Brexit · The outcome ledger · United Kingdom · 2016–2026
What changed, area by area — and how sure can we be?
The legal changes are certain in every area. The clearest measured change is in goods trade with the EU, down 14% by volume on 2019. The economy-wide cost is an estimate, not a measurement, and estimates differ in size.
Evidence last reviewed 3 October 2026
What changed, and how do we know?
The legal changes are certain; the trade frictions are measurable; the economy-wide cost is an estimate
Each row separates a dated legal change, what official statistics show happened, and what models estimate relative to staying in the EU. Columns are not scored or added: an empty cell means no reliable evidence, not zero effect.
- Legal fact
- Strong evidence
- Moderate evidence
- Limited evidence
- No reliable estimate
Immigration
31 Dec 2020Legal or institutional change
What the law or treaty now says
Legal factFree movement ended. One points-based system now covers EU and non-EU nationals, set entirely in UK law.
Observed outcome
What official statistics show happened
Strong evidenceEU+ net migration went from +322k (year to June 2016) to −42k (year to December 2025). Non-EU+ rose to +1,047k, then fell to +350k.
Modelled estimate
Compared with staying in the EU — not observed
No reliable estimateNo widely used estimate of migration without Brexit.
- Who is affected:
- EU citizens; employers in care, hospitality, food processing and haulage that relied on EU recruitment.
- Limits of the evidence:
- Migration estimates are provisional and heavily revised. The non-EU rise reflects later visa policy, not the end of free movement itself.
Goods trade
1 Jan 2021Legal or institutional change
What the law or treaty now says
Legal factThe UK left the single market and customs union. The Trade and Cooperation Agreement keeps zero tariffs for goods meeting rules of origin, but adds customs declarations and food and plant checks.
Observed outcome
What official statistics show happened
Moderate evidenceGoods exports to the EU −14% by volume since 2019; to non-EU −8%. Imports from the EU −2%; from elsewhere +10%.
Modelled estimate
Compared with staying in the EU — not observed
Moderate evidenceCEP/LSE study: the trade deal caused a sudden, persistent 25% fall in imports from the EU relative to the rest of the world, a smaller and temporary relative fall in exports, and the loss of many small export relationships. OBR: trade intensity 15% lower in the long run.
- Who is affected:
- Small exporters (paperwork costs are per consignment), food and farming businesses, manufacturers with EU supply chains.
- Limits of the evidence:
- A measurement break in EU goods data from January 2021; the pandemic and energy shock hit the same years.
- Sources:
- UK Government, Agreements reached between the UK and the EU (Trade and Cooperation Agreement, December 2020); ONS, UK trade time series (MRET), chained volume measures; Freeman, Manova, Prayer and Sampson, “UK trade in the wake of Brexit”, CEP Discussion Paper 1847 (LSE); Office for Budget Responsibility, Brexit analysis
Services trade
1 Jan 2021Legal or institutional change
What the law or treaty now says
Legal factNo automatic right to sell services across the EU and no blanket recognition of professional qualifications; firms need authorisation member state by member state.
Observed outcome
What official statistics show happened
Moderate evidenceServices exports to all partners +26% by volume since 2019. ONS publishes the EU/non-EU split only in current prices.
Modelled estimate
Compared with staying in the EU — not observed
No reliable estimateNo estimate on this site that isolates the effect on services.
- Who is affected:
- Professional, financial and creative services firms; touring performers.
- Limits of the evidence:
- Without an EU split in volume terms, services growth cannot be attributed to particular markets.
Investment, productivity and GDP
2016 onwardsLegal or institutional change
What the law or treaty now says
No reliable estimateNo single legal change: the effect runs through uncertainty from the 2016 vote and through trade costs from 2021.
Observed outcome
What official statistics show happened
Moderate evidenceBusiness investment +14% on 2016 Q2 by 2026 Q2. Observed growth does not show what would have happened otherwise.
Modelled estimate
Compared with staying in the EU — not observed
Moderate evidenceOBR: long-run productivity 4% lower than if the UK had remained, two-fifths of it already by 2021. NBER (Bloom et al.): GDP 6% to 8%, investment 12% to 13% and productivity 3% to 4% lower by end-2025.
- Who is affected:
- Everyone through incomes and tax revenue; the estimates are economy-wide averages, not effects on each household.
- Limits of the evidence:
- Counterfactuals cannot be observed. The estimates use different measures and methods and should not be swapped for one another.
Trade policy
2023–2024Legal or institutional change
What the law or treaty now says
Legal factAn independent trade policy: new agreements with Australia and New Zealand (in force 2023) and accession to the CPTPP (2024).
Observed outcome
What official statistics show happened
No reliable estimateToo recent to measure separately from other trade changes.
Modelled estimate
Compared with staying in the EU — not observed
Moderate evidenceGovernment impact assessments: Australia +0.08% of GDP by 2035, New Zealand +0.03%, CPTPP about £2bn a year by 2040.
- Who is affected:
- Exporters to those markets; UK farmers facing more import competition.
- Limits of the evidence:
- The government’s own models; small relative to the estimated EU effect, and not designed to offset it.
Regulation, subsidies, farming and fishing
2020–2023Legal or institutional change
What the law or treaty now says
Legal factNew UK regimes for farm support (Agriculture Act 2020), fishing (Fisheries Act 2020) and subsidies (Subsidy Control Act 2022), and powers to revoke or amend retained EU law (2023).
Observed outcome
What official statistics show happened
No reliable estimateNo single official measure of how far UK rules have diverged, or of the effect of divergence.
Modelled estimate
Compared with staying in the EU — not observed
No reliable estimateNo reliable aggregate estimate.
- Who is affected:
- Farmers (support now tied to environmental schemes rather than land area), fishing fleets, firms selling into both markets.
- Limits of the evidence:
- Using the freedom to diverge can raise costs for firms that must also meet EU rules; how much it has been used is contested.
Northern Ireland
2021; Feb 2023Legal or institutional change
What the law or treaty now says
Legal factNorthern Ireland follows EU goods rules and keeps an open land border; goods from Great Britain pass checks in the Irish Sea, eased by the Windsor Framework. The Assembly voted in December 2024 to continue the arrangements, without cross-community support.
Observed outcome
What official statistics show happened
Limited evidenceSee the Northern Ireland chapter: power-sharing was suspended from February 2022 to February 2024.
Modelled estimate
Compared with staying in the EU — not observed
No reliable estimateNo reliable estimate of the net economic effect of dual market access.
- Who is affected:
- Northern Ireland businesses and consumers; traders moving goods from Great Britain.
- Limits of the evidence:
- Economic effects are hard to separate from the wider UK picture.
Read across a row, not down a column. Two things are certain: the UK now writes its own rules in each area listed, and goods trade with the EU carries costs it did not before 2021. The observed trade change is moderately strong evidence of friction, weakened by a measurement break and the pandemic. The economy-wide cost rests on models: the OBR and the main academic study both estimate a cost, on different measures and of different sizes. There is no agreed rate for converting autonomy into GDP, so no total is given.
How to read the ledger
The legal column is a set of dated facts. Free movement ended on 31 December 2020; the UK left the single market and customs union on 1 January 2021; new regimes for farm support, fishing, subsidies and retained EU law followed. These are not in doubt, and in several areas the new powers have visibly been used.
The observed column is what official statistics recorded. It shows what happened, not why. Goods exports to the EU fell 14% by volume between 2019 and 2025, and to the rest of the world 8%: the difference is consistent with Brexit frictions, but the pandemic, the energy shock and a change in how EU trade is measured fall in the same years.
The modelled column compares the UK with a version of itself that stayed in the EU. That version cannot be observed, so these figures are estimates, labelled as such, with their own measure: the OBR assumes long-run productivity 4% lower; an NBER study estimates GDP 6% to 8% lower by the end of 2025. Observed growth since 2016 neither confirms nor refutes them.
Why there is no total — and what can still be concluded
Adding “decisions are now made in the UK” to “productivity is estimated to be lower” would need an exchange rate between autonomy and income. None exists, and choosing one is a political judgement. So the ledger is not scored, and it does not count rows.
That does not make every conclusion equally strong. On the evidence available, it is well supported that the UK gained formal control over the areas listed, and that trading goods with the EU became more costly. It is supported by the official forecaster and the main academic estimates — though not measured — that the economy is smaller than it would otherwise have been, with disagreement about how much. Whether that cost is worth the autonomy is a question of values the data cannot settle.
What could change within the present relationship — food and plant checks, carbon markets, youth mobility, professional qualifications — is compared in What can change within the present relationship?
Sources and methods (9)
- Immigration and Social Security Co-ordination (EU Withdrawal) Act 2020 — end of free movement
- UK Government, Agreements reached between the UK and the EU (Trade and Cooperation Agreement, December 2020) — Trade and Cooperation Agreement
- Retained EU Law (Revocation and Reform) Act 2023 — retained EU law powers
- UK Government, The Windsor Framework — further detail and publications — Northern Ireland arrangements
- ONS, UK trade time series (MRET), chained volume measures, CDIDs JIM8, JIN3, JIM7, JIN2 (goods excluding precious metals); IKBE, IKBF (services) (released 11 September 2026) — trade volumes (goods exports to the EU −14% on 2019)
- ONS, Long-term international migration, provisional: year ending December 2025, Table 1 (released 21 May 2026) — migration by nationality
- Office for Budget Responsibility, Brexit analysis (released page last updated 20 July 2026) — productivity and trade-intensity assumptions
- Bloom, Bunn, Mizen, Smietanka, Thwaites and Abrahams, “The Economic Impact of Brexit”, NBER Working Paper 34459 (released November 2025, revised June 2026) — GDP, investment, employment and productivity estimates
- Freeman, Manova, Prayer and Sampson, “UK trade in the wake of Brexit”, CEP Discussion Paper 1847 (LSE) (released April 2022) — effect of the trade deal on UK–EU trade
Method notes
- Evidence labels: “Legal fact” for statute or treaty; “Strong” for consistent official statistics with few confounders; “Moderate” for official statistics with known confounders or a single credible study; “Limited” for partial or indirect evidence; “No reliable estimate” where none was found. Labels describe evidence, not the size of an effect.