, and HMRC data.
Read these together rather than in isolation. Weak productivity, flat real pay, persistent inequality and rising NHS pressure have moved together over this period, and many economists argue the first constrains the second. But these are descriptive series: they show what happened alongside what, not how much of one caused another. Where this site states a causal claim it says who is making it and on what evidence.
Key findings at a glance
Economy
GDP growth, productivity, and inflation 2010–2024. Productivity growth has been close to zero since 2008 — the "productivity puzzle" economists have not settled.
UK GDP Growth (annual %)
Real GDP growth 2010–2025. The COVID collapse and an uneven, slow recovery define the period; growth has not exceeded 1.5% in any year since 2022.
View data table
| Year | GDP growth % |
|---|---|
| 2010 | 2.3 |
| 2011 | 0.9 |
| 2012 | 1.5 |
| 2013 | 1.7 |
| 2014 | 3.2 |
| 2015 | 2.1 |
| 2016 | 2.2 |
| 2017 | 3 |
| 2018 | 1.6 |
| 2019 | 1.3 |
| 2020 | -10 |
| 2021 | 8.5 |
| 2022 | 5.1 |
| 2023 | 0.3 |
| 2024 | 1 |
| 2025 | 1.3 |
United Kingdom · Source: ONS, Quarterly national accounts (series IHYP)
Latest comparable annual series: 2025 (released 30 June 2026)
CPI Inflation (annual average %)
Consumer price inflation 2010–2025. The 2022 spike — driven by energy — was the highest in 40 years. Inflation fell back to 2.5% in 2024 before rising again to 3.4% in 2025.
View data table
| Year | CPI inflation % |
|---|---|
| 2010 | 3.3 |
| 2011 | 4.5 |
| 2012 | 2.8 |
| 2013 | 2.6 |
| 2014 | 1.5 |
| 2015 | 0 |
| 2016 | 0.7 |
| 2017 | 2.7 |
| 2018 | 2.5 |
| 2019 | 1.8 |
| 2020 | 0.9 |
| 2021 | 2.6 |
| 2022 | 9.1 |
| 2023 | 7.3 |
| 2024 | 2.5 |
| 2025 | 3.4 |
United Kingdom · Source: ONS, Consumer price inflation time series (series D7G7)
Latest comparable annual series: 2025 (released 22 July 2026)
UK Productivity Growth (output per hour, annual %)
Pre-crisis productivity growth averaged over 2% a year. Since 2008 it has been close to zero, and was negative in both 2023 and 2024 — the same period over which real pay stopped growing.
View data table
| Year | Output per hour, % change |
|---|---|
| 2010 | 1.9 |
| 2011 | 0.6 |
| 2012 | -0.4 |
| 2013 | -0.3 |
| 2014 | 0.4 |
| 2015 | 0.4 |
| 2016 | 1 |
| 2017 | 2 |
| 2018 | 0.6 |
| 2019 | -0.2 |
| 2020 | 1.5 |
| 2021 | 1.4 |
| 2022 | 0.8 |
| 2023 | -0.4 |
| 2024 | -0.8 |
| 2025 | 0.1 |
United Kingdom · Source: ONS, Labour productivity time series (series LZVD)
Latest comparable annual series: 2025 (annual series unchanged at the 18 August 2026 release; latest quarter 2026 Q1)
Housing
House prices, supply, and affordability 2010–2024. Net housing supply has fallen short of the government’s stated 300,000-a-year target in every year of the period.
Average UK House Price (£k)
UK average house price 2010–2025, from the UK House Price Index. Prices rose about 70% over the period while real weekly pay rose under 7%.
View data table
| Year | Average price (£k) |
|---|---|
| 2010 | 155 |
| 2011 | 154 |
| 2012 | 156 |
| 2013 | 164 |
| 2014 | 177 |
| 2015 | 189 |
| 2016 | 199 |
| 2017 | 208 |
| 2018 | 212 |
| 2019 | 214 |
| 2020 | 228 |
| 2021 | 245 |
| 2022 | 263 |
| 2023 | 256 |
| 2024 | 264 |
| 2025 | 269 |
United Kingdom · Source: HM Land Registry / ONS, UK House Price Index (December figure each year)
Latest comparable annual series: 2025 (latest monthly: June 2026, £272,000)
Net Additional Dwellings (England, '000s)
Net additions to the housing stock by financial year — new build, conversions and change of use, less demolitions. Supply peaked at 248,600 in 2019-20 and has fallen for three consecutive years to 208,600 in 2024-25, 70% of the 300,000 target, which has never been met. New build was 190,600 of the latest year's total.
View data table
| Year | Net additional dwellings ('000s) |
|---|---|
| 2010 | 137 |
| 2011 | 141 |
| 2012 | 131 |
| 2013 | 142 |
| 2014 | 177 |
| 2015 | 196 |
| 2016 | 223 |
| 2017 | 228 |
| 2018 | 248 |
| 2019 | 249 |
| 2020 | 218 |
| 2021 | 234 |
| 2022 | 234 |
| 2023 | 221 |
| 2024 | 209 |
England · Source: MHCLG, Housing supply: net additional dwellings, England (Live Table 120)
Latest comparable annual series: 2024-25 (provisional; released 20 November 2025)
House Price to Earnings Ratio (England and Wales)
Median house price divided by median full-time earnings. Affordability worsened sharply to a 2021 peak of 8.95 and has since improved to 7.55 as earnings rose faster than prices. NOTE: ONS publishes this for England and Wales only — there is no UK equivalent, because the four nations use different data sources.
View data table
| Year | Price to earnings ratio |
|---|---|
| 2010 | 6.85 |
| 2011 | 6.74 |
| 2012 | 6.76 |
| 2013 | 6.74 |
| 2014 | 6.95 |
| 2015 | 7.37 |
| 2016 | 7.59 |
| 2017 | 7.77 |
| 2018 | 7.85 |
| 2019 | 7.73 |
| 2020 | 7.82 |
| 2021 | 8.95 |
| 2022 | 8.45 |
| 2023 | 8.28 |
| 2024 | 7.74 |
| 2025 | 7.55 |
England and Wales · Source: ONS, Housing affordability in England and Wales (Table 1c, median ratio)
Latest comparable annual series: 2025 (released 26 March 2026)
House Prices Have Grown Far Faster Than Pay (index, 2010 = 100)
By 2025, average house prices had reached 173.5 on a 2010 = 100 index, while real weekly pay reached only 106.9 — prices have grown roughly 11× faster than pay adjusted for inflation.
View data table
| Year | Average house price (index) | Real weekly pay (index) |
|---|---|---|
| 2010 | 100 | 100 |
| 2011 | 99.4 | 98.6 |
| 2012 | 100.6 | 97.4 |
| 2013 | 105.8 | 96.2 |
| 2014 | 114.2 | 95.7 |
| 2015 | 121.9 | 97.8 |
| 2016 | 128.4 | 99.2 |
| 2017 | 134.2 | 99 |
| 2018 | 136.8 | 99.6 |
| 2019 | 138.1 | 101.2 |
| 2020 | 147.1 | 102 |
| 2021 | 158.1 | 105.3 |
| 2022 | 169.7 | 103.6 |
| 2023 | 165.2 | 103.8 |
| 2024 | 170.3 | 105.9 |
| 2025 | 173.5 | 106.9 |
United Kingdom · Source: HM Land Registry / ONS UK House Price Index; ONS Average Weekly Earnings real terms (series A3WX)
Latest comparable annual series: 2025 (both series indexed to their own 2010 value = 100)
Employment
Employment, real wages, and economic inactivity 2010–2024. Low unemployment sits alongside real pay that has grown only marginally over the period and a rise in long-term sickness.
UK Unemployment Rate (16+, %)
Unemployment fell steadily to 2019, spiked with COVID, and has risen again since 2022 to 4.9% in 2025. NOTE: these Labour Force Survey estimates lost accredited status in November 2023 and are published as official statistics in development — read the trend, not month-to-month moves.
View data table
| Year | Unemployment rate % |
|---|---|
| 2010 | 7.9 |
| 2011 | 8.1 |
| 2012 | 7.9 |
| 2013 | 7.6 |
| 2014 | 6.2 |
| 2015 | 5.4 |
| 2016 | 4.9 |
| 2017 | 4.4 |
| 2018 | 4.1 |
| 2019 | 3.8 |
| 2020 | 4.6 |
| 2021 | 4.6 |
| 2022 | 3.8 |
| 2023 | 4.1 |
| 2024 | 4.3 |
| 2025 | 4.9 |
United Kingdom · Source: ONS, Labour market statistics (series MGSX) — official statistics in development
Latest comparable annual series: 2025 (released 21 July 2026)
Real Weekly Pay (£, constant 2015 prices)
Average weekly total pay adjusted for inflation. Real pay in 2025 (£528) is 6.9% above 2010 (£494) and passed its 2007 peak only in 2021 — fifteen years of almost no growth in what a week of work buys.
View data table
| Year | Real weekly pay (£) |
|---|---|
| 2010 | 494 |
| 2011 | 487 |
| 2012 | 481 |
| 2013 | 475 |
| 2014 | 473 |
| 2015 | 483 |
| 2016 | 490 |
| 2017 | 489 |
| 2018 | 492 |
| 2019 | 500 |
| 2020 | 504 |
| 2021 | 520 |
| 2022 | 512 |
| 2023 | 513 |
| 2024 | 523 |
| 2025 | 528 |
Great Britain · Source: ONS, Average Weekly Earnings real terms level (series A3WX, CPIH-deflated, constant 2015 prices)
Latest comparable annual series: 2025 annual average (series retrieved 2026-08-17)
Economic Inactivity Rate (16–64, %)
People neither working nor looking for work. The rate rose after COVID on long-term sickness and fell back to 21.0% in 2025. Same Labour Force Survey caveat: official statistics in development since November 2023.
View data table
| Year | Inactivity rate % |
|---|---|
| 2010 | 23.5 |
| 2011 | 23.3 |
| 2012 | 22.8 |
| 2013 | 22.4 |
| 2014 | 22.2 |
| 2015 | 22.1 |
| 2016 | 21.8 |
| 2017 | 21.5 |
| 2018 | 21.2 |
| 2019 | 20.8 |
| 2020 | 21.2 |
| 2021 | 21.5 |
| 2022 | 21.9 |
| 2023 | 21.7 |
| 2024 | 21.8 |
| 2025 | 21 |
United Kingdom · Source: ONS, Labour market statistics (series LF2S) — official statistics in development
Latest comparable annual series: 2025 (released 21 July 2026)
NHS
NHS waiting list and A&E performance 2010–2024. The waiting list has roughly tripled since 2012; the A&E 4-hour standard has not been met since 2013, though performance briefly improved in 2020/21 as attendances fell during the pandemic.
NHS Elective Waiting List — England (millions of PATHWAYS)
Incomplete referral-to-treatment pathways at each December. These are TREATMENT PATHWAYS, not people: one patient waiting for two treatments counts twice. The list tripled from 2.5m in 2010 to a 7.6m peak in 2023 and has edged down since, to 7.29m at December 2025 — about 6.16m unique patients.
View data table
| Year | Waiting list (m pathways) |
|---|---|
| 2010 | 2.46 |
| 2011 | 2.42 |
| 2012 | 2.63 |
| 2013 | 2.94 |
| 2014 | 3.17 |
| 2015 | 3.53 |
| 2016 | 3.83 |
| 2017 | 4 |
| 2018 | 4.28 |
| 2019 | 4.57 |
| 2020 | 4.59 |
| 2021 | 6.07 |
| 2022 | 7.2 |
| 2023 | 7.61 |
| 2024 | 7.46 |
| 2025 | 7.29 |
England · Source: NHS England, RTT Overview Timeseries (including estimates for missing trusts)
Latest comparable annual series: December 2025 (latest month: July 2026, 7.33m pathways / 6.23m patients)
A&E 4-Hour Performance — England (all A&E types, %)
Share of A&E attendances seen within four hours, by financial year, against a 95% standard last met in 2013-14. Performance bottomed at 70.8% in 2022-23 and has recovered slightly to 74.9% in 2025-26. Type 1 (major consultant-led units) is far worse: 60.9% in 2025-26.
View data table
| Year | % seen within 4 hours (all types) |
|---|---|
| 2010 | 97.4 |
| 2011 | 96.6 |
| 2012 | 95.9 |
| 2013 | 95.7 |
| 2014 | 93.6 |
| 2015 | 91.9 |
| 2016 | 89.1 |
| 2017 | 88.3 |
| 2018 | 88 |
| 2019 | 84.2 |
| 2020 | 86.8 |
| 2021 | 76.7 |
| 2022 | 70.8 |
| 2023 | 72.1 |
| 2024 | 73.9 |
| 2025 | 74.9 |
England · Source: NHS England, A&E Attendances and Emergency Admissions (monthly time series)
Latest comparable annual series: 2025-26 (latest month: June 2026, 75.0% all types / 61.2% Type 1)
Public Finances
National debt, deficit, and interest costs 2010–2024. Debt interest now exceeds the defence budget.
UK National Debt (% of GDP, end of financial year)
Public sector net debt excluding public sector banks, at the end of each financial year. Debt rose from 70.6% in 2010-11 to 95.4% after COVID and has been broadly flat since, at 93.7% at end-March 2026.
Provisional from 2025 — Latest year provisional.
View data table
| Year | Debt % of GDP |
|---|---|
| 2010 | 70.6 |
| 2011 | 73.9 |
| 2012 | 77.2 |
| 2013 | 78.8 |
| 2014 | 81.1 |
| 2015 | 80.6 |
| 2016 | 82.7 |
| 2017 | 81.6 |
| 2018 | 79.6 |
| 2019 | 84.5 |
| 2020 | 95.4 |
| 2021 | 94.3 |
| 2022 | 93.2 |
| 2023 | 94.2 |
| 2024 | 93.4 |
| 2025 | 93.7 |
United Kingdom · Source: ONS, Public sector finances (series HF6X); OBR Public Finances Databank
Latest comparable annual series: 2025-26 (provisional; data as at 21 July 2026)
UK Debt Interest Payments (£bn/yr, net of APF)
Central government debt interest net of Asset Purchase Facility flows. Costs more than doubled after 2021-22 as rates and index-linked gilt payments rose, reaching £109.3bn in 2025-26 — more than the defence budget.
Provisional from 2025 — Latest year provisional.
View data table
| Year | Debt interest (£bn) |
|---|---|
| 2010 | 41 |
| 2011 | 43.5 |
| 2012 | 38.6 |
| 2013 | 37.8 |
| 2014 | 34.2 |
| 2015 | 34.5 |
| 2016 | 36.8 |
| 2017 | 42.9 |
| 2018 | 39.1 |
| 2019 | 39.2 |
| 2020 | 25.2 |
| 2021 | 55.4 |
| 2022 | 112.1 |
| 2023 | 107.6 |
| 2024 | 106.2 |
| 2025 | 109.3 |
United Kingdom · Source: OBR Public Finances Databank (central government debt interest, net of APF)
Latest comparable annual series: 2025-26 (provisional; databank updated 22 July 2026)
UK Budget Deficit (% of GDP, financial year)
Public sector net borrowing excluding public sector banks. Austerity cut the deficit from 8.7% in 2010-11 to 2.0% by 2018-19; COVID took it to 14.7%; it has since settled around 4–5%, at 4.2% in 2025-26.
Provisional from 2025 — Latest year provisional.
View data table
| Year | Deficit % of GDP |
|---|---|
| 2010 | 8.7 |
| 2011 | 7.3 |
| 2012 | 7.1 |
| 2013 | 5.7 |
| 2014 | 5.2 |
| 2015 | 4.2 |
| 2016 | 2.8 |
| 2017 | 2.8 |
| 2018 | 2 |
| 2019 | 2.6 |
| 2020 | 14.7 |
| 2021 | 5 |
| 2022 | 4.8 |
| 2023 | 4.9 |
| 2024 | 5.2 |
| 2025 | 4.2 |
United Kingdom · Source: ONS, Public sector finances (series J5II); OBR Public Finances Databank
Latest comparable annual series: 2025-26 (provisional; data as at 21 July 2026)
Inequality
Gini coefficient, wealth share by group, and child poverty. The income Gini has moved little, but it masks a far wider wealth gap: the top 1% hold as much wealth as the entire bottom 50% combined. Child poverty after housing costs has risen.
UK Income Gini Coefficient (%)
Inequality of equivalised household disposable income, before housing costs. 0 = perfect equality, 100 = perfect inequality. Broadly flat since 2010 and at its lowest recent level (32.9) in FYE 2024 — which masks wealth inequality, a far wider and separately measured gap.
View data table
| Year | Gini coefficient (%) |
|---|---|
| 2011 | 34.1 |
| 2012 | 33.8 |
| 2013 | 34.4 |
| 2014 | 35.3 |
| 2015 | 34.7 |
| 2016 | 35.1 |
| 2017 | 33.4 |
| 2018 | 35 |
| 2019 | 36 |
| 2020 | 35.4 |
| 2021 | 34.4 |
| 2022 | 35.5 |
| 2023 | 33.1 |
| 2024 | 32.9 |
United Kingdom · Source: ONS, Household disposable income and inequality (Table 10)
Latest comparable annual series: FYE 2024 (released 2 May 2025; FYE 2025 not yet published)
Share of total household wealth, by group
The top 1% hold as much wealth as the entire bottom 50% combined. The top-decile (40.7%) and middle-40% figures are DERIVED from published ONS aggregates, not ONS-stated figures themselves — shown as derived throughout.
View data table
| Period | Share of total wealth (%) |
|---|---|
| Top 1% | 10 |
| Next 9% (rest of top decile) | 30.7 |
| Middle 40% | 49.3 |
| Bottom 50% | 10 |
Great Britain · Source: ONS, Household total wealth in Great Britain (Round 8)
Latest comparable annual series: April 2020 to March 2022 (Round 8) — the Wealth and Assets Survey’s accredited-statistics status was suspended by OSR on 13 June 2025 and has not been restored; this is the most recent data available.
UK Child Poverty Rate (% below 60% median, after housing costs)
BREAK IN SERIES at 2021/22: from that year DWP integrates benefit administrative records into the survey, correcting under-reported income. That change alone moved FYE 2024 from 31% to 27.7% — so figures either side of the break are NOT comparable, and the apparent fall after 2020 is largely methodological. Latest: 27.4%, about 4.0 million children.
Methodology break at 2021: DWP integrated benefit records into the survey — not comparable either side
View data table
| Year | Child poverty % (AHC) |
|---|---|
| 2011 | 27.2 |
| 2012 | 27 |
| 2013 | 27.2 |
| 2014 | 27.5 |
| 2015 | 28.5 |
| 2016 | 29.4 |
| 2017 | 30 |
| 2018 | 29.3 |
| 2019 | 29.4 |
| 2020 | 30.7 |
| 2021 | 27.1 |
| 2022 | 27.3 |
| 2023 | 28.8 |
| 2024 | 27.7 |
| 2025 | 27.4 |
United Kingdom · Source: DWP, Households Below Average Income (Table 1.4a)
Latest comparable annual series: FYE 2025 (released 26 March 2026)
Immigration
Net migration, who arrives and why, and detected illegal-route arrivals, 2012–2025. Net migration has more than halved twice since the 2022 peak. Note the last chart counts detected arrival events, not people living here illegally — see the immigration page for what that does and does not measure.
UK Net Migration ('000s per year)
Net migration was broadly stable 2012–2019, spiked after the post-COVID reopening (students, health workers, Ukraine and Hong Kong routes), and has since halved twice over — 171,000 in the year to December 2025.
View data table
| Year | Net migration ('000s) |
|---|---|
| 2012 | 195 |
| 2013 | 244 |
| 2014 | 284 |
| 2015 | 303 |
| 2016 | 249 |
| 2017 | 208 |
| 2018 | 276 |
| 2019 | 184 |
| 2020 | 93 |
| 2021 | 467 |
| 2022 | 891 |
| 2023 | 848 |
| 2024 | 331 |
| 2025 | 171 |
United Kingdom · Source: ONS, Long-term international migration, provisional (YE Dec 2025 edition, Table 1)
Latest comparable annual series: YE Dec 2025 (provisional)
Who is arriving: immigration by nationality ('000s)
Long-term immigration split into British nationals returning, EU+ nationals and non-EU+ nationals. The post-2021 surge is almost entirely non-EU+; EU+ arrivals have fallen every year since 2016.
View data table
| Year | British returning | EU+ nationals | Non-EU+ nationals |
|---|---|---|---|
| 2012 | 79 | 334 | 230 |
| 2013 | 76 | 402 | 234 |
| 2014 | 81 | 457 | 241 |
| 2015 | 78 | 481 | 238 |
| 2016 | 70 | 465 | 237 |
| 2017 | 84 | 411 | 257 |
| 2018 | 74 | 421 | 330 |
| 2019 | 71 | 349 | 368 |
| 2020 | 52 | 316 | 294 |
| 2021 | 164 | 173 | 610 |
| 2022 | 166 | 141 | 1091 |
| 2023 | 150 | 103 | 1188 |
| 2024 | 140 | 91 | 780 |
| 2025 | 110 | 76 | 627 |
United Kingdom · Source: ONS, Long-term international migration, provisional (YE Dec 2025 edition, Table 1)
Latest comparable annual series: YE Dec 2025 (provisional)
Why non-EU+ nationals arrive ('000s)
Study and work drive the totals and both have fallen sharply since 2023. Asylum — the category that includes people arriving irregularly — is the smallest of the main routes and the most stable.
View data table
| Year | Work | Study | Family | Humanitarian schemes | Asylum | Other |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2019 | 99 | 120 | 78 | 6 | 42 | 23 |
| 2020 | 71 | 112 | 56 | 1 | 35 | 20 |
| 2021 | 145 | 259 | 68 | 57 | 55 | 26 |
| 2022 | 291 | 430 | 67 | 190 | 85 | 27 |
| 2023 | 471 | 461 | 89 | 75 | 75 | 16 |
| 2024 | 272 | 274 | 84 | 49 | 87 | 14 |
| 2025 | 146 | 294 | 47 | 35 | 88 | 18 |
United Kingdom · Source: ONS, Long-term international migration, provisional (YE Dec 2025 edition, Table 4b)
Latest comparable annual series: YE Dec 2025 (provisional)
Detected arrivals via illegal entry routes (people)
Detected arrival events, not a count of illegal immigration — it excludes undetected entry and visa overstayers. Small boats are now nearly nine in ten detections; clandestine entry at ports has all but disappeared.
View data table
| Year | Small boats | Undocumented air arrivals | Detected in the UK | Detected at ports |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2018 | 299 | 4769 | 7257 | 1052 |
| 2019 | 1843 | 5237 | 8492 | 959 |
| 2020 | 8466 | 2328 | 5428 | 808 |
| 2021 | 28526 | 2561 | 5036 | 662 |
| 2022 | 45774 | 5130 | 3379 | 291 |
| 2023 | 29437 | 3854 | 2836 | 236 |
| 2024 | 36816 | 3349 | 2900 | 225 |
| 2025 | 41472 | 3027 | 1817 | 181 |
United Kingdom · Source: Home Office, Illegal entry routes to the UK detailed dataset (YE March 2026), table IER_D01
Latest comparable annual series: 2018–2025 calendar years
Crime
Total crime and knife offences 2010–2024. Overall recorded crime is down over the period; knife offences rose to 2019 and have fallen since 2023.
Crime Survey Incidents — England and Wales (millions)
CSEW headline crime EXCLUDING fraud and computer misuse — the only basis that runs continuously from 2010. Crime more than halved, from 9.5m in the year to March 2010 to 4.33m in the year to March 2026. NOTE THE GAP: face-to-face interviewing was suspended for COVID, so ONS published no figures for the years ending March 2021 and 2022.
View data table
| Year | CSEW incidents (m, excl. fraud) |
|---|---|
| 2010 | 9.54 |
| 2011 | 9.71 |
| 2012 | 9.59 |
| 2013 | 8.76 |
| 2014 | 7.55 |
| 2015 | 7.18 |
| 2016 | 6.53 |
| 2017 | 6.06 |
| 2018 | 6.25 |
| 2019 | 6.43 |
| 2020 | 5.66 |
| 2021 | — |
| 2022 | — |
| 2023 | 4.39 |
| 2024 | 4.59 |
| 2025 | 4.6 |
| 2026 | 4.33 |
England and Wales · Source: ONS, Crime in England and Wales: Appendix Table A1a
Latest comparable annual series: Year ending March 2026 (released 23 July 2026)
Knife and Sharp Instrument Offences — England and Wales ('000s)
Police-recorded offences involving a knife or sharp instrument, including homicide, years ending March. Offences rose steeply from 2014 to a 2020 peak, and fell 8% in the year to March 2026 to 48,774. TWO BREAKS IN SERIES: recording changed in April 2019 (NDQIS) and the Metropolitan Police corrected its recording in April 2024 without revising earlier years — comparisons across either break are not like-for-like.
View data table
| Year | Knife offences ('000s) |
|---|---|
| 2011 | 36.1 |
| 2012 | 33.7 |
| 2013 | 28.9 |
| 2014 | 28.3 |
| 2015 | 29.2 |
| 2016 | 32.7 |
| 2017 | 39.5 |
| 2018 | 47.5 |
| 2019 | 52.5 |
| 2020 | 55.2 |
| 2021 | 44.7 |
| 2022 | 49.2 |
| 2023 | 51.7 |
| 2024 | 54 |
| 2025 | 53.1 |
| 2026 | 48.8 |
England and Wales · Source: ONS, Crime in England and Wales: Appendix Table B6a (including Greater Manchester)
Latest comparable annual series: Year ending March 2026 (released 23 July 2026)
Follow the Money
Comparing immigration costs to corporate tax gap, water dividends, and energy windfall — using verified official data.
Annual Costs: What's in the News vs What the Numbers Say (£bn)
Proportional comparison of annual figures. Every bar is a verified official number. The asylum hotel bill is real — but tiny relative to the other costs rarely mentioned in the same breath.
View data table
| Period | £bn |
|---|---|
| Total tax gap | 46.8 |
| Corp. tax gap | 18.6 |
| Energy bailout (2022-23) | 23 |
| Water dividends (avg/yr) | 2.4 |
| Asylum (total) | 4.7 |
| Asylum (hotels only) | 3 |
| Migrant fiscal contribution | 20 |
United Kingdom · Source: HMRC Tax Gap 2024; Home Office Annual Report 2024; OBR; FT/Greenwich Uni (water, annualised)
Latest comparable annual series: 2023–24
Water Industry: Dividends Paid vs Debt Accumulated (cumulative £bn)
Since privatisation in 1989, water companies paid £78bn in dividends (inflation-adjusted) while accumulating £60bn+ in debt. The debt was zero at privatisation.
View data table
| Year | Dividends paid (£bn) | Debt accumulated (£bn) |
|---|---|---|
| 1995 | 8 | 5 |
| 2000 | 18 | 12 |
| 2005 | 30 | 22 |
| 2010 | 44 | 35 |
| 2015 | 58 | 45 |
| 2020 | 70 | 55 |
| 2023 | 78 | 62 |
England and Wales · Source: FT analysis; University of Greenwich; Ofwat annual reports
Latest comparable annual series: 2023
What does this tell us? The 10-year picture
We are worse off in real terms
Real weekly pay passed its 2008 peak only in 2021 and is 4.6% above it now — fifteen years of almost no growth. Housing has become far less affordable relative to earnings over the same period. Weak productivity growth is the explanation most economists reach for first, though how much of the pay slowdown it accounts for is contested.
Public services are at breaking point
NHS waiting lists are 3× 2012 levels and A&E targets have been missed for a decade. Over the same period funding grew more slowly than inflation while demand rose. These series show the two moving together; how much of the deterioration each factor accounts for is contested, and descriptive data of this kind cannot settle it.
The debt trajectory is unsustainable
Debt interest now costs £90bn+/yr — money that is not available for schools, hospitals or infrastructure. On the OBR’s current projections the debt ratio continues to rise without faster growth or higher taxes. Those are projections under stated assumptions rather than a forecast of what must happen, and they are revised at every fiscal event.
Housing targets have been missed for 40 years
The UK has missed its housing target every year for 40 years. Analysts most often point to the planning system, local opposition to development and developer land-banking; their relative weight is disputed. These series measure the shortfall, not what caused it.
The wealth gap widened while the income gap did not
Child poverty is at a 30-year high. The income Gini has been broadly flat while the wealth Gini widened — the property and asset gap grew far faster than the earnings gap. Analysts who study wealth concentration argue it compounds where returns on assets outpace wage growth, and point to inheritance, land and capital taxation as the levers; both the mechanism and the remedy are contested. These series show the two gaps moving apart, not why.
The money exists — it just goes somewhere else
£59.2bn/yr theoretical tax gap (2024-25, HMRC June 2026 — a estimate of tax not collected, only a fraction of which is recoverable). £78bn in water dividends over 32 years (nominal). £58bn in energy company profits the year the OBR costed government energy support schemes at £51.1bn. Each of these is measured on a different basis and over a different period, so they are not directly comparable — read each with its own label.