A home. The bills. What is left to live on?

The problem

Permissions and plans do not become occupied homes when sites are held up by missing infrastructure, viability, finance or builders.

Who is affected, and where

Households who need a home in high-demand areas of England. Territory: England. Planning is devolved: Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland run separate systems and would need their own decisions; not assessed here.

Policy status

UK Facts proposal. Builds on reforms already in place: the National Planning Policy Framework published on 17 August 2026, which replaced the December 2024 version, and the Planning and Infrastructure Act 2025 (Royal Assent 18 December 2025). The site-by-site blocker list is a UK Facts proposal, not government policy.

The evidence

What the research found:

The OBR judged that the revised planning framework would add about 170,000 net additional homes over 2025–26 to 2029–30. LSE’s qualitative research stresses certainty and meaningful participation; Centre for Cities proposes zoning instead but gives no estimate of its effect.

Evaluated on:

UK housing stock in the OBR forecast; qualitative research with planners and landowners; England, 2025–2030 forecast period

Transfer to this case:

The OBR estimate is for the reforms already enacted, not for any further package.

Our recommendation (separate from the research):

Publish the blocker, owner and cost for a small set of priority sites and count occupied homes, not permissions.

Strongest counter-evidence:

Centre for Cities argues incremental reform of a discretionary system cannot close the gap and proposes zoning; neither approach has a UK effect estimate.

Effects on record

• Net additional homes: Direction plausible; size not established. modelled, limited confidence; England. The OBR’s 170,000 extra homes by 2029–30 is its judgement of the 2024 planning reforms already in place, not of this site-by-site package, whose marginal effect has not been estimated.

Cost and funding

Cost completeness: Not yet costed. Funding: Not yet costed / funding not identified.

• Planning staff, site infrastructure and financing for priority sites (capital; paid by central government, councils, developers): Not yet costed. No defensible national price found. Planning capacity (recurring), utilities and transport connections (capital) and financing must be costed separately for each site.

Who pays:

Central government and councils for planning capacity and enabling infrastructure; developers through fees and contributions; utilities and their bill-payers for connections.

Financing proposed:

Planning fees, developer contributions and named infrastructure allocations — each to be checked for legal use and timing.

Gap remaining:

Unknown until priority sites are costed.

What delivery needs

Skills:

Planning officers and infrastructure specialists in councils.

Operational capacity:

Site-level data on blockers.

Infrastructure:

Water, power and transport connections.

Permissions:

Local plans and permissions.

Law:

Powers exist under current planning law.

Public consent:

Local consent for development; environmental trade-offs.

First step and stages

First step: Publish the actual blocker, owner and infrastructure cost for a small set of priority sites. (owner: MHCLG with local planning authorities)

1. Select sites and diagnose blockers — MHCLG and councils (proposed stage, not an official timetable)
2. Fund and sequence connections — Treasury, utilities, councils (proposed stage, not an official timetable)
3. Build and occupy — Developers and housing associations (proposed stage, not an official timetable)

Depends on: Construction workforce; Utility connection capacity

Trade-offs

Who gains and who loses:

Gains for future residents and those who need affordable homes; costs for neighbouring residents (disruption, green space) and for whoever funds infrastructure.

What else the money or effort could do:

Infrastructure money and planning staff spent here are not available for other sites or services.

Strongest counterargument:

Faster permission alone may not make sites viable or speed building, which depends on demand, finance and builders.

Risks:

Local opposition, environmental harm, construction capacity limits and counting permissions as delivery.

How we would judge it

Baseline:

Net additional dwellings, England (MHCLG Live Table 120).

Leading indicator:

Time from application to start on site at priority sites.

Outcome:

Net additional and occupied homes, affordable tenure and rents relative to income.

Continue, adapt or stop:

Continue where priority sites start faster than comparable sites; stop funding sites whose blocker is not infrastructure.

Earlier option on this page

This card replaces the option “Planning reform so homes and infrastructure get built” (legislated: In force: National Planning Policy Framework revised December 2024 (the change the OBR estimate covers); Planning and Infrastructure Act 2025, Royal Assent 18 December 2025 (no OBR estimate attached here).). Its evidence: The OBR estimated in March 2025 that the December 2024 changes to the National Planning Policy Framework would add about 170,000 homes and make the economy about 0.2% larger by 2029–30, possibly over 0.4% by 2034–35. It is a conditional, modelled estimate, not an observed result: it depends on councils applying the framework and the homes being built, and it predates the Planning and Infrastructure Act 2025, which it does not cover. MHCLG, OBR concludes planning reforms will bring housebuilding to its highest level in 40 years (26 March 2025) · OBR, The supply-side impact of planning reforms (14 August 2025)

Sources

• Office for Budget Responsibility, Economic and fiscal outlook, March 2025, Paragraphs 1.10 and 3.37 (2025-03-26; relevant passages checked)
• London School of Economics, Planning with purpose: reforming the planning system to meet modern needs (2025-03-25; relevant passages checked)
• legislation.gov.uk, Planning and Infrastructure Act 2025 (c. 34) (2025-12-18 (Royal Assent); relevant passages checked)
• Centre for Cities, A zoning system for England, PDF pp.1–3 (2025-02; relevant passages checked)

Source published March 2025 (OBR); 2025 (LSE); February 2025 (Centre for Cities); evidence reviewed 2026-10-04. Reconsider if: The OBR publishes a new estimate of the planning reforms; Net additions move decisively away from the 2024–25 level; The government publishes site-level infrastructure data.

The problem

People with health conditions who want to work often get employment help that is separate from their care and does not stay with them in work.

Who is affected, and where

Adults with health conditions or disabilities who want to work, in England and Wales. Territory: England and Wales. Connect to Work covers England and Wales; Scotland and Northern Ireland run their own employment support.

Policy status

A funded programme already exists. Connect to Work has taken referrals since April 2025 and aims to support about 300,000 people by 2029/30; IPS also operates in NHS mental health services. The proposal here is to hold it to fidelity and integrate it with care, not to start something new.

The evidence

What the research found:

Working 13+ weeks in a year: +4 percentage points for out-of-work participants in the West Midlands; +3 points for people in work in Sheffield City Region (weaker evidence); no effect for out-of-work participants there; no earnings effect at 12 months; small health gains in Sheffield City Region only.

Evaluated on:

9,785 adults with mild to moderate health conditions, in or out of work; Sheffield City Region and West Midlands, 2018–2020

Transfer to this case:

Results for severe mental illness or for one area should not be assumed for all economically inactive people.

Our recommendation (separate from the research):

Keep delivery at fidelity, integrate it with NHS care, and judge it by sustained work and health, not referrals or starts.

Strongest counter-evidence:

One of three trial groups saw no employment effect and the Exchequer return within a year was 1–2p per £1; benefits were mainly in health and wellbeing, and only in one area.

Effects on record

• Working 13 or more weeks in the year after joining (out-of-work participants): +4 percentage points (22% vs 18%) (randomised control group receiving usual support; 12 months after randomisation, 2018–2020; significant at the 99% level; no interval published). evaluated, moderate confidence; West Midlands Combined Authority. No effect for out-of-work participants in Sheffield City Region, and no effect on earnings at 12 months.
• Working 13 or more weeks in the year after joining (people in work but struggling): +3 percentage points (randomised control group; 12 months after randomisation, 2018–2020; significant only at the 90% level; no interval published). evaluated, limited confidence; Sheffield City Region. Weaker evidence than the West Midlands result.
• Self-reported health (EQ-5D-5L) at 12 months: +0.10 standard deviations (randomised control group; 12 months after randomisation; significant at the 90% level (99% when Sheffield groups are pooled); no effect in the West Midlands). evaluated, limited confidence; Sheffield City Region. Small; not found in the West Midlands. Not evidence of reduced NHS demand.

Cost and funding

Cost completeness: Partly costed. Funding: Indicative costing / partial funding.

• Connect to Work grant and programme costs, 2025–26 to 2028–29 (recurring spending; paid by central government): £1.03bn in total, 2025–26 to 2028–29, cash (nominal) prices. Sum of the four years in the revised business case. Excludes £15.5m spent in 2023–24 and 2024–25.
• Connect to Work costs, 2029–30 to 2031–32 (recurring spending; paid by central government): £134.4m in total, 2029–30 to 2031–32, cash (nominal) prices. Sum of the last three years in the revised business case.
• NHS clinical integration, referral and supervision for IPS (recurring spending; paid by NHS): Not yet costed. Not in the DWP business case. An older national IPS price is not a current rollout budget.
• Autumn Budget 2024 and Spending Review 2025 settlements for Connect to Work: £1.09bn, 2025–26 to 2028–29 — committed (allocated to this scope). £114m for 2025–26 plus £978m for 2026–27 to 2028–29. The business case says funding and costs differ because volume forecasts changed.
• Connect to Work funding to be requested at a future Spending Review: £138m, 2029–30 to 2031–32 — not committed (no allocation). “Will be requested in a future Spending Review.”

Who pays:

DWP for Connect to Work grants; the NHS for clinical integration and IPS in mental health services.

Financing proposed:

£138m for 2029–30 onwards is to be requested at a future Spending Review.

Gap remaining:

Connect to Work is funded to 2028–29; the later years are not committed and the NHS-side integration cost is not established.

What delivery needs

Skills:

Trained employment specialists and supervisors.

Operational capacity:

NHS referral routes and fidelity reviews.

Infrastructure:

None beyond services.

Permissions:

Data sharing between health and employment services.

Law:

No new law.

Public consent:

Voluntary for participants.

First step and stages

First step: Select the eligible group, service standard and an existing capacity gap in one area. (owner: DWP delivery areas and NHS commissioners)

1. Recruit and train to fidelity — Connect to Work delivery areas (proposed stage, not an official timetable)
2. Refer and support into work — Providers with NHS teams (proposed stage, not an official timetable)
3. Measure sustained work and health from payroll and survey data — DWP (proposed stage, not an official timetable)

Depends on: NHS capacity to refer and integrate; Employer vacancies

Trade-offs

Who gains and who loses:

Gains for participants who find suitable work; intensive support per person means fewer people reached.

What else the money or effort could do:

The same money could fund less intensive support for more people, or health services directly.

Strongest counterargument:

Trial effects were modest and inconsistent; scaling may dilute fidelity further.

Risks:

Unsuitable jobs, pressure on people who are not ready, and over-claiming benefit savings.

How we would judge it

Baseline:

Economic inactivity due to long-term sickness (ONS Labour Force Survey).

Leading indicator:

Programme starts and the share in paid work within 12 months.

Outcome:

Employment sustained 6–12 months later (HMRC payroll data), job quality and health.

Continue, adapt or stop:

Continue where sustained work beats a matched comparison; adapt or stop where it does not.

Sources

• Department for Work and Pensions, Health-led Employment Trials: evaluation synthesis report, Synthesis report Table 2.1 (2023-04; relevant passages checked)
• Department for Work and Pensions, Connect to Work: Programme Business Case 2 summary, Section 3.1, Table 9 (2026-07-30; full text checked)
• Centre for Mental Health, Investment priorities for mental health 2025 (2025-05-07; full text checked)
• Department for Work and Pensions, Health-led Employment Trials: evaluation synthesis report, Table 2.1 (Sheffield City Region out-of-work group) (2023-04; relevant passages checked)

Source published April 2023 (trials); July 2026 (business case); evidence reviewed 2026-10-04. Reconsider if: Connect to Work impact evaluation results; The next Spending Review; New trials in different populations.

The problem

UK investment has been low and erratic, so builders, suppliers and investors cannot plan the people and capacity that projects need.

Who is affected, and where

Users of transport, energy, water, digital and public-service infrastructure across the UK; construction firms and their workforce. Territory: UK. The Infrastructure Pipeline covers UK government projects plus regulated sectors and mayoral authorities; devolved governments run their own capital programmes, not assessed here.

Policy status

Already in place. Already government policy: the 10 Year Infrastructure Strategy (June 2025) commits at least £725bn over a decade and launched an online Infrastructure Pipeline in July 2025, updated at least every six months. UK Facts’ addition is to separate approved from aspirational projects on the page and to count completed, used assets rather than announcements.

The evidence

What the research found:

A permanent rise in public investment of 1% of GDP raises potential output by about 0.4% after five years and 2.4% after 50 years, if projects are as productive as average public capital (OBR). The Resolution Foundation/LSE inquiry found UK firms invested about 20% less than US, French and German firms since 2005.

Evaluated on:

UK public capital stock (OBR model); United Kingdom, 5- and 50-year horizons

Transfer to this case:

The OBR result is for investment of average productivity; a specific project can do better or worse.

Our recommendation (separate from the research):

Report each pipeline project as approved, funded, in delivery or complete, with whole-life and maintenance costs; never present a growth multiplier as a substitute for project costing.

Strongest counter-evidence:

Higher capital spending can be wasted where projects are poorly appraised or managed; the NAO finds spending decisions have been short-term, and the Green Book warns of optimism bias. Borrowing to invest raises debt interest, and construction labour is already short.

Effects on record

• Potential output: Direction plausible; size not established. modelled, limited confidence; United Kingdom. The OBR’s +0.4% of potential output after five years (2.4% after 50) is for a permanent rise of 1% of GDP in investment of average productivity — not an estimate for a pipeline, and not cash for the Exchequer.

Cost and funding

Cost completeness: Published programme envelope; project costs still needed. Funding: Programme funding exists; project allocation unconfirmed.

• 10 Year Infrastructure Strategy: government infrastructure funding (programme envelope) (capital; paid by central government, councils): £725bn in total, “Over the next decade” from June 2025; Spending Review 2025 totals to 2029–30, then grown with forecast inflation (HM Treasury footnote 12). Exact fiscal years are not stated for the headline., cash (nominal) prices. “At least £725bn”, an internal HM Treasury calculation. It includes housing and energy capital, so it overlaps the Social and Affordable Homes Programme (C-SAHP-ENVELOPE, A02) and Warm Homes funding (A18): never add it to them. Not an award to any project.
• Project capital, maintenance, financing and workforce costs for pipeline projects (capital; paid by central government, councils, bill-payers, private investors): Not yet costed. Costs exist project by project (the Pipeline lists projects of £25m+ economic and £15m+ social). A national growth multiplier is not a substitute for project costing.
• Ten-year infrastructure funding commitment (at least £725bn): £725bn — not committed (programme envelope, not a project award). Covers housing and energy capital too; the same money cannot be claimed again for A02 or A18. Project awards come through departmental business cases.

Who pays:

Central and local government capital budgets (taxpayers, and future taxpayers through borrowing); bill-payers for regulated water and energy projects; private investors for privately financed schemes.

Financing proposed:

Departmental capital settlements to 2029–30 from Spending Review 2025; beyond that, the Strategy’s commitment to grow capital with inflation. Additional projects need an explicit tax, reprioritisation or borrowing decision.

Gap remaining:

Unknown at project level: the £725bn is a ten-year cross-sector envelope, and project costs, maintenance and financing are published only project by project.

What delivery needs

Skills:

Construction and engineering workforce, which the Strategy says is in significant deficit.

Operational capacity:

Appraisal and commercial capacity in departments and NISTA.

Infrastructure:

Grid connections, planning consents and supply chains for each project.

Permissions:

Development consent and local planning decisions.

Law:

Existing powers; the Planning and Infrastructure Act 2025 changes consenting.

Public consent:

Local acceptance of major projects; trade-offs with other spending.

First step and stages

First step: For each sector, publish which pipeline projects have approved, funded business cases and which are aspirations, with a milestone for each. (owner: NISTA with HM Treasury and departments)

1. Classify pipeline projects by approval and funding status — NISTA (proposed stage, not an official timetable)
2. Appraise and sequence before procurement — Departments, HM Treasury (proposed stage, not an official timetable)
3. Report milestones, completion and use for each project — NISTA and delivery bodies (proposed stage, not an official timetable)

Depends on: A01: consents that become starts; A45: shared construction workforce and grid capacity; Spending Review capital settlements

Trade-offs

Who gains and who loses:

Benefits depend on where projects are built and who uses them; costs fall on taxpayers, bill-payers and communities near construction.

What else the money or effort could do:

Capital and construction workers used on one project are not available for others or for current services.

Strongest counterargument:

Stable plans can lock in poor projects; flexibility to cancel weak schemes also has value.

Risks:

Cost escalation, labour shortages, interest costs and counting announcements as delivery.

How we would judge it

Baseline:

Gross fixed capital formation as a share of GDP (UK 18.7% in 2024, lowest in the G7).

Leading indicator:

Share of pipeline projects with a funded business case and published milestones.

Outcome:

Assets completed and in use; reliability; productivity, with an explicit attribution limit.

Continue, adapt or stop:

Continue where projects reach milestones near their published cost; review the pipeline when completions fall persistently behind plan.

Sources

• HM Treasury and NISTA, UK Infrastructure: A 10 Year Strategy, Paragraphs 1.24, 1.28–1.32; Annex (2025-06-19; relevant passages checked)
• Office for Budget Responsibility, Public investment and potential output (Discussion Paper No. 5), Paragraph 4.7 (2024-08; relevant passages checked)
• Resolution Foundation / LSE Centre for Economic Performance, Ending Stagnation: A New Economic Strategy for Britain, PDF p.29 (2023-12-04; relevant passages checked)
• National Audit Office, Lessons learned: a planning and spending framework that enables long-term value for money (HC 234, Session 2024-25), Summary paragraph 11 (2024-10-27; relevant passages checked)
• HM Treasury, The Green Book (2026), Chapters 6–9 (2026-02-05; relevant passages checked)

Source published June 2025 (10 Year Strategy); August 2024 (OBR); December 2023 (Resolution Foundation/LSE); evidence reviewed 2026-10-04. Reconsider if: The next Infrastructure Pipeline update; A Spending Review resets capital budgets; An evaluation of pipeline effects on construction capacity.