Public procurement · United Kingdom · spending 2025–26 · commitments June–September 2026
The public sector spent £461.3bn on procurement in 2025–26: gross current and capital purchasing, including purchases from other public bodies. UK Facts tracks eleven procurement commitments made since June 2026; three are published rules that start in 2027. Follow what gets bought, what arrives and what changes for the public.
Priority: Improve outcomes and whole-life value from named contracts and procurement decisions. What would change it →
Evidence last reviewed 3 October 2026
Overview
How much does the public sector spend buying things?
£461.3bn
Whole public sector gross procurement, current plus capital (central government alone: £295.9bn). Includes purchases from other public bodies, so it is not all spending with private firms.
United Kingdom · 2025–26, outturn
Site calculation · HM Treasury, Public Expenditure Statistical Analyses (PESA) 2026 — Tables 5.3 and 6.5
How far have this year’s procurement promises got?
0 of 11at contract stage
Four are published rules (applying from 2027), five are announcements only, and two are outcomes with no measure yet.
United Kingdom · Checked 28 Sept 2026
Administrative data · Cabinet Office, Measures to rewire the state (press release)
How many major projects look undeliverable as planned?
20%of rated projects rated Red
34 of 172 rated government major projects at 31 March 2026, where successful delivery appears unachievable without major changes. 16 of the 189 projects had ratings withheld and 1 was not yet rated. In defence, 41% of rated projects.
United Kingdom (government major projects portfolio) · 31 March 2026
Official statistic · NISTA, Major Projects Annual Report 2025-26
When a contract fails, the people who were meant to receive the service carry the cost first — and taxpayers pay twice if the work has to be bought again. The government’s own delivery-confidence ratings show where that risk is highest.
The evidence
How far has each procurement commitment actually travelled?
Each sourced commitment on public buying, insourcing and UK jobs, and the furthest stage evidenced: announced → rule in force → tender or award → delivery → measured outcome. Equal-width stages; no percent-complete figures.
| Commitment and latest verified stage | Announced | Rule in force | Tender or award | Delivery | Measured outcome |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Central government bids scored at least 10% (from £1m) or 20% (from £5m) on jobs and skillsRule published, not yet in forceNext: Detailed guidance, promised for “autumn 2026”. Then the first tender notices from 1 January 2027.Cabinet Office (checked 28 Sept 2026) | Reached: Yes (Aug 2026) | Published, not yet in force: Published; applies later (see next) | Not yet: — | Not yet: — | Not yet: — |
| Jobs and skills pledges on £5m+ contracts tracked by KPI and reported publiclyPendingNext: First contract performance notices covering social value KPIs. Timing depends on awards; UK Facts’ reading is 2028 at the earliest.Cabinet Office (checked 28 Sept 2026) | Reached: Yes (Aug 2026) | Not yet: — | Not yet: — | Not yet: — | Not yet: Pending: depends on contracts not yet let |
| Utilities to use their own procurement to support manufacturing jobs and skillsPolicy announcedNext: Guidance to utilities or a bill, promised only “when parliamentary time allows”. No date given.Cabinet Office (checked 28 Sept 2026) | Reached: Yes (Sept 2026) | Not yet: — | Not yet: — | Not yet: — | Not yet: — |
| Ofgem asked to factor UK supply chains, jobs and skills into electricity network procurementRule published, not yet in forceNext: Takes effect 17 November 2026 after a 40-day consideration period. Network companies to respond on a voluntary minimum 10% social value weighting in an Electricity Networks Sector Growth Plan (no date given).Department for Energy Security and Net Zero (checked 28 Sept 2026) | Reached: Yes (Sept 2026) | Published, not yet in force: Published; applies later (see next) | Not yet: — | Not yet: — | Not yet: — |
| UK manufacturing jobs and apprenticeships created through utility procurementUnknown / not reportedNext: A published metric or reporting requirement. No date given.Cabinet Office (checked 28 Sept 2026) | Reached: Yes (Sept 2026) | Not yet: — | Not yet: — | Not yet: — | No measure exists: No measure or baseline published |
| National Shipbuilding Office oversight of all future government civil ship procurementPolicy announcedNext: Shipbuilding and Maritime Technology Action Plan, “planned for later this year” (2026).Cabinet Office (checked 28 Sept 2026) | Reached: Yes (Sept 2026) | Not yet: — | Not yet: — | Not yet: — | Not yet: — |
| Replacement Cefas research vessel built in a UK shipyardPolicy announcedNext: Engagement with UK shipbuilders “in the coming months”, then a tender and award. Vessel expected operational 2031 or 2032.Defra and Cefas (checked 28 Sept 2026) | Reached: Yes (Sept 2026) | Not yet: — | Not yet: — | Not yet: — | Not yet: — |
| Insourcing Unit in the Office for the Prime Minister and CabinetPolicy announcedNext: Confirmation that the unit is established. No date given.Cabinet Office (checked 28 Sept 2026) | Reached: Yes (Sept 2026) | Not yet: — | Not yet: — | Not yet: — | Not yet: — |
| Public Interest Test before contracting out central government services over £1mRule published, not yet in forceNext: 1 April 2027 start. First quarterly return (April to June 2027) due by 30 July 2027. Central publication of results: no date given.Cabinet Office (checked 28 Sept 2026) | Reached: Yes (Jun 2026) | Published, not yet in force: Published; applies later (see next) | Not yet: — | Not yet: — | Not yet: — |
| Five-year Insourcing Strategies from bodies with £100m+ annual contract spendRule published, not yet in forceNext: Publication “within 30 days of 1 April 2027”, on each body’s GOV.UK pages or website.Cabinet Office (checked 28 Sept 2026) | Reached: Yes (Jun 2026) | Published, not yet in force: Published; applies later (see next) | Not yet: — | Not yet: — | Not yet: — |
| Cabinet Office building management (including cleaning and security) brought back in-housePolicy announcedNext: A Public Interest Test result for these services, then a transition from 2028.Cabinet Office (checked 28 Sept 2026) | Reached: Yes (Sept 2026) | Not yet: — | Not yet: — | Not yet: — | Not yet: — |
United Kingdom (central government rules; English and UK bodies as stated in each rule) · Commitments announced June to September 2026; checked 28 September 2026 · Tracker of official documents; moves only when new evidence is published
Source: Cabinet Office, Measures to rewire the state (press release) (released 2026-09-27). Chart PROC-01.
| Commitment | Latest stage | Announced | Rule in force | Tender or award | Delivery | Measured outcome | Next |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Central government bids scored at least 10% (from £1m) or 20% (from £5m) on jobs and skills | Rule published, not yet in force | Yes (Aug 2026) | Published; applies later (see next) | — | — | — | Detailed guidance, promised for “autumn 2026”. Then the first tender notices from 1 January 2027. |
| Jobs and skills pledges on £5m+ contracts tracked by KPI and reported publicly | Pending | Yes (Aug 2026) | — | — | — | Pending: depends on contracts not yet let | First contract performance notices covering social value KPIs. Timing depends on awards; UK Facts’ reading is 2028 at the earliest. |
| Utilities to use their own procurement to support manufacturing jobs and skills | Policy announced | Yes (Sept 2026) | — | — | — | — | Guidance to utilities or a bill, promised only “when parliamentary time allows”. No date given. |
| Ofgem asked to factor UK supply chains, jobs and skills into electricity network procurement | Rule published, not yet in force | Yes (Sept 2026) | Published; applies later (see next) | — | — | — | Takes effect 17 November 2026 after a 40-day consideration period. Network companies to respond on a voluntary minimum 10% social value weighting in an Electricity Networks Sector Growth Plan (no date given). |
| UK manufacturing jobs and apprenticeships created through utility procurement | Unknown / not reported | Yes (Sept 2026) | — | — | — | No measure or baseline published | A published metric or reporting requirement. No date given. |
| National Shipbuilding Office oversight of all future government civil ship procurement | Policy announced | Yes (Sept 2026) | — | — | — | — | Shipbuilding and Maritime Technology Action Plan, “planned for later this year” (2026). |
| Replacement Cefas research vessel built in a UK shipyard | Policy announced | Yes (Sept 2026) | — | — | — | — | Engagement with UK shipbuilders “in the coming months”, then a tender and award. Vessel expected operational 2031 or 2032. |
| Insourcing Unit in the Office for the Prime Minister and Cabinet | Policy announced | Yes (Sept 2026) | — | — | — | — | Confirmation that the unit is established. No date given. |
| Public Interest Test before contracting out central government services over £1m | Rule published, not yet in force | Yes (Jun 2026) | Published; applies later (see next) | — | — | — | 1 April 2027 start. First quarterly return (April to June 2027) due by 30 July 2027. Central publication of results: no date given. |
| Five-year Insourcing Strategies from bodies with £100m+ annual contract spend | Rule published, not yet in force | Yes (Jun 2026) | Published; applies later (see next) | — | — | — | Publication “within 30 days of 1 April 2027”, on each body’s GOV.UK pages or website. |
| Cabinet Office building management (including cleaning and security) brought back in-house | Policy announced | Yes (Sept 2026) | — | — | — | — | A Public Interest Test result for these services, then a transition from 2028. |
Scroll the table sideways to see every column.
Where are big projects least likely to deliver as planned?
Share of rated government major projects with a Red delivery-confidence rating, 31 March 2026 (projects whose rating is withheld excluded).
United Kingdom (Government Major Projects Portfolio) · Ratings at 31 March 2026 · Official statistics; some ratings are departmental self-assessments where no independent rating was published
Source: NISTA, Major Projects Annual Report 2025-26 (released 13 July 2026). Chart PROC-03.
| Group | % Red of rated |
|---|---|
| Defence (Ministry of Defence) | 41% |
| Rest of government | 14% |
An explanation of how to read the evidence. It shows no statistic.
Announcing a rule is not delivering a better service.
Track the announcement, the rule in force, the contract award, delivery and the measured outcome separately.
Editorial explainer: no statistic is shown.
Announcing a rule is not delivering a better service. Track the announcement, the rule in force, the contract award, delivery and the measured outcome separately.
Editorial explainer: no statistic is shown.
Image description: Announcing a rule is not delivering a better service — editorial explainer from UK Facts.
Before production: Production /public-procurement returned 404; the route must exist on production before this image is promoted.
All visual summaries, their source records and their publication state are listed on Shareable visuals.
Chapter 1
Most public spending is not procurement: pay, benefits, grants and debt interest are separate. Procurement is what public bodies spend buying goods, works and services. Three figures are commonly quoted for it. They measure different things and cannot be added, subtracted or compared as shares of one another.
£90bn a year
£295.9bn
Source: Public Expenditure Statistical Analyses (PESA) 2026 — Tables 5.3 and 6.5
£461.3bn
Source: Public Expenditure Statistical Analyses (PESA) 2026 — Tables 5.3 and 6.5
A figure this page does not use. The August 2026 release also says public sector procurement “from the private sector” reached “£394.8 billion in 2024/25”, without naming a source. That is not the PESA measure: PESA 2026 puts whole public sector gross procurement at £437.8bn for 2024-25. The two use different definitions, so this page does not compare them or work out a “private sector share” from them.
Chapter 2
Public money passes through five steps before any benefit can be measured. Select a step to see what the 2026 announcements change at that point and where the evidence will appear. The commitments themselves sit in the ledger above; the binding rule underneath them is the new scoring of bids on jobs and skills.
Step 1 of 5 · Public money
Most public spending is not procurement. Pay, benefits, grants and debt interest are separate. Procurement is what public bodies spend buying goods, works and services.
In August 2026 the government set new rules for how central government scores bids on jobs and skills (“social value”).
Detailed guidance “will be published in autumn 2026”. It had not appeared when this page was checked. PPN 026 says only that it replaces the “previous edition” of the model. It does not name the earlier note, so this page does not either.
The release says utility companies, “such as electricity, gas and water infrastructure providers”, will be expected to use their own buying to support “jobs and skills in manufacturing”. It adds: “If companies do not follow the government’s lead, legislation will be brought in when parliamentary time allows to ensure they act.”
On 14 September 2026 the Department for Energy Security and Net Zero published draft guidance to GEMA, Ofgem’s governing body, “in support of growth in electricity networks through increased domestic manufacturing and supply chain capability”. It takes effect on 17 November 2026. It asks the regulator to “consider where it can incorporate workforce and skills standards” into its approach to procurement, and to consider asking companies to report “domestic versus overseas supply chain spend”. It notes that network companies are not covered by PPN 026. Instead the government “welcomes ongoing discussion” with them on a voluntary minimum 10% social value weighting. This is guidance to a regulator, not a requirement on companies, and nothing equivalent has been published for gas or water.
UK Facts note: network investment by regulated utilities is largely recovered through customers’ bills under price controls set by the regulators. So any extra cost from buying British would be more likely to show up on bills than in public spending. The release does not estimate a cost; the Ofgem guidance says procurement should still support “value for money for billpayers”.
Source: Cabinet Office, Measures to rewire the state (press release), published 27 Sept 2026.
Source: Department for Energy Security and Net Zero, Electricity networks growth: draft social and environmental guidance to GEMA, published 14 Sept 2026.
There are two separate measures here, and they have travelled different distances.
The National Shipbuilding Office “will be given oversight of all future civil ship procurement”. The aim is a “clearer and more predictable pipeline of demand” and “a simpler route for ship procurement, including working with our European allies”. How it will work is left to the Shipbuilding and Maritime Technology Action Plan, which the release says is “planned for later this year”. It had not been published when this page was checked.
This is one specific ship. Defra has applied the national security exemption in the Procurement Act 2023, so “the build will be open only to UK shipyards”.
Not known yet. No shipyard has been chosen and no contract value published. The government says it will talk to UK shipbuilders “in the coming months” to plan the next stage of the procurement. This page will not suggest a likely yard or place until a contract award names one.
The vessel decision does not show how the wider oversight role will work, and the oversight role does not commit any other ship to a UK yard.
Source: Cabinet Office, Measures to rewire the state (press release), published 27 Sept 2026.
Source: Defra and Cefas, New research ship to be built in Britain, boosting British shipbuilding and transforming UK ocean science (press release), published 28 Sept 2026.
Relevant contracts are awarded, and where
Partly published
Award notices for civil ships (starting with the Cefas vessel) and for contracts scored under PPN 026, with supplier and place of delivery.
Gap: Award notices give the supplier’s registered address, which is not necessarily where the work or the jobs are.
Apprenticeships and jobs delivered, compared with what bidders pledged
Due to be published
Social value KPIs on £5m+ contracts, reported at least once every 12 months, set against the commitments made at bid stage.
Gap: KPIs are chosen contract by contract, so they will not add up to a national total. Nothing yet checks whether jobs are new or last beyond the contract.
Utility procurement supports UK manufacturing jobs
No public data
A published measure of utilities’ UK manufacturing content or related apprenticeships.
Gap: No such measure exists. Draft guidance to Ofgem suggests electricity networks could report domestic versus overseas supply-chain spend; nothing is proposed for gas or water. Until then this cannot be tested.
Insourced services cost less over their life, or work better
No public data
Before-and-after whole-life cost and service quality for each insourced service, including transition costs.
Gap: No requirement to publish post-insourcing evaluations has been announced. Contracted-out costs are often commercially confidential, so a fair baseline may not be public.
Departments publish Insourcing Strategies and Public Interest Test results
Due to be published
Strategies within 30 days of 1 April 2027; Test outcomes “published centrally” from quarterly returns.
Gap: The form and timing of central publication are not stated, and authorities redact their own returns.
These commitments also appear in the wider tracker of the government’s commitments.
Chapter 3
Competition is how buyers test price and quality, and it is thinnest where contracts are large, specialised or restricted. The new rules make market health an explicit test: the Public Interest Test asks about “limited providers” and “excessive incumbency advantage”, and the Cefas research ship is open only to UK yards under the national security exemption. Restricting a contract can support a domestic industry, but it reduces the number of possible bidders. This page does not yet hold a UK-wide measure of bids per tender; the test for each restricted contract is below.
Local-job promises may be hard to verify
A bid scores on commitments. Whether the jobs are new, local, or would have existed anyway is not captured by a KPI that only counts them.
Test: Compare delivered KPI figures with bid pledges once the first annual reports appear.
UK sourcing may cost more or narrow competition
Restricting a contract to UK suppliers, as with the Cefas vessel, reduces the number of possible bidders. That can raise prices or lengthen timelines.
Test: Number of bids received, the award price and the delivery date against plan.
Bringing services in-house needs capability and transition money
PPN 024’s own Part Two asks whether the body can recruit, equip and govern the service. Where it cannot, insourcing risks disruption and cost.
Test: Published transition costs and service performance before and after the switch.
A contract can create jobs without improving the service it buys
Giving 20% of the score to social value leaves less weight on price and quality. Jobs are a benefit, but the service is still the thing being bought.
Test: Whether service-quality KPIs hold up on contracts awarded under the new model.
These are risks to test, not findings: none has yet happened under the new rules.
Chapter 4
Delivery is where contracts succeed or fail. The clearest records come from independent audit. Below is one well-documented case, with each date from its source. A finding, a dispute, a settlement and cash recovered are different things: of 55 disputed Covid PPE contracts (£1.26bn) in December 2024, 8 worth £325m in potential recoveries were still unresolved a year later — and a resolved dispute is not the same as money received.
Did the contract deliver what was bought, when it was promised?
Planned and actual milestones for the Army’s Ajax armoured vehicle programme, from primary audit and government sources. Dates, not a cost chart: the cost figures use different definitions.
2010 Plan
Planning assumption: a deployable capability in 2017.
2014 Contract
Manufacture contract signed: 589 vehicles for a firm price of £5.522bn (including VAT). Formal in-service target set for July 2020.
June 2021 Missed
Revised in-service target missed, after noise and vibration problems in trials.
December 2021 Delivery
£3.167bn paid; 26 vehicles received by the Army.
March 2022 Official finding
NAO: in-service date already extended by more than four years and no new target set; Department’s initial whole-life cost estimate “more than £10 billion”.
31 March 2026 Rating
NISTA rates the programme Red (independent assessment); end date March 2030; whole-life cost £8.9bn on NISTA’s definition.
United Kingdom (Ministry of Defence) · 2010 to 31 March 2026 · Official audit finding (NAO) and official rating (NISTA)
Source: National Audit Office, The Ajax programme (released March 2022). Chart PROC-02.
| Date | Milestone | Status | Source |
|---|---|---|---|
| 2010 | Planning assumption: a deployable capability in 2017. | Plan | National Audit Office, The Ajax programme |
| 2014 | Manufacture contract signed: 589 vehicles for a firm price of £5.522bn (including VAT). Formal in-service target set for July 2020. | Contract | National Audit Office, The Ajax programme |
| June 2021 | Revised in-service target missed, after noise and vibration problems in trials. | Missed | National Audit Office, The Ajax programme |
| December 2021 | £3.167bn paid; 26 vehicles received by the Army. | Delivery | National Audit Office, The Ajax programme |
| March 2022 | NAO: in-service date already extended by more than four years and no new target set; Department’s initial whole-life cost estimate “more than £10 billion”. | Official finding | National Audit Office, The Ajax programme |
| 31 March 2026 | NISTA rates the programme Red (independent assessment); end date March 2030; whole-life cost £8.9bn on NISTA’s definition. | Rating | NISTA, Major Projects Annual Report 2025-26 |
Scroll the table sideways to see every column.
Chapter 5
Neither model is cheaper by default. The insourcing strand is an announcement; the Public Interest Test beneath it is a published rule that starts in April 2027.
A new Insourcing Unit, based in the Office for the Prime Minister and Cabinet, is to “coordinate departmental insourcing activity, unblock barriers to delivery and identify cross-government opportunities to maximise value for money and restore direct operational accountability”. It will also support cutting consultancy spending “by building Civil Service talent and resources”. No budget, staffing or start date has been published.
The release calls this “the biggest wave of insourcing in a generation”. That describes an aim, not a measured result: no count or value of services to be brought in house has been published. The one named example is the Cabinet Office’s own building management, including cleaning and security. That is subject to a Public Interest Test, and the process would start “when current contracts end in 2028”.
None of these is right for every service. Each one wins or loses on the same six tests. The table sets out what to check under each model; it is UK Facts’ summary, not an official assessment.
| Criterion | In-house | Contracted out | Mixed |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whole-life costWhat does it cost over the full life of the service, not just the first contract? | No supplier profit margin or re-tendering cost. But the public body carries pay, pensions, assets and future pay settlements. | Competition can lower prices. But the price excludes the cost of letting and managing contracts, and of paying for changes the contract did not foresee. | Can keep core control in-house and buy specialist capacity. But two sets of overheads, and the handover between them, both cost money. |
| Service qualityIs the service measurably better for the people using it? | Easier to change the service as policy changes, without renegotiating a contract. | Quality can be specified and enforced through KPIs, but only for what can be written into a contract. | Depends on the split: quality problems can fall between the two parts. |
| AccountabilityWhen it goes wrong, who answers for it, and can the public see why? | Ministers and officials answer for it directly. Freedom of information applies in full. | Accountability runs through the contract. Commercial confidentiality can limit what is published. | Both routes apply, which can blur who is responsible. |
| ResilienceWhat happens if the provider fails or the market dries up? | No risk of a supplier collapsing. But the service depends on the public body keeping enough skilled staff. | Exposed to supplier failure or a thin market. PPN 024’s guidance names “limited providers” and “excessive incumbency advantage”. | Can keep a fallback in-house, if it is actually kept warm. |
| Workforce capacityAre the people and skills available to run it? | Needs managers, specialists and systems. PPN 024’s Part Two asks whether the body can “realistically recruit, onboard and retain” them. | Draws on the supplier’s workforce. Where labour is short, both sides compete for the same people. | Needs the in-house skills to manage the supplier, a capability often lost after outsourcing. |
| Transition costWhat does switching cost, and who pays? | Staff transfers (TUPE), pensions, buying or leasing assets, and the risk of disruption during handover. | Mobilisation costs and a learning period for a new supplier. The same TUPE issues apply in reverse. | Some of both, depending on which parts move. |
Source: Cabinet Office, Measures to rewire the state (press release), published 27 Sept 2026.
Source: Cabinet Office, PPN 024: The Public Interest Test and Insourcing Strategy, published 17 Jun 2026.
Source: Cabinet Office, Insourcing and the Public Interest Test — Guidance Note, published 17 Jun 2026.
Chapter 6
Three patterns recur across sectors, each with its own evidence. Defence buys large, novel equipment from few suppliers, and 16 of its 39 rated major projects were Red in March 2026. Health bought protective equipment under emergency conditions in 2020; the Covid Counter Fraud Commissioner found the government bought far more than proved necessary, and some contract disputes were still unresolved five years later. Councils, whose funding fell furthest in the 2010s, protected statutory services and cut others, which shapes what they can afford to buy. None of these patterns shows that outsourcing or insourcing is better in general.
Evidence → choices → outcomes
Public contracts that deliver the service or asset intended at a known whole-life cost.
These options link to their national assessment, including funding, delivery constraints and remaining uncertainties.
Assessed option · provisional
8/10 criteria scored
Coverage of the appraisal, not an impact score.
Delivery: Amber
Whole-life costs incomplete
Audits diagnose failures; no general cash saving is established for this proposal.
Name contracts, renewal dates and weaknesses; recruit commercial expertise; publish baselines, performance and remedies.
Assessed option · provisional
7/10 criteria scored
Coverage of the appraisal, not an impact score.
Delivery: Amber
Whole-life costs incomplete
The artifact offers weak support for its spinout/procurement package. Smart Grants evaluation is relevant to a different instrument and cannot validate the whole bundle.
Separate spinout terms, procurement trials, grants and firm adoption; define market failure, beneficiaries and comparator.
What would it take to improve this?
The outcome we want: Public contracts that deliver the service or asset intended at a known whole-life cost.
The main constraint: Contracting authorities lack enough skilled commercial and contract-management staff, and specifications often start from a solution rather than the outcome — a workforce and coordination constraint that more money or new rules alone do not remove.
Constraint type: workforce, coordination, evidence.
What is funded now, and the changes assessed against it — the current baseline and the alternatives, before the position today and the actions.
Provisional single-reviewer assessments from the 6 October 2026 review; not approved business cases, and not government policy.
These options also bear on this topic. The full assessment sits on the home page named under each.
Deliver what is already fundedDelivery RAG: Amber
Home: Follow the money.
Range if completed: 14.0–20.0 out of 30 (equal weights; not yet assessed: expected incremental benefit (Bn), incremental affordability (Co))
Turn research into products and adoptionDelivery RAG: Amber
Home: Innovation.
Range if completed: 11.0–20.0 out of 30 (equal weights; not yet assessed: increment beyond baseline (Ad), expected incremental benefit (Bn), incremental affordability (Co))
Alternatives already on record: 22 options listed under the points in the position today (12 without an action record), and 3 earlier options under other options compared. They have not been scored in the review.
Which quadrant a point sits in is our analytical judgement, not a statistical category. Each point says whether it is a measured fact, our synthesis or a risk.
A new legal framework is in place: the Procurement Act 2023 took effect on 24 February 2025, with wider duties to publish contract information through delivery.
Measured factConfidence: High· In force since 24 February 2025· United Kingdom (Scotland largely separate)
Source: Cabinet Office, Transforming Public Procurement (collection) — Procurement Act 2023 in force 24 February 2025 (Collection page)
Legislation: The Procurement Act 2023 (in force 24 February 2025) requires at least three key performance indicators on contracts over £5m and yearly published assessments.
Checked 4 October 2026. A commitment is not delivery.
Buy measurable results and manage contracts through delivery
Applies the Act’s KPI and publication duties to a named set of renewing contracts.
Who: Cabinet Office; departments · Evidence: Expert or audit recommendation · Status: Site-editorial action
Source: Institute for Government, The role of procurement in delivering mission-led government (Report PDF pp.4–5)
Contract transparency
Published notices and performance let the public see results.
Who: Cabinet Office · Evidence: Expert or audit recommendation · Status: Established
Source: legislation.gov.uk, Procurement Act 2023, section 52 (key performance indicators) (Sections 52 and 71)
Publish bid data for bid-rigging screening
Uses the new data to detect collusion.
Who: Cabinet Office; CMA · Evidence: Expert or audit recommendation · Status: External proposal
Source: Competition and Markets Authority, Public procurement in the national interest: reflections from the CMA (8 September 2026) (Recommendations on bid-rigging)
Public bodies bought £461.3bn of goods, works and services in 2025–26 (including purchases from other public bodies) — a large lever on service quality and on which new products get adopted.
Measured factConfidence: High· 2025–26· United Kingdom
Source: HM Treasury, Public Expenditure Statistical Analyses 2026 (Table 5.3 (current plus capital procurement; UK Facts sum))
Options assessed against this point: Deliver what is already funded (Amber delivery RAG)
Policy: Central-government contracts (about £90bn a year) to back British jobs and skills: the social-value weighting rises from 10% to 20% for contracts of £5m or more, for procurements starting from 1 January 2027.
Checked 4 October 2026. A commitment is not delivery.
ShortlistedBuy measurable results and manage contracts through delivery
Uses the size of public buying to demand measured outcomes.
Who: Cabinet Office; departments · Evidence: Expert or audit recommendation · Status: Site-editorial action
Source: Institute for Government, The role of procurement in delivering mission-led government (Report PDF pp.4–5)
Use public buying to test useful innovations
Directs a small share of purchasing to evaluated trials of new products.
Who: Cabinet Office; departments · Evidence: Expert or audit recommendation · Status: Site-editorial action
Source: Institute for Government, The role of procurement in delivering mission-led government (Report PDF p.19)
Report social value against a KPI each year
Shows whether the higher weighting delivers jobs and training.
Who: Cabinet Office; contracting authorities · Evidence: Untested proposal · Status: Enacted but not operational
Source: Cabinet Office, PPN 026: the social value model (Paragraphs 10 and 13)
Name and limit procurement objectives, with trade-offs explicit
Stops added objectives eroding value for money unnoticed.
Who: Cabinet Office · Evidence: Expert or audit recommendation · Status: External proposal
Source: Competition and Markets Authority, Public procurement in the national interest: reflections from the CMA (8 September 2026) (Recommendation 1)
Interview-based research finds procurements often start from over-specified solutions, commercial staff are involved late, and senior commercial and contract-management capability is thin.
Measured factConfidence: Moderate· 2024–25 policy context (published September 2025)· UK central government
Source: Institute for Government, The role of procurement in delivering mission-led government (Report PDF p.4)
Options assessed against this point: Deliver what is already funded (Amber delivery RAG)
Policy: The National Procurement Policy Statement asks authorities to benchmark commercial capability and workforce capacity and to define “challenges to solve rather than solutions to buy”.
Checked 4 October 2026. A commitment is not delivery.
ShortlistedBuy measurable results and manage contracts through delivery
Outcome-led specification and funded contract management address over-specification and thin capability.
Who: Cabinet Office; departments · Evidence: Expert or audit recommendation · Status: Site-editorial action
Source: Institute for Government, The role of procurement in delivering mission-led government (Report PDF pp.4–5)
Specify outcomes, not solutions
Opens contracts to better or cheaper approaches.
Who: Contracting authorities · Evidence: Expert or audit recommendation · Status: Established
Source: Cabinet Office, National Procurement Policy Statement (February 2025) (p.4)
Share commercial expertise across authorities
Pools scarce senior skills.
Who: Cabinet Office; Government Commercial Agency · Evidence: Expert or audit recommendation · Status: External proposal
Source: Competition and Markets Authority, Public procurement in the national interest: reflections from the CMA (8 September 2026) (Recommendation 2)
34 of 172 rated government major projects were Red (successful delivery appears unachievable, with major issues that do not appear manageable at that stage), 16 ratings were withheld and 1 project was not yet rated.
Measured factConfidence: High· Ratings at 31 March 2026· United Kingdom
Source: National Infrastructure and Service Transformation Authority, NISTA Major Projects Annual Report 2025–26 (ratings at 31 March 2026) (Delivery confidence ratings)
Options assessed against this point: Deliver what is already funded (Amber delivery RAG)
Policy: NISTA refocused the Government Major Projects Portfolio to about 80 projects from 1 April 2026 and is embedding an Early Warning System; at 31 March 2026, 29 were Green, 109 Amber and 34 Red.
Checked 4 October 2026. A commitment is not delivery.
ShortlistedBuy measurable results and manage contracts through delivery
Milestone baselines show slippage before projects turn Red.
Who: Cabinet Office; departments · Evidence: Expert or audit recommendation · Status: Site-editorial action
Source: National Infrastructure and Service Transformation Authority, NISTA Major Projects Annual Report 2025–26 (ratings at 31 March 2026) (Ratings by department)
Early Warning System for projects at risk
Flags projects before they reach Red.
Who: NISTA · Evidence: Untested proposal · Status: Established
Source: National Infrastructure and Service Transformation Authority, NISTA Major Projects Annual Report 2025-26 (HTML) (Introduction)
Report completion and use for each project
Judges projects on finished, used assets.
Who: NISTA; departments · Evidence: Untested proposal · Status: Site-editorial action · Works through Growth & productivity: Counting completed, used assets on the growth page tests whether Red-rated projects still deliver.
Outcome-led specification, funded contract management and bounded, evaluated innovation trials could turn more purchases into working services.
Depends on: Commercial staff are funded from named budgets, and trials set a minimum result and an adoption route before they start.
Our synthesisConfidence: Moderate
Source: Institute for Government, The role of procurement in delivering mission-led government (Report PDF p.19); HM Treasury / Evaluation Task Force, The Magenta Book: Central Government guidance on evaluation (Chapter 1, sections 1.5–1.6)
Options assessed against this point: Turn research into products and adoption (Amber delivery RAG)
Funding: The £100m Sovereign AI R&D Procurement Scheme, and a social-value KPI with annual public progress reports on major contracts from January 2027.
Checked 4 October 2026. A commitment is not delivery.
ShortlistedUse public buying to test useful innovations
Bounded, evaluated trials with a route to adoption.
Who: Cabinet Office; departments · Evidence: Expert or audit recommendation · Status: Site-editorial action
Source: Institute for Government, The role of procurement in delivering mission-led government (Report PDF p.19)
Buy measurable results and manage contracts through delivery
Outcome-led specification and funded contract management.
Who: Cabinet Office; departments · Evidence: Expert or audit recommendation · Status: Site-editorial action
Source: Institute for Government, The role of procurement in delivering mission-led government (Report PDF pp.4–5)
An innovation procurement framework
Staged buying and advance market commitments.
Who: Cabinet Office · Evidence: Expert or audit recommendation · Status: External proposal
Source: Competition and Markets Authority, Public procurement in the national interest: reflections from the CMA (8 September 2026) (Recommendation 5)
Fragmented buying and limited cross-government working can erode value and leave lessons from one department unlearned in another.
Risk, not a certaintyConfidence: Moderate
Source: Institute for Government, The role of procurement in delivering mission-led government (Report summary p.4)
Policy: The Government Commercial Agency, formed on 1 April 2026 from Crown Commercial Service and central commercial teams, buys across government; a National Cloud Infrastructure Programme consolidates cloud buying.
Checked 4 October 2026. A commitment is not delivery.
Buy measurable results and manage contracts through delivery
One baseline method across departments lets lessons travel.
Who: Cabinet Office; departments · Evidence: Expert or audit recommendation · Status: Site-editorial action
Source: Institute for Government, The role of procurement in delivering mission-led government (Report PDF pp.4–5)
Pool expertise, pipelines and supplier benchmarking
Reduces fragmentation without centralising every decision.
Who: Government Commercial Agency · Evidence: Expert or audit recommendation · Status: External proposal
Source: Competition and Markets Authority, Public procurement in the national interest: reflections from the CMA (8 September 2026) (Recommendation 2)
Build cross-public-sector procurement data
Shared data show what worked elsewhere.
Who: Cabinet Office · Evidence: Expert or audit recommendation · Status: External proposal
Source: Competition and Markets Authority, Public procurement in the national interest: reflections from the CMA (8 September 2026) (Recommendation 3)
Judging rules before they apply misleads: the insourcing Public Interest Test starts on 1 April 2027 and its first quarterly return is due by 30 July 2027, with no date set for central publication.
Risk, not a certaintyConfidence: Moderate
Source: Cabinet Office, Insourcing and the Public Interest Test — Guidance Note (Commencement and reporting sections)
Policy: Public Interest Tests on insourcing apply from 1 April 2027, with the first quarterly return due by 30 July 2027 and results to be published centrally (no date set).
Checked 4 October 2026. A commitment is not delivery.
Set a date for central publication of test results
Lets the public judge insourcing decisions on evidence once tests apply.
Who: Cabinet Office · Evidence: Untested proposal · Status: Site-editorial action
Buy measurable results and manage contracts through delivery
Outcome baselines give the test something to compare against.
Who: Cabinet Office; departments · Evidence: Expert or audit recommendation · Status: Site-editorial action
Source: Institute for Government, The role of procurement in delivering mission-led government (Report PDF pp.4–5)
Apply the Public Interest Test before re-procuring
Compares in-house and outsourced delivery on the same terms.
Who: Cabinet Office; departments · Evidence: Untested proposal · Status: Enacted but not operational
Source: Cabinet Office, Insourcing and the Public Interest Test — Guidance Note (Guidance note)
Our shortlist for this page. Research quality, policy status, cost and funding are judged separately; none of these is government policy unless its status says so.Our shortlist. None is government policy unless its status says so.
Action 1A23Policy status: site-editorial action
Specify the outcome before tender, publish whole-life cost and milestones, and staff skilled contract management for the life of the contract.
The thread: issue, evidence, action
Assessment (draft, 6 October review)
A broad priority including this action (GRP-01): Deliver what is already funded
Delivery RAG: AmberGate: pending
Range if completed: 14.0–20.0 out of 30 (equal weights; not yet assessed: expected incremental benefit (Bn), incremental affordability (Co))
National plan: Growth and prosperity list
Not yet costed
Funding: Not yet costed / funding not identifiedWhy it is shortlisted here: Contracts delivering the service is the outcome this page tracks; capability is the constraint audit evidence returns to.
Weak specification and thin contract-management capacity stop public purchases turning into the services and capabilities intended.
Users of publicly contracted services and capabilities; suppliers, including small firms. Territory: UK. The Procurement Act 2023 applies to UK-wide and English bodies and Wales and Northern Ireland; Scotland largely keeps its own regime, not assessed here.
UK Facts proposal. Builds on rules already in force: the Procurement Act 2023 (from 24 February 2025) requires KPIs and performance publication for larger contracts. Applying an outcome-and-milestone baseline to a named set of renewing contracts is a UK Facts proposal.
Cost completeness: Not yet costed. Funding: Not yet costed / funding not identified.
First step: Apply the approach to a defined set of renewing contracts and publish their baseline cost, outcome and milestones. (owner: Cabinet Office with lead departments (MOD for defence))
Depends on: Procurement Act reporting data; A42 for innovation trials within the same rules
This card replaces the option “Build commercial and contract-management capability” (operating). Its evidence: NAO reports repeatedly link poor outcomes to weak specification and contract management; its 2024 study of common goods and services found scope for efficiency through better central buying. Independent evaluations of training programmes are scarce. National Audit Office, Efficiency in government procurement of common goods and services (HC 116, 2024-25) · National Audit Office, The Ajax programme
Source published September 2025 (IfG); July 2024 (RUSI); December 2023 (NAO); July 2026 (NISTA); evidence reviewed 2026-10-04. Reconsider if: First central publication of Procurement Act KPI data; A new NISTA annual report; An evaluation of outcome-based contracts.
Also on: Follow the money, Defence — one shared record, so its cost is counted once.
Action 2A42Policy status: site-editorial action
Run bounded, competitive trials against a defined service problem with a minimum acceptable result, an adoption route and independent evaluation — and publish failures.
The thread: issue, evidence, action
Assessment (draft, 6 October review)
A broad priority including this action (GRP-02): Turn research into products and adoption
Delivery RAG: AmberGate: pending
Range if completed: 11.0–20.0 out of 30 (equal weights; not yet assessed: increment beyond baseline (Ad), expected incremental benefit (Bn), incremental affordability (Co))
National plan: Growth and prosperity list
Not yet costed
Funding: Not yet costed / funding not identifiedWhy it is shortlisted here: Public buying can test innovations that matter to services, if trials are bounded, evaluated and have a buyer.
Public bodies rarely act as early customers, and pilots often end without a route to adoption or an honest evaluation.
Public-service users; innovative suppliers, including small firms. Territory: UK. The Procurement Act 2023 does not cover most Scottish devolved bodies; pilots there need Scottish rules.
UK Facts proposal. The Procurement Act 2023 (in force February 2025) allows more flexible procedures; using them for evaluated innovation trials with adoption routes is a UK Facts proposal. A national allocation now exists: on 31 August 2026 the Burnham government launched the first competitions under a £100m Sovereign AI R&D Procurement Scheme. It covers AI products only and is not an evaluated-trial programme.
Cost completeness: Not yet costed. Funding: Not yet costed / funding not identified.
First step: State the service problem and minimum acceptable result before selecting any technology. (owner: The commissioning body)
Depends on: A23: contract-management capacity; A44: the same evaluation discipline for AI tools
Source published September 2025 (IfG); May 2026 (Magenta Book); evidence reviewed 2026-10-04. Reconsider if: Evaluation of Procurement Act flexible procedures; A named innovation-procurement fund.
Also on: Innovation — one shared record, so its cost is counted once.
The leading option set out as a decision someone could take: who decides, who benefits, the best evidence, cost and funding, and the main trade-off. The full research record is one click away.
Decision briefStatutory/accountability reformReviewed 2026-10-04
The thread: issue, evidence, action
An editorial proposal by UK Facts for discussion, not government policy. Records: A23, A20 · effects E-A23-SERVICE, E-A23-DEFENCE · costs C-A23-CAPABILITY, C-A20-ANALYSIS
1.The change, in plain words
Set realistic costs before spending, then manage the contracts that deliver the priorities to the result
2.The decision requested
3.Who it is for, and what changes beyond today
Source: National Infrastructure and Service Transformation Authority, NISTA Major Projects Annual Report 2025–26 (ratings at 31 March 2026) (Delivery confidence ratings); National Audit Office, Lessons learned: a planning and spending framework that enables long-term value for money (HC 234, Session 2024-25) (Paragraph 1.17)
4.How it would work
Do: Specify outcomes before tender, publish whole-life cost and milestones, manage contracts through delivery, and set cost baselines before money is committed. Changing: Fewer change orders and overruns on the contracts that deliver the priorities.
Contracts delivering the specified service on time and near cost
Hypothesis to testEffect record E-A23-SERVICE
Recommended by audit; no evaluation of the effect.
Defence equipment closer to budget and schedule
Hypothesis to testEffect record E-A23-DEFENCE
A plausible link; overruns also come from policy changes.
Outcomes are kept separate and never added into one impact figure.
5.Best evidence
The role of procurement in delivering mission-led government
Where: Report PDF pp.4–5, p.19. Affiliation is provenance, not proof of quality.
6.Alternatives, counter-evidence and who loses
Source: National Audit Office, Lessons learned: a planning and spending framework that enables long-term value for money (HC 234, Session 2024-25) (Summary)
| Option | Who is reached | Evidence | Likely outcome and timing | Cost and funding | Main trade-off |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| The proposalNamed contracts with published baselines and managed delivery | Contracts behind the priorities | Audit recommendation | Publication in a year; effect unmeasured | Staff costs not established | Commercial staff diverted |
| Current policyCurrent policy: Procurement Act duties as applied | Larger contracts | KPI data not centrally published | Unknown | Within running costs | No targeting at the priorities |
| AlternativeInsource where markets are thin | Selected services | Results do not exist yet | From April 2027 | Transition costs | Different remedy |
The options compared, including current policy
The proposal
Named contracts with published baselines and managed delivery
Current policy
Current policy: Procurement Act duties as applied
Alternative
Insource where markets are thin
7.What other countries or the devolved nations show
No comparable evaluation found.
Searched: Evaluations of outcome-specified public contracts or published cost baselines that measure delivery or savings (UK and OECD). None found in this review.
Next step: Compare the named contracts with similar contracts outside the set at the next major projects report.
8.What delivery needs first
9.What it would cost
How the cost is built up: Commercial staff per named contract + analytical staff for baselines; no saving is assumed.
| Component | Unit and quantity | Unit cost or amount | Type, price year, period | Status |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Commercial staff, oversight, transition and maintenanceNamed renewing contracts | per contract; quantity to be set from need and capacity | Not yet costed (ledger C-A23-CAPABILITY) | recurring; price year not stated; Contract lifetimes | Not yet established |
| Analytical capacity for service cost baselinesServices behind the priorities | per spending review; quantity to be set from need and capacity | Not yet costed (ledger C-A20-ANALYSIS) | recurring; price year not stated; Each spending review | Not yet established |
Commercial staff, oversight, transition and maintenance
Named renewing contracts
Not yet costed (ledger C-A23-CAPABILITY)
recurring; price year not stated; Contract lifetimes; Not yet established
Analytical capacity for service cost baselines
Services behind the priorities
Not yet costed (ledger C-A20-ANALYSIS)
recurring; price year not stated; Each spending review; Not yet established
10.Who pays, and what is missing
11.First milestone and time to a useful result
Named renewing contracts with published outcomes, whole-life cost and milestones. (Owner: Cabinet Office with lead departments. Proposed by UK Facts, not an official deadline.)
Time to first useful result: Publication within a year; delivery results at the next major projects report.
What could delay it: Departments release commercial staff. Suppliers accept outcome terms at renewal.
12.How we would know
What is not yet known, and how to find out
Sources last checked 4 October 2026 · Owner: Evidence editor (James Harris) · Next check: the first trigger: National Audit Office reports on commercial capability or contract management.
Decision briefPublic-policy proposalReviewed 2026-10-04
The thread: issue, evidence, action
An editorial proposal by UK Facts for discussion, not government policy. Records: A42 · costs C-A42-TRIALS
1.The change, in plain words
Buy innovation only with a named buyer, a pass mark set in advance and money ready to adopt what works
2.The decision requested
3.Who it is for, and what changes beyond today
Source: UK Research and Innovation (by Steer), An Evaluation of the Small Business Research Initiative (SBRI) (Executive summary); Cabinet Office, Transforming Public Procurement (collection) — Procurement Act 2023 in force 24 February 2025 (In force 24 February 2025)
4.How it would work
Do: Commit an adoption budget and a minimum acceptable result before a competition launches Changing: so that trials that pass are bought at scale and trials that fail stop, with the result public
Tested products adopted by the public buyer after a successful trial
Hypothesis to test
The SBRI evaluation did not robustly measure adoption; this is the outcome to track.
Service benefit and whole-life cost in the targeted service
Hypothesis to test
Specific to each trial; measured against the stated minimum result.
Outcomes are kept separate and never added into one impact figure.
5.Best evidence
An Evaluation of the Small Business Research Initiative (SBRI)
Where: Executive summary. Affiliation is provenance, not proof of quality.
The role of procurement in delivering mission-led government
Where: Report PDF p.19. Affiliation is provenance, not proof of quality.
6.Alternatives, counter-evidence and who loses
Source: Institute for Government, The role of procurement in delivering mission-led government (Report PDF p.19)
| Option | Who is reached | Evidence | Likely outcome and timing | Cost and funding | Main trade-off |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| The proposalInnovation competitions only with a named adoption budget holder and a pass mark set in advance | Service users in the targeted area; small suppliers | SBRI evaluation; IfG recommendation | First trial result in one to two years | Not costed; no allocation identified | Fewer competitions |
| Current policyCurrent practice: SBRI-style competitions with adoption decided later | Supplier firms | Firm headcount gains; no turnover or productivity effect; adoption unmeasured | Ongoing | Existing programme budgets | Pilots without buyers |
| AlternativeRenew contracts with outcome baselines (national priority brief on this page) | Users of contracted services | Audit and expert recommendation | At each renewal | Commercial staff time | Improves existing services rather than testing new ones |
The options compared, including current policy
The proposal
Innovation competitions only with a named adoption budget holder and a pass mark set in advance
Current policy
Current practice: SBRI-style competitions with adoption decided later
Alternative
Renew contracts with outcome baselines (national priority brief on this page)
7.What other countries or the devolved nations show
Country lesson · United States (Department of Energy), Awards 1983–2013; study published 2017
Evidence: Experimental or quasi-experimental evaluationPartial match: some conditions differ
Not a UK forecast: the effect above was measured in that place and population. Source: American Economic Association, Financing Innovation: Evidence from R&D Grants (American Economic Review 107(4): 1136–64) (Abstract). Reviewed 2026-10-04.
8.What delivery needs first
9.What it would cost
How the cost is built up: Competition and trial contracts + integration and security + evaluation + exit; scaling is a separate, pre-committed budget decision triggered only by a pass.
| Component | Unit and quantity | Unit cost or amount | Type, price year, period | Status |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Trial, integration, staff training, security, maintenance and exitOne bounded innovation trial by a named commissioning body | trial; quantity to be set from need and capacity | Not yet costed (ledger C-A42-TRIALS) | mixed; price year not stated; Trial period plus adoption decision | Not yet established |
Trial, integration, staff training, security, maintenance and exit
One bounded innovation trial by a named commissioning body
Not yet costed (ledger C-A42-TRIALS)
mixed; price year not stated; Trial period plus adoption decision; Not yet established
10.Who pays, and what is missing
11.First milestone and time to a useful result
One department publishes a service problem, minimum acceptable result, adoption budget holder and evaluation plan before launching a competition (Owner: The commissioning body, with the Cabinet Office. Proposed by UK Facts, not an official deadline.)
Time to first useful result: Trial results within one to two years of launch.
What could delay it: No budget holder will pre-commit Suppliers bid less for a tougher pass mark
12.How we would know
What is not yet known, and how to find out
Sources last checked 4 October 2026 · Owner: Evidence editor (James Harris) · Next check: the first trigger: A change to innovation procurement policy or the Procurement Act 2023 guidance.
First, the prerequisite
Publish outcome, whole-life cost and milestones for a set of renewing contracts
Owner: Cabinet Office with departments
No date: the timing depends on the steps before it.
Then, the decision
Fund contract-management posts from named budgets; name an innovation trial and its success threshold
Owner: Departments; commissioning bodies
No date: the timing depends on the steps before it.
Then, delivery
Public Interest Tests apply to new projects and re-procurements
Owner: Central government departments; Government Commercial Agency
1 April 2027 — source
Finally, the measured outcome
Milestones, change orders and trial results published
Owner: Contracting authorities; NISTA; NAO
No date: the timing depends on the steps before it.
Cost, committed funding and the remaining gap for the same scope and years. A programme envelope is not an award to a project; a proposal is not committed money. None of these costs has been established yet, so no total is shown.
Cost and funding ledger
Commercial staff, contract oversight, transition, maintenance and supplier compliance
A23 · administration · not costed
Trial, integration, staff training, security, maintenance and exit
A42 · administration · not costed
“Not yet costed” means no defensible cost has been found — not that the action is free. Lifetime benefits, benefit-cost ratios and forecast savings are never shown here as money available to spend.
| Action | Outcome and area | Effect | Compared with | Evidence |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Buy measurable results and manage contracts through delivery | Contracts delivering the specified service on time and near cost Public service delivery | Direction plausible; size not established | — | plausible spillover; limited confidence; United KingdomRecommended by research and audit; no evaluation estimates the effect. |
| Buy measurable results and manage contracts through delivery | Defence equipment programmes delivered closer to budget and schedule Defence and security | Direction plausible; size not established | — | plausible spillover; limited confidence; United KingdomAudit and expert recommendations, not an evaluation: no source estimates how much better contract management would reduce overruns, and policy changes cause some of them. |
The outcome measures to watch. A baseline is where we start, not a target; where there is no official target we say so.
projects (of 172 rated) · United Kingdom
Target: none — no official target.
Source: National Infrastructure and Service Transformation Authority, NISTA Major Projects Annual Report 2025–26 (ratings at 31 March 2026) (Delivery confidence ratings). Next release: annual (summer) (check the release calendar).
quarterly returns · UK central government
Target: none — the rule starts on 1 April 2027; no results exist yet.
Source: Cabinet Office, Insourcing and the Public Interest Test — Guidance Note (Reporting section). Next release: first quarterly return due to the Government Commercial Agency by 30 July 2027; central publication date not set.
“Full text checked” means we read the report itself; “relevant passages” means the sections behind each figure; “summary or abstract only” means we could not read the full study, so no number from it is published here without another source.
Options from earlier work on this page that are not on the shortlist. They remain valid choices; their evidence is shown as before.
| Option | Resources | Time | Evidence | Outcome to watch |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Publish contract performance | Data systems and staff time to report. | Annual KPI reports for contracts let under the Act from 2026; social-value KPIs not before 2028. | limited | Earlier remedial action on failing contracts. |
| Test whether services should come in-house | Staff, assets and transition funding for any service brought in-house. | Tests from April 2027; transitions as contracts end (for example 2028 for Cabinet Office facilities). | not evaluated | Whole-life cost and service quality before and after each switch. |
| Recover money from failed contracts | Lawyers, investigators, time. | Years per case. | moderate | Fewer disputed contracts in future emergencies. |
Plan reviewed 2026-10-04. How we judge evidence.
Every major defence programme with its delivery-confidence rating, end date and whole-life cost.
Why an estimated loss, a claim and cash recovered are different numbers.
Health is the largest public service budget, and much of it is bought from suppliers.
Donations are published separately from contracts.
A donation and a contract to the same company is not evidence that one caused the other.
