Growth & productivity · Published estimates · UK
Which investments give Britain the biggest return?
Published estimates suggest well-chosen public investment, research and training all pay back over time — but they measure different things, over different horizons, and mostly before the money is spent. They show ranges, not a single best buy.
Evidence last reviewed 3 October 2026
How to read these numbers
Three different questions get called “the return on investment”. What does more public investment in general do to the economy? — answered by the OBR and IMF as an effect on output. Was this programme worth it? — answered by departments as a benefit-cost ratio, usually before the money is spent. What does research pay back? — answered by academic studies as a rate of return. The figures below are grouped by question, because a 2.4% rise in output, a benefit-cost ratio of 2 and a 20% rate of return are not the same kind of number and cannot be ranked against each other.
Nothing here is UK Facts’ own estimate, and nothing is added up. Programmes compete for the same workers, sites and budgets, so the return to doing everything at once is not the sum of the returns to each.
What does more public investment do to output?
The official estimates agree on direction and disagree on size. The OBR’s central estimate is that a sustained rise of 1% of GDP — about £31bn a year at today’s GDP — raises the economy’s potential output by about 0.4% after five years and 2.4% after fifty. Most of the gain is slow: it comes from the new capital accumulating, not from the spending itself. The IMF’s cross-country evidence is similar in the medium term but highly conditional: large when there is slack in the economy and projects are well managed, close to nothing when investment is badly managed or paid for by cutting elsewhere.
| Investment | Estimate | What it measures | Main limit (as the source states it) |
|---|---|---|---|
| Public investment in general (UK), sustained rise of 1% of GDPOffice for Budget Responsibility, August 2024 (para 4.7) | +0.4% after 5 years; +2.4% after 50 years | Effect on the level of potential outputHorizon: 5 and 50 years | Assumes projects as productive as the average; the OBR calls it “initial, high-level, and partial equilibrium analysis”. Implies an economic rate of return of about 9% and a fiscal return of about 2%. |
| The October 2024 Budget’s capital spending rise (about 0.6% of GDP a year)Office for Budget Responsibility, 30 October 2024 (p.79 and Box 3.3) | +0.14% after 5 years; +0.43% after 10 years; +1.4% after 50 years (range 0.6% to 3.0% at 50 years) | Effect on the level of potential outputHorizon: 5, 10 and 50 years | The range depends on whether £1 of public investment displaces 50p of business investment or attracts £2 of it; the OBR describes the evidence on this as mixed. |
| Public investment in advanced economies, rise of 1 percentage point of GDPInternational Monetary Fund, October 2014 (pp. 82–83) | +0.4% in the same year; +1.5% after four years | Effect on the level of outputHorizon: 0 and 4 years | Much larger in periods of slack (about 3% after four years) and with efficient investment management (2.6%); about 0.7% where management is inefficient; not significantly different from zero when the investment is budget-neutral. |
| Public investment, rise of 1% of GDP (advanced and emerging economies)International Monetary Fund, October 2020 (pp. 40–41) | Multiplier of about 0.6 at baseline; above 2.0 when uncertainty is high | Effect on output (two-year multiplier)Horizon: 2 years | Lower where public investment management is weak. Written for the pandemic recovery, when there was unusual slack. |
| UK public investment (short run)International Monetary Fund, July 2025 (p.11, footnote 9) | About 1, against about 0.3 for day-to-day spending and tax changes | Impact (first-year) fiscal multiplierHorizon: First year | A demand effect, not a long-run supply effect; IMF says it is in line with the OBR’s assumptions. |
Which programmes were judged best value for money?
Which programmes were appraised as the best value for money?
Published appraisals put these programmes between about £1 and £5 of benefit for each £1 of cost
Benefit-cost ratios as published by each department or delivery body, central estimates, for selected UK programmes. A ratio of 1 means benefits equal costs.
- Apprenticeships, levels 2–3 (DfE)5.0
- Road maintenance and renewals (National Highways)4.0
- Apprenticeships, levels 4–5 (DfE)3.0
- Affordable Homes Programme (DLUHC)2.2
- Road enhancement schemes (National Highways)2.0
- HS2 Phase One (DfT, 2020)1.2
England or Great Britain, by programme · Appraisals published 2020–2025; price bases differ · Appraisals made before or during delivery — not measured outcomes
Sources, definitions and data — Published appraisals put these programmes between about £1 and £5 of benefit for each £1 of cost
- Geography:
- England or Great Britain, by programme — Programmes listed; each appraisal counts different benefits
- Measure:
- Benefit-cost ratio (£ of benefit per £1 of cost)
- Period:
- Appraisals published 2020–2025; price bases differ
- Status:
- Appraisals made before or during delivery — not measured outcomes
- Calculation:
- Central values as published; no adjustment. Each row’s own source is listed in the table below the chart.
- Compare with:
- DfT value-for-money categories: poor below 1, low 1–1.5, medium 1.5–2, high 2–4, very high 4 or more
- Not included / breaks:
- Not a league table. Appraisals use different methods, price years and benefit definitions (apprenticeships count lifetime earnings; housing counts land value and health; roads count time savings). They are averages for whole programmes, not the return on the next £1. The NAO has warned that over-optimism routinely overstates benefits.
Source: DfE, The net present value of further education in England 2021 to 2022, Table 1 (released February 2025). Chart GROW-06.
View the data as a table
| Programme | BCR | Source |
|---|---|---|
| Apprenticeships, levels 2–3 (DfE) | 5 | DfE, The net present value of further education in England 2021 to 2022, Table 1 |
| Apprenticeships, levels 4–5 (DfE) | 3 | DfE, The net present value of further education in England 2021 to 2022, Table 1 |
| Road maintenance and renewals (National Highways) | 4 | Highways England, Economic analysis of the second road period, pp. 12–13 |
| Affordable Homes Programme (DLUHC) | 2.2 | DLUHC, Affordable Homes Programme 2021–2026: accounting officer assessment |
| Road enhancement schemes (National Highways) | 2 | Highways England, Economic analysis of the second road period, pp. 12–13 |
| HS2 Phase One (DfT, 2020) | 1.2 | DfT, HS2 Phase One Notice to Proceed: accounting officer assessment |
| Investment | Estimate | What it measures | Main limit (as the source states it) |
|---|---|---|---|
| Level 2 and level 3 apprenticeships (England, 2021–22 starts)Department for Education, February 2025 (Table 1) | BCR about 5; about £9 of benefit per £1 of DfE spending | Benefit per £1 of total economic cost (BCR); benefit per £1 of DfE spendingHorizon: Learners’ working lives | Average returns for everyone who started, backward-looking, 2021–22 prices; not the return on one extra place. |
| Level 4 and 5 apprenticeships (England, 2021–22 starts)Department for Education, February 2025 (Table 1) | BCR about 3; about £7 per £1 of DfE spending | BCR; benefit per £1 of DfE spendingHorizon: Learners’ working lives | As above. |
| Strategic road network: operations, maintenance and renewals, 2020–25Highways England (now National Highways), July 2020 (pp. 12–13) | About 4 | Appraised BCRHorizon: Appraisal period | Appraised before delivery, 2010 prices. |
| Affordable Homes Programme 2021–2026 (England)Department for Levelling Up, Housing and Communities (now MHCLG), March 2023 | 2.2 | Appraised BCRHorizon: Appraisal period | Counts land value uplift, distributional and health benefits; “subject to ongoing review”. |
| Strategic road network: 69 enhancement schemes, 2015–20Highways England (now National Highways), July 2020 (pp. 12–13) | 2.0 (new schemes in the next period: about 1.6) | Appraised BCRHorizon: Appraisal period | Appraised before delivery; benefits £26.7bn against costs £13.2bn, 2010 prices. |
| HS2 Phase One (London–Birmingham)Department for Transport; National Audit Office, April 2020 | 1.2 (DfT, April 2020); full Y network 1.5. NAO reported 1.0 for Phase One, 0.8 without wider impacts (January 2020) | Appraised BCR, including wider economic impactsHorizon: Appraisal period | DfT notes the calculation pre-dates the OBR’s March 2020 downgrade to long-term growth; costs were then estimated at £35–45bn (2019 prices). The NAO did not audit the figures. |
| Sizewell C nuclear power stationDepartment for Energy Security and Net Zero; National Audit Office, July 2025 (Tables 1–2) | £3.9bn to £18.0bn (2024 prices); 0.9 to 1.4 per £1 of government spending | Net present social value; value per £1 of government spendingHorizon: To about 2100 | Highly sensitive to power demand and cost assumptions. The NAO found benefits to consumers will not outweigh costs until at least 2064. A different measure from a BCR, so not plotted. |
What does research pay back?
Studies of UK public R&D find high average returns — about 20% a year in the 2014 government-commissioned review, up to 40% in a 2024 update — and that public R&D attracts private R&D over time. The authors of each warn against using these averages to predict the return on an extra pound. The one recent programme evaluation, of Innovate UK Smart Grants, found about £2 of extra output per £1 so far. What happens to research after it is done is covered on the innovation page.
| Investment | Estimate | What it measures | Main limit (as the source states it) |
|---|---|---|---|
| Public R&D (UK)Frontier Economics for DSIT, 12 December 2024 (Executive summary) | Up to 40% a year, six years after the investment — about £40m a year of extra GVA per £100m | Rate of return (private-sector GVA)Horizon: 6 years | The authors say the figures “should be interpreted cautiously” and “may be biased upwards”. |
| Public R&D (UK)Frontier Economics for BIS, July 2014 (p.8) | About 20% | Social rate of returnHorizon: Long run | Likely to understate the return, because it counts only effects on private-sector productivity. |
| Public R&D (UK)Oxford Economics for BEIS, March 2020 (Figure 1) | £0.41–£0.74 in the same year; £1.96–£2.34 in the long run | Private R&D attracted per £1 of public R&DHorizon: Mostly within 5 years, almost all within about 15 | The authors “advise caution” in using the findings for future policy. Extra private R&D is not itself output. |
| Innovate UK Smart Grants (£403m)Ipsos and Technopolis for Innovate UK, July 2026 | £2.18 by 2024–25; projected £4.47 by 2032–33 | Additional GVA per £1 of public spendingHorizon: To 2024–25, projected to 2032–33 | Comparison-group evaluation; the later figure is a projection. |
Why these numbers are probably too neat
| Investment | Estimate | What it measures | Main limit (as the source states it) |
|---|---|---|---|
| Government projects in generalNational Audit Office, December 2013 (Foreword) | Over-optimism “all too frequently” underestimates time, cost and risk and overestimates benefits | Qualitative findingHorizon: — | Applies to appraised BCRs in the table above. |
| Budget measures, November 2025Office for Budget Responsibility, 26 November 2025 (p.63) | Impacts on government and business investment “too small to impact potential output” | Effect on potential outputHorizon: Forecast period | Small changes in investment have effects too small to score; the long-run gains above need sustained increases. |
Appraisal is not evaluation. Almost every ratio above was calculated before or during delivery, and few programmes are re-scored afterwards against what actually happened.
Averages are not margins. A high average return on apprenticeships or roads does not mean the next pound earns the same — the best schemes are usually done first.
Constraints bind together. Extra investment in housing, grid and transport at the same time competes for the same construction workers, which raises costs and lowers each programme’s real return. See the dependency map.
What evidence would a real “best buy” comparison need?
A defensible ranking of investments by return would need four things that do not yet exist in published UK evidence:
- One method. Benefits counted the same way across departments — today roads count time savings, housing counts land values and health, and training counts lifetime earnings.
- Outcomes, not forecasts. Evaluations after delivery comparing what was appraised with what happened, for a representative set of programmes.
- Marginal returns. The return on the next £1bn in each area, not the average over everything already spent.
- Interactions. A model of how programmes compete for workers, land and grid capacity, so that combined packages are not scored as the sum of their parts.
Until then, the honest reading is the one the sources themselves give: most well-chosen public investment is expected to return more than it costs over the long run; the size is uncertain; and delivery capacity, not only money, decides whether it does. The options for raising investment are compared on the growth page.
Sources and methods (17)
- OBR, Discussion Paper No.5: Public investment and potential output, para 4.7 (released August 2024) — Public investment in general (UK), sustained rise of 1% of GDP
- OBR, Economic and fiscal outlook, October 2024, p.79 and Box 3.3 (released 30 October 2024) — The October 2024 Budget’s capital spending rise (about 0.6% of GDP a year)
- IMF, World Economic Outlook, October 2014, Chapter 3: Is it time for an infrastructure push?, pp. 82–83 (released October 2014) — Public investment in advanced economies, rise of 1 percentage point of GDP
- IMF, Fiscal Monitor, October 2020, Chapter 2: Public investment for the recovery, pp. 40–41 (released October 2020) — Public investment, rise of 1% of GDP (advanced and emerging economies)
- IMF, United Kingdom: 2025 Article IV Consultation staff report (Country Report No. 25/204), p.11, footnote 9 (released July 2025) — UK public investment (short run)
- DfE, The net present value of further education in England 2021 to 2022, Table 1 (released February 2025) — Level 2 and level 3 apprenticeships (England, 2021–22 starts)
- Highways England, Economic analysis of the second road period, pp. 12–13 (released July 2020) — Strategic road network: operations, maintenance and renewals, 2020–25
- DLUHC, Affordable Homes Programme 2021–2026: accounting officer assessment (released March 2023) — Affordable Homes Programme 2021–2026 (England)
- DfT, HS2 Phase One Notice to Proceed: accounting officer assessment (released April 2020) — HS2 Phase One (London–Birmingham)
- DESNZ, Sizewell C final investment decision: value for money assessment, Tables 1–2 (released July 2025) — Sizewell C nuclear power station
- Frontier Economics for DSIT, Returns to public R&D, Executive summary (released 12 December 2024) — Public R&D (UK)
- Frontier Economics for BIS, Rates of return to investment in science and innovation, p.8 (released July 2014) — Public R&D (UK)
- Oxford Economics for BEIS, The relationship between public and private R&D funding, Figure 1 (released March 2020) — Public R&D (UK)
- Innovate UK, Smart Grants impact evaluation: final report (released July 2026) — Innovate UK Smart Grants (£403m)
- NAO, Over-optimism in government projects, Foreword (released December 2013) — Government projects in general
- OBR, Economic and fiscal outlook, November 2025, p.63 (released 26 November 2025) — Budget measures, November 2025
- DfT, Value for money framework, Table 5.1 (released May 2025) — value-for-money categories for benefit-cost ratios
Method notes
- Figures are quoted as published, in each source’s own price base; none has been adjusted, combined or extrapolated.
- Benefit-cost ratios are classified using the Department for Transport’s value-for-money categories for reference only; other departments use their own thresholds.
- Sources were opened and checked on 3 October 2026.