Britain and Europe
Europe is spending much more. Money, orders, troops assigned and forces ready today are four different things.
First: which dataset can answer which question
The European Defence Agency’s data does not include the United Kingdom.
The UK left the EDA on leaving the EU, and EDA totals cover the 27 EU member states — not geographic Europe. Comparing a UK figure against an EDA figure means comparing a number Britain is not in with one it is. This page therefore uses EDA onlyfor the EU-27 aggregate, and NATO’s harmonised dataset for every country-by-country comparison.
| Question | Correct source |
|---|---|
| Total EU-27 defence spending and investment | European Defence Agency |
| UK, France, Germany, Poland and Italy compared | NATO defence expenditure dataset |
| Forces deployed on NATO’s eastern flank | NATO and national defence ministries |
| Actual operational readiness | National governments and auditors — usually incomplete |
Spending compared, on one definition
The six G7 countries that are NATO members. 2026 figures are NATO estimates.
Source: NATO, Defence Investment of NATO Countries (2014–2026), Table 3. Core defence expenditure as a share of real GDP, 2021 prices. 2025 and 2026 are NATO estimates.
Britain has been above the NATO 2% guideline throughout. The change is that others have caught up and passed it: Germany has gone from 1.16% in 2014 to an estimated 2.69%. Britain is no longer distinctive in Europe for spending more — it is distinctive for having always done so.
The United States is deliberately kept out of the main comparison. At over 3% of a vastly larger economy it distorts every axis it appears on, and "the UK spends less than America" tells a reader nothing they did not already know.
The EU-27 aggregate, for scale
€418bn
EU-27 defence expenditure
Not the same as: European defence spending. It excludes the UK, Norway and Turkey.
€454bn
Forecast EU-27 expenditure
Not the same as: Outturn. EDA figures for the latest year may rest on approved budgets.
2.4%
EU-27 defence spending as a share of GDP
Not the same as: A figure comparable with the NATO percentages above — different basis, different membership.
EU-27 spending rose 20% in 2025 and is projected to rise a further 9% in real terms in 2026. This is the EU-27 total, not Europe. It does not include the UK, Norway or Turkey. It is also a spending measure — higher budgets do not by themselves show that deployable capability has risen in proportion.
Europe spent a decade spending less
The headline figures describe a surge. The longer series shows what the surge started from.
- 2005€226bn
- 2014€195bn
- 2024€349bn
- 2025€418bn
- 2026€454bn
Only the years EDA labels explicitly in its published chart are shown. Intermediate years appear on the figure but are not given as numbers, and this site does not read values off a chart image and present them as data. 2026 is a projection.
The finding the headline hides. EU defence spending fell in real terms through the decade to 2014, reaching €195bn in the year Russia annexed Crimea — 14% below its 2005 level. It has since more than doubled. Europe did not simply start spending more after 2022; it spent a decade spending less, and the recovery began at a low base.
Do not join EDA publications together. EDA re-bases its whole series each publication. The 2025–26 edition uses constant 2025 prices; the previous edition used 2024. Figures for the same year therefore differ between publications, and a series built by joining editions together would show movements that are purely an artefact of re-basing. Every point below comes from the current publication.
What the money is being spent on
28%+
Of EU defence spending goes on equipment
Not the same as: Deployed capability. Procurement is an input.
€17bn
Research and development (4%)
Not the same as: Keeping pace with procurement. EDA reports the gap between the two continuing to widen.
23
Member states at 2% of GDP
Not the same as: A stable group — ten more than in 2024.
EDA’s own finding is that collaborative procurement remains below target and national approaches dominate, leaving equipment life-cycles unsynchronised and undermining economies of scale. More money has not yet produced more joint buying.
That last point matters for Britain. Europe rearming through 27 national programmes rather than joint ones changes what access to those programmes is worth — which is the substance of the SAFE question below.
Who Britain should be compared with
A single league table ranked by share of GDP always flatters or damns someone unfairly. Three tiers answer three different questions.
Peer strategic powers
France, and to a degree GermanyFrance is the only genuine like-for-like: nuclear weapons, attack submarines, carrier aviation, expeditionary reach, a permanent Security Council seat and a large domestic industry. UK versus France deserves its own comparison rather than a row in a table.
Effort comparators
Poland, Estonia, LithuaniaThese answer a different question: what does a country do when it believes it might be invaded? Poland spends roughly twice Britain’s share of GDP. Its circumstances differ — it borders the theatre of Russia’s war — so this is a measure of effort, not a target Britain should mechanically copy.
Scale comparators
Germany, Italy, and the EU-27 aggregateFor the question of whether Britain is keeping pace with European rearmament.
The eastern flank: present now, or committed?
The rule this section exists to enforce. A brigade assigned to a country is not a brigade stationed in it. Comparing Germany’s planned 5,000 with another country’s current battlegroup headcount would be comparing an intention with an outturn.
Germany in Lithuania
Present now
Building up
Committed or reinforceable
About 5,000 military and civilian personnel
The 45 Armoured Brigade was activated in 2025 after an advance party arrived in 2024. It is intended to be permanently stationed, with Leopard 2 tanks, Puma infantry fighting vehicles and supporting artillery. Personnel, equipment and Lithuanian host infrastructure are still being built up, so the planned establishment is not the number present today.
France in Romania
Present now
About 1,200 in the battlegroup, of whom about 800 are French
Committed or reinforceable
Reinforcement exercised to brigade scale
France leads NATO’s multinational battlegroup in Romania. It also practises rapid reinforcement to brigade level, but the permanently deployed battlegroup and the larger reinforcement force are different things and should not be presented as one.
United Kingdom in Estonia
Present now
Leads the multinational battlegroup
Committed or reinforceable
A UK-based brigade assigned to reinforce
Britain’s model differs from Germany’s: rather than permanently stationing a brigade forward, it holds one at readiness in the UK. That trades permanent presence for flexibility, and makes reinforcement speed — how fast the brigade could actually arrive, with armour, artillery, air defence and logistics — the question that matters.
The SAFE question
Security Action for Europe is an EU financial instrument offering up to €150bn in loans. The borrowers are EU member states, not defence companies.
Britain did not lose the right to borrow €150bn. It was never eligible.
The UK is not an EU member state and was never eligible to borrow under SAFE. The real question was always narrower: whether British companies could participate in SAFE-funded contracts on improved terms.
What actually happened
- 19 May 2025The UK and EU sign a broad Security and Defence Partnership.
- September 2025The Council authorises the Commission to negotiate UK participation in SAFE.
- Through 2025Negotiations do not produce an agreement acceptable to both sides.
- February 2026The responsible UK minister tells Parliament that no agreement was possible that met UK national interests.
- SubsequentlyCanada concludes its own SAFE participation agreement. The UK has not.
Current position. As of August 2026, the UK has a Security and Defence Partnership with the EU but has not secured an agreement giving British industry expanded access to SAFE-supported procurement.
Four things that are said and are wrong
- Britain has been expelled from SAFE — it was never a member.
- Britain has lost access to €150bn — it was never eligible to borrow it.
- The UK could have borrowed €150bn — SAFE lends to EU member states.
- British firms are completely banned from SAFE contracts — the default third-country component rules still apply.
What British firms face by default
Under the default SAFE rules, components originating outside the EU, EEA-EFTA states and Ukraine generally cannot exceed 35% of the estimated component cost of the end product. A bespoke agreement can change the terms for a participating third country — Canada negotiated one; the UK did not.
The open question. Would the cost and conditions of an agreement have been outweighed by the additional procurement opportunities for UK defence companies, and by closer integration into European supply chains? There is no published cost-benefit analysis, and the negotiating terms were not disclosed.
“Britain has been shut out of a €150 billion European defence fund”
MisleadingWhat is known: SAFE lends up to €150bn to EU member states. The UK, as a non-member, was never able to borrow from it. Negotiations on participation for British industry began in September 2025 and did not reach agreement; a UK minister told Parliament in February 2026 that no acceptable terms were found. Canada has since concluded an agreement.
What is not known: What terms were offered or refused — the negotiating detail was not published — and what the foregone opportunities are worth to UK industry. No cost-benefit analysis has been published by either side.
What would change this verdict: Publication of the negotiating terms, or a costed estimate of the procurement British firms could otherwise have accessed.
Related: UK defence spending, the industrial base that SAFE access would affect, and readiness — the thing spending comparisons cannot measure. Back to the defence overview.