Most of England's most deprived neighbourhoods have stayed that way since 2019
Where in England is deprivation most concentrated, and how resilient is Britain's food supply? The Indices of Deprivation 2025 and Defra's UK food security data — every figure traced to MHCLG or Defra.
The Indices of Deprivation 2025
MHCLG's current edition (English Indices of Deprivation 2025 (IoD2025 / IMD2025)), published 30 October 2025, ranks all 33,755 small areas (LSOAs) in England relative to one another across seven weighted domains.
82%
Of most-deprived-decile neighbourhoods were also most-deprived in IMD2019
65%
Of England's 296 local authorities contain a highly-deprived neighbourhood
67.2%
Of the most-deprived 10% of LSOAs are deprived on at least 4 of 7 domains
2
LSOAs nationally rank in the most-deprived 10% on all 7 domains at once
| Domain | Weight | Most-deprived local authority (by share of LSOAs in national bottom decile) |
|---|---|---|
| Income Deprivation | 22.5% | Middlesbrough (45.6% of its LSOAs) |
| Employment Deprivation | 22.5% | Hartlepool (49.1% of its LSOAs) |
| Education, Skills and Training Deprivation | 13.5% | Middlesbrough (44.4% of its LSOAs) |
| Health Deprivation and Disability | 13.5% | Liverpool (60.6% of its LSOAs) |
| Crime | 9.3% | Middlesbrough (54.4% of its LSOAs) |
| Barriers to Housing and Services | 9.3% | Brent (73.5% of its LSOAs) |
| Living Environment Deprivation | 9.3% | Isles of Scilly (100% of its LSOAs) |
Source: MHCLG, English Indices of Deprivation 2025 statistical release and research report (Appendix D). Rural areas run more deprived than urban on housing condition (27.8% vs 14.2%) but less deprived on road traffic accidents.
Why there is no IMD2019-vs-IMD2025 trend chart
Given the indicator, geography and domain-composition changes above, a chart plotting IMD2019 and IMD2025 scores or ranks for the same LSOA on one time axis would conflate genuine deprivation change with definitional/methodology change, in a way readers cannot disentangle from the chart alone. The one figure MHCLG itself publishes bridging the two editions — 82% decile persistence — is shown here as a headline continuity statistic, not as license to build a two-point trend line from it.
- Indicator basket materially expanded and changed: 55 indicators in IoD2025 versus 39 in IoD2019 — 20 are entirely new, 14 were "updated and significantly modified", and only 21 were "updated without significant modifications" (Technical Report §3.3.4).
- LSOA geography changed: IMD2015 and IMD2019 used 2011-Census LSOA boundaries; IMD2025 uses 2021-Census LSOA boundaries. MHCLG states "the boundaries of approximately 6% of the 2011 LSOAs were modified" (Technical Report §1.2.2, footnote 2) — so even an LSOA whose code appears unchanged may not cover the same footprint.
- Crime domain rebuilt: 4 indicators in IMD2019 (violence, burglary, theft, criminal damage) became 8 in IMD2025 — three separate violence-related indicators, a new public order/weapons-possession indicator, and a new anti-social-behaviour indicator — drawing on newly-granted Home Office Data Hub access and a fuller set of notifiable-offence categories, over 6 years of crime data instead of IMD2019’s 2 (Technical Report §4.7.24–§4.7.27).
- Living Environment domain indicators changed: the IMD2019 "households lacking central heating" indicator was dropped as no longer discriminating (too few households now lack central heating); 3 new indicators were added — EPC-based housing quality, lack of private outdoor space, and road/rail/aircraft noise pollution; the indoor/outdoor sub-domain weighting shifted from 67%/33% (IMD2019) to 70%/30% (IMD2025) (Technical Report §4.9.38–§4.9.41).
- Income domain indicator basis shifted with the ongoing national rollout of Universal Credit, only partially reflected in IMD2019’s methodology and still "ongoing development work" as of IMD2025 (Technical Report §4.3.3).
- Domain weights themselves are UNCHANGED between IMD2019 and IMD2025 (Income 22.5%, Employment 22.5%, Education 13.5%, Health 13.5%, Crime 9.3%, Barriers to Housing and Services 9.3%, Living Environment 9.3%) — the discontinuity is in what each domain measures internally, not in how the 7 domains combine.
- The IMD is, by MHCLG’s own description, "a relative measure of multiple deprivation" (Technical Report §3.1.3) — every score/rank is relative to every other LSOA at that one point in time, not an absolute scale. Even a methodologically-identical re-run would not support "this LSOA’s score fell by N points" as a real-terms improvement claim, because a change in relative rank always reflects both that area’s own change and every other area’s change together.
A comparable long-run proxy: the Claimant Count
Where a longer-run view of deprivation is needed, this site uses the ONS Claimant Count (UK, seasonally adjusted, series BCJD) — a continuous monthly series running from 1971 to the present. It is shown explicitly as a PROXY for the employment-deprivation trend, not as a substitute for the IMD Employment Deprivation Domain — see that series’ own notes for exactly how it differs (narrower claimant-only measure, no small-area breakdown, and itself downgraded by ONS to Experimental Official Statistics status during the Universal Credit transition).
Claimant Count (UK, seasonally adjusted)
The Claimant Count gives a genuine 1971-present monthly read on out-of-work benefit claims — a narrower, but methodologically continuous, employment-deprivation proxy.
View data table
| Year | Claimant Count (UK, seasonally adjusted) |
|---|---|
| 1971 | 757.7 |
| 1972 | 639.4 |
| 1973 | 422.6 |
| 1974 | 558.5 |
| 1975 | 997.1 |
| 1976 | 1108.8 |
| 1977 | 1181.5 |
| 1978 | 1083.8 |
| 1979 | 1044.1 |
| 1980 | 1777.4 |
| 1981 | 2373.3 |
| 1982 | 2673.7 |
| 1983 | 2813.7 |
| 1984 | 2955.7 |
| 1985 | 3033.4 |
| 1986 | 3021.4 |
| 1987 | 2535.8 |
| 1988 | 2005.8 |
| 1989 | 1629.5 |
| 1990 | 1846.5 |
| 1991 | 2535.9 |
| 1992 | 2960.3 |
| 1993 | 2764.8 |
| 1994 | 2407.4 |
| 1995 | 2221.8 |
| 1996 | 1872.1 |
| 1997 | 1410.5 |
| 1998 | 1314.3 |
| 1999 | 1159.3 |
| 2000 | 1029.9 |
| 2001 | 966.5 |
| 2002 | 935.2 |
| 2003 | 906 |
| 2004 | 826.1 |
| 2005 | 908.1 |
| 2006 | 939.9 |
| 2007 | 815.2 |
| 2008 | 1179.4 |
| 2009 | 1593.4 |
| 2010 | 1454 |
| 2011 | 1601.8 |
| 2012 | 1560.3 |
| 2013 | 1242 |
| 2014 | 876.6 |
| 2015 | 769.6 |
| 2016 | 780.5 |
| 2017 | 824 |
| 2018 | 1000.5 |
| 2019 | 1240.3 |
| 2020 | 2622 |
| 2021 | 1840.3 |
| 2022 | 1536.6 |
| 2023 | 1563.2 |
| 2024 | 1724.3 |
| 2025 | 1650.4 |
| 2026 | 1664.5 |
United Kingdom · Source: Office for National Statistics, Claimant Count and vacancies dataset (UNEM) · series BCJD · as of 2026 Jul
UK food security: self-sufficiency is not the same as resilience
Defra's own framing: production-to-supply ratios are "a very broad indicator... not a definitive measure of food security since they do not account for many dimensions of this complex issue." Diversity of supply and trade-route resilience are separate dimensions the ratios below do not capture — the UK Food Security Report's own Theme 3 (Food Supply Chain Resilience) covers those qualitatively, not as a clean numeric series, so it is described here rather than charted.
UK food self-sufficiency ratio (all food)
The UK produces roughly six in ten of the food items it consumes — a ratio that has fluctuated but shown no strong long-term trend.
View data table
| Year | UK food self-sufficiency ratio (all food) |
|---|---|
| 1956 | 47 |
| 1957 | 48 |
| 1958 | 49 |
| 1959 | 51 |
| 1960 | 52 |
| 1961 | 53 |
| 1962 | 54 |
| 1963 | 54 |
| 1964 | 55 |
| 1965 | 56 |
| 1966 | 57 |
| 1967 | 58 |
| 1968 | 59 |
| 1969 | 60 |
| 1970 | 57 |
| 1971 | 58 |
| 1972 | 62 |
| 1973 | 62 |
| 1974 | 61 |
| 1975 | 66 |
| 1976 | 66 |
| 1977 | 61 |
| 1978 | 65 |
| 1979 | 66 |
| 1980 | 72 |
| 1981 | 76 |
| 1982 | 77 |
| 1983 | 76 |
| 1984 | 78 |
| 1985 | 73 |
| 1986 | 73 |
| 1987 | 74 |
| 1988 | 71 |
| 1989 | 75 |
| 1990 | 74 |
| 1991 | 75 |
| 1992 | 74 |
| 1993 | 73 |
| 1994 | 73 |
| 1995 | 74 |
| 1996 | 70 |
| 1997 | 68 |
| 1998 | 67 |
| 1999 | 68 |
| 2000 | 67 |
| 2001 | 63 |
| 2002 | 63 |
| 2003 | 64 |
| 2004 | 62 |
| 2005 | 60 |
| 2006 | 59 |
| 2007 | 60 |
| 2008 | 60 |
| 2009 | 59 |
| 2010 | 62 |
| 2011 | 64 |
| 2012 | 63 |
| 2013 | 60 |
| 2014 | 62 |
| 2015 | 61 |
| 2016 | 60 |
| 2017 | 62 |
| 2018 | 60 |
| 2019 | 62 |
| 2020 | 60 |
| 2021 | 61 |
| 2022 | 60 |
| 2023 | 62 |
| 2024 | 65 |
| 2025 | 60 |
United Kingdom · Source: Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs (Defra), Agriculture in the United Kingdom (AUK), Chapter 14 'The food chain' · series Table 14.1c — 'All food' · as of 2025
UK food self-sufficiency ratio (indigenous-type food)
Restricted to food the UK climate can actually grow, self-sufficiency is substantially higher — the gap between the two lines is entirely food the UK cannot realistically produce at scale.
View data table
| Year | UK food self-sufficiency ratio (indigenous-type food) |
|---|---|
| 1956 | 61 |
| 1957 | 62 |
| 1958 | 63 |
| 1959 | 64 |
| 1960 | 65 |
| 1961 | 66 |
| 1962 | 67 |
| 1963 | 67 |
| 1964 | 67 |
| 1965 | 68 |
| 1966 | 69 |
| 1967 | 70 |
| 1968 | 71 |
| 1969 | 72 |
| 1970 | 68 |
| 1971 | 69 |
| 1972 | 72 |
| 1973 | 73 |
| 1974 | 71 |
| 1975 | 77 |
| 1976 | 77 |
| 1977 | 73 |
| 1978 | 77 |
| 1979 | 78 |
| 1980 | 84 |
| 1981 | 88 |
| 1982 | 89 |
| 1983 | 89 |
| 1984 | 95 |
| 1985 | 89 |
| 1986 | 87 |
| 1987 | 86 |
| 1988 | 83 |
| 1989 | 87 |
| 1990 | 85 |
| 1991 | 87 |
| 1992 | 85 |
| 1993 | 85 |
| 1994 | 86 |
| 1995 | 87 |
| 1996 | 83 |
| 1997 | 82 |
| 1998 | 82 |
| 1999 | 82 |
| 2000 | 80 |
| 2001 | 75 |
| 2002 | 76 |
| 2003 | 77 |
| 2004 | 75 |
| 2005 | 73 |
| 2006 | 72 |
| 2007 | 73 |
| 2008 | 73 |
| 2009 | 73 |
| 2010 | 76 |
| 2011 | 78 |
| 2012 | 77 |
| 2013 | 73 |
| 2014 | 76 |
| 2015 | 76 |
| 2016 | 77 |
| 2017 | 77 |
| 2018 | 74 |
| 2019 | 76 |
| 2020 | 74 |
| 2021 | 74 |
| 2022 | 73 |
| 2023 | 75 |
| 2024 | 77 |
| 2025 | 72 |
United Kingdom · Source: Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs (Defra), Agriculture in the United Kingdom (AUK), Chapter 14 'The food chain' · series Table 14.1c — 'Indigenous food' · as of 2025
Source concentration and specific categories
Domestic origin share
58.4%
2025 — UK Stat Pack does not compute this; it is Defra's own figure.
EU-sourced share
22.8%
2025 — the largest single external source region, a real (if partial) source-concentration indicator.
Share of UK food consumption of domestic (UK) origin
Domestic origin share has stayed broadly stable, with the EU consistently the largest external source — a genuine, if partial, concentration signal.
View data table
| Year | Share of UK food consumption of domestic (UK) origin |
|---|---|
| 1988 | 66.309 |
| 1989 | 66.793 |
| 1990 | 66.145 |
| 1991 | 66.447 |
| 1992 | 64.184 |
| 1993 | 63.304 |
| 1994 | 62.651 |
| 1995 | 61.78 |
| 1996 | 59.842 |
| 1997 | 57.517 |
| 1998 | 55.81 |
| 1999 | 56.62 |
| 2000 | 56.37 |
| 2001 | 55.728 |
| 2002 | 53.872 |
| 2003 | 53.364 |
| 2004 | 53.259 |
| 2005 | 50.56 |
| 2006 | 49.146 |
| 2007 | 50.662 |
| 2008 | 52.313 |
| 2009 | 51.055 |
| 2010 | 51.357 |
| 2011 | 52.708 |
| 2012 | 53.701 |
| 2013 | 53.977 |
| 2014 | 54.151 |
| 2015 | 52.452 |
| 2016 | 48.941 |
| 2017 | 52.141 |
| 2018 | 52.892 |
| 2019 | 52.922 |
| 2020 | 53.575 |
| 2021 | 58.141 |
| 2022 | 58.043 |
| 2023 | 58.029 |
| 2024 | 57.296 |
| 2025 | 58.432 |
United Kingdom · Source: Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs (Defra), Agriculture in the United Kingdom (AUK), Chapter 14 'The food chain' · series Figure 14.5 — 'UK' · as of 2025
Fresh vegetables self-sufficiency (volume)
56%
2025, 7 years of data (Defra's own coverage, not truncated by this site).
Fresh fruit self-sufficiency (volume)
14%
2025, 7 years of data.
Agricultural productivity
Total Factor Productivity of the UK agricultural industry
UK agricultural Total Factor Productivity has grown roughly 50% since 1973, though growth has slowed markedly in the most recent decade.
View data table
| Year | Total Factor Productivity of the UK agricultural industry |
|---|---|
| 1973 | 100 |
| 1974 | 106.27 |
| 1975 | 102.466 |
| 1976 | 98.23 |
| 1977 | 105.163 |
| 1978 | 109.322 |
| 1979 | 109.611 |
| 1980 | 114.701 |
| 1981 | 116.733 |
| 1982 | 119.523 |
| 1983 | 116.676 |
| 1984 | 127.588 |
| 1985 | 122.793 |
| 1986 | 123.299 |
| 1987 | 121.782 |
| 1988 | 121.276 |
| 1989 | 125.085 |
| 1990 | 125.819 |
| 1991 | 129.167 |
| 1992 | 130.667 |
| 1993 | 127.531 |
| 1994 | 128.657 |
| 1995 | 127.223 |
| 1996 | 126.233 |
| 1997 | 128.062 |
| 1998 | 131.213 |
| 1999 | 136.742 |
| 2000 | 139.422 |
| 2001 | 136.754 |
| 2002 | 144.875 |
| 2003 | 145.139 |
| 2004 | 145.635 |
| 2005 | 150.038 |
| 2006 | 148.034 |
| 2007 | 145.805 |
| 2008 | 151.845 |
| 2009 | 147.658 |
| 2010 | 147.069 |
| 2011 | 153.962 |
| 2012 | 145.861 |
| 2013 | 146.359 |
| 2014 | 155.24 |
| 2015 | 156.443 |
| 2016 | 150.828 |
| 2017 | 156.359 |
| 2018 | 153.293 |
| 2019 | 158.882 |
| 2020 | 150.809 |
| 2021 | 160.075 |
| 2022 | 167.034 |
| 2023 | 153.411 |
| 2024 | 152.745 |
| 2025 | 154.196 |
United Kingdom · Source: Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs (Defra), Total factor productivity of the UK agricultural industry — machine-readable dataset · series category=total_factor_productivity, item=total_factor_productivity · as of 2025
How this is calculated, and what "evidence class" means
- A — Observed official statistic — the Indices of Deprivation 2025 (MHCLG), Claimant Count (ONS), and every food/agriculture figure (Defra).
- B — Official/admin statistic with methodological limitations — Claimant Count specifically is class B: ONS reclassified it from National Statistic to Experimental Official Statistics status following disruption from the Universal Credit rollout since 2013.
The Indices of Deprivation are a periodic snapshot — IMD2025, published 30 October 2025, is the current edition, superseding IMD2019. They are not published as a continuous time series, because a comparable one does not exist from one edition to the next; the reasons are set out in full in the section above. Raw neighbourhood-level (LSOA) microdata is out of scope for this page; every figure shown is a national or local- authority-level summary MHCLG itself headlines. An "import dependency" series computed as 100 minus self- sufficiency was deliberately not built, since Defra already publishes closely related direct figures (domestic/EU origin share) without needing UK Stat Pack arithmetic.