A revived Pensions Commission is already reviewing the system. Its recommendations won't land until after the next election.

A full, independent review of the whole pension system's long-term adequacy, including the State Pension age — not a specific reform itself, but the process expected to recommend the next round of them.

Evidence:

The terms of reference themselves state that, on current trends, private pension income for someone retiring in 2050 could be around 8% lower than for someone retiring in 2025 — the adequacy problem the Commission exists to address, stated in the document that launches it.

Expected effect:

A final report due 2027, feeding recommendations for the period after the next general election.

Time horizon:

Long — reports in 2027, and its own terms of reference push implementation beyond the current Parliament by design.

Trade-offs:

Deliberately slow: keeping recommendations out of the current government's immediate decisions may allow a more considered, less politically rushed review, but it also means anyone hoping for near-term action from this specific process will not get it.

Unknowns:

What it will actually recommend, and whether a future government will act on those recommendations — the original 2002-2005 Commission's recommendations did become auto-enrolment, but only after several more years of further policy work.

The 8%-of-band-earnings minimum contribution — see the full options (status quo, a straight rise, an opt-down tier, tiered-by-income) already set out on the workplace-pensions page, not repeated here.

Evidence:

PPI's own modelling: 8% contributions are widely judged unlikely to deliver an adequate retirement income maintaining working-life living standards; 12% is the most commonly discussed alternative.

Expected effect:

Higher pension pots at retirement for anyone who stays enrolled at the higher rate — the central aim of every version of this proposal.

Time horizon:

Could be implemented within a single Parliament if legislated, but no government has yet committed to a timetable.

Trade-offs:

A higher mandatory minimum could increase opt-out rates among people with stretched incomes, which would undo some of automatic enrolment's own success — the same tension the workplace-pensions page sets out in full.

Unknowns:

Whether any specific increase would be phased in gradually (as the original 8% was) or introduced in one step, and how employers would respond.

Automatic enrolment currently applies to employees only — the self-employed have no equivalent default mechanism, and participation has collapsed accordingly (see the inequalities page).

Evidence:

IFS: self-employed pension participation fell from around 60% (1998) to around 20% (since 2013), while employee participation rose to 89-90% under auto-enrolment over the same broad period.

Expected effect:

Would, if it worked, close some of the gap between employee and self-employed pension saving documented on the inequalities page.

Time horizon:

No government has published a firm design or timetable — genuinely early-stage as a policy option.

Trade-offs:

The core design problem is that auto-enrolment relies on an EMPLOYER to make the default decision and match contributions — the self-employed have no equivalent counterparty, so any mechanism would need a genuinely different design, not a simple extension of the existing one.

Unknowns:

What mechanism (if any) could replicate auto-enrolment's "inertia" effect without an employer in the loop — HMRC's tax return process, pension provider defaults and other routes have all been discussed without a settled answer.

Already legislated — see the workplace-pensions page for the full detail (13 million pots worth £1,000 or less, a multiple-default-consolidator model, target go-live 2030).

Evidence:

DWP: the reform is projected to boost the average earner's pension pot by around £1,000 through consolidation alone.

Expected effect:

Fewer, larger, more efficiently administered pots — DWP's own stated aim.

Time horizon:

Target go-live 2030 — years away, not immediate.

Trade-offs:

A "default" consolidation model moves people's pots without an active choice on their part (though an opt-out exists) — a deliberate trade-off between administrative efficiency and requiring individual consent for every transfer.

Unknowns:

Exactly which consolidator scheme(s) will be authorised, and how the transition will be sequenced across 13 million existing pots.

Currently, relief is given at the saver's marginal Income Tax rate (20%/40%/45%) — see the tax-relief page for the full mechanism. A single flat rate (often discussed around 25-30%) would replace that with one rate for everyone.

Evidence:

Raised and consulted on by successive governments (including a 2015 HM Treasury consultation) without being implemented — a genuinely recurring proposal, not a new idea.

Expected effect:

Would redistribute relief away from higher and additional-rate taxpayers toward basic-rate taxpayers, all else equal, since a flat rate below 40%/45% cuts relief for higher earners while a rate above 20% increases it for basic-rate savers.

Time horizon:

Could be implemented within a single Budget if a government chose to, but every government that has consulted on it has ultimately not proceeded.

Trade-offs:

Higher-rate taxpayers would receive less relief per pound contributed than today; basic-rate taxpayers would receive more — a direct redistribution with clear winners and losers, which is part of why it has repeatedly been considered and dropped.

Unknowns:

What rate any future flat-rate proposal would actually set, and how employer contributions (currently outside the personal marginal-rate system) would be treated under a flat-rate regime.