Suggested Portsmouth Action Plan
UK Facts' own evidence-led analysis of what the data suggests could help — not Portsmouth City Council policy, a government commitment, or a funded programme unless 'Current status' says so.
Suggested Portsmouth Action Plan — this is UK Facts's own evidence-led analysis of what the data suggests could help, not Portsmouth City Council policy, a government commitment, or anyone's funded programme unless "Current status" says so explicitly. Costs are order-of-magnitude estimates, not costed bids, and are labelled as such throughout. See each item's sources for the underlying evidence, and the Development Plan for what is actually official, funded or underway.
Suggested by UK Facts · not council policy
The 10 suggestions at a glance
1. A fully costed SEND plan aligned to the 2026 reforms, published before the DSG override ends
Why it matters: The DSG statutory override ends on 31 March 2028, and no local plan responding to the February 2026 Schools White Paper has been identified.
Current status: Not proposed officially
2. Break large contracts into smaller lots so Portsmouth firms can bid
Why it matters: Only 17.3% of the council’s £414.6m a year in contracts is with businesses registered in the city.
Current status: Not proposed officially
3. A Community Land Trust for island housing
Why it matters: Portsmouth is an island and cannot expand outward, so every new home competes with employment land, green space and flood defence.
Current status: Not proposed officially
4. A shared port and naval-base apprenticeship pipeline
Why it matters: The council’s own skills strategy puts graduate retention at roughly 19%, well below what the city’s anchor employers would need.
Current status: Not proposed officially
5. Sustained, targeted literacy/numeracy tutoring in the highest-deprivation wards
Why it matters: Educational underachievement gaps in the most deprived wards persist and compound over a child’s schooling.
Current status: Not proposed officially
6. A formally designated QA Hospital–University of Portsmouth health innovation zone
Why it matters: Two genuine anchor institutions for health research, but no formal structure to commercialise that research locally.
Current status: Not proposed officially
7. A public, dated delivery timetable for the remaining worst Portsmouth/Langstone sewage outfalls
Why it matters: Residents have no site-by-site schedule for the outfalls with the worst spill records, so progress cannot easily be checked.
Current status: Underway
8. A visible local campaign on the registered waste-carrier database, alongside enforcement
Why it matters: Fly-tipping incidents rose from 751 to 1,092 in a single year, while only 17 Fixed Penalty Notices were issued.
Current status: Not proposed officially
9. Insist Tipner West's marine employment space is built alongside the housing, not after it
Why it matters: There is no fallback development land: if the marine employment space slips, the city loses one of its few chances to grow high-wage jobs on the island.
Current status: Under discussion
10. Complete a signposted cycle circuit of Portsea Island
Why it matters: Good cycling infrastructure fragments exist but do not connect into one continuous, safe route.
Current status: Not proposed officially
Each suggestion in full
Every item below starts from a documented problem, cites the evidence for it, and proposes something specific — with costs given as order-of-magnitude estimates (never invented precision), who would realistically have to act, and what would tell us whether it worked. Some of this recovers and rebuilds a previous version of this plan that used to live on the inequality page; other items are new, drawn from the evidence gathered for Beyond the Headlines.
1. A fully costed SEND plan aligned to the 2026 reforms, published before the DSG override ends
Current status: Not proposed officiallyProblem
Portsmouth has held a Dedicated Schools Grant surplus while recording the worst severe absence of the three local education authorities and, until 2025/26, the lowest EHCP rate of the three. No published document explains why the high needs block was underspent in those years, and no local plan responding to the February 2026 Schools White Paper has been identified. The DSG statutory override ends on 31 March 2028; the reorganisation decision that would have abolished the council the next day was withdrawn on 7 September 2026 and is under government review.Proposed intervention
Publish a costed local SEND and inclusion plan aligned to the White Paper's four-tier model and Inclusion Hub requirement, before the override ends. Options it should price rather than assume: an EHC assessment hub on the Hampshire model; directly employed specialist practitioners rather than spot-purchased assessment; expansion of speech, language and mental health provision proportionate to the actual need mix; and additional specialist or inclusion-base places. The plan should state explicitly what the historic underspend was not spent on.- Timescale
- Short-term (1–3 yrs)
- Responsible
- Portsmouth City Council; Portsmouth Education Partnership; Department for Education; Schools and academy trusts
Evidence, why it might work and trade-offs
Evidence
DSG carry-forward of +£11.5m (March 2024), +£11.1m (2025) and +£8.0m (2026 draft), turning to a budgeted −£4.5m in 2026/27. Severe absence 3.55% against Southampton 3.36% and Hampshire 2.44% (DfE, 2024/25). EHC plan timeliness collapsed to 1.6% in 2023 and recovered only to 42.9% by 2025, below the England average. Primary need mix is markedly different from Southampton: 29.2% speech, language and communication against 21.5%, and 24.6% social, emotional and mental health against 14.6% (DfE school census, January 2026).Why it might work
Portsmouth's need mix is dominated by two needs — speech and language, and social, emotional and mental health — that depend on therapy and specialist staffing rather than buildings, and are therefore addressable without a capital programme. A costed plan is also the only way the city's DSG position can be defended in any future reorganisation negotiations, because an unexplained surplus invites the assumption that the money is available to absorb a partner's deficit.Trade-offs / risks
Committing the remaining surplus to recurrent staffing creates a forward liability that any successor authority would inherit. Doing nothing risks the surplus being netted against a partner authority's deficit if reorganisation returns, with nothing to show for it locally. Both are real; the plan is how the choice gets made deliberately rather than by default.Cost, funding route and success measures
Cost
The plan itself is officer time. The interventions it would price are the real cost: directly employed specialist practitioners are typically low single-digit millions a year at city scale, and specialist places are a capital question. No figure should be committed before the plan establishes what the need mix actually requires.
Funding route
Existing high needs block, including any remaining carry-forward; DfE high needs stability grant; capital via the schools condition allocation for any places element.
Success measures
- A published plan, costed, dated and mapped to the White Paper tiers
- EHC plan timeliness returning to and holding above the England average
- Severe absence falling — the nearest measured proxy for unmet need
- A published explanation of the historic high needs underspend
2. Break large contracts into smaller lots so Portsmouth firms can bid
Current status: Not proposed officiallyProblem
Portsmouth City Council holds £414.6m a year in contracts. Only £71.8m — 17.3% — is with businesses registered in the city, and £25.3m of that is a single highways PFI locked until 2032. Strip that out and local share is nearer 11%. The largest category, construction, repairs and facilities, is £147.1m a year with just 10.3% going to Portsmouth-registered firms — on work physically carried out in Portsmouth.Proposed intervention
Adopt a lotting and social value strategy under the Procurement Act 2023: divide large construction, maintenance and facilities contracts into geographic or trade lots sized for firms of 10 to 50 staff; apply the permitted social value weighting to local employment and supply chain; publish a forward pipeline far enough ahead that local firms can prepare bids and form consortia; and require main contractors on the largest lots to sub-contract a stated share locally.- Timescale
- Short-term (1–3 yrs)
- Responsible
- Portsmouth City Council (procurement); Any successor authority, if reorganisation proceeds; Solent Chamber of Commerce and local trade bodies
Evidence, why it might work and trade-offs
Evidence
Contracts register released under FOI2026/02585, August 2026: 2,326 contracts, annual value £414.6m. Portsmouth (PO1–PO6) 413 contracts worth £71.8m. Rest of UK 1,356 contracts worth £238.6m. Agency and temporary staffing is 0% local; energy 1.5%; waste 0.1%. £212m a year reaches contract expiry before 1 April 2028.Why it might work
The barrier is usually contract size rather than capability — a £13m facilities contract cannot be bid by a twenty-person Portsmouth firm however good it is. The Procurement Act 2023 expressly permits both lotting and social value weighting. The spend is also recurrent rather than one-off, which is the condition under which local capacity has time to build and repay.Trade-offs / risks
More lots means more contracts to manage and can raise unit costs. Local preference cannot lawfully be applied as a straight geographic restriction — only social value weighting and lot sizing are available. And a registered local address is not the same as local employment, so the measure can be gamed by a letterbox office unless employment is what is actually weighted.Cost, funding route and success measures
Cost
Procurement capacity rather than programme cost — additional contract management for a larger number of smaller lots, in the low hundreds of thousands a year. Smaller lots can carry a modest unit-cost premium against a single large contract; that premium is the price of the policy and should be stated rather than assumed away.
Funding route
Existing procurement budget; no new funding required.
Success measures
- Local share of annual contract value, measured excluding the highways PFI so the figure is not flattered by one locked contract
- Number of contracts awarded to firms with fewer than 50 employees
- Share of the £212m expiring before April 2028 that is re-let in lots under £2m
Sources (2)
- Portsmouth City Council — contracts register, FOI2026/02585 — 2026-08-10
- Procurement Act 2023 — 2023
3. A Community Land Trust for island housing
Current status: Not proposed officiallyProblem
Portsmouth cannot expand outward — it is an island — so every new home competes with employment land, green space and flood defence. Ordinary market housing delivery alone has not kept pace with need, and short-term/holiday letting further inflates prices in an already-constrained market.Proposed intervention
A Community Land Trust (CLT) that acquires land and builds homes sold or rented permanently below market value — the land is never resold, so affordability is locked in for good, not just for one sale. Target: several hundred CLT homes on Portsea Island by the early 2030s.- Timescale
- Medium-term (3–7 yrs)
- Responsible
- Portsmouth City Council; Homes England; A newly-formed or partner CLT body; MOD (as a potential landowner)
Related official project:Tipner West & City Centre North (Development Plan) →
Evidence, why it might work and trade-offs
Evidence
The Portsmouth Local Plan 2024–2040 sets a 17,700-home target with essentially no fallback land beyond the sites named in the Development Plan. Portsmouth City Council's own Skills and Labour Market Strategy (March 2026) separately notes graduate retention pressure partly linked to cost of living and housing in the city.Why it might work
CLTs are an established UK model (e.g. London CLT, St Clements) precisely for constrained urban land where conventional "affordable" percentages get eroded by viability negotiations. Because the land is permanently removed from the open market, affordability doesn't decay over time the way section 106 discounts sometimes do.Trade-offs / risks
CLT delivery is typically slower and smaller-scale than conventional private development, and depends on finding a willing landowner (public or MOD land) rather than relying on the open market.Cost, funding route and success measures
Cost
Tens of millions in initial land acquisition and build costs, offset over time by below-market rents/shared-ownership receipts rather than being a pure grant cost — treat any total figure as a rough order of magnitude, not a costed bid.
Funding route
Homes England grant funding; possible surplus MOD/Crown Estate land in the area; Portsmouth City Council land contribution.
Success measures
- Number of CLT homes completed and let/sold below market value
- Whether affordability is genuinely locked in at re-sale (not eroded over time)
Sources (1)
4. A shared port and naval-base apprenticeship pipeline
Current status: Not proposed officiallyProblem
Portsmouth's naval base and port are major employers, but the local graduate/apprentice retention rate is low — Portsmouth City Council's own Skills and Labour Market Strategy (March 2026) puts graduate retention at roughly 19%, well below what the city's anchor employers would need to build a durable local skills pipeline.Proposed intervention
A formally coordinated apprenticeship hub linking QA Hospital, BAE Systems, the naval base, the port and Portsmouth City Council into one shared pipeline, deliberately targeted at wards with the highest youth unemployment rather than left to individual employer recruitment.- Timescale
- Medium-term (3–7 yrs)
- Responsible
- BAE Systems; Royal Navy / MOD; University of Portsmouth; City of Portsmouth College; Portsmouth City Council
Evidence, why it might work and trade-offs
Evidence
BAE Systems runs a genuine, if fluctuating in scale, apprenticeship and graduate programme at its Portsmouth Naval Base site. UTC Portsmouth exists specifically as an employer-partnered technical sixth form with BAE Systems, Royal Navy, QinetiQ, NATS and DSTL among its named partners. But there is no single shared, city-wide pipeline coordinating these separately-run schemes.Why it might work
Employer-partnered technical education already works at small scale in Portsmouth (UTC Portsmouth's Ofsted results are strong); the constraint is scale and coordination, not a lack of any working model to build on.Trade-offs / risks
Coordinating multiple large, independent employers (private sector, MOD, NHS, further/higher education) is a genuine governance challenge, not just a funding one.Cost, funding route and success measures
Cost
Set-up cost in the low millions; a large share of ongoing running cost would typically come from the Apprenticeship Levy the anchor employers already pay.
Funding route
Apprenticeship Levy contributions from anchor employers; Department for Education T-Level/skills funding.
Success measures
- Apprenticeship starts per year across the coordinated pipeline
- Graduate/apprentice retention rate in Portsmouth (tracked against the Council's ~19% baseline)
Sources (1)
6. A formally designated QA Hospital–University of Portsmouth health innovation zone
Current status: Not proposed officiallyProblem
Portsmouth has two genuine anchor institutions for health research — Queen Alexandra Hospital and the University of Portsmouth — but no formal structure to commercialise research locally, contributing to the city's low graduate-retention rate.Proposed intervention
A formally designated health innovation zone co-locating QAH clinical research, University of Portsmouth academic research, and scale-up commercial space for health-tech spin-outs — explicitly including the follow-on/scale-up space the university's own documentation says is currently missing.- Timescale
- Medium-term (3–7 yrs)
- Responsible
- University of Portsmouth; NHS Hampshire and Isle of Wight / Portsmouth Hospitals University NHS Trust; Innovate UK
Evidence, why it might work and trade-offs
Evidence
The University of Portsmouth has delivered 100+ Knowledge Transfer Partnerships over two decades (£9.2m in grants, £4.9m in matched business funding) and has produced real spin-outs (RevoNA Bio; Spirogen, sold to AstraZeneca in 2013). But the university's own incubator space (formerly including Portsmouth Technopole, sold to The Trafalgar Group in May 2025 and rebranded Ocean House) has historically lacked follow-on space for companies that outgrow early-stage premises.Why it might work
The underlying research relationship already works (KTPs, real spin-outs) — the gap is specifically the follow-on commercial space that lets a growing company stay in Portsmouth rather than relocate to Southampton Science Park or London.Trade-offs / risks
Portsmouth competes directly with Southampton Science Park and London for exactly this kind of scale-up tenant — space alone does not guarantee retention without a genuinely competitive offer.Cost, funding route and success measures
Cost
A dedicated cluster facility is typically a mid-single-digit-million capital cost; treat as an order of magnitude pending an actual costed proposal.
Funding route
Innovate UK; NHS innovation funding; University of Portsmouth commercial development budget; Solent Freeport innovation incentives.
Success measures
- Number of health-tech spin-outs remaining and scaling within Portsmouth (not just formed here)
- Follow-on commercial space actually delivered
7. A public, dated delivery timetable for the remaining worst Portsmouth/Langstone sewage outfalls
Current status: UnderwayProblem
Southern Water's Three Harbours Partnership is a genuine £170m investment, but residents have no published, site-by-site schedule for the specific outfalls with the worst spill records — so progress cannot easily be checked against a promise.Proposed intervention
A published, dated, site-level delivery plan for the remaining worst outfalls — modelled on the Stanley Road, Stamshaw bottleneck, which has reportedly already been fixed under this same programme.- Timescale
- Short-term (1–3 yrs)
- Responsible
- Southern Water; Environment Agency; Ofwat
Evidence, why it might work and trade-offs
Evidence
Portsmouth Harbour recorded 124 storm-overflow spills totalling 234 hours in the most recent EDM reporting year (Rivers Trust "Top of the Poops", aggregating Environment Agency data); Southsea East remains classified "Poor" for bathing water by the Environment Agency.Why it might work
The programme has already delivered at least one concrete, named fix — the ask here is transparency and pace, not a new mechanism.Trade-offs / risks
None significant — this is a transparency ask on an existing programme rather than a new intervention with its own trade-offs.Cost, funding route and success measures
Cost
No new cost — this is a transparency/reporting ask on an already-funded (£170m) programme, not a new spending request.
Funding route
Already funded — Southern Water's existing Three Harbours Partnership / Clean Rivers and Seas Plan.
Success measures
- A published site-by-site timetable existing at all
- Spill count/hours falling at the named worst outfalls year-on-year
Sources (2)
- Southern Water — Portsmouth Harbour £170m storm overflow scheme — 2024–2026
- Top of the Poops (Rivers Trust) — Portsmouth Harbour — 2025 data year
8. A visible local campaign on the registered waste-carrier database, alongside enforcement
Current status: Not proposed officiallyProblem
Portsmouth fly-tipping incidents rose from 751 to 1,092 in a single year, while only 17 Fixed Penalty Notices were issued over the same period — a large gap between incidents and enforcement capacity.Proposed intervention
A local, visible awareness campaign on the waste-carrier register — letting residents check in seconds whether whoever they're paying to take waste away is legally allowed to — run alongside (not instead of) continued enforcement and the incoming 2027 licensing reform.- Timescale
- Short-term (1–3 yrs)
- Responsible
- Portsmouth City Council; Environment Agency
Evidence, why it might work and trade-offs
Evidence
Government-commissioned research (NatCen, for Defra) found fewer than 3 in 10 people nationally know the registered waste-carrier database exists, and only 11% know fly-tipping can lead to a criminal conviction.Why it might work
This targets a documented awareness gap directly, at very low cost, rather than relying solely on an enforcement capacity that current numbers show is already stretched thin.Trade-offs / risks
Awareness campaigns alone will not stop determined rogue commercial operators — this is a complement to enforcement and the 2027 licensing reform, not a replacement for either.Cost, funding route and success measures
Cost
Low — primarily a communications/campaign cost, not new infrastructure.
Funding route
Portsmouth City Council communications budget; potential Defra local-authority engagement funding.
Success measures
- Awareness of the waste-carrier register among residents (survey-based)
- Fly-tipping incident count trend
Sources (1)
9. Insist Tipner West's marine employment space is built alongside the housing, not after it
Current status: Under discussionProblem
Portsmouth's island geography means there is no fallback development land beyond the sites already in the Local Plan — if Tipner West delivers homes but the marine employment floorspace slips or shrinks, the city loses one of its few remaining chances to grow permanent, high-wage jobs on the island.Proposed intervention
Portsmouth City Council and the Local Plan examination process should treat the marine employment floorspace as a delivery condition tied to the housing phases, not something that can be quietly reduced later for viability reasons.- Timescale
- Short-term (1–3 yrs)
- Responsible
- Portsmouth City Council (planning); Homes England; The Tipner West developer(s)
Related official project:Tipner West (Development Plan) →
Evidence, why it might work and trade-offs
Evidence
The Portsmouth Local Plan allocates Tipner West for up to 1,000 homes plus 58,000 sqm of marine employment space — but housing and commercial floorspace on mixed-use sites nationally do not always deliver in the proportions originally allocated once a scheme reaches viability negotiations.Why it might work
This is a planning-conditions ask, not a new funding request — it uses a lever the council already has (planning obligations) rather than asking for new money.Trade-offs / risks
Tying housing delivery to commercial floorspace conditions can slow down urgently-needed housing if a developer argues the employment space is not viable — a genuine trade-off between speed of housing delivery and the jobs objective.Cost, funding route and success measures
Cost
No direct public cost — this is a planning-policy/conditions ask, not a spending proposal.
Funding route
N/A — planning conditions, not a funding ask.
Success measures
- Marine employment floorspace actually delivered vs the 58,000 sqm allocation, tracked phase by phase
Sources (1)
10. Complete a signposted cycle circuit of Portsea Island
Current status: Not proposed officiallyProblem
Portsmouth has several genuinely good cycling infrastructure fragments (Hilsea Lines, the Southsea Coastal Scheme's promenade diversions) but they do not currently connect into one continuous, safe route.Proposed intervention
A fully signposted cycle circuit of Portsea Island (roughly 12km) connecting Hilsea Lines, Eastern Road, Eastney, the Southsea seafront, Old Portsmouth and Tipner, resolving the specific dangerous junctions rather than treating each green-space project's cycle path as a standalone amenity.- Timescale
- Medium-term (3–7 yrs)
- Responsible
- Portsmouth City Council (highways); Active Travel England
Related official project:Green Infrastructure Investment (Development Plan) →
Evidence, why it might work and trade-offs
Evidence
The Development Plan's own "what's still missing" assessment for Green Infrastructure names the Hilsea Lido–Eastney–Southsea Castle seafront cycle routing as incomplete and unsafe at several junctions.Why it might work
Most of the individual segments already exist or are being built as part of other funded schemes (Hilsea Lines restoration, Southsea Coastal Scheme) — the missing piece is junction treatment and continuity, not building a route from scratch.Trade-offs / risks
Junction redesigns that favour cyclists can reduce motor-vehicle capacity at pinch points on an island with only one main road in and out — a real trade-off given Portsmouth's existing traffic congestion.Cost, funding route and success measures
Cost
Mid-single-digit millions, primarily for junction upgrades, surfacing and wayfinding rather than new route construction.
Funding route
Active Travel England; Solent Transport capital programme; developer contributions from Tipner West and City Centre North.
Success measures
- Number of dangerous junctions resolved
- Cycle trip counts on the connected route
Sources (1)