Immigration · United Kingdom · year to December 2025 (provisional)
Net migration nearly halved in a year. What has that changed?
Provisional UK net migration was 171,000 in the year to December 2025, down from a revised 331,000 a year earlier. Net migration is arrivals minus departures: 813,000 people arrived (1,012,000 a year earlier) and 642,000 left (680,000).
Priority: Evaluate migration routes and local impacts separately; improve lawful asylum decisions and service planning. What would change it →
Evidence last reviewed 3 October 2026
Overview
The short version
Three key measures
How much has net migration changed in a year?
171,000net, provisional
Down from a revised 331,000 in the year to December 2024, a 48% fall in net migration. ONS’s 95% range is 145,000 to 197,000. The two flows, separately: 813,000 arrivals (1,012,000 a year earlier) and 642,000 departures (680,000). Arrivals did not halve; net is the difference between them.
Arrivals, departures and net change →United Kingdom · year to December 2025, provisional
Source: How much has net migration changed in a year?
Provisional · ONS, Long-term international migration, provisional (dataset), Tables 1 and 2
Why do people from outside the EU come?
47%to study
294,000 of 627,000 non-EU+ arrivals came to study, with dependants. Work-related arrivals fell from 471,000 in 2023 to 146,000. Non-EU+ nationals are 77% of all arrivals.
Work, study, family and humanitarian routes →United Kingdom · year to December 2025, provisional
Source: Why do people from outside the EU come?
Provisional · ONS, Long-term international migration, provisional (dataset), Table 4b
How many people are waiting for a first asylum decision?
40,168people
Down from 160,919 at the end of 2022. 16,021 people on asylum support were in hotels, against 45,753 at the end of 2022. Appeals are counted separately.
Asylum decisions, accommodation and returns →United Kingdom · end of June 2026
Source: How many people are waiting for a first asylum decision?
Official statistic · Home Office, Immigration system statistics: asylum summary tables, year ending June 2026, Asy_00a
Who feels this most?
Migration’s effects land unevenly — by place, by sector and by service. Relative to its size, international migration adds most to London’s population (below); work visas were concentrated in health and social care, which recruited heavily from abroad after 2022. The same places and services that gain workers also absorb the extra demand. What migration adds, and costs, in public services and the economy.
The evidence
Separate the flows, the routes and the local pressures
Arrivals, departures and net change
How do arrivals and departures add up to net migration?
813,000 arrivals minus 642,000 departures equals 171,000 net
Long-term immigration, emigration and net migration (people moving for 12 months or more), all nationalities, United Kingdom, year to December 2025.
Net migration is the gap between two large flows, so modest changes in either move it a lot. Arrivals fell by 199,000 on the year while departures stayed high, which is why the net figure nearly halved. ONS puts the net figure between 145,000 and 197,000 (95% range), clearly below the previous year’s range. First estimates move: the year to December 2024 was first put at 431,000, now 331,000.
United Kingdom · year to December 2025 (provisional) · Official statistics in development; the latest year is provisional
Sources, definitions and data — 813,000 arrivals minus 642,000 departures equals 171,000 net
- Geography:
- United Kingdom — Long-term international migrants, all nationalities
- Measure:
- People
- Period:
- year to December 2025 (provisional)
- Status:
- Official statistics in development; the latest year is provisional
- Calculation:
- As published by ONS (Table 1). All three are ONS estimates rounded to the nearest 1,000; departures are published, not derived. Net is immigration minus emigration.
- Compare with:
- year to December 2024: 331,000 net (revised), the amber mark
- Not included / breaks:
- Excludes short visits and people moving for under a year. Asylum seekers are included once they have stayed (or are expected to stay) a year; small-boat arrival counts are a different, Home Office measure and are not a component of this chart.
Source: ONS, Long-term international migration, provisional (dataset), Tables 1 and 2 (released 21 May 2026). Chart MIG-01.
View the data as a table
| Flow | year to December 2025 | year to December 2024 (revised) |
|---|---|---|
| Immigration (arrivals) | 813,000 | 1,012,000 |
| Emigration (departures) | 642,000 | 680,000 |
| Net migration | 171,000 | 331,000 |
| Net migration, 95% range | 145,000–197,000 | 309,000–348,000 |
When did net migration peak?
The peak was 944,000 in the year to March 2023; the highest calendar year was 2022, at 891,000
Long-term net migration, all nationalities, United Kingdom, rolling 12-month periods ending each quarter from June 2012.
1996–2026 displayed window · observations only. Shading marks years outside the displayed record.
Two "peaks" are quoted and both are right: 944,000 is the highest 12-month total (the year to March 2023, ONS’s headline peak), while 891,000 is the highest calendar year (2022). Calendar 2023 was lower, at 848,000. The surge came from non-EU+ students, health and care workers, their dependants and the Ukraine and Hong Kong schemes; the latest figure is close to the level of early 2021. Over the long run, the 2012–2019 average (calendar years, the pre-pandemic years of this series) was 243,000 a year; the latest year is below it.
United Kingdom · year to June 2012 to year to December 2025 · Official statistics in development; years from early 2025 are provisional
Sources, definitions and data — The peak was 944,000 in the year to March 2023; the highest calendar year was 2022, at 891,000
- Geography:
- United Kingdom
- Measure:
- People per rolling year
- Period:
- year to June 2012 to year to December 2025
- Status:
- Official statistics in development; years from early 2025 are provisional
- Calculation:
- As published by ONS (Table 1). Each point is a 12-month total plotted at the end of its period; overlapping periods are not added together.
- Compare with:
- Calendar year 2022: 891,000
- Not included / breaks:
- The comparable series starts in 2012. Earlier survey-based estimates use a different method and are not joined on.
Source: ONS, Long-term international migration, provisional (dataset), Tables 1 and 2 (released 21 May 2026). Chart MIG-03.
View the data as a table
| Year ending | Immigration | Emigration | Net migration | Status |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Jun 2012 | 639,000 | 477,000 | 162,000 | revised |
| Sep 2012 | 630,000 | 473,000 | 157,000 | revised |
| Dec 2012 | 643,000 | 448,000 | 195,000 | revised |
| Mar 2013 | 649,000 | 446,000 | 204,000 | revised |
| Jun 2013 | 669,000 | 454,000 | 215,000 | revised |
| Sep 2013 | 720,000 | 461,000 | 259,000 | revised |
| Dec 2013 | 713,000 | 469,000 | 244,000 | revised |
| Mar 2014 | 731,000 | 475,000 | 256,000 | revised |
| Jun 2014 | 737,000 | 489,000 | 248,000 | revised |
| Sep 2014 | 761,000 | 497,000 | 264,000 | revised |
| Dec 2014 | 778,000 | 494,000 | 284,000 | revised |
| Mar 2015 | 780,000 | 484,000 | 296,000 | revised |
| Jun 2015 | 778,000 | 482,000 | 296,000 | revised |
| Sep 2015 | 774,000 | 481,000 | 293,000 | revised |
| Dec 2015 | 797,000 | 494,000 | 303,000 | revised |
| Mar 2016 | 803,000 | 506,000 | 298,000 | revised |
| Jun 2016 | 832,000 | 511,000 | 321,000 | revised |
| Sep 2016 | 804,000 | 514,000 | 290,000 | revised |
| Dec 2016 | 772,000 | 523,000 | 249,000 | revised |
| Mar 2017 | 759,000 | 519,000 | 240,000 | revised |
| Jun 2017 | 718,000 | 518,000 | 200,000 | revised |
| Sep 2017 | 754,000 | 549,000 | 205,000 | revised |
| Dec 2017 | 752,000 | 544,000 | 208,000 | revised |
| Mar 2018 | 736,000 | 543,000 | 193,000 | revised |
| Jun 2018 | 757,000 | 541,000 | 216,000 | revised |
| Sep 2018 | 766,000 | 539,000 | 226,000 | revised |
| Dec 2018 | 825,000 | 549,000 | 276,000 | revised |
| Mar 2019 | 849,000 | 575,000 | 274,000 | revised |
| Jun 2019 | 821,000 | 597,000 | 224,000 | revised |
| Sep 2019 | 793,000 | 591,000 | 202,000 | revised |
| Dec 2019 | 788,000 | 605,000 | 184,000 | revised |
| Mar 2020 | 815,000 | 645,000 | 170,000 | revised |
| Jun 2020 | 736,000 | 625,000 | 111,000 | revised |
| Sep 2020 | 606,000 | 571,000 | 35,000 | revised |
| Dec 2020 | 662,000 | 569,000 | 93,000 | revised |
| Mar 2021 | 629,000 | 496,000 | 132,000 | revised |
| Jun 2021 | 818,000 | 567,000 | 251,000 | revised |
| Sep 2021 | 937,000 | 552,000 | 384,000 | revised |
| Dec 2021 | 947,000 | 480,000 | 467,000 | revised |
| Mar 2022 | 1,069,000 | 495,000 | 575,000 | revised |
| Jun 2022 | 1,167,000 | 486,000 | 681,000 | revised |
| Sep 2022 | 1,317,000 | 496,000 | 822,000 | revised |
| Dec 2022 | 1,398,000 | 508,000 | 891,000 | revised |
| Mar 2023 | 1,469,000 | 525,000 | 944,000 | revised |
| Jun 2023 | 1,466,000 | 543,000 | 924,000 | revised |
| Sep 2023 | 1,461,000 | 570,000 | 891,000 | revised |
| Dec 2023 | 1,441,000 | 593,000 | 848,000 | revised |
| Mar 2024 | 1,359,000 | 625,000 | 734,000 | revised |
| Jun 2024 | 1,299,000 | 650,000 | 649,000 | revised |
| Sep 2024 | 1,159,000 | 662,000 | 497,000 | revised |
| Dec 2024 | 1,012,000 | 680,000 | 331,000 | revised |
| Mar 2025 | 945,000 | 685,000 | 260,000 | provisional |
| Jun 2025 | 888,000 | 669,000 | 219,000 | provisional |
| Sep 2025 | 862,000 | 661,000 | 202,000 | provisional |
| Dec 2025 | 813,000 | 642,000 | 171,000 | provisional |
Scroll the table sideways to see every column.
The total hides a change in who is moving. British nationals have left in larger numbers than they returned in every year of the series (−136k net in the latest year), and since 2022 more EU+ citizens have left than arrived (−42k). All of the net inflow is now non-EU+ nationals (350k). How the end of free movement changed the mix.
Work, study, family and humanitarian routes
ONS breaks arrivals down by reason only for non-EU+ nationals — 627,000 of the 813,000 people who arrived in the year to December 2025. Within that group, the routes moved at different speeds, which is why a single total says little about what any rule change did.
Why people arrive — and which population this breakdown covers
Study now leads non-EU+ arrivals; work-related arrivals have fallen by 69% since 2023
Long-term immigration of non-EU+ nationals by main reason for coming, United Kingdom, years to December 2019–2025. Work and study include dependants.
- Work (incl. dependants)
- Study (incl. dependants)
- Family
- Humanitarian schemes (Ukraine, Hong Kong BN(O), resettlement)
- Asylum
- Other
The 2022–23 surge had several sources at once — students and their dependants, health and care workers, and the Ukraine and Hong Kong schemes — and they have unwound at different speeds. Work-related arrivals fell from 471,000 to 146,000 after the 2024 rule changes on care workers and dependants; study fell 36% from its peak. Asylum arrivals, at 88,000, are a minority of the total and have changed little. This is a subset: it says nothing about British or EU+ arrivals.
United Kingdom · year to December 2019 to year to December 2025 · Official statistics in development; the latest year is provisional
Sources, definitions and data — Study now leads non-EU+ arrivals; work-related arrivals have fallen by 69% since 2023
- Geography:
- United Kingdom — Non-EU+ nationals only — 77% of all long-term arrivals in 2025. British and EU+ arrivals are not broken down by reason.
- Measure:
- People arriving per year
- Period:
- year to December 2019 to year to December 2025
- Status:
- Official statistics in development; the latest year is provisional
- Calculation:
- As published by ONS (Table 4b); categories are ONS’s. Totals are the sum of the six categories and may differ from the published all-reasons figure by a few thousand because ONS rounds each cell.
- Compare with:
- Peak years: work 471,000 (2023), study 461,000 (2023), humanitarian 190,000 (2022)
- Not included / breaks:
- "Asylum" counts people who claimed asylum within a year of arriving, however they came; it is not a count of small-boat arrivals. "Humanitarian" covers the Ukraine and Hong Kong BN(O) schemes and refugee resettlement. Arrivals only: some of these people have since left.
Source: ONS, Long-term international migration, provisional (dataset), Table 4b (released 21 May 2026). Chart MIG-02.
View the data as a table
| Year | Work | Study | Family | Humanitarian schemes | Asylum | Other | Total (sum) |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2019 | 99,000 | 120,000 | 78,000 | 6,000 | 42,000 | 23,000 | 368,000 |
| 2020 | 71,000 | 112,000 | 56,000 | 1,000 | 35,000 | 20,000 | 295,000 |
| 2021 | 145,000 | 259,000 | 68,000 | 57,000 | 55,000 | 26,000 | 610,000 |
| 2022 | 291,000 | 430,000 | 67,000 | 190,000 | 85,000 | 27,000 | 1,090,000 |
| 2023 | 471,000 | 461,000 | 89,000 | 75,000 | 75,000 | 16,000 | 1,187,000 |
| 2024 | 272,000 | 274,000 | 84,000 | 49,000 | 87,000 | 14,000 | 780,000 |
| 2025 (P) | 146,000 | 294,000 | 47,000 | 35,000 | 88,000 | 18,000 | 628,000 |
Scroll the table sideways to see every column.
Asylum and small boats: separate measures
Asylum is counted by the Home Office as claims, decisions and people supported, not as long-term migration. In the year to June 2026, 85,891 people claimed asylum and 115,872 received a first decision; 38% of decisions that were not withdrawals granted protection or other leave. The queue for a first decision fell to 40,168, from 160,919 at the end of 2022.
33,374 small-boat arrivals were detected in the same period. Nearly all claim asylum — but so do people who arrived with a visa: in 2025, 39,238 claims came from people who had held a visa or other leave, against 41,380 from small-boat arrivals. Decisions, accommodation and returns in detail.
Who feels this most?
Local change, and what is not measured
Where does international migration add most to the population?
London gains 5.7 people per 1,000 residents from international migration; Wales, 0.5
Net international migration (arrivals from abroad minus departures abroad) per 1,000 residents, English regions and Wales, mid-2024 to mid-2025.
Net international migration per 1,000 residents, mid-2024 to mid-2025England and Wales 3.4
- London5.7
- West Midlands4.9
- North West4.5
- North East4.4
- East Midlands3.1
- Yorkshire and The Humber2.7
- East of England2.7
- South East2.3
- South West1.9
- Wales0.5
International migration adds people unevenly: London’s rate is about 1.7 times the England and Wales figure. But it is only one part of local population change. London lost 131,961 people to the rest of the UK in the same year — more than twice what it gained from abroad — so its population fell. Pressure on local homes and services depends on births, deaths and moves within the UK too, not on this figure alone.
English regions and Wales · Mid-2024 to mid-2025 · Official statistics (ONS mid-year estimates); rates are a site calculation
Sources, definitions and data — London gains 5.7 people per 1,000 residents from international migration; Wales, 0.5
- Geography:
- English regions and Wales — Usually resident population at mid-2024
- Measure:
- People per 1,000 residents
- Period:
- Mid-2024 to mid-2025
- Status:
- Official statistics (ONS mid-year estimates); rates are a site calculation
- Calculation:
- Site calculation: ONS net international migration for each area divided by its mid-2024 population, times 1,000.
- Compare with:
- England and Wales: 3.4 per 1,000 (211,691 people)
- Not included / breaks:
- Scotland and Northern Ireland publish separately and are not shown. Moves within the UK (internal migration) are a separate component, in the table. Local international flows are modelled and are less certain for small areas.
Source: ONS, Mid-year population estimates, England and Wales: mid-2025, Table MYE3 (components of change) (released 29 July 2026). Chart MIG-05.
View the data as a table
| Area | International net | Per 1,000 | Internal (within UK) net | Per 1,000 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| London | 51,839 | 5.7 | -131,961 | -14.4 |
| West Midlands | 30,051 | 4.9 | -9,330 | -1.5 |
| North West | 34,627 | 4.5 | 23,771 | 3.1 |
| North East | 12,201 | 4.4 | 7,439 | 2.7 |
| East Midlands | 15,550 | 3.1 | 13,623 | 2.7 |
| Yorkshire and The Humber | 15,172 | 2.7 | 3,265 | 0.6 |
| East of England | 17,595 | 2.7 | 25,154 | 3.8 |
| South East | 21,688 | 2.3 | 32,130 | 3.3 |
| South West | 11,311 | 1.9 | 25,093 | 4.3 |
| Wales | 1,657 | 0.5 | 4,876 | 1.5 |
| England and Wales | 211,691 | 3.4 | — | — |
Scroll the table sideways to see every column.
London shows why one flow is not the whole story: it gained 51,839 people from abroad but lost 131,961 to the rest of the UK. Population pressure on a town’s homes, schools and GP lists depends on all of these moves, plus births and deaths.
Three things are not measured well enough to show here:
- Arrivals by reason for each council area — ONS publishes reasons nationally only.
- The number of people living here without permission, including visa overstayers.
- How long recent arrivals stay: long-term migration counts intentions to stay a year, and many students leave after their course.
Shareable visual summary
Visual summary
Image currentEvery figure printed in the image matches today’s record, and its primary sources have been checked.
Net migration nearly halved in a year. What has that changed?
Provisional ONS estimates for the year ending December 2025: 813,000 arrivals minus 642,000 departures = 171,000 net, down from a revised 331,000 a year earlier. Net is the difference between two flows; arrivals did not halve.
Long-term migration, year ending December 2025 (provisional)
813,000arrived−642,000left=171,000net migration
Text and data version
Net migration nearly halved in a year. What has that changed? Provisional ONS estimates for the year ending December 2025: 813,000 arrivals minus 642,000 departures = 171,000 net, down from a revised 331,000 a year earlier. Net is the difference between two flows; arrivals did not halve.
| Measure | Value | Period | Geography | Type | Source |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Long-term immigration | 813,000 | YE Dec 2025 | United Kingdom | survey estimate (provisional) | Office for National Statistics, Long-term international migration, provisional, Table 1 |
| Long-term emigration | 642,000 | YE Dec 2025 | United Kingdom | survey estimate (provisional) | Office for National Statistics, Long-term international migration, provisional, Table 1 |
| Net migration | 171,000 | YE Dec 2025 | United Kingdom | survey estimate (provisional) | Office for National Statistics, Long-term international migration, provisional, Table 1 |
Image description: Immigration infographic: provisional net migration of 171,000 in the year ending December 2025 — 813,000 arrivals minus about 642,000 departures.
All visual summaries, their source records and their publication state are listed on Shareable visuals.
Go deeper
Arrivals, departures and net change: what actually fell?Arrivals fell to 813,000 while 642,000 left; net migration is the small gap between two large flows.The flow, both peaks reconciled, and how much first estimates move.Read the chapter → Arrivals, departures and net change: what actually fell? Work, study, family, humanitarian: which routes changed?Work-related arrivals from outside the EU fell 69% from their peak; study is now the largest reason.Route-level arrivals, and what the breakdown does not cover.Read the chapter → Work, study, family, humanitarian: which routes changed? Asylum: the queue has shrunk — why are so many still on support? +454.8%2010–Jun 2026United Kingdom · peoplePeople awaiting an initial asylum decision. Appeals and other migration routes are separate.7,240 → 40,1682010–Jun 2026Claims, decisions, grant rates, accommodation, small boats and returns — each on its own measure.Read the chapter → Asylum: the queue has shrunk — why are so many still on support?Sources and data
Calendar years, plus the latest two rolling years to June. Stock at the end of the period. Home Office figures are revised each quarter as cases are updated.
Source dataset →Period people Status 2010 7,240 Outturn 2011 8,857 Outturn 2012 12,816 Outturn 2013 18,172 Outturn 2014 22,898 Outturn 2015 22,147 Outturn 2016 27,857 Outturn 2017 29,522 Outturn 2018 35,855 Outturn 2019 51,228 Outturn 2020 64,895 Outturn 2021 100,564 Outturn 2022 160,919 Outturn 2023 128,786 Outturn 2024 124,802 Outturn Jun 2025 90,812 Outturn 2025 64,426 Outturn Jun 2026 40,168 Outturn What does migration add to the economy and public services?Official modelling finds higher migration lowers borrowing over five years; the long-run effect is less certain.The OBR scenario with its assumptions shown, workforce reliance and what cannot be calculated.Read the chapter → What does migration add to the economy and public services? Where is change felt, and what is not measured?International migration adds most in London, which still lost people overall to the rest of the UK.Regional rates, internal moves, and the population nobody counts.Read the chapter → Where is change felt, and what is not measured? What can published data say about migration and crime?Very little directly: prison data record nationality, not immigration status, and there is no offending rate by status.What is published, what is not, and why.Read the chapter → What can published data say about migration and crime?
Evidence → choices → outcomes
What could improve it?
Asylum claims decided quickly and soundly, and local services funded in step with the population they serve — whatever level of migration Parliament chooses.
Protect workers as well as managing visas
Worker protection matters alongside migration totals. The 2023 social-care immigration inspection identified weaknesses in sponsor licensing and compliance capacity, alongside exploitation and abuse. It is evidence of a delivery risk, not a current prevalence estimate.
Evidence in the domain SWOT →How we assessed these options
What would it take to improve this?
What would move the needle?
The outcome we want: Asylum claims decided quickly and soundly, and local services funded in step with the population they serve — whatever level of migration Parliament chooses.
The main constraint: Asylum decisions, appeals and accommodation sit with different bodies — the Home Office, the tribunals and councils — so speeding up one stage moves pressure to the next unless caseworkers, judges, legal advice and move-on housing are planned together; local funding formulas lag population change by design.
Constraint type: workforce, coordination, evidence.
The options on the table
What is funded now, and the changes assessed against it — the current baseline and the alternatives, before the position today and the actions.
Provisional single-reviewer assessments from the 6 October 2026 review; not approved business cases, and not government policy.
Track asylum cases through appeals and safe move-onDelivery RAG: Amber
- Funded now
- Not yet stated in the record.
- The change assessed
- Improve a defined hand-off so an initial decision does not simply transfer the queue to tribunals or homelessness services.
Range if completed: 13.0–19.0 out of 30 (equal weights; not yet assessed: expected incremental benefit (Bn), incremental affordability (Co))
Alternatives already on record: 24 options listed under the points in the position today (17 without an action record), and 4 earlier options under other options compared. They have not been scored in the review.
The position today
Which quadrant a point sits in is our analytical judgement, not a statistical category. Each point says whether it is a measured fact, our synthesis or a risk.
What we can build on Strengths
The initial-decision queue has shrunk: 40,168 people were awaiting a first asylum decision at the end of June 2026, against 160,919 at the end of 2022, after 115,872 initial decisions in the year to June 2026.
Measured factConfidence: High· end of 2022 to end of June 2026· United Kingdom
Source: Home Office, Immigration system statistics: asylum summary tables, year ending June 2026 (Asylum summary tables (Asy_00a and related))
Options assessed against this point: Track asylum cases through appeals and safe move-on (Amber delivery RAG)
What government has committed to
Funding: Spending Review 2025 gives £200 million of asylum transformation funding to end hotel use this Parliament 'by clearing the asylum backlog, increasing appeals capacity and continuing to return those with no right to be here', and expects asylum costs to fall by at least £1 billion a year by 2028-29 compared with 2024-25.
- Who and when:
- Starmer government (to July 2026), 11 June 2025.
- Since 20 July 2026:
- Kept by the Burnham government. Re-stated under Burnham: a written answer of 14 Sep 2026 says the government plans a further £1 billion of savings by 2028-29; the Treasury Minute of 2 Oct 2026 (CP 1668) says a single programme is delivering all 'Restore Order and Control' measures under the Asylum System Board. Source: HM Treasury, Treasury Minutes for August 2026 (CP 1668): government response to PAC 'An analysis of the asylum system' (Accessible PDF https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/6abfbecac9bd185c481ec96c/E03677598_-_CP_1668_Treasury_Minutes_Web_Accessible.pdf, recs 1-6: paras 1.1-1.4 (end-to-end accountability framework, Dec 2026); 2.3 (risks incl. pressure moving between parts of system); 3.3-3.5 (system indicators covering outcomes, quality and efficiency); 4.1-4.6 (capacity gaps); 5.1-5.5 (long-term accommodation strategy); 6.3 (renegotiating asylum contracts by end of year); 6.8-6.10 (contract review; profit share, clawback; exit hotels by end of Parliament)).
- Source:
- HM Treasury, Spending Review 2025 (HTML) (Chapter 2 'Strong foundations', 'Asylum and border security' (£200m transformation funding; end hotel use this Parliament; costs down at least £1bn a year by 2028-29); Chapter 3 justice paragraph (increased capacity every year to process asylum appeals); Home Office settlement section)
Checked 4 October 2026. A commitment is not delivery.
Options (3)
ShortlistedClear asylum cases without sacrificing decision quality
Stable casework teams, legal and interpreting access and case progression keep initial decisions flowing while quality is audited.
Who: Home Office with HMCTS · Evidence: Observational analysis · Status: Funded programme
Source: University of Oxford Migration Observatory, The UK’s asylum backlog (Appeals backlog section (80,000; legal aid fees raised Dec 2025); 'How productive are Home Office caseworkers?' (52% vs 76%; attrition 22% end-2025; retention bonuses; end of customer service standard 2019))
Keep caseworkers in post
Retention measures (bonuses since 2023) keep experienced decision-makers, who take 12-18 months to reach full productivity.
Who: Home Office · Evidence: Observational analysis · Status: Established
Source: University of Oxford Migration Observatory, The UK’s asylum backlog (Appeals backlog section (80,000; legal aid fees raised Dec 2025); 'How productive are Home Office caseworkers?' (52% vs 76%; attrition 22% end-2025; retention bonuses; end of customer service standard 2019))
Make one decision on asylum and humanitarian protection
The Immigration and Asylum Bill would replace separate assessments with a single decision, cutting handling time.
Who: Home Office; Parliament · Evidence: Untested proposal · Status: Announced proposal
Source: Home Office, New independent appeals body to speed up removals (IIAA to hear appeals from late 2027, phased; single appeal route; single decision on asylum and humanitarian protection; FtT sitting days +19%)
Hotel use has fallen: 16,021 people in asylum hotels at the end of June 2026, against 45,753 at the end of 2022.
Measured factConfidence: High· end of 2022 to end of June 2026· United Kingdom
Source: Home Office, Immigration system statistics: asylum summary tables, year ending June 2026 (Asylum summary tables (asylum support by accommodation type))
Options assessed against this point: Track asylum cases through appeals and safe move-on (Amber delivery RAG)
What government has committed to
Target: The government has committed to end the use of asylum hotels by the end of this Parliament, moving towards large sites including former military sites.
- Who and when:
- Starmer government (to July 2026), 11 June 2025.
- Since 20 July 2026:
- Kept by the Burnham government. Re-stated under Burnham: 'The government will also close every asylum hotel by the end of this parliament, with under 170 now in use' (14 Aug 2026); written answer 15 Sep 2026: 'committed to end the use of asylum hotels this parliament and we are on track', fewer than 160 hotels; Treasury Minute 2 Oct 2026 para 6.8 refers to the strategy to exit hotels by the end of this Parliament. Source: Home Office and Ministry of Justice, Asylum appeals target launched for faster removals (24-week target from 12 August 2026; average wait 67 weeks; over 150,000 appeals waiting; IIAA; 'close every asylum hotel by the end of this parliament'; FtT IAC sitting days +19% vs 2024-25).
- Source:
- Home Office, Restoring Order and Control: a statement on the government's asylum and returns policy (CP 1418) ('Moving out of hotels'; 'Creating a new appeals body' (early legal advice); summary list items 'Ending hotel accommodation' and 'New appeals body')
Checked 4 October 2026. A commitment is not delivery.
Options (4)
ShortlistedClear asylum cases without sacrificing decision quality
Faster, sound decisions and appeals move people out of supported accommodation, reducing demand for hotels.
Who: Home Office; MoJ/HMCTS; councils · Evidence: Observational analysis · Status: Funded programme
Source: HM Treasury, Spending Review 2025 (HTML) (Chapter 2 'Strong foundations', 'Asylum and border security' (£200m transformation funding; end hotel use this Parliament; costs down at least £1bn a year by 2028-29); Chapter 3 justice paragraph (increased capacity every year to process asylum appeals); Home Office settlement section)
Move asylum accommodation out of hotels
Procure dispersed homes across all council areas and keep hotels only as contingency.
Who: Home Office and contractors; councils; MHCLG · Evidence: Expert or audit recommendation · Status: Established
Source: National Audit Office, The Home Office's asylum accommodation contracts (HC 874) (Report page; summary paras 4 and 8 (£4.5bn to £15.3bn))
Use former military sites as large accommodation
Large sites (Bicester, Barnham, Linton-on-Ouse, ~3,750 places; Crowborough to 2030; Wethersfield beyond 2027) replace hotel places.
Who: Home Office; MoD · Evidence: Untested proposal · Status: Announced proposal
Source: Home Office, Thirteen asylum hotels exited and returned to local communities ('less than 160 now remain'; former MOD sites (Bicester, Barnham, Linton-on-Ouse, ~3,750 places); Crowborough to 2030, Wethersfield beyond 2027)
Renegotiate asylum accommodation contracts and use clawback
Profit-share and clawback clauses and renegotiated contracts lower the cost of the estate while hotels are exited.
Who: Home Office with the Government Commercial Agency · Evidence: Expert or audit recommendation · Status: Announced proposal
Source: HM Treasury, Treasury Minutes for August 2026 (CP 1668): government response to PAC 'An analysis of the asylum system' (Accessible PDF https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/6abfbecac9bd185c481ec96c/E03677598_-_CP_1668_Treasury_Minutes_Web_Accessible.pdf, recs 1-6: paras 1.1-1.4 (end-to-end accountability framework, Dec 2026); 2.3 (risks incl. pressure moving between parts of system); 3.3-3.5 (system indicators covering outcomes, quality and efficiency); 4.1-4.6 (capacity gaps); 5.1-5.5 (long-term accommodation strategy); 6.3 (renegotiating asylum contracts by end of year); 6.8-6.10 (contract review; profit share, clawback; exit hotels by end of Parliament))
What is holding us back Weaknesses
Worker protection matters alongside migration totals. The 2023 social-care immigration inspection identified weaknesses in sponsor licensing and compliance capacity, alongside exploitation and abuse. It is evidence of a delivery risk, not a current prevalence estimate.
Risk, not a certaintyConfidence: High· Inspection, August–November 2023· United Kingdom
Source: Independent Chief Inspector of Borders and Immigration, Inspection of immigration and the social care sector (Conclusions)
Decision quality has fallen as output rose: only 52% of decisions met the Home Office’s own quality standards in 2023/24, down from 76% two years before.
Measured factConfidence: Moderate· 2021/22 and 2023/24· United Kingdom
Source: University of Oxford Migration Observatory, The UK’s asylum backlog (“How productive are Home Office caseworkers?”, paragraph 3)
Options assessed against this point: Track asylum cases through appeals and safe move-on (Amber delivery RAG)
What government has committed to
Policy: The Home Office accepted all three ICIBI recommendations on asylum casework (25 Jun 2026): it has appointed a senior quality lead, introduced a refreshed quality framework, is building feedback from appeals into decision-making, and is testing a service standard for initial decisions.
- Who and when:
- Starmer government (to July 2026), 25 June 2026.
- Since 20 July 2026:
- Kept by the Burnham government. Re-stated under Burnham: the Treasury Minute of 2 Oct 2026 (para 3.5) commits to 'a balanced set of system-level indicators ... cover[ing] outcomes, quality and efficiency, including intake, decisions, appeals' by December 2026; para 1.3-1.4 says the Asylum System Board manages trade-offs between speed, quality and cost. Source: HM Treasury, Treasury Minutes for August 2026 (CP 1668): government response to PAC 'An analysis of the asylum system' (Accessible PDF https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/6abfbecac9bd185c481ec96c/E03677598_-_CP_1668_Treasury_Minutes_Web_Accessible.pdf, recs 1-6: paras 1.1-1.4 (end-to-end accountability framework, Dec 2026); 2.3 (risks incl. pressure moving between parts of system); 3.3-3.5 (system indicators covering outcomes, quality and efficiency); 4.1-4.6 (capacity gaps); 5.1-5.5 (long-term accommodation strategy); 6.3 (renegotiating asylum contracts by end of year); 6.8-6.10 (contract review; profit share, clawback; exit hotels by end of Parliament)).
- Source:
- Home Office, Response to the ICIBI report: an inspection of asylum casework (June to December 2025) (Recommendations 1-3, all accepted (SCS Quality lead; refreshed quality framework; project to test a service standard for initial decisions; appeals feedback loops))
Checked 4 October 2026. A commitment is not delivery.
Options (5)
ShortlistedClear asylum cases without sacrificing decision quality
Quality-audit decisions alongside throughput and track appeals outcomes by cohort, so speed does not lower quality.
Who: Home Office · Evidence: Observational analysis · Status: Funded programme
Source: University of Oxford Migration Observatory, The UK’s asylum backlog (Appeals backlog section (80,000; legal aid fees raised Dec 2025); 'How productive are Home Office caseworkers?' (52% vs 76%; attrition 22% end-2025; retention bonuses; end of customer service standard 2019))
Implement the ICIBI quality recommendations
Senior quality lead, refreshed quality framework, appeals feedback loops and better recruitment and training raise the share of decisions meeting standards.
Who: Home Office (Asylum Group) · Evidence: Expert or audit recommendation · Status: Established
Source: Home Office, Response to the ICIBI report: an inspection of asylum casework (June to December 2025) (Recommendations 1-3, all accepted (SCS Quality lead; refreshed quality framework; project to test a service standard for initial decisions; appeals feedback loops))
Reinstate a service standard for initial decisions
A published time standard, tested alongside quality measures, restores a clear expectation for straightforward cases.
Who: Home Office · Evidence: Observational analysis · Status: Pilot
Source: Home Office, Response to the ICIBI report: an inspection of asylum casework (June to December 2025) (Recommendations 1-3, all accepted (SCS Quality lead; refreshed quality framework; project to test a service standard for initial decisions; appeals feedback loops))
Provide early legal advice to claimants
Earlier legal advice gets evidence in up front, avoiding late claims and poor decisions.
Who: Home Office; Ministry of Justice (legal aid) · Evidence: Untested proposal · Status: Announced proposal
Source: Home Office, Restoring Order and Control: a statement on the government's asylum and returns policy (CP 1418) ('Moving out of hotels'; 'Creating a new appeals body' (early legal advice); summary list items 'Ending hotel accommodation' and 'New appeals body')
Publish asylum system indicators including quality
Regular publication of quality alongside decisions and appeals lets Parliament see whether speed costs accuracy.
Who: Home Office (Asylum System Board) · Evidence: Expert or audit recommendation · Status: Announced proposal
Source: HM Treasury, Treasury Minutes for August 2026 (CP 1668): government response to PAC 'An analysis of the asylum system' (Accessible PDF https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/6abfbecac9bd185c481ec96c/E03677598_-_CP_1668_Treasury_Minutes_Web_Accessible.pdf, recs 1-6: paras 1.1-1.4 (end-to-end accountability framework, Dec 2026); 2.3 (risks incl. pressure moving between parts of system); 3.3-3.5 (system indicators covering outcomes, quality and efficiency); 4.1-4.6 (capacity gaps); 5.1-5.5 (long-term accommodation strategy); 6.3 (renegotiating asylum contracts by end of year); 6.8-6.10 (contract review; profit share, clawback; exit hotels by end of Parliament))
The queue has moved to appeals: around 80,000 asylum appeals were pending at the First-tier Tribunal at the end of 2025, a record.
Measured factConfidence: Moderate· End of 2025· United Kingdom
Source: University of Oxford Migration Observatory, The UK’s asylum backlog (Key points; “How large is the UK’s backlog of asylum appeals?”)
Options assessed against this point: Track asylum cases through appeals and safe move-on (Amber delivery RAG)
What government has committed to
Policy: Spending Review 2025 promises 'increased capacity every year to process asylum appeals'. The Border Security, Asylum and Immigration Act 2025 requires the First-tier Tribunal, where reasonably practicable, to decide appeals by people in asylum accommodation within 24 weeks. The Immigration and Asylum Bill would create an Independent Immigration Appeals Authority, hearing appeals from late 2027.
- Who and when:
- Starmer government (to July 2026), 11 June 2025.
- Since 20 July 2026:
- Kept by the Burnham government. Acted on under Burnham: section 49 came into force on 12 Aug 2026 (S.I. 2026/766); the Home Office announced the 24-week target on 14 Aug 2026 (average wait 67 weeks; over 150,000 appeals waiting) and First-tier Tribunal sitting days up 19% on 2024-25; the Immigration and Asylum Bill entered Commons committee on 15 Sep 2026. Source: Home Office and Ministry of Justice, Asylum appeals target launched for faster removals (Opening paragraphs: 24-week target from 12 August 2026; tribunal sitting days).
- Source:
- HM Treasury, Spending Review 2025 (HTML) (Chapter 3, justice paragraph (increased capacity every year to process asylum appeals))
Checked 4 October 2026. A commitment is not delivery.
Options (4)
ShortlistedClear asylum cases without sacrificing decision quality
Plan appeals, legal aid and move-on capacity with casework so faster initial refusals do not just lengthen the appeal queue.
Who: Home Office; MoJ; HMCTS · Evidence: Observational analysis · Status: Funded programme
Source: University of Oxford Migration Observatory, The UK’s asylum backlog (Appeals backlog section (80,000; legal aid fees raised Dec 2025); 'How productive are Home Office caseworkers?' (52% vs 76%; attrition 22% end-2025; retention bonuses; end of customer service standard 2019))
Apply the 24-week statutory timeframe for supported appeals
The tribunal must decide in-scope appeals within 24 weeks, cutting time in supported accommodation.
Who: HMCTS; judiciary; Home Office · Evidence: Untested proposal · Status: Established
Source: legislation.gov.uk, Border Security, Asylum and Immigration Act 2025, section 49 (New s.86A NIAA 2002: 24-week timeframe for appeals by people in asylum accommodation; in force 12.8.2026 by S.I. 2026/766)
Increase First-tier Tribunal sitting days
More judge sitting days in the Immigration and Asylum Chamber raise appeal disposals.
Who: Ministry of Justice; HMCTS; judiciary · Evidence: Untested proposal · Status: Funded programme
Source: Home Office, New independent appeals body to speed up removals (IIAA to hear appeals from late 2027, phased; single appeal route; single decision on asylum and humanitarian protection; FtT sitting days +19%)
Create the Independent Immigration Appeals Authority
A new body with professionally trained adjudicators and a single appeal route takes new cases while the tribunal clears the stock.
Who: Home Office; Parliament · Evidence: Untested proposal · Status: Announced proposal
Source: Home Office, New independent appeals body to speed up removals (IIAA to hear appeals from late 2027, phased; single appeal route; single decision on asylum and humanitarian protection; FtT sitting days +19%)
What could improve things Opportunities
Judging asylum casework on sound decisions and end-to-end time, and checking local funding against observed demand, would tackle delay and local pressure without assuming any particular migration total is the goal.
Depends on: Appeals, legal advice and move-on housing are funded with casework, and funding comparisons show the councils that would lose as well as gain.
Our synthesisConfidence: Moderate
Source: University of Oxford Migration Observatory, The UK’s asylum backlog (Key points); National Audit Office, Lessons learned: a planning and spending framework that enables long-term value for money (HC 234, Session 2024-25) (Summary paragraph 11)
What government has committed to
Policy: In its Treasury Minute response to the Public Accounts Committee (2 Oct 2026), the government agreed to set out by December 2026 an end-to-end accountability framework for the asylum system, a system-wide data plan with indicators covering outcomes, quality and efficiency, and an assessment of capacity gaps across decisions, appeals, accommodation, returns and local authority impacts. Separately, the 2026-27 local government settlement is the first multi-year settlement in a decade, with funding moved to new needs-based shares over three years.
- Who and when:
- Burnham government (from 20 July 2026), 2 October 2026.
- Since 20 July 2026:
- Made by the current government. The Treasury Minute was presented on 2 Oct 2026. On the local funding side, MHCLG minister Jim McMahon on 15 Sep 2026 cited 'reforming the outdated local government funding system' as action taken; no change to the multi-year settlement found.
- Source:
- HM Treasury, Treasury Minutes for August 2026 (CP 1668): government response to PAC 'An analysis of the asylum system' (Accessible PDF https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/6abfbecac9bd185c481ec96c/E03677598_-_CP_1668_Treasury_Minutes_Web_Accessible.pdf, recs 1-6: paras 1.1-1.4 (end-to-end accountability framework, Dec 2026); 2.3 (risks incl. pressure moving between parts of system); 3.3-3.5 (system indicators covering outcomes, quality and efficiency); 4.1-4.6 (capacity gaps); 5.1-5.5 (long-term accommodation strategy); 6.3 (renegotiating asylum contracts by end of year); 6.8-6.10 (contract review; profit share, clawback; exit hotels by end of Parliament))
Checked 4 October 2026. A commitment is not delivery.
Options (4)
ShortlistedMatch local service funding to changing population needs
Publish an annual comparison of observed demand (schools, GPs, housing) against allocations in fast-changing areas, showing councils that lose as well as gain.
Who: MHCLG with DfE, DHSC and ONS · Evidence: Expert or audit recommendation · Status: Site-editorial action
Source: National Audit Office, Lessons learned: a planning and spending framework that enables long-term value for money (HC 234, Session 2024-25) (Summary paragraph 11)
Clear asylum cases without sacrificing decision quality
Judge casework on sound decisions and end-to-end time rather than initial-decision volumes.
Who: Home Office; MoJ · Evidence: Observational analysis · Status: Funded programme
Source: University of Oxford Migration Observatory, The UK’s asylum backlog (Appeals backlog section (80,000; legal aid fees raised Dec 2025); 'How productive are Home Office caseworkers?' (52% vs 76%; attrition 22% end-2025; retention bonuses; end of customer service standard 2019))
Publish end-to-end asylum indicators and capacity gaps
Government-agreed indicators and a shared capacity-gap evidence base let decisions, appeals and accommodation be planned together.
Who: Home Office (Asylum System Board) with MoJ, MHCLG and HM Treasury · Evidence: Expert or audit recommendation · Status: Announced proposal
Source: HM Treasury, Treasury Minutes for August 2026 (CP 1668): government response to PAC 'An analysis of the asylum system' (Accessible PDF https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/6abfbecac9bd185c481ec96c/E03677598_-_CP_1668_Treasury_Minutes_Web_Accessible.pdf, recs 1-6: paras 1.1-1.4 (end-to-end accountability framework, Dec 2026); 2.3 (risks incl. pressure moving between parts of system); 3.3-3.5 (system indicators covering outcomes, quality and efficiency); 4.1-4.6 (capacity gaps); 5.1-5.5 (long-term accommodation strategy); 6.3 (renegotiating asylum contracts by end of year); 6.8-6.10 (contract review; profit share, clawback; exit hotels by end of Parliament))
Keep the multi-year needs-based settlement
Three-year allocations using ONS population estimates and projections, phased in over three years with 95% income protection, move funding towards assessed need.
Who: MHCLG · Evidence: Modelled scenario · Status: Established
Source: MHCLG, Provisional local government finance settlement 2026 to 2027 (Section 1.3 (first multi-year Settlement in a decade, 2026-27 to 2028-29); 95% income protection paragraphs)
What could make it worse Threats
Backlogs can move rather than clear: appeals have built up as initial decisions rose, and ending hotel use depends on accommodation contracts whose estimated 10-year cost rose from £4.5bn to £15.3bn.
Risk, not a certaintyConfidence: Moderate
Source: University of Oxford Migration Observatory, The UK’s asylum backlog (“How large is the UK’s backlog of asylum appeals?”); National Audit Office, The Home Office’s asylum accommodation contracts (HC 874) (Paragraphs 4 and 8)
Options assessed against this point: Track asylum cases through appeals and safe move-on (Amber delivery RAG)
What government has committed to
Policy: The government told the Public Accounts Committee (2 Oct 2026) that it is renegotiating the asylum accommodation contracts with the Government Commercial Agency by the end of 2026, is using profit-share and clawback clauses and considering break clauses, will write by December 2026 with a long-term accommodation strategy under different demand scenarios, and will set out delivery risks including 'pressure moving between parts of the system'. Exiting hotels by the end of this Parliament remains the stated aim.
- Who and when:
- Burnham government (from 20 July 2026), 2 October 2026.
- Since 20 July 2026:
- Made by the current government. Related written answer (17 Sep 2026): further information on the contract review will go to the PAC by December 2026.
- Source:
- HM Treasury, Treasury Minutes for August 2026 (CP 1668): government response to PAC 'An analysis of the asylum system' (Accessible PDF https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/6abfbecac9bd185c481ec96c/E03677598_-_CP_1668_Treasury_Minutes_Web_Accessible.pdf, recs 1-6: paras 1.1-1.4 (end-to-end accountability framework, Dec 2026); 2.3 (risks incl. pressure moving between parts of system); 3.3-3.5 (system indicators covering outcomes, quality and efficiency); 4.1-4.6 (capacity gaps); 5.1-5.5 (long-term accommodation strategy); 6.3 (renegotiating asylum contracts by end of year); 6.8-6.10 (contract review; profit share, clawback; exit hotels by end of Parliament))
Checked 4 October 2026. A commitment is not delivery.
Options (4)
ShortlistedClear asylum cases without sacrificing decision quality
Plan appeals and move-on capacity alongside casework so backlogs do not just move stage.
Who: Home Office; MoJ; MHCLG · Evidence: Observational analysis · Status: Funded programme
Source: University of Oxford Migration Observatory, The UK’s asylum backlog (Appeals backlog section (80,000; legal aid fees raised Dec 2025); 'How productive are Home Office caseworkers?' (52% vs 76%; attrition 22% end-2025; retention bonuses; end of customer service standard 2019))
Renegotiate the asylum accommodation contracts
Renegotiated terms, profit-share reviews and clawback reduce the 10-year contract cost.
Who: Home Office; Government Commercial Agency · Evidence: Expert or audit recommendation · Status: Announced proposal
Source: HM Treasury, Treasury Minutes for August 2026 (CP 1668): government response to PAC 'An analysis of the asylum system' (Accessible PDF https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/6abfbecac9bd185c481ec96c/E03677598_-_CP_1668_Treasury_Minutes_Web_Accessible.pdf, recs 1-6: paras 1.1-1.4 (end-to-end accountability framework, Dec 2026); 2.3 (risks incl. pressure moving between parts of system); 3.3-3.5 (system indicators covering outcomes, quality and efficiency); 4.1-4.6 (capacity gaps); 5.1-5.5 (long-term accommodation strategy); 6.3 (renegotiating asylum contracts by end of year); 6.8-6.10 (contract review; profit share, clawback; exit hotels by end of Parliament))
Publish a long-term accommodation strategy under demand scenarios
A strategy showing the accommodation mix under different demand scenarios, developed with councils, reduces reliance on emergency hotel procurement.
Who: Home Office with councils and MHCLG · Evidence: Expert or audit recommendation · Status: Announced proposal
Source: HM Treasury, Treasury Minutes for August 2026 (CP 1668): government response to PAC 'An analysis of the asylum system' (Accessible PDF https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/6abfbecac9bd185c481ec96c/E03677598_-_CP_1668_Treasury_Minutes_Web_Accessible.pdf, recs 1-6: paras 1.1-1.4 (end-to-end accountability framework, Dec 2026); 2.3 (risks incl. pressure moving between parts of system); 3.3-3.5 (system indicators covering outcomes, quality and efficiency); 4.1-4.6 (capacity gaps); 5.1-5.5 (long-term accommodation strategy); 6.3 (renegotiating asylum contracts by end of year); 6.8-6.10 (contract review; profit share, clawback; exit hotels by end of Parliament))
Apply the 24-week statutory timeframe for supported appeals
Time limit on supported appeals stops the backlog building at the appeals stage for people in accommodation.
Who: HMCTS; judiciary · Evidence: Untested proposal · Status: Established
Source: legislation.gov.uk, Border Security, Asylum and Immigration Act 2025, section 49 (New s.86A NIAA 2002: 24-week timeframe for appeals by people in asylum accommodation; in force 12.8.2026 by S.I. 2026/766)
The actions worth examining
Our shortlist for this page. Research quality, policy status, cost and funding are judged separately; none of these is government policy unless its status says so.Our shortlist. None is government policy unless its status says so.
Action 1A14Policy status: funded programme
Clear asylum cases without sacrificing decision quality
Stable, trained casework teams with interpreters and legal advice make sound first decisions; appeals and move-on accommodation are planned alongside, so cases are resolved end to end rather than moved to the next queue.
The thread: issue, evidence, action
- Issue Weakness: Decision quality has fallen as output rose: only 52% of decisions met the Home Office’s own quality standards in 2023/24, down from 76% two years before. Also: weakness, threat, strength, strength
- Evidence People awaiting an initial asylum decision; Asylum appeals pending at the First-tier Tribunal
- Action A14, this action
Assessment (draft, 6 October review)
A new scope of this action (A14v2): Track asylum cases through appeals and safe move-on
Delivery RAG: AmberGate: pending
Range if completed: 13.0–19.0 out of 30 (equal weights; not yet assessed: expected incremental benefit (Bn), incremental affordability (Co))
- Who decides:
- Home Office (decisions and accommodation), Ministry of Justice and HM Courts & Tribunals Service (appeals), with councils for move-on (UK)
- Evidence:
- Observational analysis. Administrative data show the initial backlog falling as caseworker productivity rose, while audited decision quality fell and appeals built up; no evaluation tests a particular operating model.
- Expected effect:
- Direction plausible; size not established.
- Cost and funding
£200m in total, 2026–27 to 2027–28, price basis not stated by the source; 1 further cost line, some not yet costed
Funding: Programme funding exists; project allocation unconfirmed
Why it is shortlisted here: Waiting and hotel costs are the system’s most visible failures; the initial queue is falling, so the test now is decision quality and the appeals that follow.
What it takes
The problem
People wait months or years for asylum decisions, often in costly contingency accommodation; faster initial decisions have coincided with falling decision quality and a record build-up of appeals.
Who is affected, and where
People claiming asylum in the UK and awaiting an initial decision or appeal, and the councils and communities that accommodate them. Territory: UK. Asylum is reserved to Westminster and decided UK-wide; appeals are heard by the First-tier Tribunal (Immigration and Asylum Chamber) across the UK. Accommodation and move-on involve councils in all four nations.
Policy status
A funded programme already exists. Spending Review 2025 gives £200 million of transformation funding (£150m in 2026–27, £50m in 2027–28) to speed up the asylum system and end hotel use this Parliament, with more appeals capacity each year, and says asylum costs will fall by at least £1bn a year by 2028–29 compared with 2024–25 — a government expectation, not an independent estimate. Since the change of Prime Minister, the Burnham government has restated closing every asylum hotel this Parliament and set a 24-week First-tier Tribunal target for appeals by people on asylum support and non-detained foreign national offenders, from 12 August 2026 (Home Office, 14 August 2026). The proposal is to judge throughput and decision quality together and plan appeals and move-on capacity with them.
The evidence
- What the research found:
- The Migration Observatory finds the initial-decision backlog fell to about 49,000 at the end of 2025, 46% lower than a year before, after about 108,000 initial decisions in 2025; caseworkers averaged 13 decisions a quarter, twice the 2022 rate. But only 52% of decisions met the Home Office’s own quality standards in 2023/24, down from 76% two years before, and around 80,000 appeals were pending at the First-tier Tribunal at the end of 2025, a record.
- Evaluated on:
- All asylum applications and appeals in Home Office and tribunal statistics; United Kingdom, mainly 2022–2025
- Our recommendation (separate from the research):
- Track end-to-end time, quality-audit results and appeal outcomes together, fund tribunal and move-on capacity with casework, and count hotel savings only when contracts and occupancy costs actually fall.
- Strongest counter-evidence:
- Speed targets can lower quality, so cases return as appeals; savings depend on people leaving supported accommodation, which shifts demand to councils’ homelessness services; the NAO found contract costs far above the original estimate.
Effects on record
- Time to a final asylum outcome: Direction plausible; size not established. plausible spillover, limited confidence; United Kingdom. The fall in the initial backlog is observed, but no evaluation links a particular operating model to shorter end-to-end times.
- Appeals backlog: A cost or harm; size not established. plausible spillover, moderate confidence; United Kingdom. The appeals backlog reached a record as the initial backlog fell; the causal share of decision quality is not established.
- Homelessness demand on councils after protection is granted: A cost or harm; size not established. plausible spillover, limited confidence; United Kingdom. A cost shifted to councils is not a whole-system saving.
Cost and funding
Cost completeness: Published programme envelope; project costs still needed. Funding: Programme funding exists; project allocation unconfirmed.
- Spending Review 2025: reform of the asylum system (transformation funding) (recurring spending; paid by central government): £200m in total, 2026–27 to 2027–28, price basis not stated by the source. Transformation money, not the running cost of casework or tribunals. Asylum spending was about £4.8bn in 2024/25 (Migration Observatory) — context, not a cost of this action.
- Caseworkers, interpreters, legal aid, tribunal judges and move-on support, costed together (recurring spending; paid by central government, councils): Not yet costed. Hotel savings count only after contracts and occupancy costs fall, net of replacement accommodation and council costs.
- Spending Review 2025 asylum transformation funding: £200m, 2026–27 to 2027–28 — not committed (programme envelope, not a project award). The “at least £1bn a year” cost reduction by 2028–29 is a government expectation, not funding.
- Who pays:
- Home Office (casework, accommodation), Ministry of Justice (tribunals and legal aid), councils (homelessness services for people granted protection).
- Financing proposed:
- Spending Review transformation funding; hotel savings only once realised and net of replacement accommodation.
- Gap remaining:
- Unknown: casework, interpretation, legal aid, tribunal and move-on costs have not been costed together.
What delivery needs
- Skills:
- Trained decision-makers, interpreters, tribunal judges and legal advisers.
- Operational capacity:
- Tribunal hearing time; legal aid supply; council move-on support.
- Infrastructure:
- Case-management systems shared across the Home Office and tribunals.
- Permissions:
- None beyond existing powers.
- Law:
- No new law for the operating changes.
- Public consent:
- Local consent for accommodation; public confidence in fair decisions.
First step and stages
First step: Publish the stock and flow of cases by stage, the cases awaiting evidence and the avoidable delays, with quality-audit results. (owner: Home Office with HM Courts & Tribunals Service)
- Stabilise casework teams and quality assurance — Home Office (proposed stage, not an official timetable)
- Test throughput and appeal outcomes over successive cohorts — Home Office and HMCTS (proposed stage, not an official timetable)
- Plan move-on with councils as decisions rise — Home Office, MHCLG and councils (proposed stage, not an official timetable)
Depends on: Tribunal capacity; Housing for people granted protection (councils)
Trade-offs
- Who gains and who loses:
- Gains for claimants who wait less, and for taxpayers if hotel use ends; costs shift to councils as people granted protection need housing; refused claimants face removal.
- What else the money or effort could do:
- Caseworkers, judges and legal aid used here are not available for other immigration or justice work.
- Strongest counterargument:
- Faster decisions mostly move pressure to appeals, accommodation exits and councils unless those are funded too.
- Risks:
- Wrong refusals, more appeals, destitution at move-on and claiming savings before contracts change.
How we would judge it
- Baseline:
- People awaiting an initial asylum decision (Home Office Asy_00a); appeals pending (tribunal statistics).
- Leading indicator:
- Initial decisions per quarter and the share meeting quality standards.
- Outcome:
- End-to-end time to a final outcome, appeal overturn rates, cost per resolved case and people in hotels.
- Continue, adapt or stop:
- Continue where end-to-end times fall without a rise in overturned decisions; slow down where appeals grow faster than decisions.
Earlier option on this page
This card replaces the option “Faster, accurate asylum decisions and appeals” (funded: Spending Review 2025: £200m transformation funding; commitment to end asylum hotel use this Parliament.). Its evidence: Observed, not evaluated: as initial decisions rose, the number awaiting a first decision fell from 160,919 (end of 2022) to 40,168. Much of the pressure has moved to appeals, which are not in these figures. The 2025 Spending Review ties ending hotel use to clearing the backlog and increasing appeals capacity. Home Office, Immigration system statistics: asylum summary tables, year ending June 2026 · HM Treasury, Spending Review 2025 (June 2025)
Sources
- University of Oxford Migration Observatory, The UK’s asylum backlog, Key points; “How productive are Home Office caseworkers?”; “How large is the UK’s backlog of asylum appeals?” (2026-04-22; full text checked)
- HM Treasury, Spending Review 2025, Paragraphs 2.19–2.20; Table 1.2 (2025-06-11; relevant passages checked)
- University of Oxford Migration Observatory, The UK’s asylum backlog, “How large is the UK’s backlog of asylum appeals?” (2026-04-22; full text checked)
- National Audit Office, The Home Office’s asylum accommodation contracts (HC 874), Paragraphs 4 and 8 (2025-05-07; relevant passages checked)
Source published 22 April 2026 (Migration Observatory); 11 June 2025 (Spending Review); 7 May 2025 (NAO); evidence reviewed 2026-10-04. Reconsider if: New Home Office quality-audit results; Quarterly immigration statistics; Tribunal statistics on asylum appeals.
Action 2A15Policy status: site-editorial action
Match local service funding to changing population needs
Compare observed demand for schools, GP registration, housing and support with funding in fast-changing areas, publish the comparison each year, and adjust through the formula or a specific grant with gainers and losers shown.
The thread: issue, evidence, action
- Issue Opportunity: Judging asylum casework on sound decisions and end-to-end time, and checking local funding against observed demand, would tackle delay and local pressure without assuming any particular migration total is the goal.
- Evidence immigration.net; ons-uk-population
- Action A15, this action
Assessment (draft, 6 October review)
Not assessed in the 6 October review; this action stays in the topic plan with its own evidence.
- Who decides:
- MHCLG (local government finance settlement), DfE and DHSC/NHS England (school and health allocations) and the Home Office (asylum dispersal funding), with councils (England)
- Evidence:
- Expert or audit recommendation. The NAO recommends realistic, published plans and evaluation; no study estimates how better-matched allocations change local service outcomes.
- Expected effect:
- Direction plausible; size not established.
- Cost and funding
Not yet costed
Funding: Not yet costed / funding not identified
Why it is shortlisted here: Net migration (171,000 in the year to December 2025, provisional) is one total; what residents feel is local demand on schools, GPs and housing, which formulas track with a lag.
What it takes
The problem
Councils, schools and health services are funded by formulas built on population estimates and projections, which can lag rapid local change; local pressure is also often attributed to migration without evidence either way.
Who is affected, and where
Residents of English council areas with rapid population change, including areas receiving asylum seekers and new migrants. Territory: England. Local government finance is devolved; Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland set their own formulas. Not assessed.
Policy status
UK Facts proposal. The 2026–27 settlement is the first multi-year settlement in a decade (to 2028–29). Its new needs formula uses ONS mid-year estimates for the base year and the 2022-based subnational population projections for later years, with damping: funding moves to new shares in thirds, and councils losing most keep about 95% of 2025–26 income. The Home Office pays an Asylum Dispersal Grant (£1,200 per asylum seeker accommodated on 30 March 2026, then £100 a month for each additional occupied bed space). An annual test of allocations against observed demand is a UK Facts proposal.
The evidence
- What the research found:
- The NAO found a short-term, reactive spending framework and recommended publishing delivery plans at least annually and evaluating what is funded. MHCLG’s formula documents set out which population data feed allocations and how damping limits year-to-year change; they do not test allocations against observed service demand.
- Evaluated on:
- Not evaluated. The NAO reviewed central government’s planning and spending framework.; England (local government finance); UK central government (NAO)
- Our recommendation (separate from the research):
- Publish an annual comparison of population change, service demand and funding for fast-changing areas, and set out any adjustment with the councils that would lose.
- Strongest counter-evidence:
- Projections and migration estimates are revised, so faster updating can move money on noisy data; damping exists because reallocation within a fixed total creates losers; much local pressure comes from housing supply, ageing and funding decisions rather than migration.
Effects on record
- Access to local services in fast-changing areas: Direction plausible; size not established. plausible spillover, limited confidence; England. Losers elsewhere within a fixed settlement; no evaluation of the effect on services.
Cost and funding
Cost completeness: Not yet costed. Funding: Not yet costed / funding not identified.
- Annual demand-and-funding comparison for fast-changing areas (administration; paid by central government): Not yet costed. Analyst time in MHCLG, DfE, DHSC and the ONS.
- Any adjustment to allocations for fast-changing areas (recurring spending; paid by central government, councils): Not yet costed. Within a fixed settlement, gains for some councils are losses for others; new money would need a Treasury decision.
- Who pays:
- Central government for analysis; within a fixed settlement, councils whose share falls pay for those whose share rises; new money would need a decision by HM Treasury.
- Financing proposed:
- None identified. No general national reserve is assumed.
- Gap remaining:
- Unknown: depends on whether adjustments are made within the settlement or with new money.
What delivery needs
- Skills:
- Analysts linking population, service and funding data.
- Operational capacity:
- Timely local data on school places, GP registrations and housing demand.
- Infrastructure:
- Data sharing between departments and councils.
- Permissions:
- Lawful data-sharing agreements.
- Law:
- Formula changes need the annual settlement process; no new law.
- Public consent:
- Councils that would lose funding; residents’ trust in the data.
First step and stages
First step: Compare demand and existing funding in fast-growing and shrinking areas, involving local services and residents. (owner: MHCLG with councils and the ONS)
- Publish an annual demand-and-funding comparison — MHCLG with DfE and DHSC (proposed stage, not an official timetable)
- Agree an update and reconciliation rule — MHCLG and councils (proposed stage, not an official timetable)
- Apply at the next settlement, with gainers and losers shown — MHCLG; Parliament approves the settlement (proposed stage, not an official timetable)
Depends on: ONS population estimates and projections; The multi-year settlement’s annual confirmations
Trade-offs
- Who gains and who loses:
- Gains for fast-growing areas whose funding lags; losses for areas whose share falls unless new money is added.
- What else the money or effort could do:
- Analyst time and any new grant are not available for other local services.
- Strongest counterargument:
- Formulas already use the best available projections, and more frequent changes would make council budgets less stable.
- Risks:
- Data lags and revisions, wrongly attributing all pressure to migration, and instability in council budgets.
How we would judge it
- Baseline:
- Settlement funding per resident by council and ONS population change.
- Leading indicator:
- Published gap between observed demand and funding in fast-changing areas.
- Outcome:
- Waiting times, school capacity, temporary accommodation and service cost against need.
- Continue, adapt or stop:
- Keep the comparison if it changes allocations without destabilising budgets; drop adjustments that rest on data later revised away.
Sources
- National Audit Office, Lessons learned: a planning and spending framework that enables long-term value for money (HC 234, Session 2024-25), Summary paragraph 11, recommendations (a)–(b) (2024-10-27; relevant passages checked)
- MHCLG, Foundation Formula technical note (final local government finance settlement 2026–27), Section “Residents”; “Updates to input data” (2026-02-09; relevant passages checked)
- MHCLG, Provisional local government finance settlement 2026 to 2027, Paragraphs 1.3.1–1.3.3, 1.6.3 and 2.4.1 (2025-12-17; relevant passages checked)
- Home Office, Asylum Dispersal Grant: funding instruction 2026 to 2027, Schedule 1, paragraphs 1.2–1.3 (2026-03-31; relevant passages checked)
- MHCLG, The Fair Funding Review 2.0: government response, Paragraphs 9.3.12 and 9.8.12–9.8.13 (2025-11-20; relevant passages checked)
Source published 27 October 2024 (NAO); 20 November 2025, 17 December 2025 and 9 February 2026 (MHCLG); 30 March 2026 (Asylum Dispersal Grant); evidence reviewed 2026-10-04. Reconsider if: The 2027–28 settlement confirmation; New ONS population projections; Changes to asylum dispersal funding.
How the options are assessed
One shared record per option — the same one the national plan reads. Delivery RAG, gate and list membership are separate judgements.
Provisional single-reviewer assessments from the 6 October 2026 review; not approved business cases, and not government policy.
A14v2Delivery RAG: AmberGate: pending
Track asylum cases through appeals and safe move-on
A new scope of action A14 (A14v2); A14 itself is unchanged and nothing is inherited from it.
Provisional single-reviewer desk assessment, 6 October 2026.
- Who and where
- Improve a defined hand-off so an initial decision does not simply transfer the queue to tribunals or homelessness services. (from the 6 October review) Jurisdiction: not defined.
- Result so far
- Range if completed: 13.0–19.0 out of 30 (equal weights; not yet assessed: expected incremental benefit (Bn), incremental affordability (Co))
- Funded now (baseline)
- Funded baseline not yet stated
- The change assessed (marginal)
- Improve a defined hand-off so an initial decision does not simply transfer the queue to tribunals or homelessness services. (from the 6 October review)
- Domain home: Immigration
What the evidence supports—and the next decision
An initial asylum decision can transfer pressure to appeals, accommodation or homelessness services. A shorter first queue is not a whole-system outcome.
Codex — AI-assisted analytical follow-up · 8 October 2026. Proposed appraisal design; the attributed scores below are unchanged. No funding or delivery agreement is implied.
- Define the change
- Choose a hand-off between decision, appeal and safe move-on; specify legal support, accommodation responsibilities and existing provision.
- Test whether it works
- End-to-end time, correct decisions, appeals, accommodation duration and safe move-on; reconcile people, cases and appeals rather than summing them.
- Establish the cost
- Caseworkers, judges, legal support, accommodation and local services over the full pathway; include costs shifted between agencies.
- Protect against harm
- Protect due process and prevent homelessness; a new timetable is not evidence of delivered capacity.
Read with the outcome evidence and sources in the full assessment. Monitoring proposals are not existing baseline measurements. A numerical benefit or cost score needs evidence for the defined increment, not just the scale of the problem.
Full assessment of Track asylum cases through appeals and safe move-on: ten criteria, scenarios, delivery, costs and monitoring
The ten criteria (0–3)
Each criterion is scored 0 to 3 by the reviewer. “Not yet assessed” means unknown: it is never counted as zero.
Scale and severity (Sc)2 of 3 — Serious harm to a defined group or widespread moderate harm
Reviewer’s reason: Problem scale judged from the linked domain evidence; not a population estimate of those helped.
Increment beyond baseline (Ad)2 of 3 — Specific material change to existing delivery
Reviewer’s reason: Improve a defined hand-off so an initial decision does not simply transfer the queue to tribunals or homelessness services. This is a provisional marginal-change judgement, to confirm against commissioned delivery.
Confidence in the proposed action (Ev)1 of 3 — Indirect, mixed, modelled or weak causal support
Reviewer’s reason: Site distinguishes first-decision backlog from support caseload and flags quality trade-offs.
Expected incremental benefit (Bn)Not yet assessed
Reviewer’s reason: Unknown: no sufficiently supported magnitude for this exact change.
Residual harms (Hm)1 of 3 — Material harm/unresolved mitigation
Reviewer’s reason: Rushed decisions, hidden appeals backlog and demand transferred to private rentals.
Incremental affordability (Co)Not yet assessed
Reviewer’s reason: Unknown: the proposed increment has not been costed and matched to an approved affordable allocation in this review. Existing programme envelopes are not that allocation.
Delivery capacity (Ca)1 of 3 — Binding scarce resource
Reviewer’s reason: Specify the process change and unit costs; no banked hotel saving without alternative accommodation.
Distribution (Fa)2 of 3 — Mixed or broadly neutral with safeguards
Reviewer’s reason: Distribution assessed against the target group and the burdens described here: Rushed decisions, hidden appeals backlog and demand transferred to private rentals.
Meaningful first outcome (Ti)2 of 3 — More than one and up to three years
Reviewer’s reason: Timing judgement concerns the first meaningful outcome in: Whole-case time, quality upheld, suitable accommodation days and post-decision homelessness. It does not imply all long-term benefits arrive then.
Readiness (Rd)2 of 3 — Named commissioning/allocation/coordination step
Reviewer’s reason: Audit an end-to-end cohort and test one bottleneck with tribunal/council participation. Owner: Home Office, tribunal administration, councils and accommodation commissioners.
Four weightings
Normalised as 10 × weighted sum ÷ sum of weights, on a 0–30 scale. Where a criterion is not yet assessed, the range is the lowest and highest result if it were later scored 0 or 3 — not a score, a confidence interval or a rank.
- Equal weights: Range if completed: 13.0–19.0 out of 30. Not yet assessed: expected incremental benefit (Bn), incremental affordability (Co). Funding gate: not passed.
- Evidence doubled: Range if completed: 12.7–18.2 out of 30. Not yet assessed: expected incremental benefit (Bn), incremental affordability (Co). Funding gate: not passed.
- Scale doubled: Range if completed: 13.6–19.1 out of 30. Not yet assessed: expected incremental benefit (Bn), incremental affordability (Co). Funding gate: not passed.
- Cost ignored (the funding gate still applies): Range if completed: 14.4–17.8 out of 30. Not yet assessed: expected incremental benefit (Bn), incremental affordability (Co). Funding gate: not passed.
Funding gate: Not passed — the cost is not yet assessed or no allocation is committed for this scope. Ignoring cost in a weighting never removes the gate.
Delivery RAG and gate
Delivery RAG shown: AmberReview’s claim: Amber. Best the recorded evidence allows: Amber.
Review’s reason: Full incremental costing and allocation remain unverified. Specify the process change and unit costs; no banked hotel saving without alternative accommodation.
Why it is not Green yet
- Scope (population, place and increment) not verified against the delivery baseline.
- No verified owner with the powers in place.
- Delivery capacity not verified.
- Lifetime incremental costs not complete.
- No credible funding (a committed allocation for the scope).
- Safeguards not specified.
- Monitoring lacks a metric, a data source or a baseline.
Green needs verified scope, a verified owner with the powers, verified capacity, complete lifetime costs with credible funding, specified safeguards and monitoring with a metric, source and baseline. Amber means appraisal gaps remain; Red means a material delivery obstacle. Red does not mean unimportant.
Gate: Pending — appraisal incomplete (review label: “Pending scope, cost and funding appraisal”).
Why: Scores incomplete; Funding gate not passed (cost unknown or no credible funding).
The gate is separate from national list membership: being listed does not make an option eligible, and an eligible option need not be listed.
Cost and funding
Lifetime costing: Not established.
Still to cost: Full incremental costing and allocation remain unverified. Specify the process change and unit costs; no banked hotel saving without alternative accommodation.
Funding status: not established in review.
Owner, powers and capacity
Proposed owner: Home Office, tribunal administration, councils and accommodation commissioners. (proposed, unverified).
Powers: needs a decision or allocation. Capacity: binding constraint.
Powers and capacity read from the review’s Rd and Ca anchors; no proposed owner has agreed to act (the review: “Proposed owners have not agreed to act”).
- England:
- not assessed
- Scotland:
- not assessed
- Wales:
- not assessed
- Northern Ireland:
- not assessed
Not defined in the review.
Dependencies, safeguards and risks
Depends on: Specify the process change and unit costs; no banked hotel saving without alternative accommodation.
Safeguards
None specified yet.
Risks and residual harms: Rushed decisions, hidden appeals backlog and demand transferred to private rentals.
Monitoring and measured results
Metric: Whole-case time, quality upheld, suitable accommodation days and post-decision homelessness.
Data source: Not yet named. Baseline: Not yet established.
Measures already on the domain page
- People awaiting an initial asylum decision: latest 40,168 (end of June 2026); baseline 90,812 (end of June 2025) (United Kingdom).
- Asylum appeals pending at the First-tier Tribunal: latest about 80,000 (End of 2025); baseline not published (United Kingdom).
A page measure is not necessarily the review’s metric; linking the two is an editorial decision still to be made.
Evidence for the outcome
Outcome: Whole-case time, quality upheld, suitable accommodation days and post-decision homelessness.
Site distinguishes first-decision backlog from support caseload and flags quality trade-offs.
SWOT points it addresses
- Hotel use has fallen: 16,021 people in asylum hotels at the end of June 2026, against 45,753 at the end of 2022.
- Decision quality has fallen as output rose: only 52% of decisions met the Home Office’s own quality standards in 2023/24, down from 76% two years before.
- The queue has moved to appeals: around 80,000 asylum appeals were pending at the First-tier Tribunal at the end of 2025, a record.
- The initial-decision queue has shrunk: 40,168 people were awaiting a first asylum decision at the end of June 2026, against 160,919 at the end of 2022, after 115,872 initial decisions in the year to June 2026.
- Backlogs can move rather than clear: appeals have built up as initial decisions rose, and ending hotel use depends on accommodation contracts whose estimated 10-year cost rose from £4.5bn to £15.3bn.
Review record
Assessment version: working-review-2026-10-06 (A14v2@working-review-2026-10-06).
Reviewer: Author of the review blueprint (single reviewer, not named in uk-facts-complete-plan.json). Reviewed: 6 October 2026.
Carried from the earlier domain review (C record): must be calibrated jointly with the G/W/E/NG/NW/NE records before any combined comparison.
Decision route: Audit an end-to-end cohort and test one bottleneck with tribunal/council participation.
An editorial screening framework by one reviewer, not a formal appraisal or business case. Proposed owners have not agreed to act.
Decision brief
The leading option set out as a decision someone could take: who decides, who benefits, the best evidence, cost and funding, and the main trade-off. The full research record is one click away.
Decision briefExisting programmeReviewed 2026-10-04
Decide asylum claims soundly first time, and plan appeals and move-on housing with them — tested on one cohort before it is rolled out
The thread: issue, evidence, action
- Issue Weakness: Decision quality has fallen as output rose: only 52% of decisions met the Home Office’s own quality standards in 2023/24, down from 76% two years before. Also: weakness, threat, strength, strength
- Evidence People awaiting an initial asylum decision; Asylum appeals pending at the First-tier Tribunal
- Action Clear asylum cases without sacrificing decision quality
- Decision required
- The Home Office and the Ministry of Justice run a defined cohort of new asylum claims through an end-to-end pathway — legal advice before the main interview, a chance to comment on a draft refusal, audited decisions, reserved tribunal time and early notice to councils for people granted protection — and compare its time to a final outcome, overturned decisions and homelessness at move-on with the standard process.
- Who and where
- People making a new asylum claim in the UK who enter the pilot cohort, and the councils where those granted protection will look for housing. Applies in: UK.
- Accountable body
- Home Office (asylum casework and support) and Ministry of Justice (Legal Aid Agency; HM Courts & Tribunals Service), with MHCLG for move-on
- Intervention
- Give claimants legal advice before the main interview, let their representative answer a draft refusal, audit decisions, reserve tribunal time for the cohort’s appeals and tell councils at the date of decision.
- Best evidence, and where it applies
- Official statistics show the first-decision queue falling fast while audited quality fell to 52% and appeals reached a record 80,000. Switzerland’s 2019 procedure with free legal representation was evaluated as faster, with fewer decisions sent back by the court over time, but without a control group.Studied in: All asylum applications and appeals in UK official statistics (Mainly 2016–2025).How closely the comparison transfers to this decision: Switzerland (six federal asylum regions) — partial.
- Extra cost of this change
- Capital: none identified in the brief.Recurring: Caseworkers, interpreters, legal aid, tribunal judges and move-on support, costed together — Not yet costed; Spending Review 2025 asylum transformation funding (programme total, a possible route) — £200m in total, 2026–27 to 2027–28, price basis not stated by the source; Legal advice before the substantive interview — not yet established; Extra caseworker time for the draft-decision step and quality audit — not yet established; Reserved tribunal sitting days — not yet established; Move-on support and council prevention work from the date of decision — not yet established.One-off or mixed: Independent evaluation — not yet established.
- Funding
- Not funded yet: a possible funding route exists, but nothing is allocated to this change.Committed to this change: none.Possible source, not an award: Spending Review 2025 asylum transformation funding (£200m).Unfunded: Unknown: the pilot has not been costed, and the government’s expected saving of at least £1bn a year by 2028–29 is an expectation, not money available to spend.
- Savings and wider benefits
- Not yet specified: no cashable saving or avoided cost has been costed for this change. Expected outcomes are listed one by one in the research appendix and are never added together or counted as money available.
- First 90-day step
- Publish the cohort protocol and a baseline: cases by stage, time to final outcome, quality-audit results, appeal overturns and move-on outcomes for the comparison cohort.The proposed first milestone; a 90-day date is not yet specified. Owner: Home Office with HM Courts & Tribunals Service and the Legal Aid Agency. Proposed by UK Facts, not an official deadline.
- Twelve-month milestone
- Not yet specified.Time to a first useful result: Quality-audit results and first-decision times within months; appeal outcomes need about a year, given current tribunal waits.
- Outcome, and when to scale or stop
- Measure: Share of cohort decisions meeting quality standards, and the share of intended refusals changed after the draft-decision step.Scale if: End-to-end time and appeal overturns both fall against the comparison without a rise in homelessness at move-on, at a cost per resolved case the protocol judged acceptable.Stop if: Overturns and end-to-end time do not improve against the comparison, or the cohort’s gains come only by drawing legal-aid and tribunal capacity from other claimants.
- Main trade-off
- Legal advice, quality checks and the draft-decision step take caseworker and lawyer time, so each first decision is slower and dearer; the bet is that fewer appeals and hotel nights more than repay it, which has not been shown in the UK.
- Source and review date
- The UK’s asylum backlog (22 April 2026); The Home Office’s asylum accommodation contracts (HC 874) (7 May 2025). Reviewed 2026-10-04.
An editorial proposal by UK Facts for discussion, not government policy. Records: A14 · effects E-A14-WAIT, E-A14-APPEALS, E-A14-MOVEON · costs C-A14-CASEWORK, C-SR25-ASYLUM-REFORM
Research appendix: study design, effect sizes and limits, alternatives, full costing, international comparisons and how we would know
1.The change, in plain words
Decide asylum claims soundly first time, and plan appeals and move-on housing with them — tested on one cohort before it is rolled out
2.The decision requested
- Decision
- Agree a joint Home Office–Ministry of Justice pilot for one intake cohort of new claims, with a published protocol: front-loaded legal advice, a draft-decision comment step for intended refusals, quality audit of every caseworker’s decisions, tribunal listing reserved for the cohort’s appeals, and a council notification at the date of decision; and judge it on end-to-end time, overturned decisions, hotel nights and homelessness at move-on before any roll-out.
- Accountable institution
- Home Office (asylum casework and support) and Ministry of Justice (Legal Aid Agency; HM Courts & Tribunals Service), with MHCLG for move-on
- Geography
- UK
- Powers
- Existing powers for the operating changes: Home Office casework and asylum support powers; legal aid for asylum advice; tribunal listing by HMCTS and the judiciary. Lengthening the 28-day move-on period would need an amendment to the Asylum Support Regulations 2000 (secondary legislation), so the pilot uses earlier notification within the current period. Funding through the Spending Review 2025 asylum transformation money.
- Delivery partners
- Home Office asylum casework and asylum support teams; Legal Aid Agency and legal aid providers of asylum advice; HM Courts & Tribunals Service and the First-tier Tribunal (Immigration and Asylum Chamber); Councils receiving the cohort, through MHCLG, and accommodation providers; UNHCR (quality monitoring) and an independent evaluator
3.Who it is for, and what changes beyond today
- Target population
- People making a new asylum claim in the UK who enter the pilot cohort, and the councils where those granted protection will look for housing.
- Eligibility
- Adults (and their dependants) claiming asylum in the chosen intake period or region; unaccompanied children, detained cases and claims handled under separate removal powers are excluded from the first cohort.
- Scale
- Set in the protocol from casework, legal-aid and tribunal capacity in the chosen region and a power calculation — large enough to compare appeal overturns and move-on outcomes with a matched cohort, not a national number.
- Baseline
- 40,168 people were awaiting an initial asylum decision at the end of June 2026 (against 160,919 at the end of 2022), and 16,021 were in asylum hotels. But only 52% of decisions met the Home Office’s own quality standards in 2023/24 (76% two years earlier); around 80,000 appeals were waiting at the First-tier Tribunal at the end of 2025, a record; and 39% of appeals decided on substance in 2025 overturned the Home Office. At move-on, of 16,340 households who entered council homelessness services in England in 2023–24 because they had to leave asylum accommodation, 73.4% were already homeless when assessed.
Source: Home Office, Immigration system statistics: asylum summary tables, year ending June 2026 (Asylum summary tables (Asy_00a; accommodation type)); University of Oxford Migration Observatory, The UK’s asylum backlog (Key points; “How large is the UK’s backlog of asylum appeals?”; “How many asylum appeals are submitted and decided in the courts?”; “How productive are Home Office caseworkers?”); MHCLG, Statutory homelessness in England: financial year 2024-25 (Section 10.4)
- Change beyond existing law or funding
- Already funded: £200m of Spending Review 2025 transformation money (£150m in 2026–27, £50m in 2027–28) to clear the backlog, increase appeals capacity and end hotel use; about 2,000 caseworkers; higher legal aid fees for asylum from December 2025; plans for a new appeals body. Not in place: a test of whether investing at the front end — advice, a draft-decision step, audit — reduces appeals and end-to-end time, a joint Home Office–tribunal measure of time to a final outcome, and move-on planned from the day of decision rather than after it.
4.How it would work
Do: Give claimants legal advice before the main interview, let their representative answer a draft refusal, audit decisions, reserve tribunal time for the cohort’s appeals and tell councils at the date of decision Changing: fewer weak refusals reaching the tribunal, faster final outcomes and earlier housing plans for people granted protection
Time from claim to final outcome (including any appeal)
Hypothesis to testEffect record E-A14-WAIT
The fall in the first-decision queue is observed, but no evaluation links a particular operating model to shorter end-to-end times.
Appeals lodged and decisions overturned on appeal
Hypothesis to testEffect record E-A14-APPEALS
Today faster, lower-quality decisions appear to feed the appeals backlog; whether front-loaded advice and review reduce overturns in the UK is untested. In Switzerland court remittals fell over the first two years, without a control group.
Homelessness among people granted protection at move-on
Hypothesis to testEffect record E-A14-MOVEON
Most households leaving asylum accommodation reach councils already homeless; earlier notification may allow prevention work. A cost moved to councils is not a saving.
Hotel nights and cost per resolved case
Hypothesis to test
Savings count only when contracts and occupancy costs actually fall, net of replacement accommodation and council costs.
Share of decisions meeting quality standards
Hypothesis to test
A leading indicator the pilot would publish; audit standards must be the same in the pilot and comparison cohorts.
Outcomes are kept separate and never added into one impact figure.
5.Best evidence
- Author or institution:
- Migration Observatory, University of Oxford
- Published:
- 22 April 2026
- Evaluation period:
- Mainly 2016–2025
- Design:
- Analysis of Home Office and tribunal statistics
- Sample or population:
- All asylum applications and appeals in UK official statistics
- Effect and uncertainty:
- Not an effect estimate. First-decision backlog about 49,000 at the end of 2025, 46% lower than a year earlier; caseworkers averaged 13 decisions a quarter in 2025, twice the 2022 rate; only 52% of decisions met quality standards in 2023/24 (76% two years earlier); about 80,000 appeals pending; 63,000 appeals lodged in 2025 against 26,000 decided; 39% of substantive appeal decisions overturned the Home Office.
- Limits:
- Descriptive; the causal share of decision quality in appeal growth is not established; caseworker attrition (22% at the end of 2025) and 12–18 months to full productivity complicate comparisons.
Where: Key points; sections on appeals, caseworker productivity and spending. Affiliation is provenance, not proof of quality.
The Home Office’s asylum accommodation contracts (HC 874)
- Author or institution:
- National Audit Office
- Published:
- 7 May 2025
- Evaluation period:
- 2019 to early 2025
- Design:
- Value-for-money audit of the asylum accommodation contracts
- Sample or population:
- Home Office asylum accommodation contracts
- Effect and uncertainty:
- Hotels held about 35% of people in asylum accommodation but about 76% of contract cost (£1.3bn of an estimated £1.7bn in the first seven months of 2024–25); estimated 10-year contract cost up from £4.5bn to £15.3bn.
- Limits:
- Audits costs, not the effect of casework changes on them.
Where: Summary paragraphs 4 and 8. Affiliation is provenance, not proof of quality.
Statutory homelessness in England: financial year 2024-25
- Author or institution:
- MHCLG (official statistics)
- Published:
- 27 November 2025
- Evaluation period:
- Households entering services in 2023–24, followed to March 2025
- Design:
- Administrative statistics on council homelessness duties
- Sample or population:
- 16,340 households in England homeless or threatened because they had to leave asylum accommodation
- Effect and uncertainty:
- 73.4% were already homeless when assessed (26.6% reached the council while still threatened); 20.2% were still homeless and owed no main duty after relief, against 9.9% of all households.
- Limits:
- England only; counts households who approached councils, not everyone leaving support.
Where: Section 10.4 (flows for households leaving asylum accommodation). Affiliation is provenance, not proof of quality.
Evaluation PERU: Rechtsschutz und Entscheidqualität, Schlussbericht
- Author or institution:
- Swiss Center of Expertise in Human Rights (University of Bern), commissioned by the State Secretariat for Migration
- Published:
- 16 August 2021
- Evaluation period:
- March 2019 to early 2021
- Design:
- Appeal statistics, review of 120 case files and interviews; no control group
- Sample or population:
- Claims in Switzerland’s new accelerated procedure
- Effect and uncertainty:
- Remittals of appealed accelerated decisions fell from about 18–19% to about 10–11% during 2020; about 40 of 120 files had significant quality findings, often linked to time pressure.
- Limits:
- Commissioned by the body evaluated; small file sample; low claim numbers and COVID-19.
Where: Zusammenfassung, pp. VII–X. Affiliation is provenance, not proof of quality.
6.Alternatives, counter-evidence and who loses
- Closest feasible alternative
- Keep the current speed-first approach with more caseworkers and productivity targets, and add tribunal capacity and the planned new appeals body to absorb the appeals.
- Strongest counter-evidence
- Front-loaded advice and review add time and cost to every claim, and Switzerland’s evaluators found that strict deadlines themselves pushed caseworkers into shortcuts; Switzerland also had far fewer claims. Refusals rose 79% in 2025 partly because the grant rate fell, so appeal volumes depend on who claims, not only on decision quality.
Source: Swiss Center of Expertise in Human Rights (SKMR), for the State Secretariat for Migration, Evaluation PERU: Rechtsschutz und Entscheidqualität, Schlussbericht (Zusammenfassung p. VIII); University of Oxford Migration Observatory, The UK’s asylum backlog (“How large is the UK’s backlog of asylum appeals?”)
- Distributional effects
- Gains for claimants in the cohort, who wait less and face fewer wrong refusals, and for communities hosting hotels if hotel use ends; costs move to councils as more people are granted protection and need housing; refused claimants reach removal decisions sooner. Claimants outside the cohort wait as now during the pilot.
- Main downside
- Legal-aid lawyers, interpreters and tribunal judges are scarce, so a well-resourced cohort could draw them away from other claimants.
| Option | Who is reached | Evidence | Likely outcome and timing | Cost and funding | Main trade-off |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| The proposalEnd-to-end cohort pilot: early legal advice, draft-decision step, audit, reserved tribunal time and early council notice (this brief) | Claimants in one intake cohort and the councils they move to | UK statistics show the problem; Swiss evaluation suggests feasibility, without a control group | Quality data in months; appeal and move-on outcomes after about a year | Not costed; Spending Review transformation money is a route; nothing allocated | Slower, dearer first decisions; draws scarce lawyers and judges |
| Current policyCurrent policy: more caseworkers and productivity, more appeals capacity, a planned new appeals body, ending hotels | All claimants | First-decision queue fell sharply; quality fell and appeals reached a record | Initial backlog keeps falling; appeals pressure persists until the tribunal catches up | £200m transformation funding in 2026–27 and 2027–28 | Moves the queue from decisions to appeals and from hotels to councils |
| AlternativeLengthen the move-on period from 28 days to match councils’ 56-day homelessness prevention window | People granted protection leaving asylum support | Not evaluated here; most households currently reach councils already homeless | Quick to implement by amending regulations | Extra support and accommodation nights for the Home Office; not costed | Longer stays in asylum accommodation, including hotels, while it lasts |
| AlternativeSpeed first: individual caseworker targets, simplified procedures and prioritised nationalities | Claimants in simplified or prioritised groups | Used from 2023; caseworker productivity recovered but audited quality fell | Fast effect on the initial queue | Within existing budgets | Risk of more wrong decisions and appeals |
The options compared, including current policy
The proposal
End-to-end cohort pilot: early legal advice, draft-decision step, audit, reserved tribunal time and early council notice (this brief)
- Who is reached
- Claimants in one intake cohort and the councils they move to
- Evidence
- UK statistics show the problem; Swiss evaluation suggests feasibility, without a control group
- Likely outcome and timing
- Quality data in months; appeal and move-on outcomes after about a year
- Cost and funding
- Not costed; Spending Review transformation money is a route; nothing allocated
- Main trade-off
- Slower, dearer first decisions; draws scarce lawyers and judges
Current policy
Current policy: more caseworkers and productivity, more appeals capacity, a planned new appeals body, ending hotels
- Who is reached
- All claimants
- Evidence
- First-decision queue fell sharply; quality fell and appeals reached a record
- Likely outcome and timing
- Initial backlog keeps falling; appeals pressure persists until the tribunal catches up
- Cost and funding
- £200m transformation funding in 2026–27 and 2027–28
- Main trade-off
- Moves the queue from decisions to appeals and from hotels to councils
Alternative
Lengthen the move-on period from 28 days to match councils’ 56-day homelessness prevention window
- Who is reached
- People granted protection leaving asylum support
- Evidence
- Not evaluated here; most households currently reach councils already homeless
- Likely outcome and timing
- Quick to implement by amending regulations
- Cost and funding
- Extra support and accommodation nights for the Home Office; not costed
- Main trade-off
- Longer stays in asylum accommodation, including hotels, while it lasts
Alternative
Speed first: individual caseworker targets, simplified procedures and prioritised nationalities
- Who is reached
- Claimants in simplified or prioritised groups
- Evidence
- Used from 2023; caseworker productivity recovered but audited quality fell
- Likely outcome and timing
- Fast effect on the initial queue
- Cost and funding
- Within existing budgets
- Main trade-off
- Risk of more wrong decisions and appeals
7.What other countries or the devolved nations show
Country lesson · Switzerland (six federal asylum regions), From 1 March 2019; evaluated over the first two years (to early 2021)
Switzerland’s faster asylum procedure with free legal representation
Evidence: Observational analysisPartial match: some conditions differ
- What was changed
- A revised Asylum Act moved most claims into federal asylum centres where caseworkers, interpreters, carers and a state-funded legal representative assigned to each claimant work in one place, under strict deadlines: an accelerated procedure for clear cases and an extended one for complex cases. The representative can comment on a draft decision before it is issued, and appeal deadlines are short (5 or 7 working days).
- Study design and population
- Two external evaluations commissioned by the State Secretariat for Migration (SEM): process quality (case-processing data and interviews) and decision quality and legal protection (official appeal statistics, review of 120 case files, interviews in all six regions). Before-and-after comparison with the old procedure; no control group. People claiming asylum in Switzerland, March 2019 to early 2021 — a period of relatively few claims (about 1,000 to 1,300 a month before COVID-19).
- Measured outcome there
- Procedures were much shorter than under the old system: the preparation phase averaged 37 days for 2020 claims, and 32% of cases went through the accelerated procedure against 8% handled with priority before. The share of appealed accelerated-procedure decisions sent back by the Federal Administrative Court for fresh examination fell from about 18–19% to about 10–11% during 2020. In the file review about half of 120 cases showed no problems, while about 40 had significant findings, often linked to time pressure.
- Cost status
- Not reported in the evaluations read; legal representation and the federal centres are paid by the Swiss federal government.
- What failed or remains uncertain
- Statutory deadlines for the preparation phase were missed in every region; evaluators found an “expectation pressure” to decide as many cases as possible in the accelerated procedure, weak use of the draft-decision comment step in some regions and inconsistent internal quality control. The evaluators stress their 120-file sample is not a statistical verdict, the first year had low claim numbers, and COVID-19 disrupted the second. The court’s early remittal rate was a warning sign that the fall partly reflects correction after criticism.
- Why the UK differs
- Switzerland handles far fewer claims than the UK, legal representation is built into each centre by statute, and its appeal court and cantonal accommodation system differ. UK legal aid supply is short and the tribunal backlog is at a record.
- First change required here
- Test, for a defined cohort, legal advice before the substantive interview and a chance to comment on a draft refusal, measuring appeal overturns and end-to-end time against a comparison cohort.
Not a UK forecast: the effect above was measured in that place and population. Source: Swiss Center of Expertise in Human Rights (SKMR), for the State Secretariat for Migration, Evaluation PERU: Rechtsschutz und Entscheidqualität, Schlussbericht (Zusammenfassung, pp. VII–X; chapter II.5–6); Egger, Dreher & Partner AG and Ecoplan AG, for the State Secretariat for Migration, Evaluation PERU: Teilprojekt Prozessqualität, Schlussbericht (Kurzfassung, pp. 1–3; section 3.1.5). Reviewed 2026-10-04.
8.What delivery needs first
- staff — Legal-aid asylum advisers able to see the cohort before the substantive interview. (Scarce resource shared with other priorities; owner: Legal Aid Agency and legal aid providers)
- staff — Experienced caseworkers retained through the pilot (attrition was 22% at the end of 2025, and new caseworkers take 12–18 months to reach full productivity). (Scarce resource shared with other priorities; owner: Home Office)
- dependency — Tribunal hearing time reserved for the cohort’s appeals. (Scarce resource shared with other priorities; owner: HM Courts & Tribunals Service and the judiciary)
- data — Linked Home Office and tribunal case records so time to a final outcome can be measured per claim. (Requirement; owner: Home Office with HMCTS)
- dependency — Councils able to act on early notification with housing and advice for people granted protection. (Scarce resource shared with other priorities; owner: Councils with MHCLG)
- law — No new law for the pilot; extending the 28-day move-on period would need amending regulations. (Requirement; owner: Home Office)
9.What it would cost
How the cost is built up: Cost per resolved case = (legal advice + caseworker time including draft-decision step and audit + interpreters + tribunal sitting days + accommodation nights to final outcome + move-on support) ÷ cases reaching a final outcome; compared with the standard process. Hotel savings count only when contract costs fall, net of replacement accommodation and council costs.
| Component | Unit and quantity | Unit cost or amount | Type, price year, period | Status |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Caseworkers, interpreters, legal aid, tribunal judges and move-on support, costed togetherEnd-to-end resolution of asylum cases | per year; quantity to be set from need and capacity | Not yet costed (ledger C-A14-CASEWORK) | recurring; price year not stated; Each year | Not yet establishedRead from the ledger record, which has no amount. Source: University of Oxford Migration Observatory, The UK’s asylum backlog (“How much does the UK spend on its asylum system?”) |
| Spending Review 2025 asylum transformation funding (programme total, a possible route)UK asylum system transformation, including ending hotel use | programme; quantity to be set from need and capacity | £200m in total, 2026–27 to 2027–28, price basis not stated by the source (ledger C-SR25-ASYLUM-REFORM) | recurring; price year not stated; 2026–27 to 2027–28 | Historic costTransformation money, not the running cost of casework or tribunals. Source: HM Treasury, Spending Review 2025 (Paragraph 2.19; Table 1.2) |
| Legal advice before the substantive interviewEach claimant in the cohort | per claim; quantity to be set from need and capacity | Not yet established | recurring; price year not stated; Pilot period | Not yet established |
| Extra caseworker time for the draft-decision step and quality auditIntended refusals and audited decisions in the cohort | per decision; quantity to be set from need and capacity | Not yet established | recurring; price year not stated; Pilot period | Not yet established |
| Reserved tribunal sitting daysAppeals from the cohort | per sitting day; quantity to be set from need and capacity | Not yet established | recurring; price year not stated; Pilot period | Not yet established |
| Move-on support and council prevention work from the date of decisionHouseholds granted protection in the cohort | per household; quantity to be set from need and capacity | Not yet established | recurring; price year not stated; Pilot period | Not yet established |
| Independent evaluationPilot and comparison cohorts | per evaluation; quantity to be set from need and capacity | Not yet established | one-off revenue; price year not stated; Pilot plus follow-up to final outcomes | Not yet established |
Caseworkers, interpreters, legal aid, tribunal judges and move-on support, costed together
End-to-end resolution of asylum cases
Not yet costed (ledger C-A14-CASEWORK)
recurring; price year not stated; Each year; Not yet established
Read from the ledger record, which has no amount.
Source: University of Oxford Migration Observatory, The UK’s asylum backlog (“How much does the UK spend on its asylum system?”)
Spending Review 2025 asylum transformation funding (programme total, a possible route)
UK asylum system transformation, including ending hotel use
£200m in total, 2026–27 to 2027–28, price basis not stated by the source (ledger C-SR25-ASYLUM-REFORM)
recurring; price year not stated; 2026–27 to 2027–28; Historic cost
Transformation money, not the running cost of casework or tribunals.
Source: HM Treasury, Spending Review 2025 (Paragraph 2.19; Table 1.2)
Legal advice before the substantive interview
Each claimant in the cohort
Not yet established per claim
recurring; price year not stated; Pilot period; Not yet established
Extra caseworker time for the draft-decision step and quality audit
Intended refusals and audited decisions in the cohort
Not yet established per decision
recurring; price year not stated; Pilot period; Not yet established
Reserved tribunal sitting days
Appeals from the cohort
Not yet established per sitting day
recurring; price year not stated; Pilot period; Not yet established
Move-on support and council prevention work from the date of decision
Households granted protection in the cohort
Not yet established per household
recurring; price year not stated; Pilot period; Not yet established
Independent evaluation
Pilot and comparison cohorts
Not yet established per evaluation
one-off revenue; price year not stated; Pilot plus follow-up to final outcomes; Not yet established
10.Who pays, and what is missing
- Programme envelope (a possible route, not an award)
- Spending Review 2025 asylum transformation funding: £200m, 2026–27 to 2027–28
- Allocation committed to this change
- None
- Remaining gap
- Unknown: the pilot has not been costed, and the government’s expected saving of at least £1bn a year by 2028–29 is an expectation, not money available to spend.
- Proposed financing
- Spending Review 2025 asylum transformation funding (£200m: £150m in 2026–27, £50m in 2027–28) for the Home Office share; legal aid and tribunal costs from Ministry of Justice budgets; council move-on work from council homelessness budgets. Nothing is allocated to this pilot.
- Responsible payer
- central government, councils
- Budget displaced
- Transformation money not spent on other backlog measures; legal-aid and tribunal capacity not available to claimants outside the cohort.
11.First milestone and time to a useful result
Publish the cohort protocol and a baseline: cases by stage, time to final outcome, quality-audit results, appeal overturns and move-on outcomes for the comparison cohort. (Owner: Home Office with HM Courts & Tribunals Service and the Legal Aid Agency. Proposed by UK Facts, not an official deadline.)
Time to first useful result: Quality-audit results and first-decision times within months; appeal outcomes need about a year, given current tribunal waits.
What could delay it: Legal-aid providers have capacity to advise the cohort early The tribunal can reserve listing time while the backlog is at a record Linked Home Office and tribunal data exist per claim Changes to the appeals system (the planned new body) do not alter the comparison mid-pilot
12.How we would know
- Baseline
- For the comparison cohort: time from claim to first decision and to final outcome, share of decisions passing quality audit, appeals lodged and overturned, nights in hotel and other accommodation, and homelessness duties owed at move-on.
- Comparison
- A matched cohort of claims from the same intake period handled through the standard process (or a phased start across regions), with the same audit standards and case definitions.
- Leading indicator
- Share of cohort decisions meeting quality standards, and the share of intended refusals changed after the draft-decision step.
- Follow-up
- At 6, 12 and 24 months: time to final outcome, appeal overturns and withdrawals, accommodation nights and cost per resolved case, homelessness at move-on, and removals of refused claimants.
- Continue if
- End-to-end time and appeal overturns both fall against the comparison without a rise in homelessness at move-on, at a cost per resolved case the protocol judged acceptable.
- Adapt if
- First decisions improve but end-to-end time does not, because appeals or move-on are the constraint: shift resources to those stages before expanding.
- Stop if
- Overturns and end-to-end time do not improve against the comparison, or the cohort’s gains come only by drawing legal-aid and tribunal capacity from other claimants.
- Thresholds
- Not yet set: Success and stop levels need the comparison cohort’s baseline and a power calculation set out in the published protocol; none exists yet.
What is not yet known, and how to find out
- What would front-loaded advice, the draft-decision step and reserved tribunal time cost per resolved case? (cost)Next step: Cost the protocol for one cohort, with the standard process priced the same way.Scope: One intake cohort from claim to final outcome, including move-on · Data or quotes needed: Legal aid fees per claim, caseworker hours per decision, tribunal sitting-day costs, accommodation cost per night by type, council prevention costs · Who can estimate it: Home Office and Ministry of Justice analysts, with MHCLG and the Local Government Association
- Do front-loaded advice and review reduce appeals and end-to-end time in the UK? (effect)Next step: Run the bounded cohort pilot with a matched comparison and pre-registered outcomes.Defensible route: bounded pilot
- How much of today’s appeal growth comes from decision quality rather than a lower grant rate and more refusals? (effect)Next step: Analyse appeal outcomes by audit result and nationality using existing Home Office and tribunal data.Defensible route: evaluation of existing delivery
- Would lengthening the move-on period reduce homelessness enough to justify extra accommodation nights? (legal)Next step: Compare move-on outcomes in the pilot with early notification against the current 28-day period before changing the regulations.
Sources last checked 4 October 2026 · Owner: Evidence editor (James Harris) · Next check: Home Office immigration system statistics, year ending September 2026 (26 November 2026) or the first trigger: A change to asylum appeals, accommodation contracts or move-on policy.
What it would take
The order things have to happen in
First, the prerequisite
Publish cases by stage, avoidable delays and quality-audit results
Owner: Home Office with HM Courts & Tribunals Service
No date: the timing depends on the steps before it.
Then, the decision
Fund tribunal, legal-aid and move-on capacity alongside casework
Owner: Home Office, Ministry of Justice and MHCLG
No date: the timing depends on the steps before it.
Then, delivery
Publish an annual demand-and-funding comparison for fast-changing areas
Owner: MHCLG with DfE, DHSC and the ONS
No date: the timing depends on the steps before it.
Finally, the measured outcome
Shorter time to a final outcome without more overturned decisions; fewer people in hotels
Owner: Home Office and tribunal statistics
No date: the timing depends on the steps before it.
Who pays, and what is still missing
Cost, committed funding and the remaining gap for the same scope and years. A programme envelope is not an award to a project; a proposal is not committed money. No total is shown because these costs are on different bases or periods and cannot be added.
Cost and funding ledger
Spending Review 2025: reform of the asylum system (transformation funding)
A14 · recurring spending · published programme envelope
- Amount
- £200m in total, 2026–27 to 2027–28, price basis not stated by the source
- Who pays
- central government
- Committed
- None identified
- Proposed, not committed
- £200m (Spending Review 2025 asylum transformation funding)
- Gap
- Not established
Caseworkers, interpreters, legal aid, tribunal judges and move-on support, costed together
A14 · recurring spending · not costed
- Amount
- Not yet costed
- Who pays
- central government, councils
- Committed
- None identified
- Proposed, not committed
- —
- Gap
- Not established
Annual demand-and-funding comparison for fast-changing areas
A15 · administration · not costed
- Amount
- Not yet costed
- Who pays
- central government
- Committed
- None identified
- Proposed, not committed
- —
- Gap
- Not established
Any adjustment to allocations for fast-changing areas
A15 · recurring spending · not costed
- Amount
- Not yet costed
- Who pays
- central government, councils
- Committed
- None identified
- Proposed, not committed
- —
- Gap
- Not established
“Not yet costed” means no defensible cost has been found — not that the action is free. Lifetime benefits, benefit-cost ratios and forecast savings are never shown here as money available to spend.
Effects on record, with evidence ratings (4 records)
What the evidence says each action changes
| Action | Outcome and area | Effect | Compared with | Evidence |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Clear asylum cases without sacrificing decision quality | Time to a final asylum outcome Migration and asylum | Direction plausible; size not established | — | plausible spillover; limited confidence; United KingdomThe fall in the initial backlog is observed, but no evaluation links a particular operating model to shorter end-to-end times. |
| Clear asylum cases without sacrificing decision quality | Appeals backlog Migration and asylum · harm | Size not established | — | plausible spillover; moderate confidence; United KingdomThe appeals backlog reached a record as the initial backlog fell; the causal share of decision quality is not established. |
| Clear asylum cases without sacrificing decision quality | Homelessness demand on councils after protection is granted Housing · harm | Size not established | — | plausible spillover; limited confidence; United KingdomA cost shifted to councils is not a whole-system saving. |
| Match local service funding to changing population needs | Access to local services in fast-changing areas Public service delivery | Direction plausible; size not established | — | plausible spillover; limited confidence; EnglandLosers elsewhere within a fixed settlement; no evaluation of the effect on services. |
How we would know
The outcome measures to watch. A baseline is where we start, not a target; where there is no official target we say so.
People awaiting an initial asylum decision
people · United Kingdom
- Baseline
- 90,812
- end of June 2025
- Latest
- 40,168
- end of June 2026
Target: none — no published target for the initial-decision queue.
Source: Home Office, Immigration system statistics: asylum summary tables, year ending June 2026 (Asylum summary tables). Next release: quarterly immigration statistics (check the release calendar).
People in asylum hotels
people · United Kingdom
- Baseline
- 32,041
- end of June 2025
- Latest
- 16,021
- end of June 2026
Official target: close every asylum hotel by the end of this Parliament: a Spending Review 2025 commitment, restated by the Burnham government on 14 August 2026.
Source: Home Office, Immigration system statistics: asylum summary tables, year ending June 2026 (Asylum summary tables). Next release: quarterly immigration statistics (check the release calendar).
Asylum appeals pending at the First-tier Tribunal
appeals · United Kingdom
- Baseline
- Not published
- Latest
- about 80,000
- End of 2025
Target: none — no published target; the Spending Review promises more appeals capacity each year.
Source: University of Oxford Migration Observatory, The UK’s asylum backlog (“How large is the UK’s backlog of asylum appeals?”). Next release: quarterly tribunal statistics (check the release calendar).
Measured results
What each option would be judged on, and the latest value of the measures already on this page. A measure moving is not proof that an option caused it.
Track asylum cases through appeals and safe move-on
Judged on: Whole-case time, quality upheld, suitable accommodation days and post-decision homelessness.
Data source: not yet named; baseline: not yet established.
- People awaiting an initial asylum decisionLatest: 40,168 (end of June 2026). Baseline: 90,812 (end of June 2025). United Kingdom.
- Asylum appeals pending at the First-tier TribunalLatest: about 80,000 (End of 2025). Baseline: not published. United Kingdom.
Where the ideas come from
Research, counter-evidence and methods (10 sources; 2 claims held back)
- Immigration system statistics: asylum summary tables, year ending June 2026 — Home Office, 27 August 2026.Official statistics; United Kingdom. Relevant passages checked, 2026-10-04.
- Inspection of immigration and the social care sector — Independent Chief Inspector of Borders and Immigration, date not stated.Audit or inspection. Relevant passages checked, 2026-10-07.
- The UK’s asylum backlog — University of Oxford Migration Observatory (Mihnea Cuibus, Peter William Walsh, Madeleine Sumption), 2026-04-22.Analysis of Home Office immigration statistics and tribunal statistics; United Kingdom. Full text checked, 2026-10-04. Limits: Descriptive; not an evaluation of any staffing or accommodation package. Its key points date the £4.8bn spending figure to 2025, its spending section to the 2024/25 financial year.
- Lessons learned: a planning and spending framework that enables long-term value for money (HC 234, Session 2024-25) — National Audit Office, 2024-10-27.Audit synthesis of NAO value-for-money work (HC 234, 2024–25); UK central government. Relevant passages checked, 2026-10-04. Limits: Written before the 2025 Spending Review; a published plan is an input to accountability, not a service improvement.
- The Home Office’s asylum accommodation contracts (HC 874) — National Audit Office, 2025-05-07.Public audit; United Kingdom. Relevant passages checked, 2026-10-04.
- Spending Review 2025 — HM Treasury, 2025-06-11.Budget document; United Kingdom. Relevant passages checked, 2026-10-04.
- Foundation Formula technical note (final local government finance settlement 2026–27) — MHCLG, 2026-02-09.Funding formula documentation; England. Relevant passages checked, 2026-10-04.
- Provisional local government finance settlement 2026 to 2027 — MHCLG, 2025-12-17.Consultation and settlement; England. Relevant passages checked, 2026-10-04.
- Asylum Dispersal Grant: funding instruction 2026 to 2027 — Home Office, 2026-03-31.Grant determination; United Kingdom. Relevant passages checked, 2026-10-04.
- The Fair Funding Review 2.0: government response — MHCLG, 2025-11-20.Consultation response; England. Relevant passages checked, 2026-10-04.
Counter-evidence and criticism
- Clear asylum cases without sacrificing decision quality: Speed targets can lower quality, so cases return as appeals; savings depend on people leaving supported accommodation, which shifts demand to councils’ homelessness services; the NAO found contract costs far above the original estimate. (University of Oxford Migration Observatory; National Audit Office)
- Match local service funding to changing population needs: Projections and migration estimates are revised, so faster updating can move money on noisy data; damping exists because reallocation within a fixed total creates losers; much local pressure comes from housing supply, ageing and funding decisions rather than migration. (MHCLG)
Claims held back
- Asylum spending “reached £4.8bn in 2025” — The briefing’s key points say 2025 but its spending section gives the 2024/25 financial year. Needed: Used, if at all, as £4.8bn in 2024/25.
- Hotel savings from faster decisions — The “at least £1bn a year” reduction is a government expectation; no independent estimate nets off replacement accommodation and council costs. Needed: Outturn asylum spending and contract costs after hotel exits.
“Full text checked” means we read the report itself; “relevant passages” means the sections behind each figure; “summary or abstract only” means we could not read the full study, so no number from it is published here without another source.
Other options compared — not on the shortlist (4)
Other options compared
Options from earlier work on this page that are not on the shortlist. They remain valid choices; their evidence is shown as before.
- structuralStatus: operating
Tighter rules on work and study visas
- Aims to:
- Fewer long-term arrivals on the routes the government has chosen to restrict, especially lower-skilled work and dependants.
- How:
- Raising the skill threshold for Skilled Worker visas to graduate level, closing the care-worker route to new overseas recruitment, shortening the Graduate route and tightening university compliance reduce the number of visas issued, and so arrivals a year or so later.
- Who decides:
- Home Office (Immigration Rules); Migration Advisory Committee (advice); employers and universities (sponsors).
- Main constraint:
- Lower recruitment from abroad can leave vacancies in care and some health roles if domestic supply does not rise; universities depend on international fee income.
- Evidence:
- Limited evidence — plausible mechanism, little direct evaluation
See the trade-offs and evidence
- What the evidence shows
- Earlier rule changes were followed by falls on the targeted routes: work-related non-EU+ arrivals fell sharply after the 2024 changes on care workers and dependants (MIG-02), though the data cannot separate each rule’s effect. The Home Office’s own illustrative estimate is that the 2025 white paper measures could cut inflows by up to about 100,000 a year; it calls this indicative and highly uncertain.
- Policy status
- Statement of changes HC 997 (laid 1 July 2025) raised the Skilled Worker threshold to graduate level (RQF 6) and closed care-worker visas to applicants abroad, with in-country switching allowed until July 2028. Other white paper measures are phased in.
- Resources
- Mainly rule changes and Home Office compliance work; sectors that relied on overseas recruitment need domestic workforce plans.
- Consent and decisions needed
- Requires only changes to the Immigration Rules laid before Parliament. Public support for specific rules is not measured on this site; the trade-off falls on employers, universities and the people who would have come.
- Time
- Visa grants respond within months; ONS arrival estimates show the effect about a year later, after provisional revisions.
- Cost and yield
- No single official costing. The OBR’s March 2024 scenario implies lower net migration raises borrowing over five years (by £13.1bn in 2028–29 for 200,000 a year fewer, with services adjusted) — a sensitivity, not a costing of these rules.
- Trade-offs and who pays
- Fewer arrivals reduce short-run demand for housing and services but also tax receipts and the supply of workers in sectors such as care; the balance depends on which routes shrink, not the headline total.
- How we would know it worked
- Leading indicator: Visas granted by route, quarterly. Outcome: Long-term arrivals by reason (MIG-02) and vacancy rates in affected sectors. It would not be working if: Arrivals fall on paper but in-country switching or new routes replace them, or care vacancies rise sharply.
- immediate reliefStatus: operating
Move asylum accommodation out of hotels
- Aims to:
- Lower cost per person and less local friction, with people housed in dispersed accommodation spread across more areas.
- How:
- Procure more ordinary houses and flats through the regional contracts, spread placements across all councils, and use hotels only as a contingency.
- Who decides:
- Home Office and its accommodation contractors; councils (dispersal areas); MHCLG.
- Main constraint:
- Competes with homeless households and others for the same private rented homes; the NAO found 70 local authorities (19%) had no asylum seekers in initial or dispersed accommodation at December 2024.
- Evidence:
- Limited evidence — plausible mechanism, little direct evaluation
See the trade-offs and evidence
- What the evidence shows
- The NAO found people in hotels were about 35% of those in asylum accommodation but about 76% of contract costs (£1.3bn of £1.7bn in the first seven months of 2024–25), and that the 10-year cost estimate had risen from £4.5bn to £15.3bn. That shows hotels are expensive; no evaluation shows how fast alternatives can be found.
- Resources
- Housing supply in lower-cost areas, council support services, contract management.
- Consent and decisions needed
- Local consent for dispersal and large sites is contested; councils have asked for funding to match placements. Public attitudes are not measured on this site.
- Time
- Hotel numbers have already fallen from 45,753 (end of 2022) to 16,021; ending use depends on the backlog and housing supply.
- Cost and yield
- Contract spend estimate £15.3bn over 10 years (NAO); savings per person moved are not officially published.
- Trade-offs and who pays
- Cheaper dispersed homes add demand to local rented markets; large sites have proved costly and contested.
- How we would know it worked
- Leading indicator: People in hotels, quarterly. Outcome: Total accommodation cost and placements by council. It would not be working if: Hotel numbers fall only because people move to costlier or unsuitable large sites.
- structuralStatus: operating
Returns agreements and border enforcement
- Aims to:
- Fewer dangerous Channel crossings and more returns of people with no right to stay.
- How:
- Agreements such as the UK–France pilot return some small-boat arrivals in exchange for a legal route; enforcement against smuggling networks aims to reduce crossings; returns remove people refused protection.
- Who decides:
- Home Office and Border Security Command; National Crime Agency; Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office (agreements).
- Main constraint:
- Depends on partner countries accepting returns; legal challenges; most small-boat arrivals claim asylum and many are granted protection.
- Evidence:
- Not evaluated — a mechanism to test, not an evidenced fix
See the trade-offs and evidence
- What the evidence shows
- Too early and too small to evaluate: by October 2025, 26 people had been returned to France under the pilot. Asylum-related returns were 12,568 in the year to June 2026, against 33,374 small-boat arrivals in the same period — different populations, not a ratio.
- Policy status
- UK–France pilot began in 2025; Spending Review 2025 adds up to £280m a year by 2028–29 for the Border Security Command.
- Resources
- Detention capacity, flights, caseworkers and other states’ cooperation.
- Consent and decisions needed
- International agreements and, for some measures, primary legislation. Not every returns route is available for every nationality.
- Time
- Pilots can be scaled within months if partners agree; effects on crossings are hard to separate from weather, smuggler tactics and conditions abroad.
- Cost and yield
- Up to £280m a year extra by 2028–29 for the Border Security Command (Spending Review 2025); no published cost per return under the pilot.
- Trade-offs and who pays
- Displacement of crossings to other routes; obligations under refugee law; diplomatic costs.
- How we would know it worked
- Leading indicator: Returns under each agreement, quarterly. Outcome: Small-boat arrivals and deaths at sea. It would not be working if: Returns stay in the dozens while crossings are unchanged.
- preventionStatus: announced
Domestic workforce plans for sectors that recruit abroad
- Aims to:
- Sectors such as social care and health less dependent on overseas recruitment, without unfilled posts.
- How:
- Workforce strategies, training and better pay and conditions raise domestic recruitment; the Labour Market Evidence Group and Migration Advisory Committee review which shortages justify visas; a 32% rise in the Immigration Skills Charge, announced in the white paper, is to fund training.
- Who decides:
- DHSC and DfE / Skills England (workforce and training); Home Office and MAC (shortage assessment); employers.
- Main constraint:
- Care pay depends heavily on council budgets; training takes years; employers cannot recruit domestically at pay levels the work does not command.
- Evidence:
- Limited evidence — plausible mechanism, little direct evaluation
See the trade-offs and evidence
- What the evidence shows
- The MAC’s 2018 review found migration had little or no effect on the overall employment of UK-born workers and was not a major determinant of their wages, with small negative effects for the lower-skilled and positive effects for the higher-skilled. That bounds the wage argument; it does not show that training plans will fill the posts migrants filled.
- Policy status
- Labour Market Evidence Group and workforce-strategy requirement announced in the May 2025 white paper.
- Resources
- Training places, employer investment, and pay in publicly funded sectors — much adult social care is commissioned and paid for by councils.
- Consent and decisions needed
- Higher care pay needs public funding decisions; the trade-off falls on council budgets or charges to service users.
- Time
- Years, not months: training pipelines take years to produce qualified staff.
- Cost and yield
- No official costing of the workforce plans. Immigration Skills Charge receipts are a funding source, not a measure of need.
- Trade-offs and who pays
- Higher pay raises service costs; slower recruitment risks gaps in care in the meantime.
- How we would know it worked
- Leading indicator: Domestic recruitment and vacancy rates in adult social care. Outcome: Care hours delivered and unmet need. It would not be working if: Overseas recruitment falls and vacancies rise with no rise in domestic recruits.
| Option | Resources | Time | Evidence | Outcome to watch |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Tighter rules on work and study visas | Mainly rule changes and Home Office compliance work; sectors that relied on overseas recruitment need domestic workforce plans. | Visa grants respond within months; ONS arrival estimates show the effect about a year later, after provisional revisions. | limited | Long-term arrivals by reason (MIG-02) and vacancy rates in affected sectors. |
| Move asylum accommodation out of hotels | Housing supply in lower-cost areas, council support services, contract management. | Hotel numbers have already fallen from 45,753 (end of 2022) to 16,021; ending use depends on the backlog and housing supply. | limited | Total accommodation cost and placements by council. |
| Returns agreements and border enforcement | Detention capacity, flights, caseworkers and other states’ cooperation. | Pilots can be scaled within months if partners agree; effects on crossings are hard to separate from weather, smuggler tactics and conditions abroad. | not evaluated | Small-boat arrivals and deaths at sea. |
| Domestic workforce plans for sectors that recruit abroad | Training places, employer investment, and pay in publicly funded sectors — much adult social care is commissioned and paid for by councils. | Years, not months: training pipelines take years to produce qualified staff. | limited | Care hours delivered and unmet need. |
Plan reviewed 2026-10-04. How we judge evidence.
How this connects
- Where do migrants provide staff and add service demand?
The NHS recruits heavily from abroad, and new arrivals also use services; both sides belong in the same account.
National population change is not a sufficient explanation of NHS waiting times.
- How does population change affect housing need?
More people means more households, but household formation, moves within the UK and how many homes are built matter as much.
A national migration flow cannot be turned directly into a local house-price effect.
- Who is in work, and who is not?
Migration affects the size of the workforce; employment and inactivity rates describe how it is used.
- How did the end of free movement change who comes?
EU+ net migration turned negative after 2021 while non-EU+ arrivals rose; the composition changed more than the total.
Sources and methods (13)
- ONS, Long-term international migration, provisional: year ending December 2025 (released 21 May 2026) — headline figures, peaks and the "nearly halved" comparison
- ONS, Long-term international migration, provisional (dataset), Tables 1 and 2 (released 21 May 2026) — immigration, emigration and net migration (Table 1); 95% ranges (Table 2); revisions (Table 5)
- ONS, Long-term international migration, provisional (dataset), Table 4b (released 21 May 2026) — non-EU+ immigration by reason
- Home Office, Immigration system statistics: asylum summary tables, year ending June 2026, Asy_00a (released 27 August 2026) — asylum claims, decisions, people awaiting a decision, support, hotels and returns
- Home Office, Immigration system statistics: illegal entry routes summary tables, year ending June 2026, IER_01 (released 27 August 2026) — detected small-boat arrivals
- ONS, Mid-year population estimates, England and Wales: mid-2025, Table MYE3 (components of change) (released 29 July 2026) — international and internal migration by region
- ONS, Measuring illegal migration: our current view (June 2019) — why there is no official estimate of the population living here without permission
- Home Office, Restoring control over the immigration system: white paper and technical annex (May 2025) — policy options
- HM Treasury, Spending Review 2025 (June 2025) — policy options
- National Audit Office, The Home Office’s asylum accommodation contracts (May 2025) — policy options
- Home Office, First illegal migrants returned under new UK-France agreement (October 2025) — policy options
- Migration Advisory Committee, EEA migration in the UK: final report (September 2018) — policy options
- OBR, The impact of migration on the fiscal forecast (Economic and fiscal outlook, March 2024) — policy options
Method notes
- Long-term migration counts people moving for 12 months or more. ONS estimates are "official statistics in development", built from Home Office visa and travel records and DWP/HMRC data; the latest year is provisional and is revised as more travel data arrive.
- Net migration is immigration minus emigration. It is not the number of people arriving, and it cannot be compared with arrival counts from other sources.
- The by-reason breakdown covers non-EU+ nationals only. British and EU+ arrivals are not split by reason.
- Home Office asylum and small-boat figures are administrative counts of claims, decisions and detected arrival events, on calendar years or years to June. They are not components of long-term migration and are never used here as a share of it.
- Regional figures come from ONS mid-year population estimates (mid-2024 to mid-2025, England and Wales), which use a different period and method from the UK series.