Men’s life expectancy differs by nearly six years across Hampshire.

The problem

Hampshire’s 13 council areas differ widely on health, housing costs and work, while powers are split between districts, the county, two unitary cities, one NHS board, one police force and a new combined county authority — so no single body owns the gaps.

Who is affected, and where

Residents of ceremonial Hampshire (Portsmouth, Southampton and 11 districts), starting with the area and group where a gap is largest. Territory: Local. England only. Ceremonial Hampshire excludes the Isle of Wight, although the NHS board, the police force and some programmes also cover it.

Policy status

UK Facts proposal. Not an agreed local plan. Programmes already hold money here: Connect to Work allocations of £18.7m (Hampshire, 4,800 starts) and £12.6m (Solent — Portsmouth, Southampton and the Isle of Wight — 3,700 starts); a £34.8m Warm Homes: Local Grant to a 31-council consortium led by Portsmouth that includes Southampton and all 11 Hampshire districts; and Eastleigh Borough Council is a Social and Affordable Homes Programme strategic partner (£154.4m for 1,042 homes). The March 2026 reorganisation decision was withdrawn on 7 September 2026 and is under review, so any plan must work on the current 13 authorities. University of Southampton researchers are a possible research route, not an agreed partner.

The evidence

What the research found:

The Marmot review sets out a framework across income, housing, work and early years without quantifying a local package; the Magenta Book advises planning the evaluation, comparison and baseline before implementation; the University of Southampton’s STEER group page describes health-equity research capacity, with no completed intervention results.

Evaluated on:

Not evaluated.; Ceremonial Hampshire, 2026

Our recommendation (separate from the research):

Choose one gap and one owner, use stable boundaries and resident involvement, design the evaluation first, and never scale a national cost by population share.

Strongest counter-evidence:

Small populations make local effects hard to detect; boundaries and responsibilities may change after the reorganisation review; and differences in life expectancy between areas reflect who lives there, not only local services.

Effects on record

• Outcome of the chosen local pilot: Direction plausible; size not established. plausible spillover, evidence gap confidence; Ceremonial Hampshire. Local, so never counted towards national reach; the effect depends entirely on the pilot chosen.

Cost and funding

Cost completeness: Not yet costed. Funding: Not yet costed / funding not identified.

• One local pilot and its evaluation (recurring spending; paid by councils, NHS): Not yet costed. Cost each local intervention and its evaluation; national costs are never scaled by population.

Who pays:

The council, NHS body or authority that owns the chosen pilot; any research grant would be separate and is not assumed.

Financing proposed:

Existing local allocations (for example Connect to Work or Warm Homes grants) only where their conditions allow; these belong to national programmes and are not new money.

Gap remaining:

Unknown until a pilot is chosen and costed.

What delivery needs

Skills:

Local analysts and evaluators.

Operational capacity:

Officer time in the owning body.

Infrastructure:

Data on stable boundaries.

Permissions:

Data-sharing agreements between councils and the NHS.

Law:

None.

Public consent:

Resident involvement in choosing the pilot.

First step and stages

First step: Use stable boundaries, local needs evidence and resident involvement to select one pilot and its owner. (owner: The relevant council or NHS body, with the combined county authority where its powers apply)

1. Agree ownership and budget for one pilot — Owning council or NHS body (proposed stage, not an official timetable)
2. Run and evaluate against a comparison — Owning body with evaluators (proposed stage, not an official timetable)
3. Decide on continuation from the results — Owning body (proposed stage, not an official timetable)

Depends on: The outcome of the reorganisation review; Local data on matched denominators

Trade-offs

Who gains and who loses:

Gains for residents of the chosen area or group; others wait, and the owning body bears the cost.

What else the money or effort could do:

Officer time and money used for one pilot are not available elsewhere.

Strongest counterargument:

Local pilots rarely have enough people to show an effect, and national programmes already operate here.

Risks:

Confused responsibilities, changing boundaries, small samples and claiming that moving area causes the observed life-expectancy differences.

How we would judge it

Baseline:

Area measures on this page: life expectancy, claimant rate, house price to earnings ratio and persistent absence by council area.

Leading indicator:

Delivery of the chosen pilot to plan.

Outcome:

Local access and outcomes, subgroup differences and costs; life expectancy only as a long-run outcome.

Continue, adapt or stop:

Continue where the pilot beats its comparison on the chosen outcome; stop otherwise.

Sources

• UCL Institute of Health Equity / Health Foundation, Build Back Fairer: The COVID-19 Marmot Review, Executive summary PDF p.7 (2020-12; relevant passages checked)
• HM Treasury / Evaluation Task Force, The Magenta Book: Central Government guidance on evaluation, Chapter 1, sections 1.5–1.6 (2026-05-14; relevant passages checked)
• University of Southampton, Southampton Transdisciplinary Health Equity Research Collaborative (STEER), Group page “About” (Live research-group page; full text checked)
• Department for Work and Pensions, Connect to Work: grant guidance for England, Annex of accountable bodies (printed pp.61–62); paragraph 219 table (printed p.64) (2026-05-15; relevant passages checked)
• Department for Energy Security and Net Zero, Warm Homes: Local Grant — successful local authorities, Entry “Portsmouth” (2026-07-02 (updated); relevant passages checked)
• MHCLG and Homes England, Homes England and government confirm strategic partners for the Social and Affordable Homes Programme, Strategic partners table (Eastleigh Borough Council) (2026-08-25; relevant passages checked)
• MHCLG, Local government reorganisation: programme review and decisions withdrawal letter to council leaders, Letter, paragraphs on withdrawn decisions and May 2027 elections (2026-09-07; full text checked)
• University of Southampton, Southampton Transdisciplinary Health Equity Research Collaborative (STEER), Group page “About” (Live research-group page; full text checked)

Source published December 2020 (Marmot); May 2026 (Magenta Book); 2026 (local allocations); evidence reviewed 2026-10-04. Reconsider if: The outcome of the reorganisation review; A completed local evaluation; New local allocations.

The problem

Record numbers of households are in temporary accommodation while a new social-housing programme is being allocated: the first allocations (25 August 2026) fund supply in general, not homes for households in temporary accommodation.

Who is affected, and where

Homeless households in temporary accommodation, and households on social-housing waiting lists, in England. Territory: England. Housing is devolved; Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland have separate programmes, not assessed here.

Policy status

A funded programme already exists. The Social and Affordable Homes Programme 2026–2036 (£39bn envelope) made its first allocations on 25 August 2026 (£9.58bn to 33 strategic partners outside London; more than £16bn outside London and around £5bn in London still to allocate), under the Burnham government; its aim is supply, especially social rent, with temporary accommodation a stated use only for limited acquisitions. The dedicated temporary-accommodation capital route is the separate Local Authority Housing Fund, not assessed here. Linking awards to temporary-accommodation outcomes is a UK Facts proposal.

The evidence

What the research found:

The NAO found the department’s central forecast was 157,000 homes under the 2021 programme, against a published target of “up to 180,000 should economic conditions allow”.

Evaluated on:

The 2021 Affordable Homes Programme; England

Our recommendation (separate from the research):

Track each award against social-rent lettings and households leaving temporary accommodation, not grant announced.

Strongest counter-evidence:

Rising build costs cut the last programme’s output; grant per home and the share at social rent trade off against the number of homes.

Effects on record

• Households leaving temporary accommodation: Direction plausible; size not established. plausible spillover, limited confidence; England. Whether new social-rent homes are additional locally and reach households in temporary accommodation has not been evaluated.
• Income after housing costs of households moving into a social-rent home: Direction plausible; size not established. plausible spillover, limited confidence; England. No source we checked estimates how much poverty after housing costs falls when households move into new social-rent homes; rent levels, benefit offsets and who is housed all change the answer.
• Stability of home and school for children leaving temporary accommodation: Direction plausible; size not established. plausible spillover, limited confidence; England. Our sources count the children affected but none evaluates the effect of rehousing on attendance, attainment or health, so this is a link to test, not a finding.

Cost and funding

Cost completeness: Published programme envelope; project costs still needed. Funding: Programme funding exists; project allocation unconfirmed.

• Social and Affordable Homes Programme 2026–2036 (programme envelope) (capital; paid by central government): £39bn in total, 2026–27 to 2035–36, price basis not stated by the source. A ten-year envelope allocated by bidding — not an award to any project. MHCLG states no price basis. Homes England’s share includes £1.2bn of bridge funding announced in March 2025.
• Grant, borrowing, rent, maintenance and infrastructure for a named scheme (capital; paid by central government, councils, households): Not yet costed. Must come from a scheme’s award and business case; dividing the envelope by a guessed number of homes is not a cost.
• Social and Affordable Homes Programme envelope: £39bn, 2026–27 to 2035–36 — not committed (programme envelope, not a project award). Not an award to a scheme. A selected scheme counts as funded only once its award, co-financing and conditions are checked.

Who pays:

Central government grant; housing associations and councils through borrowing repaid from rents; tenants through rents.

Financing proposed:

Programme grant plus landlord borrowing.

Gap remaining:

Unknown for any selected scheme until its award, co-financing and running costs are checked.

What delivery needs

Skills:

Development and housing-management staff.

Operational capacity:

Housing associations’ balance sheets, also needed for repairs and safety work.

Infrastructure:

Sites with connections.

Permissions:

Planning permission for each scheme.

Law:

No new law needed.

Public consent:

Local consent for schemes.

First step and stages

First step: Link a named allocation to a tenure mix, timetable and the households it will serve. (owner: Homes England, GLA and councils)

1. Award and planning checks — Homes England / GLA, Bidding opened February 2026; first strategic-partner allocations 25 August 2026
2. Build or acquire, then let — Housing associations and councils (proposed stage, not an official timetable)
3. Measure lettings to households in temporary accommodation — Councils; MHCLG statistics (proposed stage, not an official timetable)

Depends on: A01: deliverable sites; Construction capacity

Trade-offs

Who gains and who loses:

Gains for households who get a social tenancy; the subsidy per home is highest for social rent; other uses of the same capital lose out.

What else the money or effort could do:

The same grant could buy more homes at higher rents, or fund repairs to existing stock.

Strongest counterargument:

Acquiring existing homes can add little to total supply and compete with first-time buyers.

Risks:

Cost inflation, contractor capacity and grant dependence; homes that are not additional locally.

How we would judge it

Baseline:

Households in temporary accommodation (MHCLG Table TA1).

Leading indicator:

Social-rent starts and lettings from programme awards.

Outcome:

Households leaving temporary accommodation into settled homes; cost per sustained tenancy.

Continue, adapt or stop:

Expand where lettings reach households in temporary accommodation; review schemes whose completions fall short as costs rise.

Sources

• MHCLG / Homes England / GLA, Social and Affordable Homes Programme 2026 to 2036 (collection; MHCLG policy statement; Homes England prospectus), Policy statement “Introduction” and “Delivery routes” (2025-11-10 (collection); policy statement 2025-11-07; prospectus updated 2026-04-15; full text checked)
• National Audit Office, The Affordable Homes Programme since 2015, Summary, paragraph 14 (2022-09; full text checked)
• National Audit Office, The Affordable Homes Programme since 2015, Summary, paragraph 14 (2022-09; full text checked)

Source published November 2025 (programme documents); September 2022 (NAO); August 2026 (first allocations); evidence reviewed 2026-10-04. Reconsider if: Programme allocations are published; Temporary accommodation numbers change direction; A new NAO report on the programme.

The problem

Cold, inefficient homes push up bills and can harm health, and poor installations can make homes worse.

Who is affected, and where

Low-income and fuel-poor households in inefficient homes, in England. Territory: England. Warm Homes Plan grants are England-focused; devolved arrangements were to be set out separately; Scotland and Wales run their own schemes.

Policy status

A funded programme already exists. The Warm Homes Plan allocates £4,422m of low-income home grants for 2025–26 to 2029–30. The proposal here is targeting by need plus quality assurance, within that programme.

The evidence

What the research found:

Solid wall insulation cut median gas use by 17% in 2024 for measures installed in 2023 (indicative). The Cochrane review found health improvements “are possible”, clearest where homes were inadequately warm.

Evaluated on:

Homes with measures installed under government schemes (energy); people in improved homes in 39 studies (health); England and Wales, 2023–24 (energy); several countries to 2012 (health)

Our recommendation (separate from the research):

Select homes by need and suitability, fund surveys and post-installation checks, and measure weather-adjusted use and indoor conditions.

Strongest counter-evidence:

Savings vary year to year and include households choosing to heat more; health effects are uncertain and the review is old.

Effects on record

• Gas use in homes after solid wall insulation: −17% median gas use (similar homes without measures; 2024 savings for measures installed in 2023; indicative; varies year to year and includes households choosing to heat more). evaluated, moderate confidence; England and Wales. Observational comparison, mostly from government schemes; savings for cavity and loft insulation are smaller.
• General, respiratory and mental health of residents: Direction plausible; size not established. evaluated, limited confidence; Studies in several countries, searched to 2012. The review says improvements “are possible”, clearest where warmth was inadequate; no current UK estimate and no cashable NHS saving.
• Low-income households counted as fuel poor: Direction plausible; size not established. plausible spillover, limited confidence; England. The fall in the headline count partly follows from the definition. Whether hardship actually falls depends on real bills, heating behaviour and prices, which the count does not measure.
• Damp and mould after poorly specified or installed insulation: A cost or harm; size not established. plausible spillover, limited confidence; England. This is why A18 pairs grants with a survey before work and checks after it. No national rate of defects is published in the sources we checked.

Cost and funding

Cost completeness: Published programme envelope; project costs still needed. Funding: Programme funding exists; project allocation unconfirmed.

• Warm Homes Plan: low-income home grants (capital; paid by central government): £4.42bn in total, 2025–26 to 2029–30, price basis not stated by the source. Grant line only; the plan’s loans and financial transactions are different kinds of money and are not included. No price basis stated.
• Property surveys, installation quality checks, remediation and monitoring (recurring spending; paid by central government, landlords, households): Not yet costed. Use surveyed property-level costs; no invented national average.
• Warm Homes Plan low-income grant allocations: £4.42bn, 2025–26 to 2029–30 — not committed (programme envelope, not a project award). Programme allocation; an individual home or council scheme is funded only once its award is confirmed.

Who pays:

Central government grants; landlords under minimum standards; some households’ own contributions.

Financing proposed:

Warm Homes Plan low-income grants; landlord duties.

Gap remaining:

Unknown for any scheme until surveyed costs, quality assurance and remediation are priced.

What delivery needs

Skills:

Accredited installers and assessors.

Operational capacity:

Council delivery teams.

Infrastructure:

None beyond the homes.

Permissions:

Landlord and occupant agreement.

Law:

Private-rented minimum standards via regulations.

Public consent:

Disruption to occupants.

First step and stages

First step: Select homes by need and building suitability, then secure the award and installer capacity. (owner: Councils with DESNZ)

1. Survey — Assessors (proposed stage, not an official timetable)
2. Install and inspect — Accredited installers; councils (proposed stage, not an official timetable)
3. Monitor over heating seasons — DESNZ and councils (proposed stage, not an official timetable)

Depends on: Installer workforce; Quality-assurance regime

Trade-offs

Who gains and who loses:

Gains for low-income households in the least efficient homes; landlords bear costs and may pass some on in rents.

What else the money or effort could do:

Grant spent here is not available for other energy or housing programmes.

Strongest counterargument:

Savings can be smaller than modelled and poor work can cause damp.

Risks:

Poor ventilation, workmanship, rent increases and installer scarcity.

How we would judge it

Baseline:

Fuel poverty rate in England (DESNZ).

Leading indicator:

Measures installed, defects found and fixed.

Outcome:

Weather-adjusted energy use, indoor conditions, bills and appropriate health outcomes.

Continue, adapt or stop:

Scale where measured savings hold after inspection; stop measures that cause defects.

Sources

• Department for Energy Security and Net Zero, National Energy Efficiency Data-Framework (NEED): summary of analysis 2026, Section 3, Figure 3.1 (2026-06-11; relevant passages checked)
• Cochrane / Hilary Thomson and colleagues, Housing improvements for health and associated socio-economic outcomes (Cochrane Review CD008657); plain-language title 'Housing improvement as an investment to improve health', Abstract (2013-02-28; summary or abstract only)
• Department for Energy Security and Net Zero, Warm Homes Plan (updated 18 March 2026), Funding allocations table (2026-03-18; relevant passages checked)
• Cochrane / Hilary Thomson and colleagues, Housing improvements for health and associated socio-economic outcomes (Cochrane Review CD008657); plain-language title 'Housing improvement as an investment to improve health', Authors’ conclusions (2013-02-28; summary or abstract only)

Source published March 2026 (Warm Homes Plan); June 2026 (NEED); February 2013 (Cochrane); evidence reviewed 2026-10-04. Reconsider if: Devolved and all-tenure allocations are published; A new UK evaluation of health effects; A new NEED release.