Britain today · Inequality

Inequality is about more than income: wealth, security and healthy life expectancy are unevenly shared

Income, accumulated wealth, food security and healthy life expectancy are different dimensions, measured by different bodies, that do not move together. This page keeps them separate rather than folding them into one score.

Read this first — what else changes the meaning of the headline

Income inequality (Gini)
32.9%

Broadly flat since 2010, at its lowest recent level — but income inequality alone says nothing about wealth, held far more unequally, or security against shocks.

ONS, Household disposable income and inequality (Table 10)

Wealth held by the wealthiest 1%
10%(estimated)

The same share as the entire bottom half of households combined, April 2020 to March 2022 (Round 8). This is the weakest evidence on this page — the underlying survey lost its accredited-statistics status (see below).

ONS, Household total wealth in Great Britain

Low-income children in food-insecure households
24%

Against 9% of the population as a whole — the same DWP release, so this comparison is like-for-like.

DWP, Households Below Average Income: FYE 1995 to FYE 2025

Healthy-life-expectancy gap by deprivation
~19 years

Between England's most and least deprived tenth at birth — the starkest measured gradient on this page, and a different dimension again from income, wealth or food security.

ONS, Healthy life expectancy by national area deprivation, England and Wales

Six different dimensions, not one inequality score

Public debate about 'inequality' often blurs these together. Each is measured separately below, by a different body, over a different period — they should not be added, averaged, or assumed to move the same way.

Income

Gini coefficient of household disposable income — section 5 below and the context strip above.

Source: ONS

Wealth

Accumulated assets (property, pensions, savings) — section 1 below, plus the century-long World Inequality Database reconstruction in section 4.

Source: ONS Wealth and Assets Survey; World Inequality Database

Consumption / essentials

Whether households can actually afford food and material essentials, not just their income level — section 2 below.

Source: DWP Households Below Average Income

Housing security

Referenced through deep-material-poverty-by-tenure in section 2 — see the Housing page for the fuller picture on cost pressure by tenure.

Source: DWP HBAI

Food insecurity

A distinct, directly-measured DWP series, not inferred from income alone — section 2 below.

Source: DWP Households Below Average Income

Healthy life expectancy

The starkest measured gradient on this page — section 3 below.

Source: ONS Health state life expectancies by deprivation

Read these together, carefully. They are connected social gradients, measured by different bodies over different periods and geographies. They do not show that wealth concentration caused the others — no official analysis establishes that, and this page does not claim it.

1. Wealth is not a bigger income. It is security.

Two households on the same monthly income can live entirely different lives, because income is what arrives and wealth is what absorbs shocks. This is what assets actually do.

Same income, different assetsHousehold with assetsHousehold without
An unexpected £2,000 billPaid from savingsCredit, arrears or going without
HousingOwned, with a fixed and eventually falling costRented, at a cost that moves with the market
Losing a month of incomeA buffer absorbs itImmediate hardship
RetirementPension and property incomeLargely the state pension
Helping a child buy a homeCan contribute a depositCannot
Changing job, retraining or starting a businessCan absorb the riskRisk may be unaffordable

An explanation of what assets do, not a statistical model of two specific households.

£15,200

Median household wealth where the head is aged 16–24

£502,500

…and where the head is aged 65–74

33×

The difference between them — much of it pensions and property

The wealth data is the weakest evidence on this page

The Office for Statistics Regulation suspended the Wealth and Assets Survey’s accredited status on 13 June 2025, and it has not been restored. OSR judged Wealth and Assets Survey outputs "no longer of sufficient value or quality to meet users’ needs", citing falling response rates and lack of investment. The suspension covers the most recent round and all releases until ONS meets five stated requirements. The figures cover Great Britain, not the UK, and the latest available period is April 2020 to March 2022 (Round 8).

This is not a one-off gap.No timeline for restoring accreditation has been published, so wealth — unlike almost every other figure on this site — will likely stay the weakest-evidenced measure here for some time. This page will keep flagging it for as long as the suspension stands, rather than quietly upgrading the confidence of a figure whose underlying data hasn’t improved.

A correction we have made to our own page. This site previously said the wealthiest tenth hold “around 41%” of wealth, attributed to ONS. That is not an ONS figure — ONS published 43% in its 2018–20 bulletin and dropped the framing entirely in the current round. It can be derived from published aggregates at about 40.7% (Decile 10 aggregate wealth £5,523,204m (Table 2.2) divided by total aggregate wealth £13,568bn (Table 2.1).), but a derived number must be shown as ours, not theirs. The published figures above are used instead.

ONS, Household total wealth in Great Britain · OSR suspension notice

£141,176

average tax paid per person by HMRC’s “Wealthy individuals” segment — 0.85m people, 2023 to 2024

Not a wealth-band figure — this group is defined by income (£200k+) or assets (£2m+), not by a wealth decile — but it is a real, sourced “per head, by group” tax figure where almost none exist. Full workings, caveats and a second income-decile-based per-head series: who owns Britain’s wealth, and who pays the tax →

2. Who cannot afford the essentials

The clearest measured relationship on this page. All three figures come from the same DWP release, so the comparison between them is like-for-like.

  • Everyone in the UK9%

    Down 2 percentage points on the year.

  • People in relative low income (after housing costs)19%

    Down 4 percentage points on the year.

  • Children in relative low income (after housing costs)24%

    Down 6 percentage points on the year.

Deep material poverty

Lacking at least four of thirteen specified essentials. Introduced as a headline measure alongside relative low income, because a relative-income line alone does not tell you whether a household can actually afford what it needs. In FYE 1.9 million children 13% — were in deep material poverty, against 14% the year before. DWP marks that fall as not statistically significant, so it should not be read as established improvement.

28.2%

Social rented

18.6%

Private rented

9.1%

Owned outright

3.7%

Buying with a mortgage

Housing tenure makes more difference than almost any other characteristic. And on work: 38.1% of children in deep material poverty are in families where no adult works — against 13.1% of all children. That gap is real and large. It also means the majority of children in deep material poverty are in working families, which is the part most often left out.

DWP, Households Below Average Income: FYE 1995 to FYE 2025 · FYE 2025 (year ending March 2025) · released 26 March 2026

3. The gap is measured in years of life

The starkest measured gradient in UK statistics. People in England’s most deprived tenth can expect around nineteen fewer years in good health than those in the least deprived — and the gap in healthy years is far wider than the gap in total years, which means more of a shorter life is spent in poor health.

Healthy life expectancy at birth

Most deprived tenthLeast deprived tenth
Men — healthy life expectancygap of 19.4 years
49.8
69.2
Women — healthy life expectancygap of 20.3 years
48.2
68.5
Values by deprivation decile
GroupMost deprived tenthLeast deprived tenthGap
Men — healthy life expectancy49.8 years69.2 years19.4 years
Women — healthy life expectancy48.2 years68.5 years20.3 years

Total life expectancy at birth

Most deprived tenthLeast deprived tenth
Men — total life expectancygap of 10.4 years
73.2
83.6
Women — total life expectancygap of 8.1 years
78.3
86.4
Values by deprivation decile
GroupMost deprived tenthLeast deprived tenthGap
Men — total life expectancy73.2 years83.6 years10.4 years
Women — total life expectancy78.3 years86.4 years8.1 years

ONS, Healthy life expectancy by national area deprivation, England and Wales · England · 2022 to 2024. ONS also publishes a slope index across all ten deciles, of 19.3 years for men and 20.1 for women.

  • This compares AREAS, not individually rich and poor people. Someone on a low income in a wealthy area is counted in the least deprived decile.
  • Deprivation is measured across income, employment, education, health, crime, housing and environment — not income alone.
  • These are associations. They do not establish that inequality caused the gap, and health, behaviour, occupation and local services all contribute.
  • England only. Wales is published separately; Scotland and Northern Ireland use different measures.

4. How today compares with the last century

Independent academic estimate

Every official UK source on this page starts in 2010 or later. To see whether today is unusual you need a longer run, and that means an academic reconstruction rather than an official statistic. The World Inequality Database combines tax records, national accounts and surveys — which matters because surveys systematically under-record the very top, the same weakness that cost the Wealth and Assets Survey its accreditation.

If pre-tax national income in 2023 were £100, this is who received it
  • Bottom 50% — £20The lower-earning half of adults
  • Middle 40% — £43Everyone between the median and the top tenth
  • Next 9% — £23The top tenth, excluding the top 1%
  • Top 1% — £13The highest-income or wealthiest one in a hundred
pre-tax national income, 2023
GroupShare of every £100
Bottom 50%£20.4
Middle 40%£43.4
Next 9%£23.1
Top 1%£13.1

Shares of pre-tax national income among adults. The top 10% includes the top 1%, so the bands here are made mutually exclusive to sum to 100.

Before government acts

If pre-tax income in 2023 were £100, this is who received it
  • Bottom 50% — £20The lower-earning half of adults
  • Middle 40% — £43Everyone between the median and the top tenth
  • Next 9% — £23The top tenth, excluding the top 1%
  • Top 1% — £13The highest-income or wealthiest one in a hundred
pre-tax income, 2023
GroupShare of every £100
Bottom 50%£20.4
Middle 40%£43.4
Next 9%£23.1
Top 1%£13.1

Income from pay, profits, rents and ownership, before taxes and benefits.

After tax, benefits and public spending

If post-tax income in 2023 were £100, this is who received it
  • Bottom 50% — £30The lower-earning half of adults
  • Middle 40% — £42Everyone between the median and the top tenth
  • Next 9% — £19The top tenth, excluding the top 1%
  • Top 1% — £9The highest-income or wealthiest one in a hundred
post-tax income, 2023
GroupShare of every £100
Bottom 50%£29.7
Middle 40%£42.0
Next 9%£19.0
Top 1%£9.3

The same income after taxes, cash benefits and allocated public spending. The bottom half rises from 20% to 30%; the top 1% falls from 13% to 9%.

A century of income shares

Britain became dramatically more equal in the middle of the twentieth century, then reversed after 1980. The top 1% took 26.07% of pre-tax income in 1920, fell to 6.78% by 1980, and is 13.08% today.

Pre-tax national income, share taken by each group
United Kingdom

Bottom 50%, middle 40% and top 10% sum to the whole. The top 1% is a subset of the top 10% and is therefore shown in the table below rather than stacked, so the columns are not double-counted.

  • Bottom 50%
  • Middle 40%
  • Top 10%

Each column is one year, stacked to show shares of the total. Vertical axis runs 0–100%.

Academic reconstructions from the World Inequality Database, not official statistics. Earlier decades rest on sparser sources than recent years, and the series is not a National Statistic.

Source: World Inequality Database, United Kingdom pre-tax national income shares.

View as table
YearBottom 50%Middle 40%Top 10%
192017.16%35.9%46.93%
193022.8%35.03%42.17%
194022.28%42.96%34.76%
195022.18%45.17%32.65%
196022.76%46.37%30.87%
197023.06%46.97%29.97%
198022.57%48.95%28.48%
199019.52%47.57%32.91%
200018.75%45.29%35.97%
201019.76%45.39%34.84%
202020.29%43.92%35.79%
202220.2%43.55%36.25%
202320.43%43.35%36.22%

Wealth is far more concentrated than income

And the century-long story is more dramatic still: the top tenth held 94.08% of net personal wealth in 1920.

1920 to 1990

YearBottom 50%Top 10%Top 1%
19201.6%94.08%59.33%
19302.56%90.51%57.58%
19503.65%86.49%45.11%
19707.54%72.1%30.73%
198011.28%58.26%21.14%
199013.07%51.63%18.73%

1995 to today

YearBottom 50%Top 10%Top 1%
20004.98%55.78%20.37%
20104.95%54.63%20.04%
20204.68%56.84%20.9%
20234.64%57.14%21.3%

Why these are two tables and not one line: Break in series between 1994 and 1995: the bottom half’s recorded wealth share falls from 11.97% to 6.25% in a single year. That is a change in how the series is constructed, not an event that happened to households. Figures either side are not comparable.

Is Britain unusual?

Pre-tax income shares on a consistent basis, 2023. Britain sits between France and Germany, well below the United States and well above Sweden.

  • Swedentop 10%: 28.98% · top 1%: 9.51% · bottom 50%: 24.42%
  • Francetop 10%: 34.03% · top 1%: 11.82% · bottom 50%: 20.3%
  • United Kingdomtop 10%: 36.22% · top 1%: 13.08% · bottom 50%: 20.43%
  • Germanytop 10%: 37.65% · top 1%: 13.31% · bottom 50%: 18.77%
  • United Statestop 10%: 46.76% · top 1%: 20.73% · bottom 50%: 13.44%

A share falling does not mean a group got poorer

These are shares of a total, not amounts. A group’s share can fall while its real income rises, if the total grew faster. Between 1980 and today Britain became markedly more unequal in shares AND most groups became absolutely better off in real terms. Both are true, and a chart of shares alone cannot tell you which mattered more to any individual household. For what actually happened to living standards, read the pay and poverty data on this site — not this section.

How to read these figures

WID’s most recent years are extrapolated rather than observed: 2024 repeats 2023 exactly, and figures from 2015 onwards are projected from survey data. The last years built on tax microdata are 2006–14. Treat recent movements as indicative.

These are academic reconstructions, not official statistics, and they can differ legitimately from ONS figures because they incorporate tax records that surveys miss. They belong one tier below ONS and DWP on this site, and are used only for wealth concentration, long-run history, redistribution and international comparison — never for poverty, housing, health or household hardship, which UK official sources measure directly.

Source: World Inequality Database (WID.world), 25 July 2026 bulk edition · methodology · codes dictionary. Pre-tax income: Blanchet, Chancel and Gethin (2020). Wealth: Alvaredo, Atkinson and Morelli (2016). Post-tax: Fisher-Post and Gethin (2023).

5. Compare the trends yourself

These four series are deliberately not overlaid on one chart. Two lines on shared axes can be made to look correlated by choosing the scales, and these measure different things over different periods with different breaks. Stacked, they let you compare movement while keeping those differences visible.

Hover or focus any chart to mark the same year on all of them. Compare the trends — this does not establish causation.

No year selected

Income inequality (Gini coefficient)

United Kingdom · % — higher means more unequal

View the numbers
YearIncome inequality (Gini coefficient)
201134.1
201233.8
201334.4
201435.3
201534.7
201635.1
201733.4
201835
201936
202035.4
202134.4
202235.5
202333.1
202432.9

Source: ONS, Household disposable income and inequality (Table 10)

Children in relative low income (after housing costs)

United Kingdom · % of children

Break in series: from 2021/22 DWP integrates benefit administrative records into the survey, which moved the measured rate by around three percentage points. Figures either side are not comparable.

View the numbers
YearChildren in relative low income (after housing costs)
201127.2%
201227%
201327.2%
201427.5%
201528.5%
201629.4%
201730%
201829.3%
201929.4%
202030.7%
202127.1%
202227.3%
202328.8%
202427.7%
202527.4%

Source: DWP, Households Below Average Income (Table 1.4a)

Everyone in a food-insecure household

United Kingdom · % of individuals

Break in series: from 2021/22 DWP integrates benefit administrative records into the survey. Figures either side are not directly comparable.

View the numbers
YearEveryone in a food-insecure household
20207.8%
20216.4%
20227%
202310.9%
202411.3%
20259%

Source: DWP, Households Below Average Income: FYE 1995 to FYE 2025

Children in low income who are food insecure

United Kingdom · % of children in relative low income AHC

Break in series: from 2021/22 DWP integrates benefit administrative records into the survey. Figures either side are not directly comparable.

View the numbers
YearChildren in low income who are food insecure
202025.7%
202122.3%
202222.3%
202329.6%
202430.3%
202524.2%

Source: DWP, Households Below Average Income: FYE 1995 to FYE 2025

UK Income Gini Coefficient (%)

Income inequality has been broadly flat since 2010 and is at its lowest recent level — which tells you nothing about wealth, held far more unequally, or about whether incomes themselves rose.

View data table
UK Income Gini Coefficient (%)United Kingdom. Source: ONS, Household disposable income and inequality (Table 10). FYE 2024 (released 2 May 2025; FYE 2025 not yet published).
YearGini coefficient (%)
201134.1
201233.8
201334.4
201435.3
201534.7
201635.1
201733.4
201835
201936
202035.4
202134.4
202235.5
202333.1
202432.9

United Kingdom · Source: ONS, Household disposable income and inequality (Table 10) · as of FYE 2024 (released 2 May 2025; FYE 2025 not yet published)

UK Child Poverty Rate (% below 60% median, after housing costs)

Note the break in 2021/22: DWP began integrating benefit records into the survey, which moved the measured rate by around three percentage points. The apparent fall after 2020 is largely methodological.

Methodology break at 2021: DWP integrated benefit records into the survey — not comparable either side

View data table
UK Child Poverty Rate (% below 60% median, after housing costs)United Kingdom. Source: DWP, Households Below Average Income (Table 1.4a). FYE 2025 (released 26 March 2026).
YearChild poverty % (AHC)
201127.2
201227
201327.2
201427.5
201528.5
201629.4
201730
201829.3
201929.4
202030.7
202127.1
202227.3
202328.8
202427.7
202527.4

United Kingdom · Source: DWP, Households Below Average Income (Table 1.4a) · as of FYE 2025 (released 26 March 2026)

6. What this data cannot tell you

Did wealth inequality cause food bank use to rise?
No official analysis establishes this, and the series cannot answer it. Wealth is measured every two years in a survey that has lost its accredited status; food bank parcels are administrative counts from one charity network. Two lines moving together over a decade in which incomes, housing costs, benefit rules and referral practice all changed cannot isolate one cause. We show both and say plainly that this is an association.
How many individual people used a food bank?
Nobody knows. Trussell counts PARCELS, not people, covers only its own network, and cannot identify repeat use across the year. It is a real measure of emergency demand and a poor measure of how many households are in difficulty. The official food-security question in the Family Resources Survey is the better measure of that, and is used here as the primary evidence.
Is a stable Gini coefficient good news?
Not necessarily. The Gini can hold steady while everybody gets poorer, or while the bottom and top both move. It measures the shape of the income distribution, not its level, and says nothing at all about wealth — which is far more unequally held than income.
Does area deprivation tell you about individual wealth?
No. Deprivation deciles describe neighbourhoods. Most people in a deprived area are not the poorest people in the country, and wealthy individuals live in deprived areas. Treating an area statistic as a personal one is one of the commonest errors in this field.

7. What is proposed — and what it would mean

Six ways of taxing wealth more heavily, each with the revenue that has been modelled for it, who would pay, and the objection its critics make. These are contested policy options, not settled answers, and the site takes no position on which is right.

Before comparing these options, see who owns Britain’s wealth, and what each group actually pays in tax today — including why no published data can show tax paid broken down by wealth band, and what the closest available evidence (income-based, not wealth-based) does and doesn’t support.

Annual tax on wealth above £10m

Widely quoted, unverified

A charge of 1–2% each year on individual net wealth above a £10m threshold, applying only to wealth above the line — someone with £11m pays on £1m, not £11m. Base would include property, pensions, investments and private business assets, less debts.

Advanced by: Most prominently argued by Gary Stevenson (Gary’s Economics), who proposes 2% above £10m. The Green Party proposes 1% above £10m and 2% above £1bn.

Modelled revenue

£24bn a year (as commonly quoted)

We could NOT verify the £24bn against its underlying modelling. It is usually attributed to Wealth Tax Commission work led by Arun Advani at Warwick, but the Commission’s published illustrations use different parameters — for example 0.6% above £2m raising about £10bn. The £24bn may well be a defensible extrapolation; we simply could not confirm it, and doubling a rate does not reliably double a yield once behaviour changes. Treat it as a campaign figure pending verification.

Who pays

Roughly 20,000–22,000 individuals, on the figures usually quoted.

Case for: Targets net wealth directly rather than the transactions or income that existing taxes reach, and shifts the balance of taxation from earnings towards assets.

Case against: Valuing private businesses, land and unlisted assets annually; asset-rich but cash-poor taxpayers; changes of tax residence; trusts and offshore structures; and the administrative cost of running a valuation exercise every year.

Gary’s Economics — the argument in his own words

Minimum tax on wealth above £100m

Independently modelled

A 2% minimum effective annual tax, applying only to the very largest fortunes, designed so that those already paying that much in other taxes pay nothing extra.

Advanced by: Proposed in academic analysis at King’s College London.

Modelled revenue

About £10bn a year

A different design from the £10m proposal and not additive to it. The narrower base means far fewer valuation disputes but also far fewer taxpayers, so the yield is more exposed to the decisions of a small number of households.

Who pays

Fewer than 1,000 households.

Case for: Concentrates on extreme wealth where the case for undertaxation is strongest, and the small number of taxpayers makes administration more tractable.

Case against: Highly mobile taxpayers; requires international coordination to be durable; and the yield depends heavily on a handful of individuals’ choices.

King’s College London analysis

One-off wealth levy

Independently modelled

A single charge on wealth above a threshold, assessed once on a past date and payable over several years, rather than an annual tax.

Advanced by: The Wealth Tax Commission’s own preferred option — it concluded a one-off tax is easier to justify and administer than an annual one, and that the economic case for an annual tax is much less straightforward.

Modelled revenue

Depends entirely on threshold and rate

Because it is assessed on a past date, there is far less scope to rearrange affairs to avoid it. That is its central advantage and also why it cannot be repeated — a "one-off" tax people expect to recur behaves like an annual one.

Who pays

A larger group than the annual proposals, depending on where the threshold is set.

Case for: Much harder to avoid, and does not require an annual valuation machine.

Case against: Politically difficult; raises money once; and credibility depends on it genuinely not recurring.

Wealth Tax Commission, final report

Property and land tax reform

Independently modelled

Replacing council tax, stamp duty and business rates with a proportional property tax or land value tax based on current values, rather than 1991 valuations.

Advanced by: Advanced by the tax lawyer Dan Neidle as a better alternative to an annual wealth tax, and by others across the political spectrum. Burnham has separately advocated a land value tax.

Modelled revenue

Design-dependent

Council tax in England is still based on 1991 property values, which is the clearest case of an existing tax failing to track wealth. Reform is revenue-neutral or revenue-raising depending on design.

Who pays

Property owners and landowners, weighted towards higher-value property.

Case for: Land cannot move or hide, so avoidance and emigration are far less of a problem than with a wealth tax.

Case against: Creates visible winners and losers by region; hits asset-rich, cash-poor households, particularly pensioners; and revaluation is politically painful.

Tax Policy Associates

Capital gains tax reform

Modelled, but disputed

Raising CGT rates towards income tax rates, so that income from selling assets is taxed comparably to income from work.

Advanced by: Liberal Democrat policy (20%, 40% and 45% bands, costed at £5.2bn a year by 2028-29 and hypothecated to the NHS). Green policy proposes full alignment with income tax. Also discussed within Labour.

Modelled revenue

£5.2bn (Lib Dem design); £16–20bn claimed for full alignment

The higher figures for full alignment are disputed. Raising the rate changes when people choose to realise gains, so a static calculation overstates the yield; the tax lawyer Dan Neidle has argued the £16bn figure is substantially wrong.

Who pays

People realising gains on assets — concentrated among higher-wealth households, but including business sales and second properties.

Case for: Uses an existing tax with existing administration; no new valuation regime required.

Case against: Taxpayers control the timing of disposals, so behavioural response is large and the yield uncertain.

Chartered Institute of Taxation, election analysis

Inheritance tax reform

Independently modelled

Narrowing reliefs — particularly business and agricultural property relief — and closing gifting routes.

Advanced by: Advanced by Dan Neidle among others as part of reforming existing taxes rather than creating new ones. Ed Davey has said the better-off should pay more inheritance tax.

Modelled revenue

Design-dependent

Reliefs are where most of the foregone revenue sits. IHT raises comparatively little relative to the wealth it nominally covers, largely because of the reliefs and gifting rules.

Who pays

Larger estates, at the point of death.

Case for: Existing administrative machinery, and taxes wealth at the point it transfers rather than annually.

Case against: Extensive avoidance through lifetime gifting and trusts; and reliefs exist partly to protect family farms and businesses from forced sale.

Institute for Government explainer on wealth taxes

The argument behind the £10m proposal

Gary StevensonA former Citibank trader turned campaigner, whose channel Gary’s Economics has made the case for an annual wealth tax to a large audience. His argument runs: Wealth concentrates → wealthy households buy more assets → asset prices rise faster than wages → people dependent on wages fall further behind → concentration compounds. His stated aim is not primarily to raise a sum to spend. It is to slow the concentration of wealth and shift taxation away from work and towards assets, which he argues would eventually allow taxes on earnings to fall.

The claimWhat the evidence supports
A tax of this kind would raise substantial revenueIndependently modelled, though the specific £24bn figure is unverified
It would reduce measured post-tax wealth concentrationAlmost by construction
It would slow asset accumulation at the topPlausible; magnitude unquantified
It would make housing more affordableProposed mechanism; no reliable quantified effect
It would raise wagesProposed mechanism; no reliable quantified effect
It would allow taxes on work to be cutA political choice, not an automatic consequence

The main counter-argument: The tax lawyer Dan Neidle is the most prominent critic, challenging the proposal on valuation of private assets, tax residence and capital mobility, liquidity for asset-rich taxpayers, and international experience — most countries that tried annual wealth taxes have abandoned them. He argues reforming property tax, capital gains tax and inheritance tax would raise more with fewer problems.

This is a campaign proposal, not government policy. Stevenson has said publicly "I’m not advising Andy Burnham, but I’d love to" — he should not be described as a government adviser.

Gary’s Economics — the argument in his own words

8. What each party has actually done

The two-child benefit limit was abolished on 6 April 2026. The Child Poverty Strategy was published on 5 December 2025 with two headline metrics — but no statutory target. The widely quoted 550,000 figure is a modelled projection of the measures’ effect, which the government’s own impact paper describes as a comparison with and without them, not a commitment.

Labour (government)

Enacted in law

On child poverty: Abolished the two-child benefit limit from 6 April 2026, at roughly £3.1bn a year by 2029/30, benefiting about 560,000 families by an average £5,310. Free school meals extended to all Universal Credit households from September 2026. Published a ten-year Child Poverty Strategy in December 2025. Crucially, it contains NO statutory target — the widely quoted 550,000 figure is a modelled projection of the measures’ effect, which the government’s own impact publication describes as a comparison with and without the measures rather than a commitment.

On taxing wealth: Stated intention only. Committed to the manifesto pledge not to raise income tax, VAT or NI rates this Parliament. Burnham has long argued the UK taxes work more heavily than wealth and has advocated a land value tax, but has not proposed a general wealth tax, and nothing is costed. Reports that he would align capital gains tax with income tax bands are contested and we could not verify them.

Our Children, Our Future: Tackling Child Poverty (published 5 December 2025)

Reform UK

Position reversed

On child poverty: Reversed its position. Farage supported scrapping the two-child limit in summer 2025, then in February 2026 proposed REINSTATING it to fund tax cuts for hospitality: "It is reducing the benefits bill in favour of encouraging private enterprise and jobs and wealth creation." Reform costed the hospitality package at £2.29bn in year one rising to £2.9bn by year four, funded by reinstating the limit — so unlike most positions on this page, the trade-off is explicit and costed.

On taxing wealth: No verified position established.

Reported February 2026

Conservative

No verified position found

On child poverty: No verified current position found on the two-child limit or the Child Poverty Strategy.

On taxing wealth: No verified position established.

Liberal Democrat

Costed policy

On child poverty: Opposed the two-child limit consistently since 2017 and supported the Bill removing it in February 2026. Called the December 2025 Child Poverty Strategy "just a collection of existing proposals, which is very light on any new measures", noting the government’s own numbers leave nearly four million children in poverty. Their only poverty target is not child-specific: end deep poverty within a decade. We found no statement after the limit was actually removed in April 2026 setting out what they want next.

On taxing wealth: Capital gains tax reform is costed: rates of 20%, 40% and 45% by gain size, claimed to raise £5.2bn a year by 2028-29 and hypothecated to the NHS. On an annual wealth tax the party has no policy at all — it appears in neither the manifesto, the policy index nor recent conference motions.

Liberal Democrat response to the Child Poverty Strategy, December 2025

Green

Costed policy

On child poverty: Backed abolition and says it is not enough: welcomed the removal but argued "far more action is needed to end the scandal of child poverty", with subsequent asks for universal free school meals, rent controls and universal winter energy support. Has no numeric child poverty target — the "250,000 children" figure is a claimed effect of its benefit measures, not a target. Notably, no Green MP spoke in the February 2026 Commons debate on removing the limit, and we found no Green response to the December 2025 Child Poverty Strategy.

On taxing wealth: The most specific wealth tax proposal of any party: 1% annually on individual assets above £10m and 2% above £1bn, which the party puts at around £15bn a year, plus aligning capital gains tax with income tax rates. These costings are contested — an independent review puts the wealth tax yield nearer £9bn, and the tax lawyer Dan Neidle notes no comparable tax exists anywhere raising that much from so few people.

Green Party measures on the affordability crisis, April 2026

SNP (Scottish Government)

Costed policy

On child poverty: Scotland has STATUTORY child poverty targets under the Child Poverty (Scotland) Act 2017 — the only part of the UK that does. It MISSED all four interim targets for 2023-24: relative child poverty was 22% against a target below 18%. The 2030 target of under 10% is independently projected to be missed, with the IFS, IPPR Scotland and the statutory Poverty and Inequality Commission all forecasting around 18%. The Scottish Child Payment is £28.20 a week, rising to £40 for under-ones from 2027-28. Scotland legislated its own two-child limit mitigation costing £155m, then withdrew it in December 2025 once the UK abolition was confirmed, reallocating £141m to other child poverty work.

On taxing wealth: Stated intention, constrained by devolution: "our scope for wealth taxation is severely limited, but we will continue to explore what is feasible". Firm devolved commitments are a mansion tax from 2028 (new council tax bands above £1m and £2m) and a private jet tax, neither costed in the manifesto. The manifesto says nothing about capital gains tax, which is reserved.

Bringing Hope, Building Futures: Tackling child poverty delivery plan 2026-2031

Plaid Cymru (Welsh Government)

Stated intention

On child poverty: Wales has NO child poverty targets — the 2024 strategy contains none, which is the central criticism from CPAG, Save the Children and the Children’s Commissioner for Wales. Plaid, now leading the Welsh Government, has committed to replacing it with a plan carrying "clear targets, benchmarks and milestones", restated as government policy in June 2026; those targets have not yet been published. Its Cynnal payment (£10 a week for children aged 0-6 in Universal Credit households) is a pilot with no cost attached in the manifesto. On the two-child limit it accepts the UK abolition and presses for the overall benefit cap to be lifted as well.

On taxing wealth: The 2026 Senedd manifesto says nothing about a wealth tax or capital gains tax. Plaid backed both at Westminster in 2024, but has not restated that in its devolved programme; both taxes are reserved.

Deputy First Minister statement on tackling poverty, June 2026

How we researched this: We verified Labour, Reform UK, SNP, Plaid Cymru, Liberal Democrat and Green positions against primary sources — manifestos, government publications and ministerial statements. For the Conservatives alone we could not establish a current, sourced position within this research pass. That is a limit of our research, not evidence that those parties have no position, and we will not characterise them until we can cite them. We also searched specifically for instances of any party dismissing or downplaying child poverty and found none for the SNP, Plaid Cymru, Liberal Democrats or Greens; Reform UK’s reinstatement of the two-child limit is a stated trade-off rather than a dismissal, and is quoted in its own words.

Want to act on this? Your MP votes on all of it — find and contact yours.

Which losses get the most attention — and which are actually largest?

Public argument about who receives public money tends to focus on some of these figures far more than others. Here they are on the same axis, from the official sources.

Amounts compared, in billions of pounds
  • State Pension£146.1bn
  • Working-age and children’s benefits£145bn
  • Total tax gap£59.2bn
  • Corporation Tax gap£21bn
  • Benefit overpayments (fraud and error)£9.9bn
  • Benefit fraud£6.8bn
  • Benefit underpayments£1.2bn
  • Tax avoidance£0.8bn

Sources: DWP benefit expenditure tables, DWP fraud and error estimates, HMRC measuring tax gaps. Different geographies and reference years — see the source list below.

Do not add these together. Several of these sit inside one another: the Corporation Tax gap and avoidance are parts of the total tax gap, and benefit fraud is part of total overpayments. Adding them double-counts.

And none of it is recoverable. None of these is money that could simply be collected. The tax gap is an estimate of theoretical liability, not funds waiting in an account, and no tax authority in the world collects 100%. Benefit fraud estimates are sample-based, not detected cases.

Which of these do you see written about most often?

This site does not tell you what to conclude from that. It publishes the amounts, on the same axis, from the official sources — and leaves the comparison to you.

What the evidence supports about the causes of hardship

Supported by the evidence

  • Where someone sits in the income and wealth distribution is the strongest single predictor of whether they experience material hardship.
  • Housing costs, which fall hardest on renters and on the bottom half of the wealth distribution, are a major driver of the difference between income before and after housing costs.
  • Wealth is far more concentrated than income, and wealth determines whether a household can absorb a shock — a boiler, a car repair, a month of reduced hours — without falling into difficulty.

Not supported

  • That benefit fraud is a significant cause of national hardship. At £6.8bn it is real, and it is small against the sums above.
  • That migration is a significant cause of hardship for low-income households. The evidence on wage effects is contested and the measured effects are small.

The honest limit. None of this establishes causation for any individual household. Someone can be in genuine hardship for reasons that have nothing to do with the distribution, and pointing at national statistics does not describe anyone’s particular life.

For the detail behind these figures, see the benefits system and where tax goes uncollected.